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Document 812 9th Novemher 1979 
AGENDA 
of the Second Part of the Twenty•Fifth Ordinary Session 
Paris, 3rd-6th December 1979 
1. Political Questions 
1. Political conditions for European armaments 
co-operation 
2. Impact of the evolving situation in the Near 
and Middle East on Western European secu-
rity 
Il. Defence Questions 
1. New weapons and defence strategy 
2. SALT II and its implications for European 
security 
3. Nuclear, biological and chemical protection 
4. Definition of armal!lents requirements and 
procurement in Western Europe 
III. Technical and Scienti6c Questions 
1. Brazilian-European collaborative ventures 
and the consequences for Europe 
2. Arctic technology 
3. The industrial bases of European security 
- guidelines drawn from the symposium 
on 15th, 16th and 17th October 1979 
IV. Budgetary and Administrative Questions 
1. Budget of the Assembly for the financial 
year 1980 
2. Accounts of the Administrative expenditure 
of the Assembly for the financial year 1978 
- The Auditor's report and Motion to 
approve the final accounts 
3. Draft Opinion on the budget of the minis-
terial organs of Western European Union 
for the financial year 1979 
V. Relations with Parliaments 
Relations with parliaments 
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Report tabled by Mr. van Waterschoot on behalf of 
the General Affairs Oommittee 
Report tabled by Sir Frederic Bennett on behalf of 
the General Affairs Oommittee 
Report tabled by Mr. van den Bergh on behalf of the 
Oommittee on Defence Questions and Armaments 
Report tabled by Mr. Cook on behalf of the Oommittee 
on Defence Questions and Armaments 
Report tabled by Mr. Banks on behalf of the Oom-
mittee on Defence Questions and Armaments 
Report tabled by M r. M eintz on behalf of the Oom-
mittee on Defence Questions and Armaments 
Report tabled by MM. Lewis, Adriaensens, Scheffler 
and Oornelissen on behalf of the Oommittee on 
Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions 
Report tabled by Mr. Spies von Büllesheim on behalf 
of the Oommittee on Scientific, Technological and 
Aerospace Questions 
Report tabled by MM. Onslow and Valleix on behalf 
of the Oommittee on Scientific, Technological and 
Aerospace Questions 
Report tabled by Mr. Alber on behalf of the Oom-
mittee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration 
Report tabled by Mr. Alber on behalf of the Oom-
mittee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration 
Report tabled by Mr. Kershaw on behalf of the 
Oommittee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration 
Information report tabled by Mr. De Poi on behalf 
of the Oommittee for RelaNons with Parliaments 
Document 813 3rd December 1979 
ORDER OF BUSINESS 
of the Second Part of the Twenty .. Fifth Ordinary Session 
Paris, 3rd-6th December 1979 
MONDAY, 3rd DECEMBER 
Morning 9 to 11 a.m. 
Meetings of Political Groups. 
11 a.m. 
l. Opening of the Second Part of the Twenty-Fifth Ordinary Session. 
2. Examination of credentials. 
3. Address by the President of the Assembly. 
4. Adoption of the draft Order of Business of the Second Part of the Twenty-Fifth Ordinary Session. 
5. The balance of force : 
Vote on the draft recommendation in Document 809 postponed from the last session. 
11.45 a.m. 
6. Address by Mrs. Hamm-Brücher, Minister of State for Foreign Affaira of the Federal Republic 
of Germany. 
7. Political conditions for European armaments co-operation : 
presentation of the report tabled by Mr. van Waterschoot on behalf of the General Affairs 
Commit tee. 
De ba te. 
Afternoon 3 p.m. 
l. Definition of armaments requirements and procurement in Europe : 
presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Meintz on behalf of the Committee on Defence Questions 
and Armaments. 
De ba te. 
2. The industrial bases of European security - guidelines drawn from the symposium on 15th, 
16th and 17th October 1979: 
presentation of the report tabled by MM. Onslow and Valleix on behalf of the Committee on 
Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions. 
De ba te. 
Votes on the draft recommendations. 
At the close of the Sitting 
Meeting of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments. 
TUESDAY, 4th DECEMBER 
Morning 9.30 a.m. 
Meeting of the General Affaira Committee. 
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10 a.m. 
1. Impact of the evolving situation in the Near and Middle East on Western European security: 
presentation of the report tabled by Sir Frederic Bennett on behalf of the General Affairs Com-
mittee. 
Debate. 
11 a.m. 
2. Address by Mr. Bernard-Reymond, Minister of State for Foreign Affairs of the French Republic. 
Afternoon 3 p.m. 
1. Budget of the Assembly for the financial year 1980 : 
presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Alber on behalf of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs 
and Administration. 
2. Accounts of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for the financial year 1978 - The 
Auditor's report and Motion to approve the final accounts: 
presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Alber on behalf of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs 
and Administration. 
De ba te. 
Votes on the draft texts. 
3. Draft opinion on the budget of the ministerial organs of Western European Union for the 
financial year 1979 : 
presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Kershaw on behalf of the Committee on Budgetary 
Affairs and Administration. 
De ba te. 
V ote on the draft opinion. 
4. Impact of the evolving situation in the Near and Middle East on Western. European security. 
Resumed debate. 
Vote on the draft recommendation. 
WEDNESDAY, 5th DECEMBER 
Morning 10 a.m. 
1. New weapons and defence strategy: 
presentation of the report tabled by Mr. van den Bergh on behalf of the Committee on Defence 
Questions and Armaments. 
Debate. 
Vote on the draft recommendation. 
2. SALT II and its implications for European security: 
presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Cook on behalf of the Committee on Defence Questions 
and Armaments. 
Debate. 
Afternoon 3 p.m. 
1. SALT II and its implications for European security : 
Resumed debate. 
Vote on the draft recommendation. 
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2. Arctic technology: 
5 p.m. 
presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Spies von Büllesheim on behalf of the Committee on 
Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions. 
De ba te. 
3. Address by Mr. Thorn, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Luxembourg, Chairman-in-Office of the 
Co un cil. 
THURSDAY, 6th DECEMBER 
Morning 9 a.m. 
10 a.m. 
Meetings of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions and of the 
Committee for Relations with Parliaments. 
1. Arctic technology : 
Resumed debate. 
Vote on the drajt recommendation. 
2. Brazilian-European collaborative ventures and the consequences for Europe: 
presentation of the report tabled by MM. Lewis, Adriaensens, SchefHer and Cornelissen on behalf 
of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions. 
De ba te. 
Vote on the draft recommendation. 
3. Relations with parliaments : 
presentation of the information report tabled by Mr. De Poi on behalf of the Committee for 
Relations with Parliaments. 
CLOSE OF THE TWENTY-FIFTH ORDINARY SESSION 
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Report of the external Auditor 
to the Assembly 
of Western European Union 
on the accounts for the flnancial year 1978 
General 
1. The following financial statements, together 
with an explanatory memorandum, were sub-
mitted to me by the President : 
(a) Summary of income and expenditure 
for the financial year 1978 and finan-
cial position as at 31st December 1978 
(Appendix I). 
(b) Statement of budget authorisations, 
expenditure and unexpended credits 
for the financial year 1978 (showing 
also transfers between sub-heads) 
(Appendix Il). 
( c) Statement of suiDS due and received 
from the Secretary-General of Western 
European Union, London, in respect of 
contributions to the Assembly of 
Western European Union budget for 
1978 (Appendix III). 
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( d) Account of the provident fund for the 
financial year ended 31st December 
1978 (Appendix IV). 
2. My examination of the accounts has been 
carried out in accordance with Article 14 of the 
Financial Regulations of the Assembly. 
Summary of Income and Expenditure 
( Appendix 1) 
(a) General 
3. The approved budget provided for expendi-
ture of F 7,979,000 of which F 201,000 was 
expected to be covered by miscellaneous receipts 
and the balance by contributions. 
4. Actual expenditure in the year amounted to 
F 7,723,279 including excesses totalling F 100,503 
over the budget authorisations for Heads III, V 
and VI, which were met by savings on Head IV. 
Income amounted to F 8,068,650 comprising 
F 7,778,000 from contributions requested and 
received and F 290,650 from miscellaneous 
receipts. There was thus an excess of income over 
expenditure of F 345,371 arising from a bud-
getary surplus ofF 255,721 (as shown in Appen-
dix II) and extra miscellaneous receipts of 
F 89,650. 
(b) Pension scheme 
5. In paragraphs 6 and 7 of my report on the 
Assembly's accounts for 1977, I explained that the 
cost of pension benefits payable under the corn-
mon pension scheme implemented in that year 
by the co-ordinated organisations, Western Euro-
pean Union, Council of Europe, NATO, OECD 
and the European Space Agency, is charged to 
the budget of the organisation and that staff 
contributions made under the scheme are credited 
to the budget as miscellaneous income. I recorded 
that staff recruited on or after lst July 1974 
were obliged to join the scheme but that eligible 
staff employed before lst July 1974 had until 
30th June 1978 to decide whether or not to join 
the scheme and to surrender sums from their 
provident fund holdings to meet the cost of 
validating past service. I also recorded that the 
sums so surrendered are held in special pension 
validation accounts by the office of the Secretary-
General pending transfer to member governments. 
6. During 1978, 21 Assembly staff members 
decided to join the pension scheme. Their pension 
contributions for 1978, together with those of the 
three staff members who joined the scheme in 
1977, totalled F 105,922 and are included as 
income in the Assembly's 1978 accounts. 
7. Staff members joining the pension scheme 
whose provident fund holdings had been reduced 
by withdrawals and were thus insufficient to 
meet the cost of validating all their service prior 
to lst July 1974 may undertake, under Article 44 
of the pension scheme rules, to repay the amount 
of any deficiency, plus compound interest at 4 % 
per annum, over a period of five years from 
30th June 1978. Repayments under these arrange-
ments are included as income to the budget. In 
December 1978 the Budget and Organisation 
Committee approved a proposai to reduce the 
cost of validation of service prior to lst July 1974 
(see paragraph 11 below) and the reductions 
were credited to staff members. The amounts due 
to those staff members making repayments after 
30th June 1978 were treated as additional repay-
ments under Article 44 of the pension scheme 
rules. Total repayments during the year amounted 
to F 70,260. 
8. Pensions paid in 1978 totalled F 80,669 
(Appendix II, Head VI). The awards were cal-
culated in accordance with implementing 
instructions issued by the Secretary-General of 
Western European Union in pursuance of 
Article 52 of the pension scheme rules. The Board 
of Auditors of Western European Union in their 
report on the 1977 WEU accounts questioned 
sorne interpretations of the rules and as a result 
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the Council of Western European Union decided 
in March 1979 that the Co-ordinating Committee 
of Government Budget Experts should examine 
whether the implementing instructions as a whole 
were in accord with the pension scheme rules. 
Statement of budget authorisations, 
expenditure and unexpended credits 
(Appendix II) 
9. The transfers between sub-heads within the 
same head of the budget, shown in this statement, 
were duly authorised in accordance with Article 6 
of the Financial Regulations. These Regulations 
contain no provision for the authorisation of 
transfers between heads but, in accordance with 
a procedure approved by the Council in 1973, the 
Assembly informed the Council in March 1979 
that expenditure would be incurred in excess of 
budget provisions on Heads III, V and VI. The 
total excess expenditure (F 100,503) was met 
from savings on Head IV. 
Provident fund 
(Appendix IV) 
10. The assets of the provident fund of the 
Assembly are amalgamated with the assets of the 
provident funds of the other organs of Western 
European Union in joint deposits administered 
by the office of the Secretary-General. The joint 
deposits were held in various currencies until 
31st May 1978 when they were converted to 
French francs, the currency in which the pro-
vident fund accounts of staff members are kept. 
The whole of the resultant gain on book value 
was credited to the accounts of staff members at 
31st May 1978. But at that date, the staff mem-
bers' accounts included their contributions made 
after lst July 1974. When these staff members 
joined the pension scheme their post-1st July 
1974 contributions became the property of the 
member governments, who were therefore entitled 
to the gain on exchange at 31st May 1978 thereon. 
Correcting adjustments have been made in 1979, 
including, where necessary, recovery of sums 
overpaid to staff members who withdrew their 
balances from the provident fund in 1978. 
11. Member governments also became the owners 
from lst J uly 197 4 of sums surrendered un der 
the pension scheme from staff members' provident 
fund holdings in respect of the validation of 
service prior to lst July 1974. At 30th June 1974 
the market value of the currencies held in joint 
deposits exceeded the book value of staff members' 
accounts but those accounts were not written up 
to reflect the market value at that date. When 
they were written up on 31st May 1978 the 
market value of the provident fund holdings had 
fallen since 30th June 1974. In December 1978 
the Budget and Organisation Committee approved 
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a proposai whereby those staff members who 
joined the pension scheme and opted to surrender 
their pre-1st July 1974 provident fund holdings 
in order to validate their service prior to 1st July 
197 4 were given the benefit of the higher market 
value of their holdings at 30th June 1974. This 
was achieved by reducing the cost of validation 
of service prior to 1st July 1974. The member 
governments have therefore borne the loss in 
market value of these transferred assets between 
30th June 1974 and 31st May 1978. 
12. The interest earned by the provident fund 
from 1st July 1974 on validation sums and on 
pension scheme members' post-1st July 1974 
contributions is also due to member governments. 
Following an observation by their auditors, 
Western European Union have confirmed that 
the actual rate of interest earned by the provident 
fund between 1st July 1974 and 30th June 1978 
was greater than the rate of interest used to 
calculate the sums transferred from members' 
provident fund holdings to the pension validation 
accounts. The Assembly have made the required 
adjustments in 1979 including, where necessary, 
recovery of sums overpaid to members who had 
withdrawn the balance of their holdings in the 
provident fund. 
13. The balances in the provident fund at 
31st December 1978 on the accounts of Assembly 
staff members totalled F 1,149,722, including 
F 267,341 repayable to members who have joined 
the pension scheme. 
14. I have received a certificate from the depo-
sitary showing the amount of the joint deposits 
held at 31st December 1978 and a statement from 
the office of the Secretary-General confirming 
the share of those deposits standing to the credit 
of the Assembly's provident fund in the office's 
books at 31st December 1978. 
15. I wish to record my appreciation of the 
willing co-operation of the officers of the Assem-
bly during my audit. 
Sir Douglas HENLEY, K.C.B. 
(Comptroller and Auditor General, 
United Kingdom) 
External Auditor 
21st June 1979 
Explanatory Memorandum 
(communicated by the President to the Auditor of 
the Assembly in connection with the flnancial year 
1918) 
1. The statements attached hereto refer to : 
(a) Summary of income and expenditure -
financial position as at 31st December 
1978 (Appendix I) ; 
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( b) Statement of budget authorisations, 
expenditure and unexpended credits 
(Appendix II) ; 
( c) Contributions (Appendix III) ; 
(d) Provident fund (Appendix IV). 
2. The statement of budget authorisations, 
expenditure and unexpended credits indicates 
that a sum of F 255,721 remains unexpended, 
whereas the final balance of income over expen-
diture was F 345,371. The difference between 
these two figures, F 89,650, represents : 
- Bank interest ....... 
- Sundry receipts ..... 
- Sale of publications 
- Contributions 7 % 
- Reimbursement of 
loans on validation 
- Less receipts for 1978 
estimated in the bud-
get ............... . 
Transfers 
F 
78,380 
15,012 
21,076 
105,922 
70,260 
F 
290,650 
201,000 
89,650 
3. Excess expenditure amounting to F 125,701 
has been met by transfer between sub-heads 
within heads. N evertheless, ex cess expenditure 
resulting from the Assembly's share in the 
renovation of the committee rooms (Head III), 
expenditure in connection with the communicat-
ing door between the Economie and Social Conn-
cil and the Wilson Wing (Head V) and expendi-
ture on pensions (Head VI), making a total 
ofF 100,503, has been deducted from the overall 
amount of unexpended credits in Head IV. The 
Council has been informed of this. 
Contributions 
4. Ail contributions were received from the 
Secretary-General WEU London before 31st 
December 1978. 
Provident funà 
5. The Assembly's funds are incorporated with 
those of the other organs of WEU and the 
entire fund is administered by the Secretary-
General in consultation with the Clerk of the 
.Assembly. 
6. The Secretary-General has continued to 
reooive advice from the advisory panel set up 
within WEU and from outside bankers on the 
investment of the funds. These are at present 
held in French francs with the International 
Westminster Bank Ltd., London. 
7. The Assembly's provident fund has been 
considerably reduced since the introduction of 
the pension scheme and on 31st December 1978 
amounted to F 1,149,722, as shown at Appen-
dix IV. 
8. Sorne adjustments to the calculation of 
validation amounts for members of the staff will 
17 
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be dealt with in the accounts for the financial 
year 1979. 
9. The President would like to take this 
opportumty of expressing the appreciation of 
the .Assembly for the help which was extended 
to the Office of the Clerk by the United King-
dom Comptroller and Auditor General. 
18th June 1979 
Kai-Uwe von HASSEL 
President of the Assembly 
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APPENDIX 1 
Summary of income and expenditure for the financial year 1978 
(in French francs) 
Per attached statement 
Assessments of member states (see Appendix III) 
M iseellaneOUB 
(A) Sundry receipts 
Bank interest 
Sundry receipts .............................................. . 
Sale of publications ........................ , ................. . 
(B) Pensions 
Contributions (7 %> .......................................... . 
Reimbursement of provident fund withdra.wa.ls (loans, etc.) ...... . 
Expenditure under budget authorisation (see Appendix II) , ..... . 
Expenditure in excess of budget authorisation on Hea.ds III, V and VI 
Excess of income over expenditure ............................ . 
Financial position as at 31st December 1978 
A.ssets 
Cash at bank 
Sundry advances ....................... , . , , ...... , ......... . 
Accounts receivable .............................. , .......••.. 
Uabilities 
Accounts payable ............................................ . 
Excess of income over expenditure ... , ................... , .... . 
Certified correct : 
78,380 
15,012 
. 21,076 
105,922 
70,260 
7,622,776 
100,503 
646,552 
59,018 
145,508 
505,707 
345,371 
7,778,000 
290,650 
8,068,650 
7,723,279 
F 345,371 
851,078 
F 851,078 
Ka.i-Uwe von HAssEL 
President of the Assembly 
Francis HUMBLET 
Gierle of the Assembly 
Siegbert ALBER 
Ohairman of the Oommittee on 
Budgetary Aff airs and Administration 
1 have examined the foregoing summary of income and expenditure and the statement of assets 
and liabilities. 1 have obtained a.ll the information and explanations that 1 have required, and I 
certify, as the result of my audit, that in my opinion these statements are correct. 
21st June 1979 
Signed: Sir Douglas HENLEY, K.C.B. 
OomptroUer and A uditor General, 
United Kingdom 
External Auditor 
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APPE 
STATEMENT OF BUDGET AUTHORISATIONS, EXPENDITURE AN 
Total budget for 
DETAILS 19781 
HEAD 1 • EXPENDITURE FOR STAFF 
Sub-Heaà 1 (a) Salaries of permanent establishment 3,488,000 
(b) Recruitment of additional temporary staff (grades 
Band C), including travelling expenses and French 
social security 12,000 
Sub-Head 2 Allowances, social charges, etc. 
(A) Allowances 
(a) Household allowance 127,000 
(b) Children's allowance 174,000 
(c) Expatriation allowance 291,000 
(d) Compensatory rent allowance 10,000 
(e) Overtime 15,000 
(/) 
(g) Education allowance 55,000 
(h) Allowance for language courses 2,000 
(B) Social charges 
(a) Social security 250,000 
(b) Supplementary insurance 141,000 
(c) Provident fund 218,000 
(0) Expenses relating to the recruitment, arrival and 
departure of permanent officials 
(a) Travelling expanses and per diem for candidates not 
residing in Paris, who are convened for examinations 
and interviews, and cost of marking examination 
pa pers 1,600 
(b) Reimbursement of travelling expanses on arrivai 
and departure of staff and dependent persons 1,500 
(c) Removal expanses 3,400 
(d) Installation allowance 4,500 
(e) Biennial home leave for non-French officiais 10,000 
(/) Medical examination 3,000 
Total of Head 1 4,807,000 
1. Document 750, Amendment 1 and Addendum. 
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lXII 
NEXPENDED CREDITS FOR THE FINANCIAL YEAR 1978 
Transfera Total after Total Unexpended transfera e:xpenditure credits 
+ -
3,488,000 3,366,873 121,127 
5,722 17,722 17,722 -
127,000 120,503 6,497 
21,435 152,565 151,951 614 
5,722 285,278 280,171 5,107 
10,000 5,844 4,156 
2,523 17,523 17,523 -
825 55,825 55,825 < -
2,000 360 1,640 
250,000 245,908 4,092 
141,000 ll1,291 29,709 
18,087 236,087 236,087 -
1,600 - 1,600 
1,500 - 1,500 
3,400 - 3,400 
4,500 - 4,500 
10,000 5,776 4,224 
3,000 2,245 755 
27,157 27,157 4,807,000 4,618,079 188,921 
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DETAILS 
HEAD II- EXl'ENDITURE RELATING TO THE SESSIONS OF THE ASSEMBLY 
Bub-Heaà 3 1. Temporary staff 
Temporary staff required for the sessions of the 
Assembly 
2. LinguiBtie staff 
(A) Interpretation serviceB 
(a) Interpretation services required for the sessions of 
the Assembly 
( b) Interpretation services required for meetings of 
Committees between sessions 
(B) Tranalation serviceB 
Temporary translators for the sessions of the 
Assembly 
3. Inaurance for temporary Btaff 
4. 1 natallation of equipment for seBsiOnB 
5. M iBcellaneouB expenditure during seBsÏOnB 
Total of Head II 
HEAD III - EXl'ENDITURE ON PREMISES AND EQUIPMENT 
Bub-Head 4 Pre mises 
Bub-Head 5 Capital equipment 
Total of Head III 
22 
Total budget for 
1978 
396,000 
178,000 
160,000 
346,000 
5,000 
173,000 
44,000 
1,302,000 
182,000 
70,000 
252,000 
APPENDIX Il 
Transfera Total alter Total Unexpended transfera expenditure credits 
+ -
30,000 366,000 362,396 3,604 
178,000 170,409 7,591 
21,715 138,285 ll5,236 23,049 
346,000 339,492 6,508 
5,000 3,739 1,261 
51,433 224,433 224,433 -
282 44,282 44,282 -
51,715 51,715 1,302,000 1,259,987 42,013 
182,000 259,137 1 77,137 1 
70,000 71,761 1 1,761 1 
252,000 330,898 1 78,898 1 
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DETAILS 
HEAD IV - GENERAL ADMINISTRATIVE OOSTS 
Sub-Head 6 Postage, telephone, telegraph charges, transport of 
documents 
Sub-Head 7 Paper, stationery and office supplies 
Sub-Head 8 Printing and publishing of Assembly documents 
Sub-Head 9 
Sub-Head 10 
Sub-H ead 11 
Purchase of documents, reference works, etc. 
Official cars 
Bank charges 
Total of Head IV 
HEAD V • 0THEB EXPENDITUBE 
Sub-Head 12 Travel and subsistance allowances and insurance for 
Sub-Head 13 
Sub-Head 14 
Sub-Head 15 
Sub-Head 16 
Sub-Head 17 
Sub-Head 18 
Sub-Head 19 
Sub-Head 20 
the President of the Assembly, Chairmen of Com-
mittees and Rapporteurs 
Expanses for representation and receptions 
Committee study missions 
Official journeys of members of the Office of the 
Clerk 
Expanses of experts and the auditor 
Expenditure on information 
Expanses for groups of the Assembly 
Contingencies and other expenditure not elsewhere 
provided for 
Non-recoverable taxes 
Total of Head V 
HEAD VI - PENSIONS 
Sub-Head 21 Pensions, allowances, etc. 
(A) Pensions 
(a) Retirement pension 
(b) Invalidity pension 
(c) Survivors' pension 
(cl) Orphans' pension 
(B) AllowanceB 
(a) Household allowance 
( b) Dependants' allowance 
(c) Education allowance 
(cl) Relief allowance 
(C) Severance grant 
(D) PaymentB to member states for validation 
Total of Head VI 
1 TOTAL 1······· ... 
Total budget for 
1978 
260,000 
150,000 
680,000 
22,500 
40,000 
500 
1,153,000 
55,000 
100,000 
3,000 
155,000 
24,000 
36,000 
17,000 
3,000 
10,000 
403,000 
40,000 
22,000 
62,000 
7,979,000 
The expenditure figures include charges for goods delivered and services rendered by 31st December 1978, 11o1 
Kai-Uwe von HAssEL 
President of the A.ssembly 
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Transfera Total alter Total Unexpended transfera expenditure credits 
+ -
9,006 250,994 212,873 38,121 
8,639 158,639 158,639 
-
680,000 601,123 78,877 
367 22,867 22,867 
-
40,000 32,201 7,799 
500 7 493 
9,006 9,006 1,153,000 1,027,710 125,290 
9,278 45,722 45,722 
-
8,919 91,081 91,081 
-
915 2,085 2,085 
-
13,014 141,986 141,986 -
820 23,180 23,180 -
2,809 38,809 38,809 -
1,214 15,786 15,786 -
32,141 35,141 38,077 1 2,936 1 
790 9,210 9,210 
-
34,950 34,950 403,000 405,936 1 2,936 1 
' 
2,482 37,518 37,518 -
391 21,609 21,609 -
2,873 2,873 21,542 1 18,669 1 
2,873 2,873 62,000 80,669 1 18,669 1 
125,701 125,701 7,979,000 7,723,279 255,721 
ud for up to 31st March 1979, in aooordance with the Financial Regulations of the Assembly. 
UMBLET 
lssembly 
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Siegbert ALBER 
Chairman of the Committee on 
Budgetary Alfairs and Administration 
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APPENDIX ill 
STATEMENT OF SUMS DUE AND RECEIVED FROM THE SECRETARY-GENERAL 
OF WEU LONDON IN RESPECT OF CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE WEU ASSEMBLY 
BUDGET FOR 1978 
Contributions Budget surplus Main Net Member states 600ths overpaid budget contributions 
in 1977 1977 for 1978 required 
F F F F 
Belgium 59 (-) 33,185 (-) 38,262 764,837 693,390 
France 120 (-) 67,493 (-) 77,822 1,555,600 1,410,285 
Federal Republio of 
Germ any 120 (-) 67,493 (-) 77,822 1,555,600 1,410,285 
Ita.ly 120 (-) 67,493 (-) 77,822 1,555,600 1,410,285 
Luxembourg 2 (-) 1,124 (-) 1,298 25,926 23,504 
Netherla.nds 59 (-) 33,185 (-) 38,262 764,837 693,390 
United Kingdom 120 (-) 67,493 (-) 77,822 1,555,600 1,410,285 
--
600 (-) 337,466 (-) 389,110 7,778,000 7,051,424 
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PROVIDENT FUND 
ACCOUNT FOR THE FINANCIAL YEAR ENDED 31st DECEMBER 1978 
-· 
F F 
Balance brought forward : 
Aocounts of staff members as at lat January 1978 5,716,755 Transfer to pension validation a.ccounts 5,194,414 
Contributions of staff members and of the Assembly 
of Western European Union 359,795 
Repa.yments of loans by staff members 74,080 Withdrawa.ls 
Interest received during the yea.r 253,675 
Repayment of oost of crediting past service of retired Accounts of existing 
staff member 24,692 December 1978 
Gain on valuation a.t 31st Ma.y 1978 95,641 
6,524,638 
Ka.i-Uwe von HAssEL Francis HUMBLET 
President of the Assembly Clerk of the Assembly 
180,502 
staff members as a.t 31st 
1,149,722 
6,524,638 
Siegbert ALBER 
Chairman of the Committee on 
Bwlgetary Affaira and Administration 
1 have examined the foregoing Statement. 1 have obtained ali the information and explanations that 1 have required, and 1 oertify, as the result of 
my audit, that in my opinion this Statement is oorreot. 
2181 June 1979 
Sir Douglas HENLEY, K.C.B. 
ComptroUer and Awlitor General, United Kingdom 
External Awlitor 
Document 814, Addendum 9th J uly 1979 
Accounts of the Administrative Expenditure of the Assembly 
for the Financial Year 1918 
MOTION TO APPROVE THE FINAL ACCOUNTS OF THE ASSEMBLY 
FOR THE FINANCIAL YEAR 1978 1 
submitted on behalf of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration 2 
by Mr. Alber, Chairman and Rapporteur 
The .Assembly, 
Having examined the final accounts of the Assembly for the financial year 1978, together with 
the Auditor's Report, in accordance with Article 16 of the Financial Regulations, 
Approves the accounts as submitted and discharges the President of the Assembly of his 
6nancial responsibility. 
1. Adopted unanimously by the Committee. 
2. Mem'bers of the Committee : Mr . .J.l'ber (Chairman); 
MM. Jager, Adriaensens (Alternate: Mr. Bonnel) (Vice-
Chairmen) ; MM. Ahrens, .J.ntoni, Bonalum.i, Del Duca, 
Depietri, Evers, Hengel, Lord Hughes, MM. Jager, Jeam-
28 
brun, McNamara (Alternate: Lord McNair}, Orsini, 
Page, Peeters, Sehleiter, Stainton (Alternate : Kershaw), 
Tummers, Vohrer, Mrs. van der Werf-Terpstra. 
N.B. The names of those taking part in the vote are 
printed in Ualics. 
Document 815 9th July 1979 
DRAFT BUDGET OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE EXPENDITURE 
OF THE ASSEMBLY FOR THE FINANCIAL YEAR 1980 1 
submttted on behalf of the Committee on Badgetary Affairs and Administration 1 
by Mr. Alber, Chairman and Rapporteur 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Sum.mary of Estimates for the Financial Year 1980 
Allocation of Expenditure under Heads and Sub-Heads 
Explanatory Memorandum 
Summary of Estimates for the Financial Year 1980 
Details 
Head 1 : Expenditure for staff ................................. . 
HeaJJ, Il : Expenditure rela.ting to temporary personnel ............ . 
HeaJJ, III: Expenditure on premises and equipment ................ . 
HeaJJ, IV: General administrative costs .......................... .. 
H ea4, V : Other expenditure .................................... . 
H ea4, V 1 : Pensions ............................................. . 
TOTAL EXI'ENDITURE •••••••••••••••••••• 
TOTAL REOEIPTS •••••••••••••••••••••••• 
NET TOTAL ••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 
Estimate for 1980 
F 
5,799,000 
1,682,000 
367,000 
1,358,000 
947,000 
91,000 
10,244,000 
406,000 
9,838,000 
1. Adopted in the Committee on Budgetary Affaira and 
Administration by 11 votes to 0 with 2 abstentions and 
approved by the Presidential Committee. 
2. Members of the Committee: Mr. AZber (Chairman) ; 
MM. Jager, Adriaensens (Alternate: Mr. BonneZ) (Vbe-
Chairmen) ; MM. Ahrens, Antoni, Bonalumi, DeZ Duca, 
Depietri, Evers, HengeZ, Lord Hughes, MM. Jager, Jeam-
brun, McNamara (Alternate : Lord McNair), Orsini, 
Page, Peeters, Schleiter, Stainton (Alternate : Kershaw), 
Tummers, Vohrer, Mrs. van der Werf-Terpstra. 
29 
N. B. The names of those ta'king part in the vote are 
printed in itaZics-
DOCUMENT 815 
Allocation of Expenditure under Heads and Sub-Heads 
Details 
Head I- EXPENDITlJRB FOR STAFF 
Sub-Hea.d 1 : Salaries of permanent establishment ......•........ 
Sub-Hea.d 2 : (A) Allowances ................................ . 
(B) Social charges ............................. . 
(C) Expenses relating to the recruitment, arrivai and 
departure of permanent officiais ............. . 
TOTAL OF HEAD I ...................... . 
Head II - EXPENDITUBE BELATING TO THE SESSIONS OF THE ASSEMBLY 
Sub-Hea.d 3: 1. Tempora.ry staff ............................. . 
2. Linguistic staff .............................. . 
3. Insurance for temporary staff ................ . 
4. Installation of equipment for sessions ......... . 
5. Miscella.neous expenditure during sessions .....•.. 
TOTAL OF HEAD II ..................... . 
Head III- EXPENDITUBE ON PBEMISES AND EQUIPMENT 
Sub-Head 4 : 1. Premises .................................... . 
2. Work on the building (joint areas) ............. . 
Sub-Hea.d 5 : Capital equipment .............................. . 
ToTAL oF HEAD III ................... . 
Head IV - GENERAL ADMINISTRATIVE OOSTS 
Sub-Hea.d 6: Postage, telephone, telegra.ph charges, transport of 
documents .................•.....•..............• 
Sub-Hea.d 7: Office supplies and hire of machines .............. . 
Sub-Hea.d 8: Printing and publishing of Assembly documents ... . 
Sub-Hea.d 9 : Purchase of documents, reference works, etc. . .... . 
Sub-Hea.d 10 : Official cars .................................... . 
Sub-Hea.d Il : Bank charges .................................. . 
TOTAL OF HEAD IV .................... . 
Head V- OTHEB EXPENDITUBE 
Sub-Head 12 : Tra.vel and subsistence allowances and insurance for 
the President of the Assembly, Cha.irmen of Commit-
tees and Rapporteurs .........•................... 
Sub-Hea.d 13 : E:xpenses for representation and receptions ....... . 
Sub-Hea.d 14: Committee study missions ....................... . 
Sub-Hea.d 15 : Official journeys of members of the Office of the Clerk 
Sub-Hea.d 16 : Expenses of experts and the auditors ............ . 
Sub-Hea.d 17 : Expenditure on information ..................... . 
Sub-Head 18: E:xpenses for groups of the Assembly ............ . 
Sub-Hea.d 19: Contingencies and other expenditure not elsewhere 
provided for ................................... . 
Sub-Head 20: Non-recoverable taxes ........................... . 
TOTAL OF HEAD v ..................... . 
Head VI - PENSIONS 
Sub-Hea.d 21: (A) Pensions .....................•..•........... 
(B) Allowances .................................. . 
(C) Severance grant ............................ . 
ToTAL oF HEAD VI .................... . 
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Eatimate for 1980 
F 
4,348,000 
789,000 
635,000 
27,000 
510,000 
872,000 
5,000 
244,000 
51,000 
243,000 
104,000 
20,000 
295,000 
190,000 
800,000 
28,000 
44,500 
500 
77,000 
120,000 
3,000 
187,000 
45,000 
250,000 
250,000 
3,000 
12,000 
91,000 
5,799,000 
1,682,000 
367,000 
1,358,000 
947,000 
91,000 
Head I - Expenditure for Staff 
Sub-Head 1 
SA.LABIES OF PERMANENT ESTABLISHMENT 
DOCUMENT 815 
(a) Basic salaries 
Estimate : F 4,348,000 
Estimate : F 4,328,000 
Rank 
The Clark ............................................ . 
The Clerk Assistant ...•............••.................. 
Counsellors ...•.....•......••..•.....•..................• 
First Seoretaries .•.....••........••.....•..•..••..•....• 
Secretary ...........•.•......••...............•......... 
Secretaries-Tra.nsla.tors /Publications .•..................•.• 
Administrative Assistant /Assistant Tra.nslator 
Chief Accountant ......••..••....•...........•......•... 
Persona! Assistants .••.•......•..•...........•........... 
Bil~ Sho~d ~ists ............................•. 
Switchboa.rd Operator .•.•..........•.................•.. 
Head Roneo-Storekeeper .•............................... 
Messengers •.••..........•..............•......•........ 
WEU 
Grade 
Hors cadre 
Hors cadre 
A5 
A4 
A3 
A2 
B6 
B4 
B3 
B3 
C6 
C3 
(b) Reoruitment of additional tempora.ry staff (grades B and C), 
including travelling expenses and French social security 
No. 
1 
1 
5 
2 
1 
3 
1 
4 
6 
1 
1 
2 
28 
Total 
F 
140,000 
301,000 
1,317,000 
451,000 
198,000 
441,000 
150,000 
455,000 
555,000 
98,000 
86,000 
136,000 
4,328,000 
Estimate: F 20,000 
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Sub-Head 2 
A.LLOWANOES, SOCIAL CHARGES, ETC, 
lA) ALLOWANOES 
Estimate: F 789,000 
(a) Household allowanoe Estimate : F 158,000 
Rank WEU No. Total Grade F 
Clerk Assistant ......................................... Hors cadre 1 18,000 
Counsellors •.................•.................•........• A5 4 63,000 
First Seoretary ......................................... A4 1 13,000 
Seoretary ••....•......•......•.......................... A3 1 12,000 
Persona! Assistants ....•.••............................•. B4 3 21,000 
Bilingual Shorthand Typists .••..•......•.......•....... · .. B3 3 17,000 
Head Roneo-Storekeeper ................................. C6 1 5,000 
Messengers ••••..•...•••...........•.•••••.•••...•..•..•. ca 2 9,000 
16 158,000 
(b) Children's allowanoe Estimate : F 176,000 
7,020 F per year per ohild: 25 ............................... F 176,000 
(c) Expatriation allowanoe Estimate : F 356,000 
Rank WEU No. Total Grade F 
Counsellors .............................................. A5 3 150,000 
First Seoreta.ry ......................................... A4 1 44,000 
Seoretary ............................................... A3 1 42,000 
Seoretary-Translator f Publications 
Administrative Assistant /Assistant Translator ...••......... A2 2 49,000 
Persona! Assistants .•......•...........•................. B4 2 42,000 
Bilingual Shorthand Typists .............................. B3 2 29,000 
11 356,000 
(à) Compensatory rent allowanoe Estimate: F 10,000 
(e) Overtime Estimate : F 22,000 
(/) 
(g) Education allowanoe Estimate : F 65,000 
(4) Allowanoe for language courses Estimate : F 2,000 
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(B) SOCIAL OHARGBS 
Estimate: F 635,000 
(a) Social Security EBtimate: F 370,000 
27 officiaJs F 370,000 
(b) Supplementary insurance Estimate: F 175,000 
(c) Provident fund EBtimate : F 90,000 
14 % of basic salaries X 644,000 F F 90,000 
(0) BXI'BNSBS BBLATING TO TBJ!l REORUITMENT, ABRIVAL AND DEPARTURE OF PERMANENT OFFIOULS 
(a) Travelling expanses and per diem for candidates not residing 
in Paris who are convened for examinations and interviews and 
oost of marking examination papers 
EBtimate: F 27,000 
Estimate : F 1,600 
(b) Reimbursement of travelling expanses on arrivai and departure 
of staff and dependent persons 
Eslimate : F 1,500 
(c) Removal expanses 
EBtimate : F 3,400 
(d) Insta.llation allowanoe 
EBtimate: F 7,000 
(e) Biennia.l home leave for non-French officiais 
EBtimate: F 10,000 
(/) Medical eumination 
EBtimate : F 3,500 
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Head n - Expenditure relating to the sasions of the Assembly 
EBii~: F 1,682,000 
Sub-Heaà 3 
1. TBMPORABY STAFJ' 
Tempora.ry staff required for the sessions of the Assembly 
Paris : 10 days 
Funotion Daily Total 
remuneration No. 
F F 
Head of the sittings office ............................. .. 525 la 9,400 
Hea.ds of sections ...................................... . 420 2a 35,500 
565 4b 
Sergea.nt-at-Arms ....•......•...•......•..••..••......... 490 1 b 5,900 
Secretaries for the Assembly ......•.......•.•....•....... 374 2a 19,200 
490 2b 
Précis writers ................................•........•. 374 4a 38,400 
490 4b 
Verbatim reporters ................••.................•.• 490 12 b 115,000 
624 6c 
Assistants •••••..•.•..••.••.••.•.••..•.•.••.•.....•..... 355 4b 140,000 
320 23 b 
239 6a 
203 IOa 
Head ushers .•..............•.•••..••..............•.... 169 2a 3,400 
Ushers ...•••.........••.•........••..................•. 157 12 a 34,200 
320 4b 
Roneo /Assemblera ..............•......••••.............. 157 12 a 19,000 
Ill 420,000 
a. Reoruited looaJly. 
b. Reoruited outside France. 
c. Reoruited as free.Ianoe staff. 
Travelling expanses . . . . • . . • . . . • • • F 90,000 
510,000 
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2o LIN'GUISTIO STAD 
(A) Interpretation SertJicu 
(a) Interpretation services required for the aeaaiona of the AaaembJy 
10 da.ys 
Funotion Total 
No. 
F 
Interpretera ............................................ 12 210,000 
12 210,000 
Travelling expanses o o o o o o o o F 16,000 
F 226,000 
(b) Interpretation services required for meetings of committeea between aeaaiona . o o o o o F 190,000 
(B) Tra'Mlalion. SertJicu 
Tempora.ry tra.nsla.tora for the aeaaiona of the Aaaembly 
Da. il y Eatimate• 
Funotion remuneration No. 
F F 
Revisera ................................................ 560 3a 175,000 
890 4b 
Tra.nala.tora .............................................. 454 4a 160,000 
746 4b 
Aaaiata.nta. o • o • o ••• o o ••••••• o o o o o ••••••••••••••••••••••••• 355 3b 108,000 
320 2b 
239 4a 
203 3a 
27 443,000 
1. Baaed on 32 days for the revisera and tra.nsla.tors. 
a. Reoruited loca.lly. 
b. Reoruited outaide France. 
Travelling expanses o o • • • • • • • • • • • F 13,000 
F 456,000 
3. I:JJSlJRANOB J'OB 'l'BMPOBABY STA.l!'J' 
E&timatc : F 5,000 
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4. INSTALLATION OF EQUIPMENT FOR SESSIONS 
- Installation of simultaneous interpretation equipment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 220,000 
·-Installation of telephone booths .................................... F 14,000 
- Installation of a teleprinter "France-Presse" for the Press Service ...... F 10,000 
/Cstimate : F 244,000 
5. MISCELLA.NEOUS EXPENDITURE DURING SESSIONS 
- Removal expanses ................................................ F 6,000 
-Medical Service (Doctor and Nurse) ................................. F 6,000 
- Hire of typewriters and technicians . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 5,500 
- Servioing of lifts . • . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 6,500 
- Cleaning • • . • . . • • . . • • . . • . . . . . . • • • . . • . • • • . • . . . . . • . . • • . • . • . • • . . . . . • . F 13,000 
- Miscellaneous ..................................•••..........•...... F 14,000 
lCstimare: F 51,000 
Head III - Expenditure on premises and equipment 
Estimate: F 367,000 
Sub-Heaà 4 
1. PREMISES 
- Hire of committee rooms outside Paris and installation of simultaneous 
interpretation equipment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 15,000 
- Joint overheads for the premises and insurance ...................... F 200,000 
- Minor repaira to equipment and machines and removal of furniture F 20,000 
- Miscellaneous ..................................................... F 8,000 
2. WORK ON THE BUILDING 
(joint areas) 
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Sub-Head 5 
CAPITAL EQUIPMENT 
- 18 typists' desks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 15,500 
- 1 tape recorder ........................................ F 4,500 
Estimate : F 20,000 
Head IV - General administrative cosa 
Estimate: F 1,358,000 
Sub-Head 6 
POSTAGE, TELEPHONE, TELEGRAPH OHARGES, TRANSPORT OF DOCUMENTS 
- Postage ........................................•.•..... F 171,000 
- Telephone ......................................•....•... F 100,000 
- Telegrams. • . • . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • . . . . . . F 9,000 
- Transport of documents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 15,000 
Estimate : F 295,000 
Sub-Head 7 
OFFICE SUPPLIES AND HIRE OF MACHINES 
- Purchase of roneo paper, stencils, headed writing paper and other 
office supplies 
- Hire of machines for photocopying and printing 
.TDstimate: F 190,000 
Sub-Head 8 
PRINTING AND PUBLISHING OF ASSEMBLY DOCUMENTS 
- Printing of Assembly documents (includes the record of debates, 
minutes of the Assembly and Assembly documents) 
- Printing of Reports of the Council 
- Printing of Texts Adopted 
- Miscellaneous - Bulletins, printing of the Agenda. 
and Order of Business of the Assembly, voting lists, etc. 
- Reprints 
-Brochures 
E8timate : F 800,000 
8ub-Head 9 
PUROB.ASB OF DOCUMENTS, REFERENCE WORXS, ETC. 
Estimate : F 28,000 
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Sub-Head 10 
OI'J'IOI.AL CARS 
- Hire of official cars 
.EBiimale : F 44,500 
Sub-Head 11 
BANX OIIARGBS 
.Estimait : F 000 
Head V - Other expenditure 
.Estimate: F 947,000 
Sub-Head 12 
T~VBL .AND SUBSISTBNOB ALLOWANOBI:I AND INSUBANOB FOB THE PBBSIDBNT OF THB .A.SSB.MBLY, 
OlLUBl\IEN OF OOMMITTBl!lS AND B.A.PPOBTBUBS 
.Estimate: F 77,000 
Sub-Head 13 
BXPBNSBS J'OB BBPBESBNT.A.TION AND BBOBPTIONS 
.Estimate : F 120,000 
Sub-Head 14 
OOIDIITTB.II STUDY MISSION& 
.Estîmate: F 3,000 
Sub-Heaà 15 
OJ'FIOI.A.L JOUBNBYS OF MBMBBBS OF THE OFFIOB OF THE OLBBK 
.Estimate: F 187,000 
Sub-Head 16 
BXPBNSBS OF EXPBBTS AND THB .A.UDITOB 
.Estimate : F 45.000 
Sub-Head 17 
BXPBNDITUBB ON INFORMATION 
.Estimate : F 250,000 
Sub-Head 18 
BXPBNSES J'OB GROUPS OF THE .ASSBMBLY 
.Estimate : F 250,000 
Sub-Head 19 
OONTINGBNOIBS AND OTHBB EXPENDITUBE NOT BLSBWHBBB PBOVIDBD J'OB 
.Estimate : F 3,000 
Sub-Head 20 
NON·BBOOVBB.ABLB TAXES 
.Estimate : F 12,000 
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Head VI - Pensions 
Sub-Head 21 
PENSIONS, .ALLOW .ANOES, ETO. 
(A) Penaion8 
Estimate: F 91,000 
(a) Retirement pension ..................................... Estimate: F 51,000 
( b) Inva.lidity pension .. . .. . .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. . .. .. .. . Estimate : pro mem. 
(c) Survivors' pension . • . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • . • • • . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • Estimate: F 26,000 
(d) Orpha.ns' pension ....................................... Estimate: F 14,000 
(B) Allowances 
Estimate : pro mem. 
(a) Household a.llowance ..................•...............• Estimate: pro mem. 
(b) Dependants' allowa.nce ...•..•......•..•..............••• Estimate: pro mem. 
(c) Education allowance ..•..•........•..•.................. Estimate: pro mem. 
(d) Relief allowance ....•••......••......•••..•............. Estimate: pro mem. 
(C) Severance grant 
Estimate : pro mem. 
Income 
(A) Sundry receipts 
Estimate: F 100,000 
(a) Sale of publications • . . • . . . . . • . . . . . . . . • . . . . . • . . . . . . . . . . . F 15,000 
(b) Bank interest .........•............................... F 75,000 
(c) Social security reimbursements •.......•...............•. F 10,000 
(B) Pensions 
Estimate : F 306,000 
(a) Contributions (7 %) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Estimate: F 248,000 
(b) Reimbursement of provident fund withdrawals (loans, etc.). Estimate: F 58,000 
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Explanatory Memorandum 
(submfttecl by Mr. Alber, Chairman and Rapporteur) 
1. The draft budget now before you amounts to F 9,838,000. The budget for 1979 amounted to 
F 8,517,000. The difference is therefore F 1,321,000. 
2. Head I- Expenditure for staff 
The increase (F 802,000) in the estimate for this head takes account of: 
(i) the effect over a full yea.r of increases granted in 1979 in basic salaries, expatriation and 
household allowances and contributions in respect of supplementary insurance and social security ; 
(ii) annual increments ; 
(iii) the probable effect of any salary increa.ses in 1980 due to inflation. Increases are estimated 
at 10%; 
(iv) an increase in the salary of the Clerk Assistant. It seems essential to apply to the staff of 
the Office of the Clerk of the Assembly the normal rule whereby the basic salary of an 
official (excluding the various allowances) should correspond to his responsibilities and should 
not be less than that of officiais of lower grades. The amount shown corresponds to the 
application of this rule. 
3. Head II - Expenditure relating to sessions of the .Assembly 
Sub-head 3.1 - Tempora.ry staff 
The estimated increase is F 50,000. 
Salaries for temporary staff follow the sca.les applied in the Council of Europe and the European 
Parliament. In accordance with the decision of the Budget Committee of the Council, the WEU Assembly 
a.pplies automatically, in the course of the yea.r, ail increases in salary sca.les as and when they are applied 
by the Council of Europe and the European Parliament. 
Sub-head 3.2 (A) - Interpretation services 
The increase (F 53,000) in the estimate for this sub-head takes into account probable increases in 
the scales applied by the co-ordinated organisations for salaries and per diem allowances payable to 
interpretera. 
Sub-head 3.2 (B) - Translation services 
The increase (F 49,000) in the estimate for this sub-head corresponds to sca.les applied in the Council 
of Europe. 
Sub-head 3.4 - Installation of equipment for sessions 
The increase (F 23,000) in the estimate for this sub-head corresponds to the expected increase in 
the oost of installing equipment needed for two part-sessions held in Paris. 
4. Head III- Expenditure on premises and equipment 
Sub-head 5 - Capital equipment 
The sum of F 20,000 is for the purchase of a tape recorder and the replacement of eighteen typists' 
desks for temporary staff. 
5. Head IV - General administrative costs 
Sub-hea.d 7 - Office supplies and hire of machines 
The increase (F 9,000) in the estimate for this sub-head corresponds to the higher oost of paper 
and office supplies. This sub-head now also covers the hire of a printing machine for addressing envelopes 
for despatching documents of the Assembly and of an Addressograph machine. 
Sub-head 8 - Printing and publishing of Assembly documents 
The increase (F 60,000) in the estimate for this sub-head corresponds to the expected increase in 
the oost of printing. 
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Sub-head 9 - Purchase of documents, reference works, etc. 
The increase (F 3,000) in the estimate for this sub-head is due to the higher oost of subscriptions 
to newspapers, periodicals and reference works. 
6. Head V - Other expenditure 
Sub-head 12 - Travel and subsistance allowances and insurance for the President of the Assembly, 
Chairmen of Committees and Rapporteurs 
The increase (F 77,000) in the estimate for this sub-head is due to the increase in travelling expanses 
and per diem allowances. 
Sub-head 13 - Expanses for representation and receptions 
The increase (F 10,000) in the estimate for this sub-head corresponds to rising priees. 
Sub-head 15 - Official journeys of members of the Office of the Clerk 
The increase (F 17,000) in the estimate for this sub-head corresponds to the increase in travelling 
expanses and per diem allowances foreseen in 1980. 
Sub-head 16 - Expanses of experts and the auditors 
The increase (F 18,000) in the estimate for this sub-head corresponds to increases in fees payable 
to the auditor and experts. 
Sub-head 17 - Expenditure on information 
When the 1979 budget was drawn up, an estimate ofF 300,000 was foreseen. This amount was 
reduced to F 142,500. It is requested that the amount be raised to F 250,000 in the 1980 budget. 
Sub-head 18 - Expanses for groups of the Assembly 
There are now five political groups in the Assembly. This sub-head has been increased by F 107,500. 
When the 1979 budget was drawn up, an estimate ofF 200,000 was foreseen. This amount was 
reduced to F 142,500. It is requested that the amount be raised to F 250,000 in the 1980 budget. 
7. Head VI - Pensions 
In this budget, account has been taken of only three pensions to be paid : one retirement, one 
survivor's and one orphan's pension. 
8. Sundry receipts 
2* 
Expected receipts in 1980 include: 
(i) sale of publications; 
(ii) bank interest ; 
(iii) social security reimbursements in respect of staff on sick leave; 
(iv) income resulting from the contribution of 7% from staff subscribing to the pension fund and 
the reimbursement of loa.ns and withdrawals. 
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Head 1 - Expenditure for Staff 
Bub-Heaà 1 
SALAJUBS OF PERMANENT ESTABLISHMENT 
(a) Basic salaries 
Estimate for 1980 ....................................................... F 4,328,000 
Budget for 1979 .............................................•.......... F 3,754,000 
Net inorease .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. F 574,000 
See the explanatory memorandum, paragra.ph 2. 
(b) Reoruitment of a.dditional temporary staff (grades B and C), including travelling 
expanses and French social security 
Estimate for 1980 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 
Budget for 1979 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 
Net increa.se . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 
20,000 
14,000 
6,000 
This estimate has been ca.lcula.ted on the ba.sis of increa.sed re.tes payable to temporary staff. 
Sub-Heaà 2 
ALLOWANCES, SOOIAL CHARGES, ETC. 
(A) ALLOWANOES 
(a) Household allowa.nce 
Estimate for 1980 .............••..............•••........................ F 158,000 
Budget for 1979 • • . . . . . . . . . . . . • . • • . • . . . • . . . . . . . • • • • • . • • • . . . . . • . . . . . . . . . . . . F 135,000 
Net increase .................. F 23,000 
This allowanoe has been calculated on the basis of the status of staff. 
(b) Children's allowance 
Estimate for 1980 ........................................................ F 176,000 
Budget for 1979 ...............................................•.......... F 170,000 
Net increase . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 6,000 
This allowance has been calculated on the basis of the status of staff. 
(c) Expatriation allowance 
Estimate for 1980 ........................................................ F 356,000 
Budget for 1979 ....................................................•..... F 310,000 
Net increase .................. F 46,000 
This estimate has been calculated on the basis of the number of non-French staff entitled to the 
allowance. 
(à) Compensatory rent allowance 
Estimate for 1980 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 10,000 
Budget for 1979 .......................................................... F 10,000 
Estimate uncha.nged 
This estimate has been calculated on the basis of the rent allowanoe now paid and the number of 
officiais qualifying for an allowance. 
(e) Overtime 
(f) 
Estimate for 1980 ....................................•................... F 22,000 
Budget for 1979 ..................................•....................... F 20,000 
Net increase ................. F 2,000 
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(g) Education allowance 
Estimate for 1980 ......................................................... F 65,000 
Budget for 1979 .......................................................... F 60,000 
Net increase . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 5,000 
This estima te has been calculated on the basis of the number of officiais entitled to this allowance. 
(h) Allowance for language courses 
Estimate for 1980 ........................................................ F 2,000 
Budget for 1979 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 2,000 
Estima.te unchanged 
This estimate has been caloulated on the basis of the number of officiais entitled to this a.llowanoe. 
(B) SOCiAL O~ES 
(a) Social security 
Estimate for 1980 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • • . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • . • . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 370,000 
Budget for 1979 ..•....................................................... F 275,000 
Net increase ................... F 95,000 
( b) Supplementary insurance 
Estimate for 1980 ...•.................................................... F 175,000 
Budget for 1979 ..................................................... , . . . . F 150,000 
Net increase .................. F 25,000 
(c) Provident Fund 
Estimate for 1980 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 90,000 
Budget for 1979 .............................•............................ F 73,000 
Net increase ................. F 17,000 
This calculation is based on 14% of basic salaries for staff having opted to remain in the 
provident fund scheme. 
(0) EXPENSES RELATING TO THE BEOBUITMENT, ABBIVAL AND DEPABTUBE OF PERMANENT OFFIOIALS 
(a) Travelling expanses a.nd per diem for candidates not residing in Paris, who are convened 
for examinations and interviews, and oost of marking examination papers 
Estimate for 1980 ........................................................ F 1,600 
Budget for 1979 .......................................................... F 1,600 
Estimate unchanged 
(b) Reimbursement of travelling expenses on arrivai and departure of staff and dependent 
persona 
Estimate for 1980 , . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 1,500 
Budget for 1979 ................. , .... , ................................... F 1,500 
Estimate unchanged 
Calculated on the basis of estimated departures and replacement of staff. 
(c) Removal expanses 
Estimate for 1980 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 3,400 
Budget for 1979 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 3,400 
Estimate unchanged 
Caloulated on the basis of estimated departures and replacement of staff. 
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(d) Installation allowance 
Estimate for 1980 ......................................................•• F 7,000 
Budget for 1979 ••.•...................................•.................• F 4,500 
Net increase . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 2,500 
Calculated on the basis of poBBible replacement requirements. 
(e) Biennial home leave for non-French officiais 
Estimate for 1980 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • . F 10,000 
Budget for 1979 . • . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 10,000 
Estimate unchanged 
Based on the number of staff entitled to home leave in 1979. 
(f) Medical examination 
Estimate for 1980 .......•••.............................................. F 3,500 
Budget for 1979 • . . • . • . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • • . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 3,000 
Net increase . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 500 
Head II - Expenditure relating to the sessions of the Assembly 
Sub-Head 3 
1. TEMI'ORABY STAFF 
'femporary staff required for the sessions of the Assembly 
Estimate for 1980 ...................•..........•......................... F 510,000 
Budget for 1979 ..................••...................................... F 460,000 
Net increase ................. F 50,000 
The basis of the calculation is two part-sessions in Paris making a total of 10 sitting days. 
See the explanatory memorandum, pa.ragraph 3. 
2. LllfGUISTIO STAJ'J' 
(A) lnkrprdalion SertJieu 
(a) Interpretation services required for the sessions of the Assembly 
Estimate for 1980 ............................•........................... F 226,000 
Budget for 1979 •......................................................... F 193,000 
Net increase .................. F 33,000 
See the explanatory memorandum, paragraph 3. 
(b) Interpretation services required for meetings of committees between seBBions 
Estimate for 1980 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • . . . . . . . . . F 190,000 
Budget for 1979 .....•....................•..............................• F 170,000 
See the explanatory memorandum, para.graph 3. 
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Estimate for 1980 ........................................................ F 456,000 
Budget for 1979 ..•....................................................... F 407,000 
Net increase .................. F 49,000 
See the explanatory memorandum, paragraph 3. 
3. INSURANOB FOR TEMI'ORARY STAFF 
Estimate for 1980 ......................•................................. F 5,000 
Budget for 1979 ........................•................................. F 5,000 
Estimate unchanged 
4. INSTALLATION OF EQUIPMENT FOR THE SESSIONS 
Estimate for 1980 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 244,000 
Budget for 1979 .......................................................... F 221,000 
Net increase .................. F 23,000 
This calculation is ba.sed on the installations necessary for two part-sessions held in Paris. 
See the explanatory memorandum, paragraph 3. 
5. MISOBLLA.NBOUS liiXl"liiNDITURB DURING TRB SBSSION8 
Estimate for 1980 ........................................................ F 51,000 
Budget for 1979 ....................................................•...•• F 41,000 
Net increase . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 10,000 
Head III - Expenditure on premises and equipment 
Sub-Head 4 
1. PRBMISBS 
Estimate for 1980 •.........•............................................. F 243,000 
Budget for 1979 ...................................................•...... F 337,000 
Net decrease ................. F 94,000 
This estimate has been calculated on the basis of the Assembly's share in maintenance costa, the 
hire of committee rooms and insurance. 
2. WORK ON THE BUILDING 
(joint areas) 
Estimate for 1980 ....................................................... F 104,000 
Budget for 1979 ........................................................ . 
----
Net increa.se ................. F 104,000 
This representa the Assembly's share in work on the committee rooms - air conditioning and 
sound-proofing - and also work on drainage. 
Sub-Heaà 5 
CAPITAL BQUIPMBNT 
Estimate for 1980 .....................•..................•............... F 20,000 
Budget for 1979 ..........•..............................................• F 26,000 
Net decrease ...............•. F 6,000 
See the explanatory memorandum, pa.ra.graph 4. 
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Head IV - General administrative costs 
Sub-Heat!. 6 
POSTAGE, TELEPHONE, TELEGRAI'H CHARGES, TIU.NSPORT OF DOCUMENTS 
Estimate for 1980 .........................•.............................. F 295,000 
Budget for 1979 .......................................................... F 295,000 
Estimate unchanged 
Sub-Heat!. 7 
OFJ!'ICE SUPPLIES AND HIRE OF MAOHINES 
Estimate for 1980 . • . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • . . . . . . . F 190,000 
Budget for 1979 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 181,000 
Net inorease .................. F 9,000 
See the explanatory memorandum, paragraph 5. 
Sub-Heat!. 8 
PRlNTING AND PUBLISHING OF ASSEMBLY DOCUMENTS 
Estimate for 1980 ...................•...........•........................ F 800,000 
Budget for 1979 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 740,000 
Net increase . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 60,000 
See the explanatory memorandum, paragraph 5. 
Sub-Heat!. 9 
PUROHASE OF DOCUMENTS, REFERENCE WORXS, ETC, 
Estimate for 1980 ....................•................•....••..••.•.•••.. F 28,000 
Budget for 1979 .......................................•.......•.........• F 25,000 
Net inorease .................. F 3,000 
See the explanatory memorandum, paragraph 5. 
Sub-Heat!. 10 
OFJ!'IOIAL CARS 
Estimate for 1980 ........................................•.......•....... F 44,500 
Budget for 1979 .......................................................... F 44,500 
Estima.te unchanged 
In the absence of a car belonging to the Âssembly, provision must be made for the hire of chauffeur. 
driven cars for the President of the Assembly and the Clerk. 
Sub-Heat!. 11 
BANK CHARGES 
Estima.te for 1980 .................................................••....• F 500 
Budget for 1979 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • . . . . F 500 
Estimate unohanged 
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Head V - Other expenditure 
Sub-Heaà 12 
TRAVEL AND SUBSISTENOE ALLOWANOES AND INSURA.NOE FOR THE PRESIDENT OF THE ASSEMBLY, OHAIBMEN 
OF OOMMITTEES AND RAPPORTEURS 
Estimate for 1980 ........................................................ F 77,000 
Budget for 1979 . . . . . . . . • . . . . . . . • . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 70,000 
Net increase ................. F 7,000 
Travel and subsistance allowances for members of the .Assembly attending committee meetings, 
including meetings of the Presidential Committee, are paid by the governments. 
The .Assembly is responsible for tra.vel and subsistance allowances for visita by the President of 
the .Assembly, Rapporteurs and, on occasion, Committee Chairmen when auch visita are connected 
with the preparation of a report or .Assembly business. Journeys by Chairmen and Rapporteurs are 
subjeot to the approval of the Presidential Committee. 
See the explana.tory memorandum, pa.ragra.ph 6. 
Bub-Head 13 
EXPENSES FOR REPRESENTATION AND REOEPTJONS 
Estimate for 198) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 120,000 
Budget for 1979 .......................................•.................. F 110,000 
Net increase .................. F 10,000 
See the expla.na.tory memorandum, para.gra.ph 6. 
Sub-HUMJ 14 
OOMMITTBE STUDY MISSIONS 
Estimate for 1980 . . • . • . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • . . . . . . . . • . . . . . . . . . F 3,000 
Budget for 1979 ...............................................•........•• F 3,000 
Estimate unchanged 
Sub-Head 16 
OJ'FIOIAL JOUBNEYS OF MBMBEBS OF THE OJ'FIOB OF THE OLEBK 
Estimate for 1980 ........................................................ F 187,000 
Budget for 1979 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 170,000 
Net inorease ................. F 17,000 
See the expla.na.tory memorandum, pa.ragraph 6. 
Sub-Heaà 16 
EXPENSES OF EXPERTS AND THE AUDITOBS 
Estimate for 1980 ........................................................ F 45,000 
Budget for 1979 .......................................................... F 27,000 
Net inorea.se . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 18,000 
See the explanatory memorandum, pa.ragraph 6. 
Sub-Heaà 17 
EXPBNDITUBE ON INFORMATION 
Estimate for 1980 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 250,000 
Budget for 1979 .......................................................... F 142,500 
Net increase ................. F 107,500 
See the explana.tory memorandum, para.graph 6. 
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Sub-Head 18 
BXPBNSBS J'OB GROUPS OF THB ASSEMBLY 
Estimate for 1980 ........................................................ F 250,000 
Budget for 1979 .....•.................................................••. F 142,500 
Net increase ................. F 107,500 
See the expla.natory memorandum, paragraph 6. 
Sub-Head 19 
COMTINGBNOIES AND OTHBB BXPBNDITUBB MOT BLSBWJIBBB PBOVIDED J'OB 
Estimate for 1980 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 3,000 
Budget for 1979 .......................................................... F 3,000 
Estimate unchanged 
Sub-Head 20 
MOM·BBCOVBBABLB TAXES 
Estimate for 1980 ......................................•................. F 12,000 
Budget for 1979 .......................................................... F 10,000 
(a) Retirement pension 
Estimate for 1980 
Estimate for 1979 
Net increase . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 2,000 
Head VI - Pensions 
Sub-Head 21 
PENSIONS, ALLOW ANCES, ETC. 
(A) Pensions 
F 51,000 
F 46,000 
Net increase . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 5,000 
See the expla.natory memorandum, pa.ragraph 7. 
( b) Invalidity pension . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . pro mem. 
(c) Survivors' pension 
Estima.te for 1980 
Estimate for 1979 
F 26,000 
24,000 ....................................................... F 
Net increase . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 2,000 
See the explanatory memorandum, paragraph 7. 
(d) Orphans' pension 
Estimate for 1980 ....................................................... F 14,000 
Estimate for 1979 ....................................................... F 13,000 
Net increase ................. F 1,000 
See the explanatory memorandum, pa.ra.graph 7. 
(B) .Allowance8 
pro mem. 
(C) Severance granl 
pro mem. 
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Amendment 1 
22nd November 1979 
Draft budget of the administrative expenditure 
of the Assembly for the financial year 1980 
AMENDMENT 1 1 
tabled by Mr. Alber 
Summary of revised estimates for the financial year 1980 
Initial 
Details estima te for 1980 
F 
Head I : Expenditure for staff ................................. . 5,799,000 
Head II : Expenditure relating to temporary personnel~ ........... . 1,682,000 
Head III: Expenditure on premises and equipment ............... . 367,000 
Head IV : General administrative costs ........................... . 1,358,000 
Head V : Other expenditure .................................... . 947,000 
Head VI : Pensions ............................................. . 91,000 
TOTAL EXPENDITURE ..•..••.•.•....•...• 10,244,000 
TOTAL RECEIPTS •.•.....••.••.......•••. 406,000 
NET TOTAL ....•.•••.•.•...•.•.......••• 9,838,000 
1. See llth Sitting, 4th December 1979 (Amendment agreed to). 
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Amended 
estima te 
for 1980 
F 
5,799,000 
1,682,000 
339,000 
1,358,000 
947,000 
91,000 
10,216,000 
406,000 
9,810,000 
Signed : Alber 
Document 815 Addendum 22nd November 1979 
Dra(t budget of the administrative expenditure 
of the Assembly for the financial year 1980 
ADDENDUM 
Letters from the Secretary-General 
and the Clerk of the Assembly 
dated 24th October and 20th November 1979 
24th October 1979 
Dear Mr. Humblet, 
I am writing to inform you that the Council 
have now examined the WEU Assembly budget 
for 1980 and, in accordance with the agreed 
procedure, have expressed a favourable opinion 
on the budget as amended in Document C-B (79) 
16. Two copies of this document are enclosed. 
Encl. 
Mr. F. Humblet 
Clerk of the Assembly of 
Western European Union 
Yours sincerely, 
E. LoNGERSTAEY 
Secretary-General 
43, avenue du Président Wilson 
75775 Paris Cedex 16 
Paris, 20th November 1979 
Dear Secretary-General, 
I have the honour to inform you that the 
Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Adminis-
tration and the Presidential Committee have 
today considered the amendments proposed by the 
Council to the draft budget of the Assembly for 
the financial year 1980. 
The reduction of Frs. 28,000 in Head III, 
Sub-Head 4.2 has been approved. 
The Presidential Committee decided that the 
draft budget would be submitted to the Assembly 
without any further amendments. The draft 
budget has now been reduced to Frs. 9,810,000. 
Yours sincerely, 
F. HUMBLET 
Clerk of the Assembly 
H. E. Mr. Edouard Longerstaey 
Secretary -General 
Western European Union 
9 Grosvenor Place 
London SW1X 7 HL 
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Original : English 
C-B (79) 16 
11th October 1979 
Secretary-General's note 
WEU Assembly budget for 1980 
1. The draft budget of the WEU Assembly 
for 1980 (Assembly Document 815), circulated 
under reference B (79) 11, was examined by the 
Budget and Organisation Committee at a meet-
ing held in London on 4th and 5th October 
1979 (BR (79) 2, V- to be circulated). 
2. The Committee's conclusions can be sum-
marised as follows : 
HEAD I (Expenditure for Staff) 
It was noted, from the explanatory memo-
randum on pages 12 and 13 of the budget, that 
the estimates included provision for an increase 
of the salary of the Clerk Assistant and it was 
recalled that this matter was currently being 
studied by the Council. Sorne delegates expressed 
the view that they would have preferred to see 
the cost of any increase compensated by econo-
mies achieved elsewhere in the budget. 
HEAD Il (Expenditure relating to sessions of the 
Assembly) 
Sub-H ead 3.5 - Miscellaneous expenditure dur-
ing sessions 
The Committee recommended that this credit 
be reduced by 5,000 francs from 51,000 francs 
to 46,000 francs. 
HEAD Ill (Expenditure on premises and equip-
ment) 
Sub-H ead 4.2 - W ork on the building 
The credit of 104,000 francs was reduced by 
28,000 francs to 76,000 francs. 
The original credit was based on the June 
1979 estimate of the cost of certain conference 
room and other work in the shared parts of the 
Paris offices. The final estimates for this work, 
higher than originally foreseen, appeared under 
Sections B and C in the WEU budget for 1980 
(B (79) 10, Part II) where the total of the 
shared costs was given as 571,000 francs. Dele-
gates were unable to accept that figure for 1980 
and it was agreed that the work programme 
would be spread over the years 1980 and 1981. 
The overall cost for 1980 was consequently 
reduced to a rounded-off total of 252,000 francs, 
of which the Assembly's share would be 76,000 
francs. 
HEAD V (Other expenditure) 
Sub-H ead 17 - Expendit1tre on information 
Sub-H ead 18 - Expenses for Groups of the 
Assembly 
It was recalled that in the 1979 budget the 
President of the Assembly had sought to increase 
these credits from 36,000 francs to 300,000 francs 
and from 17,000 francs to 200,000 francs respect-
ively. The Council and Assembly had eventually 
agreed to increase both to 142,500 francs. 
In the 1980 estimates, it was proposed that 
both credits should be raised from 142,500 francs 
to 250,000 francs. There was almost unanimous 
agreement that, from a budgetary point of view, 
the proposed increases were unacceptable. Dele-
gates noted that the combined 1980 estimates 
of the Paris-based offices of WEU showed an 
increase of approximately 13 % against 1979 and, 
subject to confirmation on the part of the Belgian 
Delegate, they recommended that any increases 
for these two items should be limited to that 
DOOUMENT 815 ADDENDUM 
percentage. This would mean that the 1979 credits 
of 142,500 francs would be increased by 18,500 
francs to a total (for each) of 161,000 francs 
instead of 250,000 francs. The reduction for each 
sub-head would amount to 89,000 francs making 
a total reduction under Head V of 178,000 
francs. 
A summary table showing the amended totals 
for each head is attached. It will be noted that 
the overall effect of the proposed amendments 
is to reduce the net total of the Assembly's 
estimates for 1980 by 211,000 francs from 
9,838,000 francs to 9,627,000 francs. The percen-
tage increase, against 1979, falls from 15.51% 
to 13.03%. 
3. Subject to the foregoing observations the 
Committee could recommend the Council to 
express a favourable opinion on the draft budget 
of the WEU Assembly for 1980. 
4. Under the agreed procedure for the approval 
of Assembly budgets, given in paragraph 4 of 
the cover-note of document B (79) 11, the next 
stage is for the Council to give its opinion on 
the budget, indicating either preparedness to 
accept the draft or proposing amendments. That 
opinion is to be conveyed to the Assembly prior 
to the next sitting which commences in Paris on 
3rd December 1979. After the session, the budget 
will be referred back to the Council for final 
approval. 
5. The Council's opinion will be sought at the 
meeting to be held in London on 23rd October 
1979. 
ANNE X 
Draft budget of the administrative expenditure 
of the Assembly of WEU for 1980 
Proposed amendments 
Head Fr. frs 
I. Expenditure for staff ................................ . 5,799,000 
IL Expenditure relating to temporary personnel ......... . 1,682,000 
III. Expenditure on premises and equipment .............. . 367,000 
IV. General administrative costs ......................... . 1,358,000 
V. Other expenditure .................................. . 947,000 
VI. Pensions 91,000 
Fr. frs 
-
(-) 5,000 
(-) 28,000 
-
(-) 178,000 
-
Fr. frs 
5,799,000 
1,677,000 
339,000 
1,358,000 
769,000 
91,000 
TOTAL EXPENDITURE .............. 10,244,000 (-) 211,000 10,033,000 
TOTAL REOEIPTS ................. . 406,000 
NET TOTAL .. .. . .. . .. .. .. . .. .. . . .. 9,838,000 (-) 211,000 
51 
406,000 
9,627,000 
Document 816 
SALT Il and ifs implications for European security 
REPORT 1 
submitted on behalf of the 
Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments 2 
by Mr. Cook, Rapporteur 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
DRAFT RESOLUTION 
on SALT II and its implications for European security 
EXPLANATORY MEMORANDUM 
submitted by Mr. Cook, Rapporteur 
1. Introduction 
II. Description of texts 
III. Implications for Europe and the Alliance 
(i) The balance of central strategie systems 
25th September 1979 
(ii) Implications for levels of British and French nuclear forces 
(iii) Non-circumvention and mutual assistance 
(iv) Restrictions on cruise missile technology 
(v) Implications for Soviet medium-range systems 
(vi) Guidelines for SALT III 
IV. Conclusion and ratification of the treaty 
V. Opinion of the minority 
APPENDICES : 
1. Recommendation 324 and reply of the Council 
II. Comparative table of United States and Soviet strategie offensive arms 
1. Adopted in Committee by 13 votes to 1 with 0 
abstentions. 
2. MembfJTS of the Committee: Mr. Boper (Chairman) ; 
MM. Bonnel, Roberti (Vice-Chairmen) ; MM. A hrens, 
Banks, Baume! (Alternate : Bozzi), Bechter, van den 
Bergh, Boldrini, Boucheny, Dejaràin, Fosson, Grant 
(Alternate : Lorà Duncan-Sanàys), Handlos, Hardy 
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(Alterna te : Cook), de Kaster, Lemmrich, Maggioni, 
Meintz, Ménard, Onslow, Pawelczyk (Alternate : Büch· 
n6T), Pecchioli, Péronnet, Schmidt (Alternate : Vohr6T), 
Scholten (Alternate : van Hulst), Tanghe. 
N.B. The names of those taking part in the vote are 
printeà in italics. 
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Draft Resolution 
on SALT Il and ifs implications for European security 
The Assembly, 
(i) Conscious of its authority under the Brussels Treaty as the only European parliamentary assembly 
with statutory responsibility in matters of defence ; 
(ii) Having considered the SALT II texts, and the accompanying agreed statements and common 
understandings, and the evidence given by the United States Administration to the Senate committees ; 
(iii) Noting that the agreements cannot affect the British and French nuclear forces, both of which 
make a meaningful contribution to the allied nuclear deterrent, and that the agreements impose no 
restrictions on mutual assistance in the production of nuclear weapons between the United States and 
its allies ; · 
(iv) Regretting that it has not proved possible in the framework of SALT II to agree on significant 
mutual reductions of strategie offensive arms of all types ; 
(v) Believing however tha.t the broad parity in aU categories of strategie offensive arms which SALT II 
seeks to bring about will increase the stability of mutual deterrence and cannot provide any unilateral 
advantage for the Soviet Union ; 
(vi) Concluding therefore that the SALT II agreements should enhance the security of Europe and 
the Atlantic Alliance and will not in any way diminish the credibility of the United States strategie 
deterrent; 
(vii) Reserving for further consideration in a future report its position on SALT III, 
lNSTRUOTS ITS PRESIDENT 
To transmit the text of the present resolution and the corresponding report of the Committee on 
Defence Questions and Armaments to the President and all members of the United States Senate ; 
ÜALLS UPON THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES 
To approve the ratification without amendment of the treaty on the limitation of offensive arms 
signed in Vienna on 18th June 1979. 
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Explanatory Memorandum 
(submitted by Mr. Cook, Rapporteur) 
1. Introduction 
1. The Comnittee has followed the progress 
of the strategie arms limitation talks (SALT) 
from the outset, and rcported frequently on 
them. In particular it reported on the SALT 1 
texts - the (permanent) ABM treaty and the 
interim agreement and protocol on strategie 
offensive arms - after their signature in 1972 1 
and reviewed the progress of the SALT II nego-
tiations as recently as October 1978 when it 
adopted the report prepared by Mr. Baumel 
(Document 787) on which the Assembly subse-
quently adopted Recommendation 324 (attached 
at Appendix I with reply of the Council). 
2. SALT II textls, so long in preparation, were 
finally signed by Presidents Carter and Brezhnev 
in Vienna on 18th June and have been published; 
the ratification process has begun in the United 
States Senate with the opening of hearings by 
the Foreign Relations and Armed Services Com-
mittees in July and the principal Administration 
witnesses have been heard. No new facts have 
emerged to cause the Committee to modify in 
any signi:fficant way the conclusions it reached in 
October last year. 
Il. Description of texts 
3. As foreshadowed in Document 787, the texts 
signed in Vienna comprise three main documents 
- a treaty of nineteen articles expiring on 
31st December 1985 "unless replaced earlier by 
an agreement further limiting strategie offensive 
arms" ; a protocol of four articles (expiring on 
21st December 1981 unl~s replaced earlier by 
a further agreement) imposing temporary limits; 
and a statement of principles for future negotia-
tions on SAI,T III. Additionally, however, there 
are forty-three pages of agreed statements and 
common understandings, four pages of data on 
present weapons inventory and a Soviet state-
ment on the TU-22M bomber (Backfire). 
4. The principal provisions of nineteen articles 
of the treaty on the limitation of strategie offen-
sive arms, as further interpreted by the agreed 
statements and common understandings, are 
summarised as follows : 
Article I contains the general undertaking 
to "limit" strategie arms qualiitatively and quan-
titatively, and to "exercise restraint" in the 
development of new ones. 
1. Document 587, East·West .-elations and defence, 
Rapporteur Mr. Destremau, 8th November 1972, leading 
to Recommandation 227 adopted on 6th December 1972. 
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Article II provid~ definitions of intercon-
tinental ballistic missile (ICBM) launchers, sub-
marine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) laun-
chers, heavy bombers, air-to-surface ballistic mis-
siles (ASBl\Is), launchers of ICBMs or SLBMs 
equipped with multiple independently-targetable 
vehicles (MIRVs), MIRVed ASBMs, heavy 
ICB~ and oruise missiles. 
Article Ill provides that on entry into 
force the aggTegate total of ICBM launchers, 
SLBM launchers, heavy bombers, and ASBMs 
shall not exceed 2,400 and that from lst Janu-
ary 1981 reductions shall be initiated to reduce 
that aggregatc to 2,250. 
Article IV, setting forth limits to quanti-
tative and qualitative ~mprovements, provides 
that there shall be no new construction of addi-
tional, or relocation of fixed ICBM launchers ; 
no conversion of light to heavy ICBM launchers 
or of pre-1964 launchers to post-1964 launchers ; 
and no increase of launcher volume by more than 
32 %. There is to be no "excessive" missile storage 
or rapid reloading capability. No heavier ICBMs 
than those in service are to be developed ; the-re 
is to be no conversion of intermediate- or medium-
range ballistic missile launchers to ICBM laun-
chers and only one new type of ICBM - a light 
one - may be tested and deployed. There is to 
be no increase in numbers of MIRV s on ballistic 
mhlsiles beyond the numbers currently tested 
(ten on ICBMs, fourteen on SLBMs). ASBMs 
shall not be fitted with more than fourteen 
MIRV s, nor shall the average numbers of 
ALCMs with a range over 600 km exceed twenty-
eight per aircraft. 
Article V provides sub-ceilings on MIRVed 
ICBMs and SLBMs, heavy bombers with air-
launched cruise missiles with a range in excess 
of 600 km, the sum of which shall not exceed 
1,320. Within that total the sum of MIRV ed 
ICBMs and SLBMs shall not exceed 1,200 and 
within that total the number of MIRVed ICBMs 
shall not exceed 820. 
Article VI provides that the limits shall 
apply both to operational weapons and those ~n 
the final stage of construction, in reserve, storage, 
or under repair, and defines these conditions. 
Article VII exempts test and space launch-
ers from the limitations, but prohibits any signi-
ficant (more than 15 %) increase in their 
numbers and requires them to be located at 
defined test ranges. Twelve out of eighteen Soviet 
fractional orbital missile launchers are to be 
destroyed within eight months of entry into 
force. 
Article VIII provides that air-launch"!J. 
cruise missiles with a range in excess of 600 km 
shall not be tested from aircraft other than 
bombe !"S. 
Article IX bans the development or deploy-
ment of ballistic missiles on surface ships, in 
fixed position on the ocean bed or on the beds 
of inland waters ; it bans fractional orbital 
missiles or any nuclear or other weapon of mass 
destruction in earth orbit ; it bans mobile 
launchers for heavy ICBMs; it bans any SLBMs 
or ASBMs heavier than the heaviest light ICBM 
operational with eithe'r party at the date l)f 
signature. It bans MIRVed ALCMs with a range 
in excess of 600 km. 
Article X specifically permits any other 
modernisation or replacement of strategie 
offensive arms. 
Article XI lays down the conditions for 
dismantling or destroying excess weapons, impos-
ing time limits of four months from entry into 
force for destruction of excess ICBM launcher,3, 
six months for SLBM launchers and three months 
for heavy bombers which are in eX'cess of the 
overall aggregate of 2,400. Destruction of other 
excess weapons systerms is to be completed by 
31st December 1981 and the destruction of pro-
hibited weapons is to be completed within six 
months from entry into force. 
Article XII states that parties shall not 
circumvent the provisions of the treaty "through 
any other state or states or in any other manner". 
Article XIII contains a customary under-
taking for parties not to assume other inter-
national obligations which would conflict with 
the treaty. 
Article XIV provides for prompt negotia-
tions after entry into force on further measures 
for the limitation and reduction of strategie 
arms, and lays down the objective "to conclude 
well in advance of 1985 an agreement limiting 
strategie offensive arms to replace this treaty 
upon its expiration". 
Article XV on verification provides for the 
use of "national technical means", provides that 
parties shall not interfere with those means of 
the other party used "in a manner consistent 
with generally recognised principles of interna-
tional law" and prohibits deliberate concealment 
measures which would impede such verification. 
A.rticle XVI provides for the prior notific-
ation to the other party of any ICBM laun~h 
except for test launches which do not go beyond 
the national territory. 
Article XVII provides for the use of the 
Standing Consultative Commission established 
under SALT I to be used for implementation 
of the treaty, where parties are inter alia to 
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exchange information relevant to the treaty and 
consider other proposais for limiting strategie 
offensive arms. In particular, the agreed data 
base is to be up-dated in that Commission. 
Article XVIII provides for amendments to 
the treaty. 
Article XIX provides for ratification and 
duration until 31st December 1985. As in all 
similar treaties it provides for a right of with-
drawal if a party decides that "extraordinary 
events related to the subject matter of the treaty 
have jeopardised its supreme interests", but 
requires six months' notice including a statement 
of the extraordinary events invoked by the 
notifying party. 
5. The protocol imposes a moratorium on cer-
tain weapons which will exp~re on 31st Decem-
ber 1981 unless replaced earlier by further 
permanent agreements. 
Article I is an undertaking not to deploy 
mobile ICBM launchers, or to test ICBMs from 
such launchers. 
Article II covers cruise missiles with a range 
in excess of 600 km. Sea-launched or land-
launched versions are not to be deployed ; 
MIRVed sea-launched and land-launched versions 
are to be neither tested nor deployed. 
Article III prohibits the deployment or test-
ing of ASBMs. 
6. The Soviet statement on the Backfire bomber 
states that it is a medium-range bomber, will 
not be given intercontinental ranges through 
refuelling or any other means ; production will 
not exceed thirty per year. 
7. The texts of SALT II contain a memo-
randum of understanding providing a data 'base 
on existing numbers of strategie defence ,arms, 
which is to be up-dated on entry into force of the 
treaty and maintained in the Standing Consult-
ative Commission (see following table). 
8. F,inally the texts contain the "joint state-
ment of principles and basic guidelines for sub-
sequent negotiations on the limitation of strategie 
arms" which are described in Chapter III (vi) 
below. 
Ill. Implications for Europe and the Alliance 
(i) The balance of central strategie systems 
9. The treaty has a negligible effect on strategie 
systems currently deployed by either side. 
Article III obliges both parties to reduce the 
aggregate number of their strategie launchers to 
2,250 by 1981. This will involve a reduction 
of 254 on the Soviet side, probably ICBM launch-
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SALT II data base 
United States USSR 
at 1/11/78 
Launchers of ICBMs 1,054 
Fixed launchers of ICBMs 1,054 
La.unchers of ICBMs equipped 
with MIRVs 550 
Launchers of SLBMs 656 
Launchers of SLBMs equipped 
with MIRVs 496 
Heavy bombera 574 
Heavy bombers equipped for 
cruise missiles capable of a 
range in excess of 600 km 
Heavy bombers equipped only 
for ASBMs 
ASBMs 
ASBMs equipped with MIRVs 
ers, and a reduction of 46 on the part of the 
United States, almost eertainly heavy bombers 
which are at present mothballed. 
10. The table at Appendix II shows the numbers 
of strategie offensive weapons held by the United 
States and the Soviet Union in mid-1979, and the 
total of independently-targetable warheads 
aecording to information in the IISS Military 
Balance 1979-80, and taking aecount of the data 
base given by the two parties in the SALT II 
texts for numbers of MIRV ed missiles. As the 
Committee previously reported1 there are many 
measures of strategie capability - numbers af 
launehers, numbers of independent warheads, 
total megatonnage, "equivalent megatonnage" 
(megatonnage scaled down to calculate the 
damage likely to be inflicted on area targets). 
To assess the ability of nuclear forces to destroy 
proteeted ICBMs, however, the accuracy (CEP) 
is the most important single factor, and reliable 
information on this parameter has not been 
published. 
11. The Committee is satisfied however that in 
numbers of warheads the United States has at 
the present time a significant lead of sorne 
9,200 to 5,100 for the Soviet Union - a number 
which is expected to rise only to 7,500 in the 
early 1980s. The high average yield of Soviet 
warhead,;; however, coupled with reports that 
1. e.g. Document 787, paragraph 22. 
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0 
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0 
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at 18/6/79 at 1/11/78 at 18/6/79 
1,054 1,398 1,398 
1,054 1,398 1,398 
550 576 608 
656 950 950 
496 128 144 
573 156 156 
3 0 0 
0 0 0 
0 0 0 
0 0 0 
accuracy of modern missiles may be "approaeh-
ing" that of United S~ates missiles, has led 
critics of SALT II to claim that United States 
ICBMs were vulnerable to a pre-emptive strike, 
so that the Soviet Union eould destroy without 
warning all United States ICBMs and then hold 
the West to ransom by threatening destruction 
of Ameriean eities with its remaining forces. 
12. This argument entirely overlooks the real-
ities facing military planners. The CEP is the 
radius of the eircle within which only 50 % 
of missiles ean be expecteà to fall, so that even 
if it coïncides with the radius within which 
a protected missile silo is vulnerable, an advers-
ary targeting one warhead on eaeh milssile silo 
could expect to destroy only half of them even 
if all his missiles were entirely reliable. With 
two missiles per silo the proportion destroyed 
would only be -three-quarters and four missiles 
per silo would be required to ensure over 90 % 
destruction. Thus such a hypothetical eounter-
force strike by the Soviet Union would involve 
sorne 4,000 thermonuclear warheads fired against 
targets in eight different states with a population 
of thirty million. The "collateral" damage -i.e. 
the number of civilians killed - would be un-
likely to be less than severa! million. No Soviet 
military planner eould possibly rely on the 
United States, with over 5,000 nuclear warheads 
in its strategie submarines remaining intact, to 
refrain from retaliating against both military 
and civilian targets in the Soviet Union. 
13. The Com.mittee concludes that although 
present Soviet construction plans and the pro-
visions of SALT II would permit the numbers 
of Soviet warheads to approach those of the 
United States in the early to mid-1980s, and 
although the Soviet warheads have a highcr 
average yield, this does not necessarily mean 
that the United States will be "vulnerable" at 
this time, as certain strategists removed from the 
realities of military planning have claimed. 
Rather the Soviet Union, with far fewer numbers 
of invulnerable submarine-based missiles and sur-
rounded by four potentially hostile nuclear 
powers must see itself rin the vulnerable position. 
The difference in phase of the construction pro-
grammes of the two powers may weil lead tu 
a renewed surge of United States superiority at 
the end of the next decade if agreement on parity 
of nuclear force at much reduced levels cannot 
be reached in future SALT negotiations. 
14. A related question of vital concern to Europe 
is whether the NATO strategy of relying on the 
threat of escalation to deter lower levels of 
attack remains credible in a period of strategie 
parity formally recognised by the SALT treaties. 
Wide press coverage has been given to a state-
ment by the former Secretary of State, Henry 
Kissinger, at a !'Jymposium on NATO held ~n 
Brulllels on 1st September. He is quoted as saying 
that "in the 1980s we will be in a position 
where (i) many of our own strategie forces, 
including aU our land-based ICBMs, will be vul-
nerable and (ii) such an insignificant percentage 
of Soviet strategie forces will be vulnerable as 
not to represent a meaningful strategie attack 
option for the United States". 
15. Against this view is to be set the statement 
on SALT issued by the North Atlantic Council 
on 29th June : 
"After detailed review, against the back-
ground of regular exchanges of views which 
have taken place within the Alliance through-
out the negotiations, the allies have con-
cluded that the new treaty is in harmony 
with the determination of the Alliance to 
pur'ISue meaningful arms control measures 
in search for a more stable relatioll!'Jhip 
between East and West. The allies therefore 
hope that the treaty will soon enter into 
force. 
This treaty responds to the hope of the allies 
for a reduction in nuclear arsenals and thus 
offers a broader prospect for détente. The 
allies note that the treaty fully maintains the 
United States strategie deterrent, an ~n­
tial el~ment for the security of Europe and 
of North America. They have been given 
explicit assurances by the United States, 
which they welcome, that nuclear and con-
ventional co-operation among the allies can 
and will continue." 
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16. In the view of the Committee a search for 
a true counter-force capability - i.e. the capa-
bility to destroy with a high degree of assuran<'e 
in a surprise strike all nuclear missiles held 
by the other side - could only be de!'Jtabili.sing 
and against the interests of either NATO or the 
Warsaw Pact. The Committee believes that 
numbers of warheads currently deployed by the 
United States and those authorised under 
SALT II provide options for the United States 
to strike selectively at military objectives in the 
Soviet Union while retaining in reserve more 
than 5,000 totally invulnerable warheads in its 
strategie I'!Ubmarines. President Carter's decisiCJn 
announced on 7th September to prepare for 
the deployment (after expiry of the protocol to 
SALT II) of 200 MX missiles in the United 
States can provide, under SALT II limits, up 
to 2,000 independently-targetable warheads. With 
the inherently greater accuracy of land-based 
missiles, coupled with an invulnerable mode for 
basing them, these missiles will significantly 
enhance the capability of the United States strike 
at military targets in the Soviet Union. 
(ii) Implications for levels of British and French 
nuclear forces 
17. Prior to the l'ligna ture of SALT I in 1972, 
the Soviet Union asserted, in a unilateral state-
ment, that the United States and its allies were 
believed to have a total of fifty ballistic missile 
submarines, with eight hundred launchers, and 
that if, in the period during which the agreement 
remained in force, the United States' NATO 
allies increased the number of submarines in 
operation or under construction at the date of the 
signing of the agreement, the Soviet Union would 
be entitled to increase the number of its 
submarines accordingly. The United States did 
not recognise that unilateral statement as 
forming part of the SALT I agreements. 
18. However, the final agreement did allow the 
Soviets a marginal ad van tage in the num ber of 
launchers, which coincided with the strengthB oi 
the British and French forces. This has been 
construed as an implicit recognition that the 
British and French forces were factors dn the 
balance. 
19. The statements of data appended to SALT 
II relate solely to United States and USSR 
systems and this time there is no marginal 
advantage in numbers conceded to the Soviet 
side. In this respect SALT II would appear to 
be more favourable to European interests in that 
British and French forces are explicitly excluded 
from the ceilings set by the treaty. Moreover the 
detailed texts of the agreed statements and 
common understandings appended to the SALT 
II treaty leave no room for a unilateral interpre-
tation of this issue I'!Uch as the Soviet Union 
attempted after SALT I. 
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(iii) Non-circumvention and mutual assistance 
20. The Committee dealt at length in the 
previous report on SALT 1 - and will report 
further in a forthcoming report - on the nuclear 
forces of France and the United Kingdom and 
the contribution they make to the allied deterrent 
as a whole. Recent developments concerning 
these forces will be reported only briefly here. 
21. In the report on the military programme 
1977-82 submitted to parliament by the French 
Government on lOth September 1979, the 
importance of the French nuclear force and its 
modernisation is clear : "Priority will be given 
to the new strategie weapons system M-4 
scheduled to enter service at the beginning of 
1985 on the sixth nuclear miS~Sile submarine 
Inflexible... The S-2 firing units on the Plateau 
d'Albion will be replaced by S-3 missiles with 
thermonuclear warheads... at the same time 
studies will be earried out on the future of the 
Plateau d'Albion and on a new strategie 
component for the post-1990 period which could 
use mobile surface-to-surface ballistic missiles or 
cruise missiles." ' 
22. As far as the British strategie force is con-
cerned, it appears likely that the present British 
Government will develop a replacement for the 
four Polaris-equipped nuclear submarines. 
23. Production of the present British force has 
relied heavily on co-operation with the United 
States including the mutual exchange of informa-
tion and fissile material. It is likely that a future 
modernisation programme will continue to do so. 
Two provisions of the 1958 United Kingdom-
United States agreement on the mutual exchange 
of infol'Illation and materials for military 
purposes - those governing the provision of 
nuclear fuel for propulsion plants, and the 
exchange of fissile and other nuclear material 
for construction of nuclear warheads - will 
expire on 31st December 1979 unless renewed 
for a further five-year period as they al ways 
have been in the past. The French nuclear force 
has not relied on continued co-operation with the 
United States ; nevertheless the option of mutual 
a&'listance between allied nuclear weapons powers 
is not one that the Committee would wish to see 
foreclosed. Assistance between a nuclear weapon 
power and a non-nuclear weapon power in the 
production of nuclear weapons is not however an 
issue as it is precluded by the treaty on the non-
proliferation of nuclear weapons. 
24. Concern has been expressed in sorne Euro-
pean quarters that the "non-circumvention" 
Article XII of the SALT II treaty would impede 
the mutual assistance that the Committee holds 
to be necessary : "In order to ensure the viability 
and effectiveness of this treaty, each party 
1. Document 787. 
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undertakes not to circumvent the provisions of 
this treaty, through any other state or statel!l or 
. ' In any other manner." 
25. It is understood that the drafting of this 
article was the subject of the very closelst consul-
tations between the United States and its allies 
principally concerned, and that the Soviet Union 
was unsuccessful in securing the insertion d 
restrictive language in this article. The official 
interpretation of the United States Administra-
tion was given to the North Atlantic Council on 
29th June 1979 and was released to the United 
States Congress in the testimony of the Secretary 
of State, Mr. Vance, on lOth July 1979: 
"In the view of the United States, the non-
circumvention provision in the SALT agree-
ment simply makes explicit the inherent 
obligation any state assumes when party to 
an international agreement not to circumvent 
the provisions of that agreement. It is a basic 
tenet of international law that agreements 
once entered into are to be carried out and 
not circumvented, and the United States 
would be so obligated with or without a non-
circumvention provision. It is the position of 
the United States that the non-circumvention 
provision does not impose any additional 
obligation whatever on it beyond the specifie 
obligations of the provisions of the treaty 
and, for the period of its effectiveness, the 
protocol, nor does it broaden the interpreta-
tion of those obligations. 
The United States has consulted intensively 
with the Alliance throughout the SALT II 
negotiations, recognising the important 
Alliance interest in the SALT II agreement 
which deals with the strategie relationship 
between the United States and the Soviet 
Union. In view of the possible implications 
of the non-circumvention clause for Alliance 
co-operation, the United States reiterates 
what it has specifically stated in Alliance 
consultations during the negotiatiollil, that 
is, the non.,circumvention provision will not 
affect existing patterns of collaboration and 
co-operation with its allies, nor will it 
preclude co-operation in modernisation. The 
United States believes that, in practice, the 
non-circumvention provision, which it will 
apply as stated below, will not interfere with 
continued nuclear and conventional clo-
operation with its allies. 
As to the issue of transfers, the United 
States has consistently rejected the inclusion 
of a provision on non-transfer in the SALT 
agreement. We have made clear in the 
negotiating record that transfers of weapons 
or technology to our allies will continue and 
cannot, ipso facto, constitute circumvention. 
The United States will deal with future 
requests for transfers of weapons systems 
-~-
and technology on a case-by-case basis under 
the SALT II agreement, as it has done in 
the past. The transfer of weapons systems 
or technology for systems which were not 
numerically limited or prohibited by the 
agreement would be unaffected by the agree-
ment. With respect to systems numerically 
limited in the agreement, as under the 
interim agreement, transfers would not be 
necessarily precluded by the agreement. Of 
course, requests for such transfers would, jn 
many cases, involve policy issues, and would 
have to be dealt with in light of the circum-
stances of the situation and the particular 
request. This would also be the case if there 
were no agreement. 
The United States will not be able to transfer 
to its allies or other states those weapons 
systems or technology uniquely related to 
such systems, which are prohibited to the 
United States itself by the agreement. The 
United States fully accepts its responsibility 
not to circumvent the agreement. For the 
United States to supply to other states 
systems of a type that is prohibited to the 
United States itself by a provision of the 
agreement would be a circumvention of the 
agreement, even if there were no non-
circumvention provision. 
In accordance with recognised international 
practice, no third party cau be bound or 
legally affected by the obligations the United 
States assumes under the SALT Il agree-
ment. The United States would reject and 
would view as inconsistent with the political 
and strategie purposes of the agreement any 
attempt by the Soviet Union to raise, on the 
basis of the non-circumvention provision, 
questions concerning the activities of states 
not party to the agreement. In both a legal 
and practical sense, only the United States is 
rsubject to challenge in connection with 
questions raised by the Soviet Union with 
respect to the SALT agreement." 
26. It is clear that the United States is committed 
to mainta:ining existing agreements in the field 
of mutual nuclear co-operation for military 
purposes, will deny only technology for weapons 
which are forbidden to the United States itself 
under the terms of SALT II, and will consider 
other requests for modernisation of existing 
weapons systtms on a case-by-case basis when 
requests are received. The Committee is satisfied 
that the SALT II text is not an obstacle to the 
continuance of co-operation between the United 
States and other nuclear weapons powers in the 
Alliance. 
(iv) Restrictions on cruise missile technology 
27. The protocol to the treaty prohibits the 
deployment before 1982 of mobile ICBM 
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launchers or cruise miS$iles with a range in 
excess of 600 km on sea-based or land-based 
launchers. It has frequently been argued that 
this protocol is hostile to European interests as 
the cruise missile is an attractive option for 
modernisation of European nuclear forces. 
28. The United States has denied that this 
protocol will set a precedent for permanent 
restraint on such technology in the course of 
SALT III, and its own confidence that the 
protocol will not be extended is illustrated by 
the recent announcement that the United States 
will proceed with the development of the MX 
mobile ICBM launcher with a view to deployment 
after the protocol has expired. 
29. The option of SLCMs or GLCMs will 
clearly be a matter for further negotiations in 
SALT III before the protocol expires, and the 
Committee in a future report 1 will consider what 
importance it attaches to these options. 
(v) Implications for Soviet medium-range systems 
30. Appended to the treaty are two statements 
on the Backfire bomber. In the first of these 
President Brezhnev assures the United States 
side that the Soviet Union "will not increase the 
radius of this plane in such a way as to enable 
it to strike targets on the territory of the United 
States", and in the second President Carter 
confirms that the United States enters into the 
agreement on the basis of that assurance. 
31. The agreed statements and common undel·-
standings include an assurance by the Soviet 
Union that it will not produce or deploy the 
SS-16. The assurance was given as the SS-16, 
which is an ICBM capable of hitting America, 
shares the same launcher 2s the SS-20, which is 
a MRBM targeted against Western Europe, and 
its deployment would have posed major problems 
of verification. 
32. In both these examples SALT restricts 
Soviet deployment of strategie systems which 
threaten the United States, whilst placing no 
restraint on parallel systems which threaten 
Europe. The Committee will deal in detail with 
the question of the threat from the SS-20 and 
the Backfire in another report 2 but notes here 
that these two intermediate weapons systems are 
not uncountered threats: (i) the Backfire bomber 
has shorter range and less thau half the payload 
of the United States FB-111 A bombers based 
in the United Kingdom, and (ii) the SS-20 
represents not a new threat, but an increase in 
the threat posed by the seven hundred Soviet 
SS-4 and SS-5 missiles since 1959 ; that a 
1. On SALT III and the future of the British and 
French nuclear forces, Rapporteur Mr. Mo=ersteeg. 
2. New weapons and defence strategy, Rapporteur 
Mr. van den Bergh. 
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substantial proportion of them have been 
reported as deployed against China ; and that 
the present total of the strategie nuclear war-
heads of the three allied nuclear powers consider-
ably exceeds the total of the Soviet strategie and 
intermediate-range weapons. 
(vi) Guldellnes for SALT III 
33. The treaty is accompanied by a joint state-
ment of principles and basic guidelines for SALT 
III on which the Committee will report to the 
first part of the twenty-sixth ordinary se~ion 
(June 1980) 1• The Committee therefore does not 
examine in detail the implications of SALT III 
in a report dealing essentially with SALT II, but 
notes the following points. 
34. 'fhe gu'idelines contained in the joint state-
ment are very broad and expre~ the intention of 
both parties to pursue negotiations for a further 
reduction in the numbers of strategie arms and 
for their further qualitative limitation. AU 
paragraphs in the joint statement relate to 
strategie systems, including even the final provi-
sion tli.at : "Each party will be free to raise any 
issue relative to the further limitation of strategie 
arms." 
35. The main provisions are : 
"First. In furtherance of existing agreements 
between the parties on the limitation and 
reduction of strategie arms, the parties will 
continue, for the purposes of reducing and 
averting the risk of outbreak of nuclear war, 
to seek measures to strengthen strategie 
stability by, among other things, limitations 
on strategie offensive arms most destabilising 
to the strategie balance ttnd by measures tù 
reduce and to avert the risk of surprise 
attack. 
Third. The parties shall pursue in the course 
of these negotiations, taking into considera-
tion factors that determine the strategie 
situation 2, the following objectives: 
(1) significant and substantial reductiom~ in 
the numbers of strategie offensive arms; 
(2) qualitative limitations on strategie 
offensive arms, including restrictions 
on the development, testing, and 
deployment of new types of strategie 
offensive arms and on the modernisa-
tion of existing strategie offensive 
arms; 
1. SALT III and the future of the British and 
French nuelear forees, Rapport1•ur Mr. Mommersteeg. 
2. Italies added. 
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(3) resolution of the issues included in the 
protocol to the treaty between the 
United States of America and the Union 
of Soviet Socialist Republics on the 
limitation of strategie offensive arms 
in the context of the negotiations relat-
ing to the implementation of the 
principles and objectives set out herein. 
Fourth. The parties will consider other steps 
to em~Ure and enhance strategie stability, to 
ensure the equality and equal security nf 
the parties, and to implement the above 
principles and objectives. Each party will be 
free to raise any isme relative to the furth~r 
limitation of strategie arms 1• The parties 
will also consider further joint measures, as 
appropriate, to strengthen international 
peace and security and to reduce the risk 
of outbreak of nuclear war." 
36. It is understood that certain European 
allies of the United States were armous to 
exclude any advance commitment on the 
inclusion of grey area weapons such as MRBMs, 
but that the inclusion at their insistance of the 
words "taking into consideration factors that 
determine the strategie situation" is intended w 
permit discussion inter alia of SS-20, and that 
the Soviet Union will in any case feel free ~o 
raise what is termed "forward-based systems" in 
view of the words italicised under heading 
"Fourth" above. Europeans may take the view 
that "Eurostrategic" weapons cannot be included 
in the dialogue W'ithout sorne changes in the 
structure of the talks, at the very least to 
formalise consultation between America and its 
European allies. It may also be difficult to reach 
agreement with the Soviet Union on theatre 
nuclear weapons without sorne reference to the 
British and French nuclear forces. These are 
options that will be critically examined in the 
SALT III context ; the Committee is satisfied 
that in SALT II they remain open. 
IV. Conclusion and ratification of the treaty 
37. The treaty is now before the United States 
Senate for ratification, a proceJ~S which is 
expected to last though the autumn with a final 
vote at the end of November or beginning of 
December. To obtain ratification the treaty 
requires the votes of two-thirds of the Senate, 
but can be amended by a simple majority. 
38. Having reviewed the SALT II treaty and 
protocol in the light of the interpretative texts 
(ASCUs) and statements by the United States 
Administration to the Sen::te committees, and 
of the statement issued by the North Atlantic 
Council on 29th June 1979 2, it is the opinion of 
1. !talles added. 
2. Paragraph 15 above. 
the Committee that the treaty and the protocol 
will enhance, and not diminish, European and 
Atlantic security. 
39. The treaty makes disappointing progress 
towards disarmament, but the SALT process has 
made a worthwhile contribution to ~uperpower 
understanding and the terms of SALT II should 
be broadly acceptable to Europeans. However, 
even if SALT II is regarded with reservations 
because of the high ceilings it 8ets, failure to 
ratify would damage détente to a degree which 
is more dangerous than any provision within the 
treaty. 
40. The Committee doe:s not discuss the current 
ratification debate in the United States Senate, 
which appears to involve many matters internai 
to that country, but in view of the importance rf 
ratification for the whole of the Alliance it 
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proposes that a resolution be addressed to the 
United States Senate to inform its members of 
the views of the Assembly which has unique 
competence under the Brussels Treaty to discuss 
defence. The Committee reques~ the Presidential 
Committee to use its powers under Rule 14(2) to 
adopt the draft resolution as a matter of urgency. 
V. Opinion of the minority 
41. The report as a whole was adopted in Com-
mittee by 13 votes to 1 with 0 abstentions. The 
minori.ty stressed that its vote against was not 
to be interpreted a.S condemnation of the efforts 
of the United States and the Soviet Union to 
control strategie nuclear armaments, but was 
cast because the minority felt the Committee was 
committing an act of faith in approving the 
SALT II texts in too rouch haste. 
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APPENDIX I 
RECOMMENDATION 324 1 
on the limitation of strategie arms 2 
The Assembly, 
Believing that the security of Europe must continue to rely. both on a credible nuclear deter-
rent, i.e. a clearly-demonstrated threat of destruction to the adversary far greater thau the stake 
represented by the territories defended, and on su:fficiently numerous conventional forces ; 
Considering that the United States strategie nuclear forces form the preponderant part of the 
allied deterrent but tbat the British and French nuclear forces, through the uncertainties with which 
they face Soviet planners, make a greater contribution thau their size would suggest; 
Stressing that the Atlantic declaration made in Ottawa on 19th June 1974 assigns to the 
British and French strategie nuclear forces a deterrent rôle of their own; 
Deploring the inadequacy of progress in détente and concerned by the deterioration of East-
West relations ; 
Welcoming any attempt to curb or stop the quantitative or qualitative strategie arms race; 
Convinced of the essential and urgent nature of genuine European concertation on defence 
matters, for which the WEU Council is the natural framework, 
REoOMMENns THAT THE CoUNoiL 
1. W ork together to reach agreement on a common defence policy based on deterrence and taking 
account of the resulta of the strategie arms limitation talks; 
2. Accept no restrictions, imposed or implied, on the forces of allied countries not directly parti-
cipating in the talks ; 
3. Maintain the right of nuclear powers members of the Alliance to provide mutual assistance in 
respect of nuclear weapons ; 
4. Look to a co-ordinated effort to re-establish the true balance of nuclear and conventional forces 
between the Alliance and the Warsa w Pact ; 
5. Monitor the pursuit, deepening and extension of the process of détente; 
6. Ensure that the North Atlantic Council effectively examines every aspect of the strategie arms 
limitation talks and that the WEU member states may through this channel assert their interests in 
this field. 
1. Adopted by the Assembly on 2lst November 1978 during the Second Part of the Twenty-Fourth Ordinary Session 
(lOth Sitting). 
2. Explanatory Memorandum: see the Report tabled by Mr. Baume! on behalf of the Committee on Defence Questions 
and Armaments (Document 787). 
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REPLY OF THE COUNCIL 1 
to Recommendation 324 
1. The member governments have recently reaffirmed their resolve to seek further improvement in 
East (West relations and their continued commitment to a policy of détente as the beat means of promot-
ing stable and mutually beneficiai relationships between governments and better and more frequent 
contacts between individuals. Concrete, balanced and verifiable arma control and disarmament measures 
would in their view contribute significantly to this search for security, stability and peace. 
2. In this context a SALT II agreement which contributes to strategie stability, maintains deterrence 
and responds to the security interests and concerna of the North Atlantic Alliance is considered to be 
in the common interest. Member governments have recently welcomed the progress made in the nego-
tiations, and have expressed support for American efforts to bring them to a successful conclusion. 
3. SALT bears directly on the interest of member governments because of the rôle of American 
strategie forces in the "NATO Triad" of conventional forces, theatre nuclear forces and strategie nuclear 
forces, which provide a spectrum of military capabilities enabling NATO to meet aggression at any leval 
with an appropriate response, while also making it impossible for an aggressor to calculate in advance 
the nature of the response his attack will provoke, or how the conflict may develop thereafter. 
4. Conscious of this direct interest, the Americans have kept the North Atlantic Council informed 
of the progress of the negotiations and, in particular, there have been regular discussions on issues of 
special interest to member governments of WEU. 
5. Notwithstanding repeated eastern assurances that their aim is not to seek military superiority, 
member governments have continued to note with concern the steady build-up of Warsaw Pact forces 
and armaments, both conventional and nuclear. In the face of these developments, it remains the view 
of member governments that there is a need to devote the resources necessary to modernise and streng-
then allied capabilities to the extent required for deterrence and defence. 
1. Communicated to the Assembly on 21st March 1979. 
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APPENDIX II 
Comparative table of United States and Soviet strategie offensive arms to be limited by SALT 1 
Levels at mid-1979 
United States Soviet Union 
No. of Maximum No. of MffiVs Assumed No. No. of No. of Assumed No. Type missiles or 
each of warheads Type missiles or MIR Vs of warheads 
aircraft 
missile aire raft each 
missile 
Titan II 54 l 54 SS-9 lOO l lOO 
Minuteman II 450 l 450 SS-ll 638 l 638 
5 Minuteman III 550 3 1,650 SS-13 60 l 60 
~ SS-17 lOO 4 270 
SS-18 200 8 1,080 
SS-19 300 6 1,210 
Sub-total 1,054 2,154 1,398 3,358 
Polaris A-3 160 1 160 SS-N6 528 l 528 
Poseidon 496 10-14 5,120 SS-N8 266 l 266 
00 
~ SS-N17 12 l 12 
~ SS-Nl8 144 3 432 
Sub-total 656 5,280 950 1,238 
B-52 365 1,760 Bear ll3 
g'I:II Bison 43 
a i r~ Sub-total 156 500 
TOTALS 2,058 9,200 2,504 5,100 
Source: Compiled from data in SALT II texts; IISS Military Balance 1979-80; Report by United States Representative 
Les Aspin, 5th July 1979. 
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Amendment 1 
SALT II and its implications for European security 
AMENDMENT 1 1 
tabled by Lord McNair 
4th December 1979 
l. In the draft resolution proper, leave out "CALLs UPON THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES To" 
and insert "EXPRESSES THE HOPE THAT THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES WILL". 
Signed : MeN air 
1. See 13th Sitting, 5th December 1979 (Amendment agreed to). 
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Document 816 Addendum 3rd December 1979 
SALT II and its implications for European security 
ADDENDUM 1 
submitted on behalf of the 
Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments 
by Mr. Cook, Rapporteur 
Introduction 
1. The Committee adopted its report on 
SALT II and its implications for European 
security on 25th September 1979. The document 
incorporates a draft resolution calling upon the 
Senate of the United States to approve the ratifi-
cation without amendment of the SALT II treaty, 
and in the explanatory memorandum the Com-
mittee requested the Presidential Committee to 
use its powers under Rule 14 (2) to adopt the 
draft resolution as a matter of urgency 2 • 
2. At a meeting on 15th October the Presi-
dential Committee decided not to act thus on 
behalf of the Assembly, and instead placed the 
item on the agenda of the Assembly for discus-
sion at the second part of the twenty-fifth 
session. At the request of the Chairman of the 
Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments 
the report was referred back to that Committee to 
enable it to up-date the report in the interven-
ing period. 
3. In this addendum to the explanatory 
memorandum the Committee provides additional 
information, which moreover confirms it in the 
views expressed in Document 816. As the ratifi-
cation debate on the floor of the United States. 
Senate has been delayed until now - it may 
begin at any time - the Assembly will, as it 
happens, debate the Committee's report at the 
most opportune time. 
European approval 
4. The full approval of the North Atlantic 
Council for the SALT II texts quoted in para-
graph 15 of the Committee's report of course 
commits the seven governments of the WEU 
countries, but since that report was adopted 
statements by President Giscard d'Estaing of 
France and Chancellor Schmidt of Germany, 
following their meeting in Bonn on 2nd October 
1979, have been particularly noted. President 
1. Adopted in Committee by 20 votes to 2 with 
3 abstentions. 
2. Document 816, paragraph 40. 
66 
Giscard d'Estaing is quoted as saying in the 
presence of the Chancellor : "W e both judge the 
ratification and implementation of SALT II as 
desirable, whatever other problems there may be 
on the international scene", while Chancellor 
Schmidt said : "We both stressed how interested 
we are in the rôle of SALT II for our own 
security". 
North Atlantic Assembly 
5. On lOth and 12th September four European 
members of the North Atlantic Assembly testified 
before a sub-committee of the Senate Foreign 
Relations Committee in favour of the ratification 
of the SALT II treaty. At the Twenty-Fifth 
Session of that Assembly in Ottawa from 22nd 
to 27th October 1979, it adopted Resolution 91 
on the SALT II treaty \ which reads, in part, 
"the Assembly, ... convinced therefore that in 
providing the framework for a secure and stable 
strategie balance between the United States and 
the Soviet Union, the treaty reduces the pos-
sibility of nuclear war, contributes to inter-
national stability and thereby promotes the 
security interests of the member nations of the 
North Atlantic Alliance, ... urges the United 
States Government 2 to proceed to early ratifi-
cation of the SALT II treaty, with due respect 
to ali requirements for credible deterrence, stable 
nuclear balance, and future arms control 
negotiations ... ". The resolution was adopted by 
71 votes to 0 with 38 abstentions. The abstentions 
included the United States and French repre-
sentatives ; eight CDU members of the German 
delegation ; five Turkish representatives and one 
Greek. 
Report of the United States Senate Foreign 
Relations Committee 
6. On 9th November 1979 the Foreign Relations 
Committee of the United States Senate, by 
9 votes to 6, recommended to the Senate that it 
1. Text at Appendix I. 
2. Used in the American sense of legislative and 
executive branch of government. 
advise and consent to the ratification of the 
SALT II treaty. In a lengthy report the Com-
mittee concluded inter alia that the treaty would: 
"contribute to - not damage - United 
States national security interests ... 
With the understandings the committee has 
recommended relating to the protocol and 
defence co-operation with NATO, the treaty 
protects the security interests of America's 
allies. The committee believes our allies 
endorse the treaty and desire its prompt 
ratification because they have concluded 
that it is in their interests ... 
The committee's overall judgment is that 
the treaty is an acceptable balance of com-
promises by both sides, and that the agree-
ment gives no undue or uncompensated 
advantage to either party ... 
The treaty contains useful limitations on 
the strategie arms of both sides. However, 
from the arms control point of view, the 
value of the treaty's limits and constraints 
is principally in their precedential signifi-
cance for negotiation of deeper reductions 
and more stringent controls in SALT III. 
The committee recommends that the Senate 
delineate its own goals for more significant 
reductions and qualitative constraints in 
SALT III..." 
7. The Senate Committee passed some twenty 
reservations, declarations and understandings 
relating to approval of the treaty, of which five 
should be noted. Only two of these would require 
acknowledgement by the Soviet Union: that the 
Soviet statement on the Backfire bomber 1 handed 
by President Brezhnev to President Carter in 
Vienna on 16th June 1979 be considered part 
of the treaty and that the "agreed statements 
and common understandings" (ASCUs) appended 
to the treaty also be ~onsidered part of it. These 
provisos will not impede the entry into force of 
the treaty - the ASCUs in particular were 
signed by both Presidents at the Vienna meeting 
and are appended to the treaty texts, while the 
Backfire statement was handed over prior to 
signature and is also circulated with the treaty 
texts. 
8. The Senate committee proposes that the 
President of the United States should "affirm 
that the United States will assure that the Soviet 
military forces in Cuba are not engaged in a 
combat rôle nor will they pose a threat to any 
1. Paragraph 6 of the explanatory memorandum to 
Document 816. 
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country in this hemisphere". The Senate com-
mittee also recommends that the Senate make a 
declaration "to ensure that essential equivalence 
with the Soviet Union is maintained". 
9. The last important "understanding", adopted 
unanimously by the Senate committee on 22nd 
October, declares that nothing in the SALT II 
treaty "prevents the United States from continu-
ing existing patterns of collaboration and 
co-operation with its allies on nuclear and con-
ventional weapons required for the common 
defence including co-operation on modernisation". 
The Committee on Defence Questions and 
Armaments particularly welcomes this under-
standing of the Senate Foreign Relations Com-
mittee, which endorses the position of the United 
States Administration set forth in the Com-
mittee's report 1. 
10. The Committee on Defence Questions and 
Armaments recalls however that, as stated in its 
report, two provisions of the 1958 United King-
dom-United States agreement on the mutual 
exchange of information and materials for mili-
tary purposes - those governing the provision 
of nuclear fuel for propulsion plants, and the 
exchange of fissile and other nuclear material 
for construction of nuclear warheads - will 
expire on 31st December 1979 unless renewed, 
as they always have been for five-year periods 
in the past. 
11. Four Republican senators have signed a 
minority report to the report of the Senate 
Foreign Relations Committee, saying that: 
"While we acknowledge that the treaty contains 
some positive aspects, it is our judgment, none-
theless, that the SALT II treaty ... is detrimental 
to the security of the United States ... ". 
Conclusions 
12. Nothing in the recent events described in 
this addendum to the explanatory memorandum 
of the Committee's report leads the Committee 
to modify the views it expresses in the draft 
resolution contained in its report ; rather the 
events confirm the soundness of the Committee's 
appreciation. The Committee especially welcomes 
the assertion by the United States Senate Foreign 
Relations Committee, referred to in paragraph 9 
above, that nothing in the SALT II treaty would 
prevent co-operation between the United States 
and its allies on nuclear weapons for the common 
defence. 
1. Document 816, paragraph 25. 
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The Assembly, 
APPENDIX 
North Atlantic Assembly Resolution 91 
on the SALT II treaty 
adopted in Ottawa on 21th October 1919 
by 11 votes to 0 with 38 abstentions 
APPENDIX 
Noting that the SALT II treaty is a culmination of seven years of rigorous and complex negotiation 
by three United States administrations, and representa adherence to the obligation of the two superpowers 
under the non-proliferation treaty; 
Recognising that the treaty places numerical restraints on Soviet strategie capabilities, in terms 
of both launchers and warheads, and enhances western capabilities to predict and monitor the development 
and deployment of Soviet strategie forces ; 
Recognising further that the treaty permits the United States to pursue aU measures necessary to 
sustain the strength and credibility of the United States strategie deterrent; 
Assured that neither the treaty nor the protocol will inhibit necessary military and technological 
co-operation within the Alliance ; 
Convinced therefore that in providing the framework for a secure and stable strategie balance 
between the United States and the Soviet Union, the treaty redu ces the possibility of nuclear war, con tri butes 
to international stability, and thereby promotes the security interests of the member nations of the 
North Atlantic Alliance; 
Recognising the SALT II treaty as an essential step towards the goal achieving more substantial 
reductions in the nuclear arsenals of both sides during a future SALT III negotiation; 
Convinced that a SALT III negotiation provides the most promising forum for nuclear reductions 
in the European theatre and that progress in such a negotiation would facilitate collateral progress in 
related negotiations within the MBFR and CSCE framework ; 
Reminded that the twin precepts of the Alliance are defence and détente; 
Recognising that the unanimous endorsement of the SALT II treaty by the leaders of all member 
states of the Alliance reflects broad-based public support of the SALT process as a central element in the 
effort to stabilise the East-West military balance and simultaneously to improve East-West relations; 
Concerned, with regard to defence, that failure to ratify the SALT II treaty would have a seriously 
disruptive impact on the cohesion of the North Atlantic Alliance; 
Concerned, with regard to détente, that failure to ratify SALT II would result in a deterioration 
in East-West relations, potentially negating many of such positive aspects of détente as expanded trade, 
cultural contacts, and reunification of families; 
Respecting as an assembly of parliamentarians the sovereign right and the responsibilities of the 
United States Senate to decide on the ratification of SALT II ; 
URGES THE UNITED STATES GovERNMENT : 
1. To proceed to early ratification of the SALT II treaty, with due respect to ali requirements for 
credible deterrence, stable nuclear balance and future arms control negotiations ; 
2. To undertake SALT III negotiations aimed at accomplishing significant reductions in each side's 
nuclear forces ; 
3. To consult fully and regularly with the allies on all aspects of the negotiations, in particular on 
those pertaining to theatre nuclear forces. 
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Brazilian-European collaborative ventures 
and the consequences for Europe 
REPORT 1 
submitted on behalf of the 
27th September 1979 
Committee on Scientifi.c, Technological and Aerospace Questions 2 
by MM. Lewis, Adriaensens, Scheffler and Cornelissen, Rapporteurs 
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IV. The Ariane programme 
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1. Adopted unanimously by the Committee. 
2. Members of the Committee: Mr. Warren (Chair-
man) ; MM. Vallen, Lenzer (Vice-Chairmen) ; MM. 
Adriaensens (Alternate : Brasseur), Bagier (Alterna te : 
Lord Hughes), Bernini, Cavaliere, Cornelissen (Alternate : 
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Portheine), Hawkins (Alternate : Miller), Konings, Lewis, 
Malvy, Mart, Müller, Péronnet, Pinto, Bchwencke, Talon, 
Treu, Ueberhorst, van Waterschoot. 
N.B. The names of those taking part in the vote are 
printed in itaZics. 
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Draft Recommendation 
on Brazilian-European collaborative ventures 
and the consequences for Europe 
The Assembly, 
Considering the wishes expressed by the Brazilian Senate and Government officiais to strengthen 
scientific and technological co-operation between Brazil and the countries of Western Europe; 
Convinced that greater international co-operation in a.dvanced technology can but be beneficiai 
for both Brazil and the countries of Western Europe and will help to a.dvance their political and economie 
positions; 
Aware that in recent years Brazil ha.s advanced more quickly than some Western European conn-
tries in finding alternative energy resources; 
Impressed by the progress of technical development plans in Brazil concerning meteorology and 
communications ; 
Conscious of the mutual advanta.ges of collaboration between Brazil and Western Europe in: 
(a) nuclear research and development; 
(b) alternative energy resources; 
(c) space resea.rch and development; 
(cl) aircraft development, 
REOOMMENDS THAT THE 00UNOIL 
Invite member governments : 
1. To improve European co-ordination in respect of existing nuclea.r research and development pro-
grammes in Brazil, with special emphasis on security and safety problems ; 
2. To co-operate with the Brazilian Government on alternative energy resources ; 
3. To instruct the European Space Agency to develop closer relations with Brazil with a view to 
concluding a co-operation agreement with particular regard to the joint use of launch and tracking faci-
Iities and the development of remote sensing and direct television satellites ; 
4. To encourage industrial collaboration with Brazil in developing its next generation of civil and 
military aircraft ; 
5. To increa.se ex changes of experts with Brazil in the field of research and the application of technology. 
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Explanatory Memorandum 
(submitted by MM. Lewis, Adriaensens, Scheffler and Cornelissen, Rapporteurs) 
Introduction 
1. The Committee wishes to preface this report 
with its thanks to the Presidential Committee, 
for agreeing to this valuable visit, to the staff 
of the Brazilian Embassy in Paris, and espeeially 
Mr. de Carvalho Lopes, who helped the Chairman 
draw up a useful programme. The Ministry for 
External Relations, the Ministries of Mines and 
Energy and of Industry and Commerce as well 
as the governmental and private institutes and 
firms in Brazil greatly contributed to the success 
of the visit and the Committee expresses its 
sincere appreciation for their valuable assistance. 
2. The Committee particularly wishes to 
mention the work done by the Direetor General 
of ESA and the Directors of the Ariane pro-
gramme, external reLations and the base in 
Kourou who prepared and conducted an excellent 
programme for its visit to French Guiana. It 
was not easy to harmonise the Brazilian and ESA 
programmes but the visit went very smoothly. 
3. In preparing for its visit the Committee 
submitted a number of questions for use as guide-
lines for the discussions in Brazil 1 and was 
briefed by ESA authorities ~. 
4. To all who contriburted to the preparation 
and conduct of the visit 3 the Committee expresses 
its sincere gratitude. 
5. The Committee, on 5th July, had the honour 
of being received by the President of the Senate, 
Mr. Luis Viana Filho, in the Palace of Congress, 
where it met the Bureau of the Senate, the 
leader of the majority in the Senate, Senator 
Garbas Passarinho, Professor José Walter 
Bantista Vidal, and severa! other senators. 
6. The President of the Senate gave a general 
indication of how parliamentary supervision by 
committees worked in the Senate and in the 
Chamber of Deputies. He gave the floor to 
Senator Garbas Passarinho who said that the 
activities of the government in promoting research 
and developmeni were discussed in the appro-
priate committees as weil as on the floor of 
both Houses of Congress. The government's 
nuclear programme of course was of special 
interest. However, the parliament did not have 
the right to increase or reduce the budget 
proposed by the government. It there:flore had no 
active rôle in this field but might voice its 
opinion. Parliament had a more active rôle in 
1. Bee Appenclix II. 
2. Bee Appenclix III. 
3. Bee Appendix I : Progra=e of the visit. 
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the legislative process ; laws were proposed by 
the executive and discussed, but most of the time 
they were voted in their entirety and amendments 
might not be made unless approved by the govern-
ment. 
7. The frontiers between a full democracy and 
a guided democracy were not always very clear 
eut. The present constitution aJlowed only two 
political parties, but the government party con-
tro1led both Houses of Congress. 
8. However, in severa! towns and states the 
opposition party formed the local or regional 
administration. 
9. As the re had been an oil crisis since last 
year the government was to submit to parliament 
its proposais for handling the new situation more 
efficiently. The country would continue with its 
development projects started ten years ago, but 
certain elements would have to be changed. For 
instance, parliament would d.iscuss anew the 
nuclear power stations programme which, when 
proposed, was estimated at $12 billion but which 
might now cost sorne $25 bil.lion. .A:ccording to 
the original plans 40 % of Brazilian exports 
were needed to pay the petrol bill, burt with 
the oil crisis this percentage would certainly be 
much higher. 
10. The President of the Senate wound up the 
discussion by thanking the Committee for its 
visii to Brazil and expressed the hope that the 
contacts established would be fruitful for 
members' work in Europe. 
11. Mr. Valleix, Vice-Chairman of the Com-
mittee, gave a presentation to the hosts on the 
work of Western European Union, its Assembly 
and Committees. 
1. Bra:zil, ifs economy and technology 
(submitted by Mr. Lewis, Rapporteur) 
12. Brazil is vast. It covers sorne 8,510,000 
sq.km. with a population of 115 miLlion. The 
whole of Europe, as far as the Urals, covers 
10,240,000 sq.km. and the total population is 
628 million persons. 
13. On 4th July 1979, during the Committee's 
visit to Brazil, the President, J oao Figueiredo, 
addressed the nation indicating that the Brazilian 
economy should be put on a wartime basis 
because of the nation's energy situation. During 
the entire visit the energy situation was very 
much to the fore as it is threatening the nation's 
economie and social development. The President 
eonsiders the energy crisis and increased petrol 
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priees to be major dangers which could result 
in greater inflation, payments deficits and slower 
growth. The President said Brazil, like the 
western nations, should accustom itself to the 
imminence of living under a wartime economy. 
Brazil imports some 85 % of its oil and in 1979 
expenditure on imported oil was estimated at 
some $7 billion. A national energy commission 
is to carry out the new petroleum policy which 
will include stimulating exploration for petrol 
reserves and the development of alternative 
sources of energy. 
14. The development of the Brazilian economy 
in the period 1974-79 raised the gross national 
product from US$65 billion to more than 
$100 billion, and the per capita income to some 
$1,000 per year. Ind:ustrial expansion has 
accelerated greatly over the last ten years but 
requires an equally rapid growth of imports, 
especially of machine tools, capital goods, etc., 
and a boost to exports. The level of exports 
however remains rather low with inevitable con-
sequences for the balance of payments. 
15. Industrial growth in the period 1975-79 
was of the order of 12 % a year with special 
emphasis on the shipbuilding and capital goods 
indUBtries and petrochemicals. Government policy 
aims at making Brazil more independent in such 
fields as aircraft, ships, motor cars, components 
for the automobile industry, agricultural equip-
ment, and road-making and hydroelectric equip-
ment. Apart from modernisation of the agri-
clllltural sector, the main emphasis has been on 
energy policy which has led to the production 
of electrical energy generated basically by 
hydraulic means. However, Brazil remains 
dependent on oil for transportation and as a 
raw material for the chemical industry. 
16. A great deal of attention has been given 
to the promotion of science and technology as 
they form the basis for rapid development of 
the country. The development of new technologies 
such as nuclear energy, research into non-
conventional sources of energy, space activities 
and oceanography has also received major promo-
tion by the government during the last decade. 
17. The abovementioned fields of research, even 
if not directly related to productive sootors, were 
jUBtified not only in terms of the need to follow 
scientific and technological developments at 
world level, but also because of their impact 
on the national development process and on the 
improvement of the living standards of the 
entire population. Many of these activities are 
financed by government funds, either on a yearly 
basis or in accordance with national three-year 
plans for scientific and technological develop-
ment. In many cases foreign resources are also 
required and international organisations there-
fore play an important rôle in the national 
development programme. International assistance 
comes from agencies such as the United Nations 
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development programme and the Organisation of 
American States. The need to eut down on 
imports has led to the adoption of several 
exceptional measures, including ceilings for 
government expenditure in foreign exchange. 
External resources account for some 5 % of 
financing for research and development projects. 
18. In the development of new technologies, 
nuclear energy accounts for 12.9 % of the budget 
for scientific and technological development, 
space activities and sea resources 3.7 %, indus-
trial technology 25.5 %, agricultural technology 
13.7 %, training of personnel 26.3 %, regional 
and social development 7.3 %, and infrastructure 
1.9 %. 
19. In the discussions between the Committee 
and Ambassador Baena, Secretary General of 
the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, it was pointed 
out that inflation in Brazil is a major problem 
since it prevents Brazil from finding new markets 
for its products. Some results have been achieved, 
especially with ships built in Brazil and aircraft 
built by Embraer. Brazil has also built a small 
computer which for the moment is produced 
mainly for the internai market but which might 
be exported. Traditionally Brazil is on very good 
terms with Portuguese-speaking countries in 
Africa, with which it has commercial relations, 
and which receive development aid from Brazil. 
20. Apart from the Portuguese-speaking conn-
tries around the Atlantic perimeter, Brazil also 
has a close relationship with Nigeria as in many 
respects they are developing in parallel due to 
their increasing mutual interests in energy and 
technology markets. 
21. Your Rapportem wishes to draw attention 
to an article by Mr. Kerry Fraser in the Inter-
national Herald Tribune of 27th August 1979. 
Writing on the Brazilian foreign debt, he stated : 
"Now the largest in the developing world, 
by year's end the debt will be bucking the 
$50 billion mark. More important than its 
size is its weight, and the limit that puts 
on Brazil's growth. 
This year, interest payments will eat up 
$3.4 billion, and amortisation will oost 
another $5.9 billion. On top of that, Brazil 
expects to spend $6 to $7 billion importing 
oil. 
The upshot of ali this is that Brazil's hard-
currency needs to meet only the debt service 
and petroleum import oosts will most likely 
exceed the $14-$15 billion that exports will 
generate in 1979. 
The importance of these numbers is funda-
mental : at the beginning of 197 4, when 
Brazil's net debt - debt less reserves -
was only $6 billion, it was able to borrow 
its way out of the recession that chilled 
the world economy in the years that fol-
lowed. Now the need to pay for that bor-
rowing looks like one of the country's 
tightest growth constraints, and the need to 
repay is going to get greater. 
Next year, Brazil will have to amortise 
$6.7 billion and, in 1981, $7 billion. Only 
in 1982 does the amortisation schedule begin 
to taper off to $6.2 billion, but this year's 
borrowing is already swelling the 1982 
schedule because of Brazil's policy of 
demanding repayment conditions of thirty 
months' grace on eight-year terms or more. 
The problem is that Brazil has to do more 
than just pay for oil and its debt in order 
to grow. It has to impol'lt as weil. Essential 
raw materials and capital goods cost the 
country $8 billion in 1978, and though 
Brazil has invested massively since 197 4 in 
import substitution, irts growth is, and will 
remain, dependent on its ability to import. 
Given the numbers, that means it is depen-
dent on its ability to borrow and to increase 
export earnings." 
22. The vigour and determination of the 
Brazilian people was apparent in ali the technical 
programmes examined during the visit. Technical 
competence is often stretched to the limit, but 
the huge education programme, with 1.5 million 
students at universities, is taking Brazil forward 
to world power staJtus in the twenty-first century. 
fi. Energy 
(submitted by Mr. Adriaensens, Rapporteur) 
23. Your Rapporteur will start this chapter by 
underlining that it is of course impossible to 
discuss Brazil's energy position and policy in 
their entirerty. He will therefore keep to those 
aspects which were discussed during the visit 
to the National Commission for Nuclear Energy, 
the Brazilian Nuclear Enterprises Inc. and the 
Ministry of Mines and Energy and agencies in 
Brasilia, such as the National Council for Scien-
tific and Technological Deveil.opment. 
24. At the Nuclear Energy Commission the 
Executive Director, Dr. Rex Nazaré Aloes, 
pointed out that the commission had been set up 
to guide the establishment of infrastructure for 
nuclear energy. In order to do so the commission, 
under the basic law of its establishment and the 
application law, had the following tasks: 
s• 
(a) to assist the Ministry of Mines and 
Energy with the formulation and plan-
ning of national nuclear energy policy ; 
(b) to promote the application of nuclear 
energy for peaceful purposes and the 
training of scientists and experts ; 
( c) to issue regulations with regard to 
nuclear facilities, materials and the 
processing of radioactive waste ; 
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( d) to produce pa pers relating to nuclear 
energy, set up laboratories and organise 
research; 
( e) to organise prospection for and mining 
of nuclear ore ; 
(f) international relations. 
25. There are good prospects of being able to 
mine nuclear ore economically. In 1978, 142,300 
tons of uranium ore were mined and, in 1979, 
about 200,000 tons will be mined. The largest 
field is near ltatiaia in the north-east. 
26. Brazil is to equip itself with pressurised 
water reactors, the first of which will deliver 
624 MW and the others 1,300 MW. A total of 
eight power plants will be built ; the first should 
be ready in 1982 and the last in 1990. 
27. On 27th June 1975 an agreement was con-
cluded with Western Germany for the supply 
of these eight nuclear reactors and the construc-
tion of plants for processing irradiated fuels and 
for uranium enrichment. 
28. A contract has also been signed with the 
French firm STEC for a uranium processing 
plant in the state of Minas Gerais which should 
become operational in 1979. Its initial annual 
production will be 500 tons and this will be used 
to fu€1 Brazil's first nuclear reactor. 
29. In view of the fact that Brazil has no good 
coal resources and its hydroelectric potential will 
far from meet its requirements in the years 
2000-10, the development of nuclear energy is 
a necessity. The hydroelectric potential is 
estimated at 150 gigawatts electricity whereas 
350 GWe will be required. Brazil's energy 
requirements need to be decentralised and, 
although the Amazon area oould probably be 
self-supporting in energy, it is not possible to 
transfer energy economically from there to the 
south of the country. With a population increase 
of approximately 3 % per year, the energy 
increase should be 5 % if the present-day 
standard of living is to be maintained. In order 
to improve the economie and social position, an 
8% increase is necessary. At present, production 
is 30,000 MW e ; this should be 60,000 MW e in 
1989 and sorne 120,000 MWe in the year 2000. 
It is therefore absolutely impossible for Brazil 
to manage without nuclear energy ; as a comple-
ment in the megawatt range, only nuclear energy 
is capable of providing enough extra power in 
addition to the hydroelectric and thermal power 
stations. 
30. The Brazilian standard of living will be 
raised although even in the year 2000 it will 
not be as high as the present standard in Europe. 
31. The following tables are of interest in this 
context: 
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Per capita energy consumption in Brazil 
Primary energy Electricity Population Per capita Per capita 
consumption consumption primary energy primary electricity Year 1,000 tEP GWh ('000) consumption consumption 
(*) (*) (**) tEP kWh 
1967 51,475 34,238 86,907 0.592 394 
1968 53,415 38,181 89,299 0.598 428 
1969 56,891 41,648 91,756 0.620 454 
1970 61,170 45,460 94,282 0.649 482 
1971 65,595 50,988 97,332 0.674 524 
1972 70,II6 57,035 100,051 0.701 570 
1973 78,0II 65,218 102,828 0.759 634 
1974 84,364 72,466 105,669 0.798 686 
1975 90,324 80,293 108,579 0.832 739 
1976 99,080 88,383 ll1,624 0.888 792 
1977 103,252 99,869 ll4,785 0.900 870 
1978 109,733 II0,018 ll7,655 0.933 935 
1979 ll6,513 122,846 120,596 0.966 1,019 
1980 123,713 137,597 123,6II 1.001 1,ll3 
1981 131,357 154,724 126,701 1.037 1,221 
1982 139,474 171,913 129,869 1.074 1,324 
1983 148,092 186,676 133,ll5 l.ll3 1,402 
1984 157,242 202,767 136,443 1.152 1,486 
1985 166,959 220,523 139,854 1.194 1,577 
1986 177,275 241,377 143,351 1.237 1,684 
1987 188,229 263,199 146,934 1.281 1,791 
*As from 1978, takes account of an estimated annual increase of 7 % in the GIP. 
**As from 1978, the annual increase in population is estimated at 2.5 %· 
32. The Nrutional Nuclear Energy Commission 
is a financially autonomous governmental institu-
tion under the Ministry of Mines and Energy. 
It is directed by a board of five members 
appointed by the President of the Republic. The 
number of employees has varied greatly but now 
totals 528 persons of whom 174 are geologists 
and 60 engineers. The commission has a budget 
of $30 million a year. 
33. Dr. Aloes is in charge of licensing, the 
basic objective of which is to ensure the safe 
and regular operation of nuclear installations. As 
in other oountries, aboUJt ten years elapse between 
the preliminary studies for the site of a nuclear 
power plant and its licence for full power opera-
tion. 
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34. The nuclear programme began only recently 
so there is not yet a waste problem, but this of 
course will arise and the commission is preparing 
the storage of nuclear waste. The main purpose 
of the commission's activities is to prepare 
development of the necessary know-how. For this 
purpose Brazil has sorne 500 post-graduate 
students. They are in Brazil's eighteen univer-
sities and sorne are at American, German, French 
or British universities. The greatest number is 
now Ïin Germany. Once the necessary knowledge 
of pressurised water reactors has been attained, 
the commission intends to continue with new 
power plants such as the fast breeder. 
35. Apart from collaboration witth Germany, 
Brazil has collaborative projects with Chile on 
rad.iological protection, with Argentina on heavy 
water reactors, and with the International Atomic 
Energy Agency in Vienna on safeguards, physical 
protection and future storage of waste materials. 
36. From 1982 onwards Brazil will need 
enriched uranium provided by Urenco: the 
Netherlands, West Germany and the United King-
dom. 
37. Brazilian Nuclear Enterprises Inc. imple-
ments the nuclear energy policy in the industrial 
sector. The Committee was received by irts Presi-
dent, Ambassador Paulo Nogueiro Batista, who 
stated that as a state company Nuclebras was 
responsible for the prospection, extraction and 
enrichment of uranium and other nuclear 
mate rials. 
38. The company, d.irectly or through its 
subsidiaries, alone or in association with private 
firms, operates the industrial plants for the 
nuclear fuel cycle and for the production of 
components for nuclear power stations and 
reactors. Apart from these tasks, it also provides 
incentives for research and development of 
nuclear reactors and the nuclear fuel cycle. The 
first enrichment plant, a small plant mainly for 
research, will be ready in 1985 ; the operational 
plant will be ready in 1990. 
39. The first reactor, called Angra I, was 
built by Westinghouse as a result of a call for 
international tenders. No Brazilian equipment or 
engineers were involved in the building of this 
unit. Since then the government has decided on 
the nuclear programme of eight power stations 
and, in accordance with the agreements with 
KWU, more and more equipment and engineering 
will be Brazilian, including the manufacture of 
boil ers. 
40. Angra II and III are now being built, 
sorne 34 % being of Brazilian manufacture. In 
the case of both nuclear and hydll'oelectric power 
planJts, capital investment is very high. Nuclebras 
is being careful not to adopt a too rapid pro-
gramme as the nuclear industry in Brazil would 
be unable to oope with such •a situation. It is 
foreseen that the eight big nuclear power stations 
will be ready in the early 1990s. If this is so, 
then the increase in electric power of 10-12 % a 
year would enable the government to oope with a 
demographie growth rate of 3 %. 
41. Heavy invesrtment in energy not only 
causes many problems, mainly financial, but 
also raises staff training problems. Brazil needs 
its oil for transport ; it is now consuming sorne 
10 million tons of fuel per year. There are plans 
to replace oil by alcohol from sugar cane or fuel 
extracted. from coal. 
42. A great deal of research and drilling for 
oil is taking place in Brazil but no more than 
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350,000 to 400,000 barrels of oil a day are 
produced. $1 billion is now being invested in oïl 
exploration. 
43. $4.5 billion will be spoot on hydroelectric 
power in the basic plan for scientific and 
technological development. An important part of 
the energy budget is also allocated for research 
on and development of fuel from sugar cane or 
manioc alcohol. A barrel of fuel from alcohol 
costs $31 compared to $20 for a barrel of normal 
oil. 
44. An important task of Nuclebras is uranium 
prospection. In 1979 uranium ore extraction will 
total193,800 tons and Brazil may one day become 
an exporter of uranium. Prospecting for thorium 
is also planned. 
45. It is considered that the light-waJter 
reactors will be sufficient untïl the year 2030 ; 
after that the fast-breeder reactor or fusion will 
need to come to the fore. 
46. The immediate goal set by the government 
is to achieve a sufficient output of electricity 
for the country in the 1990s, 15 % of this being 
nuclear. 
47. Nuclebras has a work force of sorne 4,000, 
one-third of whom are of university level. It 
depends on the government for funding and its 
President is appointed by the President of the 
Brazilian Republic. 
48. Nuclebras is laying special emplrasis on 
quality guarantee and control. This guarantee 
applies to technical norms, processes and roU/tines. 
Scientists and teclrnicians are being trained in 
Germany and German rules on quality guarantee 
and control are being fo11owed. 
49. During the Committee's meeting with 
members of the Brazilian Senate, it was pointed 
out that Brazïl should be able to "grow" its 
oïl. It has very long experience with the pro-
duction of sugar cane and there are forests 
of ba bach ou ( coconut) and fields of manioc. 
Production could ·amount to sorne 4,000 million 
litres of oïl but the technological process needs 
to be improved. There were also other natural 
tropical oils which could be used instead of 
petrol. 1 % of the national territory would be 
sufficient if this type of "fuel growing" was 
promoted and accepted.. Nevertheless, the eight 
nuclear power plants remain a necessity if a 
sufficient level of electricity production is to 
be attained., especially in the southern industrial 
states. This programme will cost $10 billion and 
a parlirunentary study is now under way, initiated 
by the opposition groups in Congress. 
50. Dr. José Israel Vargas, Industrial Tech-
nology Secretary at the Ministry of Industry 
and Trade, stated that tests had been made with 
mixtures of petrol and alcohol since 1974 and a 
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mixture of 18 % alcohol and 82 % petrol on 
which to run cars had been arrived at and this 
is what is now used in cars. About 1,500 govern-
ment vehicles are run on 100 % alcohol fuel. 
The Sao Paulo Volkswagen "Beetle" output for 
Brazilian use is alcohol powered. Engine adap-
tation is simple and cheap. The government hopes 
that in 1985 it will be possible to have sorne 
1.7 million out of 8 million cars driven on pure 
alcohol, although by 1985 there might be about 
10 million cars in Brazil. Cars with diesel engines 
present a more difficult problem but here too 
progress has been made and vegetable oils mixed 
with alcohol might be a solution. The break-even 
point for production is $30 a barrel. Several 
countries in Latin America and South-East Asia 
are interested in this development, but it is quite 
clear that sugar cane and other products involved 
have to be produced without imported fertiliser. 
51. Ambassador Baena, Secretary G€neral of 
the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, pointed out 
that historically relations between Brazil and 
Western Europe had been very close and in 
general Europeans had a better understanding 
of Brazilians than the Americans. However, 
where nuclear energy and the contacts with 
Urenco countries were concerned it was rather 
difficult to explain the Brazilian position. Brazïl 
started its $20 million nuclear programme because 
it needed nuclear energy for the economie and 
social development of the cormtry. The South 
American nuclear-free-zone treaty of 1967 1 was 
not yet in force as the conditions of the two 
protocols attached to it, one with regard to 
nuclear powers and the other to outside powers, 
had not been signed and ratified by ali ; Brazil 
had done so, Cuba had not. Brazil did not wish 
to accede to a treaty which stipulated that a 
nuclear-free zone applied only to countries which 
did not possess nuclear weapons. For that reason 
Brazïl had not signed the nuclear non-prolifer-
ation treaty as it was discriminatory and more-
over did not prevent proliferation. Brazïl would 
accept universal control by the agency in Vienna. 
1. A treaty for the prohibition of nuclear weapons in 
Latin America (the Tlatelolco Treaty) was signed in 
February 1967 by twenty-two Latin American countries ; 
twenty countries have now ratified it (Argentina has 
signed but not ratified, and Brazil has ratified but 
reserved her position on peaceful nuclear explosions). 
Britain and the Netherlands have ratified it for the 
territories within the treaty area for which they are inter-
nationally responsible. Britain and the Netherlands have 
signed Protocol I (which commits states outside the region 
to accept, for their territories within it, the treaty 
restrictions regarding the emplacement or storage of 
nuclear weapons) ; France has not ; the United States 
has announced its intention of doing so. The United 
States, Britain, France and China have signed Protocol II 
to the treaty (an undertaking not to use or threaten to 
use nuclear weapons against the parties to the treaty) ; 
the Soviet Union has not. An agency has been set up 
by the contracting parties to ensure compliance with the 
treaty. (The Military Balance, 1979-80, page 75). 
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52. The Brazilian Government was not planning 
to buïld an atomic bomb and would not be able 
to do so in the next five to ten years in any 
case. 
53. The Ambassador said that Brazïl had good 
relations with ali ten of the Latin American 
countries on its borders. 
54. The President of the Republic's speech of 
4th July has led to the establishment of a national 
energy commission supervised by the Vice-Presi-
dent and involving many important government 
agencies and ministries. The President called it a 
"wartime situation" as Brazïl cannot function 
without oïl at acceptable priees. 
55. Y our Rapporteur now wishes to. make the 
following comments. 
56. Brazil depends on petroleum for 43 % of 
its energy needs. Its oil-geared economy uses 
1.13 million barrels per day, a rate that has 
been increasing by 10% a year. Domestic pro-
duction of crude oil is 168,000 barrels per day 
and about 960,000 barrels per day are imported. 
57. The Brazilian Government is giving top 
priority to its search for a solution to the oïl 
crisis. It has promised a series of "wartime" 
economy measures, the first of which freezes 
imports at the present 960,000 barrels per day. 
A high-ranking national energy commission has 
been created to establish and enforce a policy 
that would make the country less dependent on 
imported petroleum. 
58. The commission's long-range goal is the 
utilisation of a1ternative energy sources such as 
the sun, wind and tides. It also intends to speed 
up and expand Brazil's gasohol plan, develop 
shale oïl and coal gasification projects and push 
for greater use of hydro-power. 
59. The Brazilian Government recognises that 
"oïl is still the cheapest form of energy available" 
and consequently the best means of conserving it 
and finding new domestic ,reserves will be the 
commission's main concern. 
60. The state oïl company's $1 billion explo-
ration and production budget will be increased 
and drilling by foreign oïl companies will be 
encouraged. 
61. The alcohol plan is designed to substitute 
not only for gasoline but eventually for a good 
part of the diesel and fuel oïl consumed as weil. 
For four years now Brazil has been mixing 
home-grown sugar cane alcohol to gasoline at 
rates of up to 18 %, which regular car engines 
can absorb without adjustment. 
62. As the world's largest sugar cane producer, 
with plenty of arable land left, Brazïl is in the 
enviable position of growing its own source of 
renewable energy. It will take sorne years to 
solve the problems connected with alcohol and to 
plant enough cane - or other crops - to supply 
a1l the alcohol nooded, but the govel'll1Ilent has 
just budgeted $5 billion for its nationwide 
alcohol~as-fuel plan. 
63. AB part of the second stage of the plan, 
cars, starting with governm.ent vehicles, will be 
powered solely by alcohol. About 2,000 prototypes 
are bein:g tested and the big car manufacturers 
in Brazil - Volkswagen, General Motors, Ford, 
Chrysler and Fiat - are prepared to start 
assembly-line production of alcohol-fuelled cars 
as soon as they are assured a fuel supply. The 
members of the Committee used such a car during 
the visit. 
64. For petroleum derivatives that cannot be 
manufactured from alcohol, mainly lubricants, 
specialists are experimenting with castor oil. 
Brazil currently produces about 61 % of the 
world's supply. Castor oil has proved an even 
better lubricant than petroleum products in a 
series of tests. 
65. Until recently, the development of solar 
energy was held back by lack of funding and 
the relatively high cost of silicon components in 
South America. Expansion of Brazilian equip-
ment production is expected to make costs 
competitive, possibly as early as 1985. 
66. As in other nations, the rising cost of 
petroleum has produced renewed interest in tap-
ping Brazil's shale oil deposits, the world's second 
largest after Canada. 
67. Petrobras, the state oil company, is already 
squeezing 1,000 barrels of oil a day out of shale 
at an experimental station, and intends to build 
a refinery in the southern state of Rio Grande 
do Sul that will extract 50,000 barrels a day by 
1985. 
m. Space developments in Brazil 
(submitted by Mr. Scheffler, Rapporteur) 
68. On 4th July the Gommittee was received 
by Dr. Nelson de Jesus Parada, General Director 
of the Space Research Institute in Sao José dos 
Campos in the state of Sao Paulo. He began by 
outlining the history of space developments in 
Brazil. Originally they came under the Ministry 
of the Air Force, then under the office of the 
President, and later the National Security 
Council. 
69. Since 1979 all space activities are co-
ordinated by the Brazilian space activities com-
mission, the chairman of which is the joint chief 
of staff of the armed forces. The commission 
is normally known by its abbreviation Cobae and 
c~rdinates aspects of national security as well 
as the utilisation of space for civil purposes. A 
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different institute has been established for each 
of these two activities : the civil 001e is called 
the Institute for Space Research and the other 
the Space Activities Institute. 
70. The Institute for Space Research (INPE), 
un der the guidance of the National Council for 
Scientific and Technological Development, has 
activities, tasks and programmes, as shown in the 
tables hereafter, which do not duplicate the work 
of the other institute with which it has direct 
collaboration in rocket development, especially 
with regard to propellants. 
71. Brazilian space activities started in 1965 
with sounding rockets and launching facilities at 
Natal. In 1985 a first small meteorological satel-
lite will be launched. Meteorology has first 
priority because of the importance of weather 
forecasting for agriculture and because of the 
extraordinary climatoklgical influences which the 
Pacifie and the Atlantic have on Brazil. 
72. ln remote sensing special attention is being 
paid to forestry, ,agriculture and pollution. The 
operational oost of these application satellites is 
about $1 million a year, part of which can be 
recovered by selling satellite images to agri-
cultura1 or forestry institutes in Brazil and 
abroad. Until 1985 the information will be 
obtained from the NASA Landsat satellite. Once 
the French earth resources satellite, Spot, 
becomes operational Brazil hopes to obtain 
information from that source and already has 
an agreement with France on its use. 
73. The staff at INPE numbers sorne 1,000, 
of whom 400 are Bachelors of Science and 200 
Ph. Ds. The budget is $30-40 million a year. With 
this budget it hopes to be able to acquire the 
necessary knowledge to build its own sateLlite 
system. 
7 4. At the Space Activities Institute of the 
Aerospace Technical Centre of the Brazilian Air 
Force the Committee was rooeived by Colonel 
Sergio Xavier Ferolla. This centre is under the 
Air Ministry which deals with civil as weil as 
military aerospace activities. The Air Ministry 
also supervises the aircraft industry. The centre's 
objective is to combine aeronautical and space 
research and development with the training of 
aeronautical engineers. Its rôle is also to stimulate 
the development of the aeronautical industry 
and handle the certification of aircraft. For this 
purpose it is ·divided into five institutes. The 
aeronautical technology institute is a college 
which trains engineers for electronic, aeronautical 
and mechanical engineering as weil as for air-
port infrastructure engineering. It provides 
training up to Ph.D. level. The second is the 
institute for research on and technological 
development of airframes, engines, aerodynamics 
and metallurgy, for instance. The third is the 
space activities institute and is especially res-
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ponsible for rocket developments. The fourth 
institute works on the development of aero-
nautical and aerospace standards. The fifth is 
responsible for furthering co-ordination in the 
Brazilian aerospace industry and the certification 
of aircraft. 
75. The govermnent intends to create a sixth 
institute which will be in charge of test ranges, 
guarantees of quality and the introduction of 
new methods in industry. 
76. Half of the centre's budget is paid by the 
federal government and the other half by state 
governments, government organisations and 
industries. 
77. A programme is being set up to oonvel't 
aircraft engines to use ethanol ; it is planned 
to use existing engines and adapt them to this 
type of fuel. At present it is not possible for 
Brazil to produce new engines. Perhaps_ at sorne 
stage it would be of interest to co-operate with 
engine manufacturers outside Brazil. 
78. In general, special emphasis is laid on 
adapting existing technology to circumstances 
peculiar to Brazil and manufacturing cheaper 
spare parts, or changing designs of certain types 
of hardware so that they are not too sophisticated 
and are simple and convenient to use. 
IV. Technology applied to the economie 
infrastructure 
(submitted by Mr. Cornelissen, Rapporteur) 
79. In order to achieve a sound infrastructure 
the National Council for Scientific and 
Technological Development has undertaken a 
number of priority projects such as the establish-
ment of an electricity network and scientific and 
technological bases for the development of 
transportation infrastructure, of which the 
Amazon highway is an example. The Brazilian 
railway network and maritime and river 
transportation also have high priority. 
80. Air transport is also of great importance 
in this vast continent. In order to fly its own 
aircraft the government bas established the 
Brazilian Aeronautical Corporation called 
Empresa Brasileira de Aeronautica S.A., usually 
known as Embraer. The Committee visited this 
company in Sao José dos Campos on 4th July. 
It was received by the President of Embraer, 
Mr. Ozires Silva, who began his address with a 
brief history of the company. 
81. Embraer was created on 19th August 1969 
and became operational in January 1970 to 
promote the development of the Brazilian aircraft 
industry. The government owns 51 % of the 
voting shares but only 14% of the Embraer 
stock ; the remaining shares are held by more 
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than 175,000 Brazilian companies. It bas a work 
force of sorne 5,000 people. Since 1971 it has 
built sorne 1,800 aircraft of various types. The 
first type to be built was a nationally-designed 
agricultural aircraft, which was followed by the 
Bandeirante commuter aircraft. The latter was 
also built as a transport aircraft for the Brazilian 
air force. 
82. In August 1974, Embraer signed a com-
prehensive co-operative agreement with the Piper 
Aireraft Corporation involving the assembly and 
manufacture of Piper aircraft. It now produces 
and markets these aircraft in Brazil while Piper 
Aircraft Corporation markets Embraer's aireraft 
Bandeirante. In early 1975 Embraer negotiated 
a contract with the Northrop Corporation for 
manufacturing components for the United States 
company's Tiger II combat aircraft in Brazil. 
83. In the same year the Brazilian air foree 
selected the Italian Aermacchi jet trainer and 
ground att'ack aircraft. Embraer is building this 
aircraft under licence from Aermacchi for both 
Brazilian and foreign air forees and to date sorne 
120 have been produced. 
84. At present the Brazilian economy is about 
one-tenth the size of that of the United States. 
If it were about the same, the Brazilian aviation 
fleet would probably be equal to that of the 
United States. However, the government tries to 
ensure that the capacity of the Brazilian aero-
nautical industry meets the national demand to a 
high degree. At the same time export sales are 
promoted, especially of the Bandeirante transport 
aircraft, which has been sold to several countries. 
85. Embraer has developed a new executive 
aircraft, the EMB-121. This type of aireraft is 
already in service with the Brazilian air force 
for transporting high-ranking military and 
government personnel. 
86. The greatest asset of Embraer is of course 
its growing home market. Plans are being 
formulated for a thirty-seat transport aireraft to 
help develop internai communications in the 
1980s. 
87. Within the framework of the national 
development plan the work of the National 
Institute for Research in the Amazon area is of 
prime importance. On 9th July, the Committee 
visited the institute in Manaus and had a discus-
sion wih its Director, Professor E. Salati. The 
main purpose of the institute is the establishment 
of a co-ordinated system for acquiring the neces-
sary information for planning public 1nvestment 
for infrastructure in the Amazon area. 
88. The total surface of the Amazon area is 
sorne 5 million sq.km., which represents sorne 
60% of the total surface of Brazil. About 70% 
of the Amazon area is covered by tropical forests. 
Depeniling on the type of forest, timber pro-
duction could be either 250 cu.m. per hectare or, 
in the case of open tropical forest, 120-150 cu.m. 
per hectare. With the priee of timber at sorne 
$15 per cu.m., the Ama:wn forest has a theoretical 
value of $1 billion. The opening up of this forest 
and its permanent exploitation would therefore 
constitute a very important source of income for 
Brazil. 
89. The institute has established a number of 
divisions, each of which covers a specifie type 
of research : agronomy, medicine, ecology, botany, 
technology, phytochemistry and fishing. 
90. In agronomy the purpose of the institute 
is to find the best combination of crops 
and eventually cattle raising, exploring an 
integrated and continuons form of cultivation, 
and at the same time maintaining a constant 
recycling of nutriants. 
91. In tropical medicine a special study is made 
of new diseases, most of which are found only 
in the Amazon area and are of a parasitic nature. 
The institute tries to prevent the spread of 
parasitic diseases through the study of contamina-
tion and hygienic conditions. A main source of 
concern is uncontrolled leprœy. 
92. The ecology department studies the inter-
face between the exploration of the forest and 
neighbouring regions in order to maintain a 
balance and a natural recycling of the area. 
93. In the botany division research is deme 
on soil chemistry and physics. Aa the fertility of 
tropical soil is low this research is necessary to 
provide the relevant scientific support needed 
for the proper management of land and forest. 
A large-scale dispute is being waged as to whether 
the tropical forest should be replanted by a 
hetero- or a homogeneous forest. Several major 
projects are now under way to ascertain which 
wouM be best. The most satisfactory solution 
will probably be a mixture of the two. 
94. The Amazon has 2,000 species of fish, only 
32 of which have so far any commercial or 
nutritive value. 
95. It has also more than 60,000 species of 
plants and 200 species of insects. Thus, it is 
obvions that a great deal of research has to be 
undertaken to prevent any disequilibrium of the 
forest which could result in great damage. 
96. In the field of technology, studies are being 
made on the use of carbons available in plants 
and how to obtain hydroelectric power from the 
Amazon. The river is very deep and flows at 
a speed of 3-5 km. per hour. 
97. ln the field of fishery, the institute studies 
the possibilities of using fish other than the 
thirty-two species mentioned for commercial or 
nutritive purposes. It has aJready recommended 
to the government that it ban any fish exports 
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as the local population needs the fish as protein, 
meat in the area being too scarce and too 
expensive. Much of the fishing potential of the 
Amazon region is concentrated in the Holm 
Lakes. It might be possible to install fish farms 
in these lakes, which would be of great advantage 
to the economie development of the region. 
98. The institute employs sorne 200 researchers 
of whom twenty are of Ph.D. level and twenty 
of M.Sc. level. It works in collaboration with 
many similar institutes in other parts of the 
world, especially in California and sorne Euro-
pean countries, for instance the Ford Foundation, 
the Max Planck Institute, the World Wildlife 
Organisation, the United Nations, F AO and the 
Organisation of American States. The institute 
would need sorne 1,500 researchers in order to 
carry out all its research as it wished to. Its 
basic budget is sorne 110 million cruzeiros. Its 
total budget from all sources, federal, state and 
private, is sorne 200 million cruzeiros a year. 
99. The National Institute for Research in the 
Amazon Region is a subordinate unit of the 
National Council for Scientific and Technological 
Development. 
100. On 6th July 1979, the Committee met with 
the President of the National Council for 
Scientific and Technological Development, 
P11ofessor Mauricio Matos Peixoto, the Director, 
Professor Amadeu Curi, and the Superintendent 
for International Co-operation, Dr. Dourimar 
Nunes de Moura. 
101. Dr. Nunes de Moura said it was the Coun-
cil's task to assist the Minister of Planning in 
the preparation and follow-up of basic plans for 
scientific and technological development as weil 
as in the analysis of scientific and technological 
sectorial plans and programmes. It proposes 
norms and instruments for the support of 
scientific and technological research of interest 
to the social and economie development of the 
country. It also provides financial and technical 
assistance for research projects and promotes the 
training of personnel in the field of science and 
technology. 
102. The Council has a special committee which 
deals directly with Amazon development and 
which is now preparing new legislation for sub-
mission to Congress at its next session. This 
legislation will set out rules governing the 
exploration and exploitation of the area. 
103. A big new dam for hydroelectric purposes 
is to be built at Tucuruy, creating a lake of 
200,000 hectares with 1.3 million cu.m. of forest. 
104. In order to attain the goals set, a major 
training programme has been established because 
Brazil has a serions lack of qualified manpower. 
In 1950, the universities had sorne 100,000 
students and now have 1,500,000. This tremend-
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ous increase has not been achieved without great 
difficulties, an experience shared by European 
universities. 
105. The Council's activities also extend to other 
fields of infrastructure. The oil crisis forced the 
country to take a new look at its transportation 
system which has resulted in a proposed new 
plan for electrifying the rail·ways and for build-
ing new railways in certain areas of the country. 
It has adopted a policy of gradually transferring 
heavy transport to the railways and to sea and 
river transport. 
106. In many metropolitan areas public trans-
portation systems are now being developed and 
introduced. Formerly, with oil at only $2 a bar-
rel, it did not make much sense to invest heavily 
in subway, trolley bus or other public transport 
systems. Now, however, this will ali change very 
quickly. 
107. Booause of the high rate of inflation not 
ali plans for the period 1974-79 have been 
accomplished, but approximately 60-70 % of the 
goals have been attained. The National Council 
is working not only with the research councils 
of the Brazilian states but also with research 
councils in other countries, such as France on 
solar energy, Britain with the Royal Society and 
the British Council on metallurgy, and the United 
States on computers, a field in which Brazil hopes 
to become self-sufficient. It is clear that the 
modernisation of its planning and industry will 
require a high number of computers. Small 
computers are already being built and medium-
sire computers are being developed. 
108. When the Committee met with Dr. Vargas, 
Industrial Technology Sooretary, on 5th J uly, 
he too pointed out that one of the bottlenecks 
in the implementation of the development plans 
was the lack of qualified staff. The tremendous 
expansion of the universities has resulted in 
little ·attention being paid to basic university 
research. Post-graduate courses shou:ld be 
expanded, as should basic science courses and 
studies. For instance, for its nuclear programme 
Brazil will need sorne 10,000 engineers and 
scientists: 3,000 highly qualified and 7,000 at 
a lower level. 
109. Unlike France, Brazil does not have a system 
of spooialised high-level schools but ali training is 
at universities, sorne of which are good and sorne 
bad. The universities are federal, state or priv-
ate, the latter being mainly mediocre and 
expensive. There are usually ten candidates per 
place for the federal universities. Improving 
the level will mean investing in quality. In Brazil 
the percentage of girls attending university is 
very high. Those who take post-graduate courses 
prefer to go to Europe, especially to Germany 
and France, depending on their speciality. 
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Normally they do not go to other Latin American 
countries. 
110. Where the Amazon project is concerned it 
is not difficult to find young people who are 
prepared to go and work there. 
111. Dr. Vargas explained that the National 
Council for Scientific and Technological Develop-
ment has a counselling committee called the 
Scientific and Technological Council which 
handles political, scientific and toohnologi13al 
matters. It is composed of thirty members and 
one of its main functions is to co-ordinate aH 
segments of the scientific and technological 
complex. In industrial technology this co-
ordination is very complex as there are numerous 
research institutes under different federal and 
state government agencies. Moreover, the 
technological demand covers ail industrial activ-
ities. The secretariat for industrial technology 
of the Ministry of Industry and Commerce plays 
a very important rôle in guiding the efficient 
use of industrial technology developed in federal-
and state-financed institutes. 
112. Brazil uses 1.8 % of its national product 
for research and development and is trying to 
reach the same level as Europe, i.e. sorne 3 %, 
but in fact it should use more. The main part 
of the budget is used for research and develop-
ment in energy and agriculture. The money 
cornes of course from taxpayers, but a large part 
is ploughed back in the industrial and agri-
cultural sootors. 
113. The second five-year plan from 1979-83 will 
soon be implemented. Whether it will be possible 
to finance it is of course a difficult question 
booause high inflation might create disturbances 
in the allocation of resources. 
V. The Ariane launch base at Kourou 
(submitted by Mr. Scheffler, Rapporteur) 
114. The Committee visited the Ariane launch 
base from 9th to 12th July 1979. Prior to the 
visit the Committee was briefed by ESA repre-
sentatives : Mr. R. Orye, Head of the Ariane 
Department, and Mr. J. Arets, Head of the 
International Affairs B11anch 1. 
115. In Kourou the Committee was received by 
the ESA representative in French Guiana, 
Mr. Max A. Hauzeur, Mr. Arets, and by repre-
sentatives from the Guiana Space Centre, 
Mr. P. Bescond, Deputy Technical Director, 
Mr. R. Legrand, Head of Public Relations, and 
Mrs. B. Martin, Public Relations Officer. 
1. See Appendix ITI. 
116. The Committee visited the technical 
installations near Kourou, including the control 
centre, the Ariane site and assembly facilities, 
the technical centre, the radar centres and the 
other launching facilities 1. 
117. During the discussions Mr. Hauzeur gave 
an outline of the present position and future of 
the Ariane programme 2 • 
118. He stated that the Ariane programme was 
at present the Agency's largest programme ; it 
had been in existence for nearly seven years 
and would cost sorne 700 million accounting units. 
About fifty European firms were involved. All 
ten ESA member countries participated, but 
France was the leading partner with a 62.5 % 
participation. France acted through CNES (Cen-
tre National d'Etudes Spatiales), which had 
overall responsibility, and SNIAS, whieh was 
the main manufacturer. 
119. The Ariane launcher was of conservative 
design and oot a new development in the manu-
facturing of launchers. It should be a reliable 
vehicle. The order to launch Intelsat V with 
Ariane was of the greatest importance for the 
morale of the people working on it. Many parallel 
activities were now taking place in Guiana and 
Europe in order to prepare for the first launch 
in November. There would be four qualification 
flights before the operational flights started. 
120. The Deputy Technical Director, Mr. 
Bescond, explained the missions of the Guiana 
Space Centre. The centre's first mission was to 
provide the necessary ,logistic support to prepare 
the vehicle for launch. The centre provided all 
necessary ground facilities, assembly halls, launch 
towers, the propellant supply network, and 
maintenance and opera ting teams. 
121. The centre's second mission was data col-
lection. Radars and optical tracking facilities, as 
well as high-speed cameras, followed the 
behaviour of the launcher in flight and could 
improve or verify its performances. The so-called 
internai data from the launcher to the ground 
station were also collected. Data processing was 
carried out at the centre. 
122. The third mission concerned the prevention 
of accidents involving property and persons 
which might be caused by the use of space-
craft. Safety regulations were applied ; people 
at the centre should be protected and the 
destruction of the vehicle was envisaged should 
the flight become dangerous. 
123. The Guiana site had been chosen for 
several reasons, the first being that satellite 
launchers could take full advantage of the sling 
1. See maps (a) and (b) at Appendix V. 
2. See Appendix IV. 
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effect produced by the earth's rotation. As 
Guiana was located near the equator, heavier 
satellites could be launched at lower fuel cost 
than from the Kennedy Space Centre. Launches 
could be made in all directions without endanger-
ing any population centres. In the United States 
satellites for polar orbit had to be launched from 
the V andenberg Space Centre in California ; the 
Kennedy Space Centre could not be used. More-
over, French Guiana had no earthquakes or tidal 
waves, but did have stable weather and a low 
density of population. It also had a good road 
network, an international airport, a deep-water 
harbour and good telex and telephone connec-
tions, and was free from heavy air traffic and 
busy shipping lanes. Finally, politically speak-
ing, it was also very stable. The disadvantages 
were that it was far from Europe and had no 
industrial infrastructure, which meant that 
transport costs were high and a large stock of 
spare parts had to be kept. It had only very 
small numbers of trained personnel. 
124. The budget of the space centre was 
Frs. 140 million per year ; the personnel 
numbered 600 : 300 from France and 300 local. 
Companies working on Ariane had sorne 
150 people living in Guiana and, in addition, 
there were 140 hospital personnel and firemen. 
All in all they made Kourou a small town of 
about 7,000 people. 
125. The centre stretched 55 km. along the coast 
and about 25 km. in depth, which made it equi-
valent to the surface of the Island of Martinique. 
The Directorate intended to reduce the cost of 
the programme and the number of staff. In 
particular it wished to hand over to the French 
administration those infrastructure tasks which 
the centre had had to assume as they would 
not have been carried out otherwise. 
126. Of course the tracking range for a rocket 
like Ariane required more than the tracking 
station located at Kourou. An agreement had 
been concluded with the Brazilian Government 
for a telemetry receiver station in Salinopolis 
and for a telemetry tracking and radar station 
in Natal; on Ascension Island, NASA and the 
United States Defence Department stations 
guaranteed observation of the end of the third 
stage propulsion of Ariane. 
127. Replying to questions, Mr. Hauzeur and 
Mr. Bescond said that the Ariane programme 
was a European programme, but as France was 
the main financer SNIAS was the main con-
tractor. However, when real operations started 
non-French personnel would also be present, 
including representatives from British Aerospace, 
which manufactured the launching table, 
German engineers from ERNO, and Belgians for 
the control system for liquids. With one country 
having leadership, management was much easier. 
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.Ail personnel had been extensively trained and 
American procedures were being used. However, 
American technical assistance would not be pro-
vided, nor was anybody from CNES trained in 
the United States. 
128. Once Ariane became operational industrial 
arrangements would be made to manage Ariane 
launchings. The rôle of ESA would then be 
mainly one of co-ordination and promotion. 
129. The Committee was very pleased to have 
an opportunity of visiting the Kourou base and 
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the Ariane launcher pad. The Agency's space 
activities are of great political importance which 
will certainly grow in the years to come. Its space 
programmes will benefit ESA member countries, 
developing countries and more advanced con-
tinental-size developing countries like Brazil; 
they will improve living conditions through 
weather forecasting and pollution control ; they 
willlead to industry manufacturing high-quality 
productB in space. For all these reasons, the 
Committee and the Assembly will continue as 
in the past to give ali their support to the 
Agency, its work and its programmes. 
APPENDIX I 
Sunday, lst July 
4 p.m. 
Monday, 2nd July 
2 p.m. - 6 p.m. 
7 p.m. - 8 p.m. 
Tuesday, 3rd July 
2 p.m. - 6 p.m. 
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Programme of the visit to Brazil and French Guiana 
1st-12th July 1979 
Arrivai a.t Rio de Janeiro International Airport. 
National Nuclear Energy Commission, 
8616 Estra.da. Ba.ndeirantes, 
2000 Rio de Janeiro. 
Briefing by Dr. Rex Na.za.ré Aloes, Executive Director. 
Meeting a.t the Méridien Hotel. 
Nuclebras, 
Praia. do Fla.mengo 200, 
Rio de Janeiro. 
Briefing by Amba.ssa.dor Paulo Nogueira. Batista, Director. 
Wednesday, 4th July - Sao José dos Campos 
9 a..m. - 11.30 a..m. National Space Research Institute, 
Avenida. dos Astrona.uta.s 1758. 
Briefing by Dr. Nelson de Jesus Parada., Director General. 
11.30 a.m. - 3 p.m. The Brazilian Aeronautica.l Corporation (Embraer), 
Avenida. Briga.deiro Faria Lima 2170. 
Briefing by Mr. Ozires Silva., President. 
5 p.m. - 7 p.m. Space Activities Institute, 
Aerospa.ce Technica.l Centre, 
Rua Pa.ra.ibuna.. 
Thursday, 6th July 
9.30 a..m. 
Il a.m. - 1 p.m. 
Briefing by Colonel Sergio Xavier Ferolla., Director. 
Arrivai at Brasilia. 
Palace of the National Congress, Sena.te. 
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Meeting with Mr. Luis Viana Filho, President of the Senate, his Bureau and other 
sena tors. 
4 p.m. 
5.30 p.m. 
Friday, 6th July 
10 a..m. 
Ministry for External Affaira, 
Pa.la.cio Ita.ma.ra.ty. 
Briefing by Amba.ssa.dor F. A. Baena, Secretary General of the Ministry. 
Ministry of Industry and Commerce, 
Esplana.da. dos Ministerios. 
Briefing by Dr. José Israel Vargas, Industria.l Technology Secreta.ry. 
National Council for Scientific and Technological Development, 
Avenue W. 3 Norte, 
Qua.dra. 507, Bioco B. 
Briefings by : 
- Professor Mauricio Ma.tos Peixoto, President; 
- Professor Amadeu Curi, Director ; 
- Dr. Dourimar Nunes de Moura., Superintendent for International Co-operation 
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Saturday, 7th July 
5 p.m. 
Monday, 9th July 
10 a..m. - 1 p.m. 
11 p.m. 
Tuesday, lOth July 
10 a.m. 
11 a..m. 
11.30 a..m. 
2.45 p.m. 
5.30 p.m. 
Wednesday, llth July 
Arrivai a.t Manaus. 
National lnstitute for Resea.rch in the Ama.zon Area., 
Estra.da. do Aleixo, 
P. O. B. 478, 
Manaus. 
Briefing by Professor E. Sa.la.ti, Director. 
Visit of the la.bora.tories of the Institute. 
Arrivai a.t Cayenne, French Guiana.. 
Depa.rture for Kourou. 
Visit of the Guia.na Spa.ce Centre, Kourou. 
Briefings by : 
- Mr. M. Hauzeur, Director of ESA in Kourou; 
- Mr. P. Bescond, Deputy Technical Director of CNES in Kourou. 
Committee meeting. 
Visit of the control centre. 
Visit of the Ariane launching pad and other installations. 
Briefings by : 
- Mr. Ha.uzeur ; 
- Mr. Bescond ; 
- Mr. Arets (international affairs); 
- Mr. Laroumanie (economie and social aspects); 
- Mr. Eliès (fina.ncia.l aspects) ; 
- Mr. Niel (operations) ; 
- Mr. Mora.in (installations). 
Questions and a.nswers period. 
7.30 a..m. - 3.30 p.m. Visit of installations and the Iles du Salut. 
Thursday, 12th July 
9 a.m. - 1 p.m. 
2.30 p.m. 
Visit to Sinamary. 
Depa.rture for Cayenne. 
END OF VISIT 
Participants 
MM. W .ARREN - Cha.irman 
V ALLEIX - Vice-Cha.irman 
ADRIAENSENS 
CoRNELISSEN 
KONINGS 
LEWIS 
MINNoom 
MÜLLER 
PÉRONNET 
SoHEFFLER 
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(United Kingdom) 
(France) 
(Belgium) 
(N etherlands) 
(N etherlands) 
(United Kingdom) 
(Italy) 
(Federal Republic of Germany) 
(France) 
(Federal Republic of Germa.ny) 
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APPENDIX II 
Points for discussion in Brazil 
1. General policy 
1. How can the political aims of Brazil's 
scientific and technological programmes be 
defined? What general policy has been followed 
in the modernisation of Brazilian science and 
technology in the 1970s ? 
2. What is the political organisation - federal 
and provincial - and which ministers are 
responsible for the activities concerned ? 
3. How is the federal research budget estab-
lished and what course is set for it in the near 
future? 
4. In particular, the Committee is interested 
in problems of energy - especially new sources 
of energy and nuclear energy for peaceful pur-
poses - oceanography and space. Could a brief 
review be given of Brazilian policies in these 
fields? 
5. To which of the above sectors did the 
Brazilian Government give priority during the 
1970s and to which fields will it give priority 
during the 1980s ? 
6. What is the place of metallurgy, synthetic 
fibres and electronics in the overall policy ? 
7. What part is played by state-owned industry 
and what part by private industry ? How can 
governmental action be dcfined ? 
8. Which industries are state-owned, which 
industries are part state-owned part private, and 
which industries are to remain fully private ? 
9. What is the part played by .American ,and 
European industry in the industrial development 
of Brazil? 
10. Could a breakdown country-by-conntry be 
given of Europe's rôle ? 
11. What is the part played by Latin .American 
countries? 
12. What is the Federal Government's attitude 
towards collaboration with the Western Euro-
pean countries in the near future ? 
13. In which fields is European collaboration 
sought especially ? 
14. .Are special ties being developed with the 
Common Market and, if so, in which direction 
should they be developed ? 
15. What is the opinion of the Brazilian Govern-
ment on the 1958 .Antarctic treaty, the 1963 
Moscow test ban treaty, the 1966 outer space 
treaty, the 1968 non-proliferation treaty, the 
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1970 seabed treaty and on developments in the 
IJaw of the Sea Conference ? 
16. Is there a special institute for applied 
research and development in the field of aircraft 
construction, engine development and aeronauti<'s 
in general? 
17. What types of aircraft are being planned 
for the 1980s ? 
18. For which other forms of transport do 
special institutes exist ? 
19. What is the future of jet-powered trains, 
hovercraft, electric cars ? 
U. The Ministry of Mines and Energy 
20. What is the rôle of the Ministry in the 
overaJ:l development of Brazilian research and 
technology ? 
21. What is the relationship between the Minis-
try and the universities and other institutes of 
learning? 
22. What is the rôle of the state-owned research 
institutes ? 
23. What is the rôle played by the institutes for 
fundamental research, institùtes for applied 
research and development, and institutes con-
cerned especially with environment and the well-
being of the popu}ation ? 
Energy 
24. What is now the total electricity generating 
eapacity in Brazil ? 
25. Of this capacity what percentage is gene-
rated from nuclear sources ? 
26. How much of the capacity of nuclear 
generators and electricity is under construction 
and now operating and completed ? 
27. What is the estimated requirement for 
generating capacity of electric.aà energy required 
in 1980, 1985, 1990, and what percentage of this 
will be nuclear generating stations ? 
28. Which are the utilities ordering, construct-
ing and operating power stations ? What are 
their relationships ? 
29. What is the capital of these electrical 
utilities and the method of raising funds ? 
30. What is the annual budget in nuclear 
research? 
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31. What are the capital assets now employed 
on nuclear research Y 
32. Which companies, consortia or groups are 
the main constructors of nuclear power stations 1 
33. Is research being carried out on new sources 
of energy, solar energy and geothermal energy ? 
34. What has been done in the field of radio-
active chemistry and the utilisation of radio-
eliements in order to fight air and water pollu-
tion? 
35. What is the uranium fuel situation in 
Brazil 1 
36. There is a comprehensive American report 
on the nuclear reactor choice which states that 
the uranium supply will probably not keep pace 
with the continued growth of burner-converter 
capacity beyond the year 2000. What is your 
opinion ? Should a crash programme on fast-
breeder reactors be started now Y 
37. The United States has already 183 light-
water rea.ctors either bui1t or on order. As it is 
lilrely that in the near future the main European 
oountries will also be using this type of reactor, 
what is your opinion on its safety in view of the 
recent report on. it by the United States Atomic 
Energy Commission ? 
38. Most European electricity boards consider it 
of great importance to be in the same technical 
community and that for this reason a11 European 
countries should order light-water reactors. Do 
you agree with this opinion Y 
39. Could you give an indication on the future 
of: 
(a) the advanced gas-cooled reactor; 
(b) the liquid metal-cooled reactor ; 
(c) the high-temperature reactor; 
(d) the steam-generating heavy-water reac-
tor; 
(e) fusion; 
(j) safety studies ; 
(g) major research facilities in Brazil ; 
(h) applied nuclear work (radio isotopes, 
radiation techniques) ; 
(i) non-nuclear work, especiahly on the 
environment ; 
{j) the financing of industrial research and 
development aetivities in Brazil ; 
(k) marketing ; 
(l) international relations between Brazil 
and Europe? 
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m. The Ministry oflndustry and Commerce 
40. What is the task of the Ministry in pro-
moting industries in modern technology ? On 
which industries is emphasis laid ? 
41. What is the relationship between the 
Ministry and international oil companies ? 
42. What influence does the Ministry have on 
oil-finds in Brazil ? · 
43. Does an import-export bank exist to ·assist 
industry? 
44. Could an outline be given of the develop-
ment of the electronic and of the computer 
industry? 
45. Could a short history be given of federal 
activities in these fields ? 
46. What is the share of the American com-
puter industry in the number of computers in 
use? 
4 7. What is expected to be the trend in the 
1980s Y 
48. Is collaboration sought with Western Euro-
pean computer companies ? 
49. What is Brazilian policy on software ? 
IV. Oceanology 
50. What is Brazilian policy in the field of 
oceanology Y 
51. What is the budget trend and how do figures 
for oceanology compare, for instance, with those 
for nuclear energy or space ? 
52. How much is spent on submarine research, 
how rouch on experiments in fish ranching in 
shallow waters, on drilling and basic research 
on the continental shelf, on research ships and 
the operation of marine centres ? 
V. Space 
53. When was the Brazilian space institute 
established ? Its aim is to promote a compre-
hensive programme for telecommunications by 
satellite ; what prog:NJSS has been made towards 
reaching this goal Y 
54. What relationship is there with the parlia-
mentary commissions ? 
55. What is the rôle of the universities in the 
establishment and execution of programmes Y 
56. Where international co--operation is con-
cerned, Europe, ESA and Brazil have signed 
agreements on space collaboration. What does 
this involve ? 
APPENDIX II 
57. Will Brazil participate in the space shuttle; 
is it planning to use this space shuttle and, if 
so, what are the programmes ? 
58. ln which other international space program-
mes is Brazil participating ? 
59. With which Western European countries is 
Brazil deve1oping space co-operation and in 
which special fields ? 
VI. Discussions with parliamentarians 
60. What parliamentary supervision is there of 
the industrial activities of the government and 
the increasingly specialised administrative 
machinery in the complex modern state ? 
61. Can the parliamentary committees follow the 
rapid development of technology and what ma-
chinery is there to help the parliamentarians in 
the Federal and Provincial Parliaments to fulfil 
their tasks 1 
62. Is technological policy worked out only by 
the government or do the parliamentary institu-
tions also play a rôle ? 
63. Science policy is the end product of a 
process of interchange between scientists, the 
university, industry and goV'ernment. What rôle 
does parliament play in the definition of this 
policy ? Is there any difference where the 
formulation of technological policy is concerned ? 
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64. How are the committees informed of the 
specifie subjects of research and development 
being followed by scientists ? 
65. How do the parliamentary committees super-
vise public expenditure on research and develop-
ment? 
66. Is there an effective international exchange 
of views on science and technology ,at the parlia-
mentary level 1 More especially, do the committees 
have contacts with the corresponding committees 
of the Latin American countries and the Ameri-
can or Canadian Parliaments ? 
67. The Committee is especially interested in 
problems of energy - in particular nuclear 
energy for peaceful purposes, oceanography, 
space research and aircraft construction. Could 
a brief review be given of the activities of the 
competent parliamentary committees? 
68. To which of the above sectors did the com-
mittees give priority during the 1970s and to 
which fields will they give priority during the 
1980s? 
69. What priority does parliament give to 
environmental problems ? 
70. What are the budget trends ? 
71. How is the influence of the parliament 
brought to bear on nuclear activities 1 Has a 
comprehensive and systematic programme been 
submitted to parliament 1 
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APPENDIX III 
Briefings by Mr. R. Orye, Head of the Ariane Department, 
and Mr. J. Arets, Head of the International Affairs Branch of ESA 
Paris, 18th January 1919 
Mr. ARETS. - I wish to begin by saying 
very briefly how pleased our Director-General 
is that your Committee is to visrit the Kourou 
base and how happy he will be to welcome you 
to Kourou on that occasion. 
This decision to visit the Kourou base is yet 
another demonstration of the interest taken by 
your Committee and the WEU Assembly in the 
activities of the Agency and such steps provide 
us with extremely important support. We often 
f~l in fact that the European Space Agency, in 
a field which is no doubt 1imited but nevertheless 
important, makes a contribution to the building 
of Europe. But on the other hand we a1so often 
feel that public opinion and sometimes even 
governments are not always sufficiently aware 
of this contribution to the building of Europe. 
Consequently, any gesture by wch an important 
assembly as yours showing its interest in our 
efforts to this end is of major importance for us. 
Mr. ÛRYE. - I will very rapidly remind 
you of the context of the Ariane programme and 
its development ; I will say a few words on the 
operational phase and then describe in more 
detail the facilities which your Committee will 
visit in French Guiana. 
The objective of the Ariane programme is 
to have avai1able at the end of 1980 a European 
launcher for European programmes, for member 
states' programmes and also for third-party 
programmes so that we can offer launch services 
in a competitive environment. 
To achieve this objective we have first of 
all tried to minimise the risks of overrun, of time 
overrun and of financial overrun. To this effect 
we have made systematic use of whatever techn~ 
logy, test facility or manufacturing facility was 
available in Europe. W e have, for instance, both 
for engines and for tanks reused the technology 
which was used in the French Di:amant pro-
gramme. We have reused electronic equipment 
which has been used both in European pro-
grammes and in the French ballistic missile pro-
gramme. We are using ·an inertial guidance 
system which is very similar to the one used in 
the British Harrier, made by Ferranti. 
We have called on CNES, which success-
fully managed the Diamant programme and has 
long experience in launcher programmes, to be 
in charge of the management of the Ariane pro-
gramme. In Guiana the CNES management team 
will of course be there, as will be the range team 
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because the French national authorities are the 
operators and owners of the launch site. 
A very great effort has been made on the 
quality insurance and reliability prob1em, which 
even the Intelsat technicians judged sufficient. 
Ariane is a three-ffi;age 1aunch vehicle ; its 
objective is to launch a mass of 1,700 kg into 
geosynchronous transfer orbit. For your informa-
tion, Intelsat V weighed slightly more than 
1, 700 kg, but we have been able to make sorne 
minor modifications in Ariane to meet the per-
formance requirement of Intelsat V. 
The programme started in July 1973 ; after 
the design arid testing phase there will be four 
flight trials in the period 1979-80 on which I 
will give you more information Later. 
Ail ESA member states participate in the 
financing of this programme. France pays most : 
62.5 %, the next largest contributor is Germany 
with 20.12 % and the other European member 
states pay the remainder. At the beginning of 
the programme the financial envelope was set 
at 2 billion - 2,060 million - French francs, 
which corresponded at that moment, in the 1973 
economie conditions, to 370 million accounting 
units. Roughly speaking the accounting unit is 
now 5.56 French francs, or about $1.25. Through 
inflation this fin·ancial envelope has risen from 
2 billion to more than 3.5 billion, which is not 
a negligible increase, but it has been approved 
by member states. 
On top of this initial envelope member 
states, the participants, have committed them-
selves to contribute in the same proportion to a 
margin for technical contingencies of 20 %. This 
margin is there to cope with problems which can 
normally be expected during a development 
programme of this scope. 
In terms of organisation there is a pro-
gramme board, as we have for ail our program-
mes, which is in charge of the management and 
supervision of the programme. AU member states 
al'e represented on this programme board by 
delegates. CNES has been entrusted with the 
management of the programme. The European 
Space Agency is in charge of controlling the 
execution of the programme. 
Although making forty firms in ten 
different countries co-operate has created some 
problems. I think it can be said that the problems 
have not been very great and all these firms are 
now co-operating very smoothly. 
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The dynamic tests on the complete vehicle 
were completed in the middle of 1977 ; the 
e1ectricail tests on the complete vehicle were 
completed in the first quarter of 1978. The pro-
pellant mock-up launcher will be on the launch 
pad until early April ; by the middle of April 
it will have been disa.ssembled and sent back to 
Europe where we need it for something else. But 
you will see the Guiana space centre facilities, 
the Ariane fucilities, general faci1ities for every-
thing, but you will not see the launcher and I 
do not think that seeing it in its crate is very 
impressive. 
Coming back to the progress of work, the 
test firing is now planned for November and I 
will tell you later on why we have lost a couple 
of months on the first firing. On the first stage 
we have had in fact only one major problem 
which I can say is now solved. We have been 
obliged to change the material used in the engine, 
in the nozzle of the engin·e, because the initial 
material could not withstand a very high thermal 
and vibrational environment. We have changed 
the material which has been tested successfully. 
At the moment the first stage for the first 
launch, which we call L 01, is in the process of 
being manufactured. There have been two types 
of problem: problems with sub-systems- valves, 
pressure reducers and things like this - which 
have taken a lot of time but which have not 
created basic problems. There was also an inci-
dent during one of the test firings in Vernon. 
The incorrect functioning a;llowed a very large 
quantity of gaseous hydrogen to accumulate, 
which is very dangerous when mixed with liquid 
oxygen, and when the engine was turned on the 
mixture exploded. This damaged the engine. It 
did not damage the test facility, but the stage 
itself was damaged qui te a lot. W e had to wait 
until we received another stage from the manu-
facturer before we could resume testing and 
this, unfortunately, interrupted the test pro-
gramme for several months. The interruption in 
the test programme has forced us rto delay the 
first development launch, initially scheduled for 
July. We tried for sorne time to have it in June; 
we had to go back to July, ·and have now been 
obliged to shift it to early November 1979. 
I rthink I can turn immediately to the 
schedule of test firings because as far as electrical 
systems, vehicle equipment bay and fairings are 
concerned, ground qualification is completed. We 
no longer have any problem in this area. L 01 
is thus postponed until November, the second 
firing to March (L 02 was initially planned for 
December 1979 and has been postponed until 
March), L 03 is pœtponed from May 1980 to 
June 1980, and for the last test firing, L 04, we 
feel we can maintain the initial date of October 
1980. 
The objective of the test firings is not to 
fly pay'loads but to qualify the launch vehicle, 
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but we - the delegations and the Council -
considered that it would be a pity not to offer 
passenger payload rides and where we have no 
passenger whatsoever, except for the techno-
logical capsule on the first, we have Firewheel 
which is a scientific experiment made by the 
Max Planck Institute in Germany together with 
Amsat, which is a satellite made by the radio 
amateurs and will be Oscar 9 ; as you know, 
radio amateurs have qui:te a series of satellites 
and are at number 7 or 8 and this one will be 
number 9. 
On the third firing we have in fact a double 
passenger : first, we have accepted the request 
made by the Indian space authorities to fly a 
technological telecommunications satellite. Apple 
stands for Ariane passenger payload experiment. 
It is a simple telecommunications satellite which 
has alrea;dy gone through part of its qualification 
tests. The second passenger on L 03 is the second 
unit of our Meteosat programme, which is to be 
flown on top of Apple. 
On the last firing we shall fly Marees, which 
is our maritime communications sate'ilite. Marees 
A will be the passenger on L 04 and we might 
have other passengers, but today we cannot say 
much more on this except that we shaH fly 
Marees in October next year. 
To conclude on the time-scale, our objective, 
i.e. to have Ariane available at the end of 1980, 
and not only available but also proven, remains 
unchanged. Our first operational user is probably 
going to be Exosat, which is scheduled for April 
1981. We have a six-month margin between our 
last development firing scheduled for October 
and the first operational launch scheduled for 
April 1981. 
Financially speaking, although we have not 
been able to remain within the 100 % limit, the 
initial budget envelope, we have today been 
obliged to ask for only 4.7% compared with a 
margin of 20 %, which means that we are still 
weil within the financia:l commitment made by 
member states for the development of this pro-
gramme. 
For the operational phase the ESA member 
states last year approved the manufacture of five 
operational launch vehicles - five on top of the 
prototypes L 01, L 02, L 03 and L 04. The 
operational vehicles are for launches in the 
period 1981-83. The first is Exosat, an ESA 
scientific satellite, which is scheduled for launch 
in April 1981 ; Marees B, the second satellite 
of the maritime series, is to be 1aunched in the 
second quarter of 1981 ; and at the <last Council 
meeting it was decided to launch Sirio II, which 
is a satellite built in the Italian Sirio programme. 
This is a slightly different mission : Sirio and 
Marees will be plaœd in orbit by a duallauncher, 
about which I will say something later. 
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ECS-1 is the first unit of the European 
communications satellite programme and is 
scheduled for launch at the end of 1981. From 
1983 onwards it will be put at the disposai of 
the European postal authorities. 
The French national earth observation satel-
lite called Spot is scheduled for launch at the 
end of 1983. 
A.fter a two and a half year period we have 
managed to convince Intelsat to place a firm 
order for two launches and I can tell you this 
has required quite an effort not only by the 
executive, not only by CNES, but specially by the 
European governors on the Intelsat board, who 
are aU members of the European postal autho-
rities. They have been extremely helpful and 
have been working very closely together. We 
owe part of this success to them. 
In the ECS programme there are four satel-
lites to be launched : we have three more users 
- ECS-2, ECS-3 and ECS-4. In the near future 
a decision is to be taken in France on the cons-
truction of two telecommunication satellites. 
Telecom I would have to be launched by Ariane 
in the period 1982-83. 'rhis means that we are 
coming very close to the point where we have to 
arder a new series of five 1aunchers. In December 
we in fact informed our authorities, our delega-
tions, that a decision would be needed on this 
so that we can meet probable requirements up 
to the end of 1983. 
There are two points I should like to mention 
in terms of competition : Ariane can lift 1,700 
kg. The first thing to be said is that in the early 
1980s there will be several satellites weighing 
about half that much. Satellites like ECS, Marees 
and, for instance, the Canadian Anik C and the 
Arab satellites (Arabsat) will all weigh about 
half, unfortunately slightly over half, the per-
formance capability of Ariane and we have 
therefore asked for and received authorisation 
to develop a duallaunch system. 
A dual launch system allows the simul-
taneous launch of two smaller-class payloads by 
means of one Ariane without these payloads 
constraining ·each other in any way. W e expect 
to have it available and qualified by the end of 
next year and will use it with Marees B and Sirio 
in mid-1981. 
Unfortunately these payloods are slightly 
higher than half the Ariane performance and 
this has led us to propose to the Ariane pro-
gramme board and to the ESA Council a pro-
gramme - a rather modest programme - for 
Ariane performance improvements which would 
raise the performance from 1, 700 to 2,300 kg, 
probably in two steps. This improvement can be 
achieved by rather simple means. We first 
intend to add two boosters to the first stage. It 
is a classical approach ; people always start 
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building a launcher and then in order to increase 
the performance they add boosters. We intend 
to increase the propellant capability of the third 
stage just by adding two tons of propellants, 
lengthening the tanks by about one metre, again 
a rather simple modification. W e wolrld also have 
to make a small modification to the first stage, 
not in the engine, but we have to increase the 
combustion pressure. This would enable us to 
go from 1,700 kg to 2,300 kg and we plan to 
have these modifications available at the end of 
1982 or in 1983. However, this is not an approved 
programme ; it is now under discussion ; we shall 
be seeking approval from our authorities in mid-
1979. Provided we get this approval we feel that 
by the end of 1982, when Arabsat and Telecom I 
and ECS-2 will come up for launch for instance, 
we shall be able to offer, not a better launcher, 
but a launcher of a higher performance, the unit 
cost of which will have practically not gone up. 
With regard to the launch facilities I have 
to make a distinction between the Guiana space 
centre, which is a general facility, and the Ariane 
launch base. The Guiana space centre is located 
in French Guiana, in a town called Kourou. Jt 
is very close to the equator and a1lows us to 
make maximum use of the earth's velocity and 
also minimises the degree of manoeuvre to be 
made before getting into orbit. The centre has 
a technical rôle and a logistic one. Technically 
it will provide radars, which allow the launcher 
to be tracked, and telemetry receivers which will 
show exactly wlïat is happening on board ; it 
has an operations centre and a very complex 
transmission network ; it has a very complex 
safety system because both people and facilities 
have to be protected against a possible malfunc-
tion of the launcher ; it has a meteorological 
system, etc. In terms of logistics it has transport 
facilities and can provide accommodation ; it has 
a fire-fighting system ; there is a hospital and 
everything. There are about 650 people working 
in the Guiana space centre. Roughly speaking 
there are 100 CNES staff, the other 550 being 
local industrial manpower. 
The Guiana space centre is now practically 
ready to ensure the Ariane launchings. We are 
requalifying the centre as it has been without 
any large-scale launchings for a couple of years ; 
four sounding rockets are to be launched before 
Ariane. 
The annual budget is about 160 million 
French francs, mainly for running the base -
salaries, electricity, things like that. A small 
proportion is allocated for investments and 
upkeep of facilities. About 70 % of the cast is 
financed by France and about 30 % by the other 
member states of the European Space Agency. 
This agreement was signed in 1975 and is in 
force until 1980, the end of the Ariane develop-
ment. 
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Under a new agreement for the financing 
of the Guiana space centre after the Ariane 
development phase, now under discussion, France 
would pay about one-third from its national 
budget and the remaining tw~thirds would be 
divided between the ESA member states, France 
included. It will be related to the Ariane indus-
trial return or the gross national product or 
probably a combination of both. ESA has a small 
Liaison office in Kourou in view of our launch-
ings there. 
For Ariane, there is the Ariane facility 
which is basically composed of what we call the 
Ariane launch site, the tower and the control 
centre. There are sorne additional facilities such 
as a telemetry station which will be installed 
on the Brazilian coast. 
We have radar and telemetry facilities in 
l!"'rench Guiana but we also have two stations in 
Brazil and are using a NASA station in Ascen-
sion Island. W e have an agreement with Brazil 
for the construction and operation of a facility 
in Natal. Natal is a military range on which 
high-performance radar already existed. We have 
funded the installation of a telemetry system 
compatible with the Ariane launch telemetry 
system and in exchange for this system the 
Brazilians have built general facilities like roads, 
etc. ; they are carrying out the operations free 
of charge. · 
W e have also a mobile station near Belem, 
which is a l,ittle to the north. This station has 
been installed on a semi-permanent basis to have 
a better coverage of the early phases of flight. 
In the early phases of flight the Kourou and 
Cayenne stations see the rocket only from the 
back. Radio transmissions through flames being 
somewhat difficult, we therefore have a sideways 
facing station in Belem and use existing NASA 
and United States DOD facilities in Ascension 
Island. All these facilities are practically com-
pleted. W e are carrying out transmission tests. 
The Ariane launch site itse1f is completed ; we 
started the erection of this propellant mock-up 
only when the facility was finished. We are 
also building a facility to allow the preparation 
of payloads of the Ariane class. This is called 
the EPCU which stands for "ensemble de prépa-
ration de charge utile". All this will be completed 
at the end of the year. The Ariane launch site 
cost roughly 180 million French francs and to 
this should be added the value of what was 
recovered from the old ELDO facility. The 
additional facilities cost 40 million French francs 
and the payload facilities 15 million French 
francs. Of course the Guiana space centre has 
cost far more than this. 
In reply to questions, Mr. 0RYE said the 
nominal duration of firings of the third stage 
is 560 seconds. A month after the abovementioned 
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incident we had a 500-second firing time. This 
was done to make sure that nothing was wrong 
with the stage design itself. We have had several 
of these ; the exact accumulated firing time is 
severa;l thousands of seconds. 
On costs, the ESA Council has adopted a 
pricing policy for ESA missions and for ESA's 
member states' missions based on Delta-class 
launchings. The missions will have to cost 24 
million accounting units, whereas missions which 
are to use the full Ariane capacity will cost 32 
million accounting units. This is for ESA mis-
sions and for member states' missions, but of 
course in a competitive world you have to adapt 
your priees as far as economica1ly possible. For 
Intelsat for instance we have adopted quite a 
different approach ; as we were starting from 
a weak position in respect of NASA we could 
not afford to demand a higher priee than NASA. 
W e decided to offer at marginal costs and made 
an offer of this at $20 million, which in the 
meantime we have brought up to $21.5 million. 
This policy has been approved for Intelsat and 
the Ariane programme board authorised us to 
sign the Intelsat contract based on this policy. 
For a very small increase in cost - not even half 
a million accounting units - the dual launch 
system will allow us to launch two ECS-type 
satellites. This of course improves our status very 
much. 
With the down-range station network we 
cover the totality of the booster phase. There 
is not a single second during this 800 seconds 
which is not covered by telemetry reception and 
by radar. W e see the vehicle all the time. We 
cannot afford not to see it. With a small number 
of launchings you have to get all the information 
you can and we have a continuous coverage of 
the launcher trajectory. What happens after 
injection into transfer orbit is no longer the 
launcher authority's business - it is the satellite 
people's business. Now they have their own 
network for tracking their satellites between 
injection in transfer orbits, firing of the apogee 
motor and manoeuvres in orbit. There are no 
dark areas so far as the 1auncher is concerned. 
W e have a general and a specifie co-
operation agreement with Brazil, the specifie 
agreement being for the use of the facilities in 
Natal and near Belem. From the co-operation 
which we have had so far, it can be said that 
the Brazilians are certainly very, very keen to 
co-operate with Europe. 
On possible accidents occurring during 
firings, I should mention that the Guiana space 
centre has a safety system and a safety officer. 
Guiana is very well situated because most of our 
launchings are into geostationary orbit, which 
means that you have to launch in an easterly 
direction and therefore you immediately fly over 
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the sea. The only things you have to do are to 
protect Kourou itself (which is about 20 km from 
the launch site) in the very ear1y stages of flight 
and avoid the vehicle going off-course, in the 
direction of Brazil or somewhere else. In both 
cases, with very precise radar systems, optical 
systems, we ean track the vehicle, we can predict 
the impact point, should anything happen at 
any time, and it is possible for the safety officer 
to destroy the vehicle before it can reach a posi-
tion from which it can do real damage to people 
or indeed to :facilities. 
Certainly we are condemned to succeed on 
L 01, but still it is a development firing. We are 
very well aware of the psychologica1 importance 
of this first launch, especially after the very 
unlucky experience with the previous European 
launcher programme. We are not taldng any 
risks on this first launch. We go through a very, 
very extensive ground testing programme ; we 
go through a very tight quality assurance pro-
gramme and I think we have a very reasonable 
chance of having a successful first flight. But 
then I think we all have to be realistic. If we 
were sure that the first flight would be a success-
ful one, why wou1d we have test flights ? W e feel 
we can launch in November of this year. 
The question of insurance in case something 
goes wrong with the payload has arisen for the 
Intelsat V satellite. We first of all offered a free 
reflight should the launch be totally unsuccessful, 
provided the user is willing to pay an insurance 
premium, which we feel should not exceed 10 %. 
We have also considered the possibility of 
a partial failure. W e have devised a scheme 
whereby we would have proportional, pro rata, 
compensation in the light of the usefulness of 
the spacecraft actually placed in orbit. We have 
of course not agreed to be responsible for con-
sequential damages arising from non-use of satel-
lites ; we would only accept direct consequences. 
We have no real active control over the 
vehicle. W e track it and receive all the telemetry 
data from it but cannat influence its behaviour 
except for safety reasons. W e can either stop 
or interrupt propulsion or break up the vehicle, 
but we cannot from the ground intervene if one 
of the vehicle functions does not work. In this 
case the system is lost - the flight is lost. 
Relative to the financing of the Guiana 
space centre beyond 1980 and its commercial 
aspects, an investigation is being conducted as 
follows : l!,rance would pay one-third from its 
national budget and ESA (France included) 
would pay the remaining two-thirds, the key to 
each country's share being the gross national 
product or its industrial return, or a combination 
of both. 
The first production series of five Ariane 
launchings in the period 1981-83 is considered 
96 
APPENDIX III 
a promotional series. In this period 1981-83, 
Europe has to make an effort to promote its 
launcher. NASA has decided that in this period 
1981-83 it would have a fixed pricing policy for 
the shuttle launchings, but after this period, 
from 1984 to 1992, its priees would be adjusted 
to cover total cost, including whatever losses it 
might have incurred during the first three years. 
Europe should be able to keep Ariane going, 
make sure that it works, make sure that we can 
sell it not only for our own programmes, which 
is a rather simple objective, but aJ.so for non-
ESA, non-member state programmes. 
In the Agency, as in the CNES moreover, 
we of course use solid propellants, but for other 
purposes. In civil applications, liquid propellants 
will always be used for launchers. For several 
reasons, the liquid propellant creates an environ-
ment which is generally much less hard than the 
solid propellant and it also has a better per-
formance. 
For the improved Ariane, first, we wish to 
minimise the modifications to the launcher 
proper. For instance, the addition of boosters 
hardly modifies the launcher. The only thing 
which has to be decided is how to attach them. 
This is not a simple matter but it is not very 
complicated either. 
The lengthening of the third stage of course 
modifies the launcher. The increased thrust of 
the first stage obtained by regulating the engine 
differently makes no change to the equipment 
proper. 
Once we have developed this new version 
the modified third and first stages will certainly 
become the standard version. There is no point 
in our producing two types of launcher in parai-
lei, particularly for short production runs. 
W e are of course aware that in order to 
export launchers and certainly also satellites we 
shall have in certain cases to seek special 
financial terms at least as advantageous as those 
offered by the American EXIM bank. The matter 
is being studied. We have had contacts with thP 
European Development Bank but in this case 
I think assistance is possible olli.y in the case 
of exports to African countries. Finally, this is 
certainly an important point because we know, 
for instance, that when the Brazilians called for 
offers from American and European industry 
two years ago they for their part wished no 
payment to be made before the satellite was 
completed. This called for pre-financing with 
a search for the best financial terms and here 
I think an effort should be made to set up 
appropriate machinery ; on the American side 
EXIM certainly provides very strong support. 
Geographically, the industrial breakdown 
does not change very much between the develop-
ment and production phases. France contribute~ 
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62.5 % in the development phase and since the 
production contracts were signed its share of the 
first series has diminished slightly and now 
amounts to 57 or 58%. The share of the other 
member states has not changed much eithe.r. We 
have increased the share of Italian industry 
because its contribution to development was of 
a special kind in that Italy is building a techno-
logical capsule used only in the development and 
not in the operational phase, and we wished to 
increase its share in the manufacture proper of 
the launcher. So there has not been a very great 
change. I must nevertheless tell you that even 
countries which contributed only a relatively low 
percentage to work on Ariane have provided 
considerable support. For instance, Ireland, 
which took no part in the development phase, has 
joined the Ariane programme for the production 
phase. A country like Belgium, which had 5 % 
of the work, has always been a very sound 
supporter of the Ariane programme and Switzer-
land too has always been very much in favour 
of the programme. 
Where military satellites are concerned, we 
have no military users, but a distinction must be 
drawn between passive and non-passive applica-
tion. I do not think we should be kept out of sales 
of Ariane launchings for military satellites used 
for peaceful purposes, such as observation and 
communication satellites. W e have established 
preliminary contacts with NATO, for instance, 
offering Ariane for the next generation of NATO 
communication satellites. As you know, NATO 
is now in its third generation of communication 
satellites and is considering introducing its 
fourth generation, probably as from 1984. 
Where satellites are concerned, an effort is 
being made by manufacturera to compete for 
NATO 4, and where launchers are concerned, 
we have made preliminary contacts with the 
NATO agency responsible for satellites to see 
if it will consider Ariane. W e see no reason why 
we should not sell Ariane for the launching of 
a NATO satellite and I think that if the French 
military authorities subsequently wished to place 
military communication satellites in orbit (and 
here I really am giving my persona! view) there 
is no reason why Ariane should not be used to 
launch them. A Telecom satellite is not an 
aggressive system; this is the li mit between 
peaceful and non-peaceful. 
Relative to ESA funding for Ariane, we 
have no basic problems. ESA has been living 
without a proper budget for 1978, but this does 
not involve Ariane, nor spacelab, nor the appli-
cations programmes. It involves ESA's general 
budget and its scientific programme. For 
instance, the Ariane programme board voted the 
Ariane development budget and the Ariane pro-
duction budget for 1979 in early December 1978 
and ail is going smoothly financially. 
4 
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Ariane has a twofold origin. It stems from 
the wish of most European nations to have an 
autonomous and independent launch capability 
and to launch their satellites the way they want 
and not the way the Americans want. This will, 
for instance, avoid situations such as that of 
Symphonie where NASA forced the French and 
German authorities to locate Symphonie where 
NASA wanted and not where the Europeans 
wanted, that is, so as not to cove.r certain parts 
of Eastern Europe and not to cover one or 
another area. The other point is that it will be 
very difficult to export a European satellite 
system without a European launching system 
being available. Of course, NASA would say 
"But we will launch any system you want", but 
once things really become difficult, when the 
competition really becomes tough, no holds will 
be barred, as we have seen with Intelsat. We have 
had ail kinds of arguments with which they have 
tried to eliminate us from the Intelsat V race. 
When involved in this kind of competition, it is 
not always technical objectivity which is used. 
Kourou is very close to the equator. Basi-
cally, the launcher brings an object from one 
speed to another and if you launch on the 
equator you make maximum use of the rotation 
of the earth, which is of course zero at the poles. 
The second advantage is that if you launch from 
the equator you have to make fewer corrections 
and you can therefore make more use of the 
rocket performance just to boost useful payloads 
into orbit. 
ESA has been in touch with the Arab 
countries, both with ASCO, the Arab Satellite 
Communications Organisation, and with its 
consultant, Comsat General, to ensure that when 
tenders are called for by the end of this year 
Ariane will be among the launch vehicles taken 
into consideration. With the Arab countries there 
is reasonable progress. W e are using the same 
approach with Iran but, of course, it is perhaps 
not the right moment. In South America, Colom-
hia intends to set up a communications satellite 
system either for Colombia alone or for the 
Andean nations. An effort is now under way to 
have a consulting firm appointed and there is, 
for instance, a French group bidding for this 
consultancy task. Australia is also thinking of 
putting up a satellite for telecommunications 
and television and also for linking its embassies 
in that part of the world through a satellite. 
They are considering 1985. W e have had and still 
have contacts with them for the possible use of 
Ariane and the United Kingdom industry, for 
instance, has been very active in terms of satel-
lites. The Nordic countries, as you may know, 
are very actively considering setting up a direct 
television broadcasting satellite system in 1984-
85 ; one option is for four or five satellites. This 
satellite would be an extrapolation of what we 
cali an ESA H-sat - the heavy satellite. While 
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no decision has been taken, it might lead to an 
experimental direct television satellite and ESA 
is in contact with the Nordic authorities for 
Ariane. 
Indonesia wants to build a second-generation 
Palapa satellite system for 1982-84. W e have 
been in direct contact with them and with the 
American firm which built the first-generation 
satellite to make sure that in the cahl for tenders 
- it is an absolute necessity to be in the caU for 
tenders - Ariane is included as one of the 
possible launch vehicles. The second step of 
course would then be to sell the Ariane launcher 
rather than another launcher. 
ESA has started a long-term study of the 
competition between Ariane and the shuttle, and 
the long-term future of Ariane. What will space 
in Europe be like in 1990 or in 1995 ? There will 
be competition for Ariane from the shuttle, but 
until 1986-87 either this version or the improved 
version of Ariane will still be used. 
The Russians, in my opinion, will not have 
a reusable shuttle in the very near future. They 
will continue to use conventionallaunch vehicles. 
It is not sure that the shuttle will reduce launch 
costs. Only experience and time will show 
whether the shuttle is really going to reduce 
launch costs. The launch cost for spacelab is not 
all that low. The conventional launcher will con-
tinue to exist. 
In their long-term studies on solar satellites, 
for instance, the Americans see the need for 
heavy-lift vehicles, completely different from the 
shuttle, very big launchers with an even better 
engine able to lift 1,000 tons or so. In building 
a solar satellite, a structure sorne 10-20 km long, 
the shuttle will not be powerful enough to place 
it in orbit. The shuttle will be used for other 
purposes, obviously for manned flight, for space-
lab, but not to lift heavy payloads. The shuttle 
on its own cannot reach geostationary orbit ; an 
additional stage is needed. They use what they 
cali the SSUS - the solid spinning upper stage 
- to go from lower orbit to geostationary orbit. 
This is a very interesting long-term question. 
Europe has to make up its mind in the next 
couple of years : What does it want to do after 
Ariane ? Ariane is not eternal. ESA has to decide 
whether it wants to opt for a next-generation 
launcher and what we should do in the next ten, 
fifteen or perhaps twenty years to come. A 
launcher takes a long time to build. If you look 
at the cryogenies you can say that before Ariane 
will be really qualified it will have taken more 
than ten years to get the cryogenies working ; 
the same is true for the shuttle and the same will 
be true for the next~generation launch vehicles. 
Launch programmes are long and it is not for 
nothing that they are expensive. 
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Mr. Â.RETS. - With regard to co-operation 
with Brazil and in view of the fact that you 
will be going there shortly, I woul'd mention that 
last year the Agency signed a co-operation agree-
ment with Brazil mainly relating to the instal-
lations needed for the ..Ariane tracking opera-
tions. On that occasion, our delegation, under our 
Director-General, had an extremely warm wei-
come in Brazil and there were definite signs of 
interest in co-operation between Europe and 
Brazil in space matters. 
At that very moment, Brazilian efforts to 
caU for tenders -for a Brazilian satellite, the 
Brazilsat, were broken off and put into deep 
freeze for an indefinite period, but not less than 
two years, mainly for financial reasons. It is 
therefore probable that in the coming months 
or perhaps during next year a further effort 
will be made by Brazil to revive the idea of a 
Brazilian communications satellite which, in view 
of the size of the country, is clearly very largely 
justified. 
In such a context, space Europe must cer-
tainly try to play a rôle both in ensuring the 
use of an Ariane launcher and also in allowing 
European industry to try to win this kind of 
call for tenders for the supply of the satellite it-
self. Here Europe must make a promotion effort 
and it is not always easy to know what part the 
Space Agency sho-iùd play, what part industry 
and what part the national organisations. 
But we feel that the effort is so great that 
everyone must take part and that there can be 
no exclusivity. 'Vhere we are concerned, there-
fore, we are striving to strengthen contacts and 
co-operation with Brazil and we are considering 
sending a smaU delegation to Brasilia in the 
next few months when an additional clause to 
the principal agreement for setting up a second-
acy station is signed. W e hope to take advantage 
of this journey to revive, so to speak, co-opera-
tion with Brazil, particularly with a view to 
Brazilsat. Y ou may find this information useful 
in the context of your own visit to Brazil. 
I also wished to mention a treaty on respon-
sibility prepared in the framework of the United 
Nations which has been signed and ratified by 
most states, and in any event the member states 
of the Agency. Quite recently, the European 
Space Agency, with the agreement of the member 
states, naturally, declared that it agreed to this 
treaty on responsibility being applied to its 
work. This lays down the responsibility of the 
launching state or international organisation and 
such juridical responsibility is thus now 
governed internationally by this treaty. 
I also wish to comment on marketing 
problems. I think that when we talk about 
marketing space activities there is the problem 
both of the launcher and of the satellite. A 
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satellite of American manufacture can of course 
be launched by a European launcher and Euro-
pean satellites by American launchers or the 
shuttle, but it is quite evident that work in these 
fields must be pursued in parallel and here 
again we come back to the difficulty of each 
party's rôle because although, where promoting 
the activities of Ariane as a launcher is con-
cerned, it is quite obvious that the Space Agency 
has a well-established rôle since it is responsible 
not only for developing the launcher but also 
for producing it, this is less obvious in the case 
of satellites since the Agency's rôle is limited to 
developing satellites and it is not automatically 
responsible for producing satellites for export. 
So how can this promotion be done ? There 
are various possibilities. When we have the 
opportunity, we present the Space Agency in 
other countries so as to increase credibility in 
Europe's space capability. We try to give demon-
strations ; for instance with the Meteosat satellite 
placed in orbit a year ago we made a number of 
demonstrations in African countries with a 
mobile reception station which we moved from 
place to place so asto show these countries what 
use they can make of this satellite. 
W e are studying financial problems, obvi-
ously major problems, but we are of course 
encountering the difficulty encountered by all 
international organisations in this field and one 
point to which I venture to draw your attention 
is the need, where promotion is concerned, to 
adopt a European approach. Off the record, I 
will tell you something that happened a year or 
two ago. 
Mr. Orye referred several times to Arabsat, 
the satellites which the Arab countries are con-
sidering developing and launching in the next 
few years. To this end, they have set up an Arab 
satellite communications organisation, ASCO. 
One of the main problems for the Arab countries 
is obviously the lack of qualified staff and in 
order to proceed with their work they therefore 
need a consultative body. They put out a caU 
for firms or other bodies to act as consultant to 
ASCO for a five-year period. Our position was 
as follows : where the European Space Agency 
is concerned, we proposed that member states 
make a single offer to ASCO under the aegis of 
the Agency with contributions inter alia from 
national space organisations and firms parti-
cularly competent in this field, but to make a 
single offer to the Arab countries. 
Among United States firms, a single com-
pany has been set up : Comsat. Our appeal was 
not heard and there were three national or bila-
teral European offers to the Arab organisation. 
Comsat was chosen as consultant. Obviously no 
one can say that, if made, a single European 
offer would have been preferred to the American 
one. It may perhaps be thought that if a single 
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European offer had been made there might have 
been a joint European-American consÙltancy, 
but I think that in any event it may be consi-
dered that Europe's chances of success would 
have been greater if a single offer had been 
made representing ten or eleven European 
countries rather than having competing national 
European offers to the Arabs as compared with 
a single offer by Comsat whose reputation is of 
course established. Since you asked me to speak 
frankly, I will tell you about problems facing us 
which at the very least warrant reflection in 
Europe. 
In reply to the question about Canada : 
Canada is not a member state of the European 
Space Agency but a co-operation agreement was 
concluded with it very recently. We do not yet 
know exactly how to describe Canada's relation-
ship with the Space Agency for as you know 
there are member states and, under the Conven-
tion, associate states, but the juridical position 
of Canada is merely that of a co-operating 
country. This co-operation agreement with 
Canada allows it inter alia to be kept informed 
of our activities, commits it to take part in sorne 
of them, particularly the general ones and future 
programmes, and also allows it to take part in 
sorne programmes. Among other things, Canada 
has already shown its interest in the Agency's 
work on remote sensing and on direct television 
satellites. · 
Finally, I wish to say another word about 
the question of military satellites. Here, in a 
field in which the WEU Assembly is particularly 
interested, I think the basis of our Agency, under 
Article 2 of the Convention, is to work to peace-
ful, solely peaceful ends. It is therefore a definite 
feature of the Convention and the fact that 
countries like Switzerland and Sweden take part 
in our work is obviously not alien to this 
insistence on pursuing such aims. W e are there-
fore in a position where we can have no dealings, 
near or far, with military activities and 1 
remember that in certain resolutions or other 
texts of your Assembly sent to us for the inform-
ation of our member states there were remarks 
or questions touching on the military aspects of 
your work in the space field. There are sorne 
misgivings here, which is understandable in view 
of the membership of our organisation. 
Nevertheless, there is another equally evi-
dent side to the problem : as Mr. Orye said, if we 
develop the Ariane launcher and in other fields 
we develop a satellite capability and if an organ-
isation like NATO decides to acquire space 
means, this should not mean, under the pretext 
that the Agency has an exclusively peaceful rôle, 
that all space supplies should be American. Here 
there is therefore a problem which must be 
viewed from every angle, but I can only give you 
a picture of the position of the European Space 
Agency. 
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The Ariane programme 
(a) Milestones in the Ariane programme 
20th December 1972 : European Space Confer-
ence 
The research ministers of the member 
countries of ESRO and ELDO meet in Brussels. 
The Europa II and III programmes are 
abandoned. France proposes a new launcher 
project : Ariane (formerly L III S). 
30th July 1973: European Space Conference 
in Brussels 
The Ariane programme is adopted, along 
with the spacelab (European orbital laboratory 
flown on the United States space shuttle) and 
Marots (maritime communications) programmes. 
These programmes are to be carried out within 
the frame of a European Space Agency, a single 
organisation covering the activities of ESRO and 
ELDO. 
December 1973 
The international arrangement on Arian~ 
cornes into force with France financing 62.5 % 
of the programme. The total development cost is 
2,472 MF, which includes a 20% contingency 
margin. 
The Centre National d'Etudes Spatiales 
(CNES) is prime contractor for the programme, 
in which ten countries participate. 
1974 
Industrial contracts are started. 
31st May 1975 
Establishment of the European Space 
Agency. 
1974-75 
Development and qualification of the 
launcher's sub-systems. 
Mid-1976 
Start of "dynamic mock-up" tests by the 
industrial architect, Société Nationale Indus-
trielle Aérospatiale. 
Apn11977 
Start of "electrical mock-up" tests. 
Mid-1978 
Shipment to the launch base at Kourou of 
an example of Ariane for the "propellants mock-
100 
up" operations (finalisation of procedures for 
erecting the launcher in the tower, tank filling 
and draining tests, vibration and climatic envi-
ronment tests). 
First tests of the stages 
- 13th December 1977 : lst stage, L 140 
- 31st J anuary 1978 : 2nd stage, L 33 
- lOth January 1978: 3rd stage, H 8 cry-
ogenie) 
Qualification firings 
- November 1979 : First launch Ariane 
LOl 
- March 1980 : Launch L 02 
-June 1980: Launch L 03 
- October 1980 : Launch L 04 
Operational firings 
Starting early 1981. 
(b) Present position and future of the Ariane 
programme 
(February 1979) 
Ariane programme 
In 1973 the member states of the European 
Space Research Organisation (ESRO) decided to 
develop the Ariane launcher. ESRO has since 
become the European Space Agency (ESA), an 
intergovernmental organisation composed of 
eleven European member states (most of them 
members of the European Community) and 
whose aims are essentially the development of 
spacecraft and their launch systems for peaceful 
ends. ESA is developing the Ariane launcher, 
originally designed to place a 1,500 kg payload 
in a transfer orbit of 200/36,000 km. 
The development work started in July 1973 
with the target of having an operationallauncher 
available by the end of 1980. 
The constant progress so far achieved has 
been built up on a prudent design approach 
based on technologies acquired in Europe through 
experience with civil and military programmes 
and on the maximum use of existing facilities 
and installations. 
The guaranteed performance (in geostation-
ary transfer orbit) has been raised to 1,700 kg 
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during development, thus exceeding the initial 
objective by 200 kg. 
Taking advantage of the experience gained 
by CNES in its highly successful Diamant 
launcher programme, the European Space 
Agency entrusted CNES with the management 
of the Ariane project. 
1. Main tests 
As well as the numerous sub-systems deve-
lopment tests (engines, electronic equipment, 
structures), the Ariane programme development 
work is based on a large number of overall tests: 
- "dynamic" tests of the launcher held 
between mid-76 and mid-77; 
- "electrical system" tests which, after the 
setting up of the facilities, started in 
April 1977 and ended in November 1978. 
Concurrently, the development of the pro-
pulsion systems for the three stages has given 
rise to the following main tests : 
- A series of ten cluster tests, Gl to GlO, of 
the four engines of the first stage. The 
conclusion of this series was highly 
satisfactory and was foilowed by the Ml 
firing of the first stage to ftùl flight 
standard in mid-December 1977 (111 s), 
the M2 firing on 9th March 1978 (122 s), 
and the M3 firing in mid-June 1978. 
These firings, which in other respects 
were perfectly satisfactory, had to be 
stopped before reaching the nominal 
duration (143 s) as a result of a defect 
in the graphite of the throat of the 
engine nozzles. After changing this 
material the M4 firing, which completed 
the development of the first stage, was 
fully successful (143 s) in early Decem-
ber 1978. 
- An Ml firing of the second stage on 31st 
January 1978 (138 s), an M2 firing on 
31st March 1978 (138 s), and an M3 
firing on 14th August 1978 were all 
highly successful. They followed a series 
of firings of the propulsion system which 
were also very satisfactory. The first 
qualification firing Ql also took place 
and the second firing is planned for 
February. 
- Two long-duration firings of the third 
stage on lOth January 1978 (250 s) and 
on 2nd February 1978 (550 s) with 
normal eut-off on depletion of the pro-
pellants. 
The third stage, equipped with battleship 
tanks replacing the light flight tanks, was also 
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subjected to a successful firing of 250 s, and 
three firings of a nominal dura ti on ( over 500 s). 
As a result of faulty ignition of an engine, 
a stage firing at the end of November 1978 
caused an explosion which damaged the third-
stage propulsion bay without affecting the test 
stand. This accident, which does not put in 
question the design of the flight stage, has caused 
the suspension of the development tests on the 
third stage with flight tank until May 1979. 
Development testing of this stage with the 
battleship tank will be carried out concurrently 
and without a break between now and June 1979. 
Testing of the other sub-systems ( equipment 
bay and fairing) are completed. 
Finally, at the Kourou launch base, after 
satisfactory tests of the launcher check-out 
system, the finalisation of the launch site, which 
was more difficult than expected, was completed 
in December 1978. The "propellant mock-up" 
tests which are currently being carried out will 
enable a check to be made of the launcherjlaunch 
site interfaces and the launch procedures, as well 
as helping with the training of the launch team. 
The technical difficulties referred to above 
have led to an adjustment in the time-table of 
test flights, which are now as follows : 
- L 01 3rd November 1979 ; 
- L 02 March 1980 ; 
- L 03 June 1980 ; 
- L 04 October 1980. 
It will be seen that the initial programme 
target of the launcher being developed by the 
end of 1980 has every chance of being met and 
that there is a substantial margin in relation to 
the date of the first operationallaunch requested 
(15th April1981). 
U. Planned launches 
While the first launch, L 01, will carry only 
a technological capsule and ballast, the following 
launches, L 02, L 03 and L 04, will be used for 
launching, in addition to the Ariane technological 
capsule (ATC), the following satellites: 
- Amsat (radio~amateur satellite) and Fire-
wheel (Max Planck Institute experiment) 
on the second test, L 02 ; 
- Meteosat-F 2 (European meteorological 
satellite) and Apple (Indian experi-
mental communications satellite) on the 
third flight, L 03; 
- Marees-A (European maritime commu-
nications satellite) on the fourth test, 
L 04. 
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At its 24th meeting on 25th and 26th April 
1978, the ESA Council decided on the production 
of a first series of five operational launchers to 
be used for the following programmes : Exosat 
(scientific satellite being developed under an 
ESA mandatory programme), ECS-1 (first Euro-
pean point-to-point satellite communications 
system), Marecs-B (European maritime commu-
nications satellite), Spot (experimental earth 
resources observation satellite). The last launcher 
will serve as a back-up. 
In addition, at its 35th meeting on 7th 
December 1978, the Intelsat Board of Governors 
decided to place with ESA one firm Ariane 
launch order and an option for its Intelsat V 
series of satellites, after two and a half years of 
keen competition with the space shuttle. 
Finally, at its 28th meeting on 12th and 13th 
December 1978 the ESA Council approved the 
launch by Ariane of the ECS-2, ECS-3 and 
ECS-4 satellites which will be exploited by Eutel-
sat. 
Consequently, a second series of five or six 
launchers will be put into production at the end 
of 1979. 
ID. The potential market -satellites of all 
kinds - for the Ariane launcher 
In view of the world programmes which can 
give rise to Ariane launches during the 1981-90 
decade and allowing for the back-up launchers 
needed in the event of possible launch failures 
or in-orbit satellite malfunctions, it is a reason-
able estimate that the Ariane market will repre-
sent a requirement over the next ten years of 
forty to sorne fifty launch vehicles. 
This estimate is based mainly on the setting 
up of European space systems to which Europe 
is already committed, or which are very likely 
to be decided within the next three years, and 
on the export prospects for space systems. 
In the case of systems in the first group, 
launches have been assumed between 1981 and 
1990 of : 
- two or three ESA scientific satellites, the 
first of which has already been decided 
(launch in 1981) ; 
- the follow-on satellites of the French 
earth observation programme which may 
comprise two further units to ensure 
continuity of the exploitation and evolu-
tion of the system ; 
- one or two ESA earth observation satel-
lites ; 
- three Meteosat satellites to provide con-
tinuity of meteorological observations 
over the decade ; 
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- two technological satellites to experiment 
the techniques and systems needed for 
materials processing in space, a new 
space application likely to develop con-
siderably over the period 1990-2000 ; 
- four ECS satellites (in 1981, 1982, 1985 
and 1986 respectively) and three Marees 
satellites (in 1981 and early and late 1982 
respectively) ; 
- satellites for the Telecom-1 project pro-
posed by the Direction Générale des Télé-
communications in France and intended 
mainly to assure numerical transmission 
between firms. This project, not yet 
decided, might require the placing in 
orbit of three satellites for the period 
concerned; 
- seven satellites for the requirements of· 
three direct television broadcasting 
systems in Europe ; 
- three to four additional application satel-
lites. 
With regard to the export of space systems, 
Iran, India, the Arab League and certain South 
American countries have already indicated their 
intention of equipping themselves by 1981-83 
with national or regional satellites to meet their 
requirements. 
The development prospects for direct tele-
vision broadcasting satellites in particular were 
bolstered at the W orld Administrative Radio 
Conference on satellite broadcasting held in 
Geneva in January 1977. The extent of the requi-
rement was such that when planning orbital 
locations and frequency channels for these satel-
lites, it was necessary to limit requests from each 
country to four or five television programmes. 
There is no doubt that the operational demons-
tration of such a powerful instrument as tele-
vision broadcasting by satellite may expedite 
projects in a considerable number of countries, 
even if the timetable is still very unpredictable. 
This could be the case in Europe as soon as one 
country decides to use such a system, but would 
also apply to the Middle East, including Saudia 
Arabia, and to South America and to Africa, 
particularly in countries where the ground infra-
structure is still non-existent or concentrated at 
a few places. 
With regard to exports, the following launch 
assumptions are made for the 1981-90 decade : 
- five to ten satellites for establishing two 
to four national or regional telecom-
munications systems ; 
- four to eight satellites for the establish-
ment after 1983 of two to four direct 
television broadcasting systems ; 
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- two to four satellites for international 
Intelsat and Inmarsat telecommunication 
systems. 
In view of the possibility in sorne cases of 
placing two satellites in orbit with a single 
launcher, these assumptions taken together point 
to a requirement of between thirty-six and forty-
six launchers. 
Combined with a launch success probability 
factor of 90 % - as for American launchers -
necessitating four to five back-up launchers, the 
estimate therefore ranges between forty and sorne 
fifty launchers. · 
IV. Ariane's chances of competing with the 
United States shuttle 
With a few months to go before the first 
test flights of the shuttle - the new space trans-
portation system developed by the United States 
- and the Ariane launcher developed by Europe, 
commercial satellite promoters who need to 
schedule their launches at the present time are 
hesitating a great deal before making up their 
minds. 
Although NASA, which has had a monopoly 
of the launch market, enjoys an unquestioned 
technical reputation with users, the latter are 
nonetheless concerned about the technical novelty 
of the shuttle and would like, before making a 
choice, greater certainty about the time schedule, 
costs and environmental conditions for their 
payloads. 
The Ariane programme and the shuttle 
programme, born of very different motivations 
and ambitions, have however a common purpose, 
i.e. the launching of application satellites. But, 
while the shuttle is well-suited to low-orbit mis-
sions, this is not so much the case for geostation-
ary orbits since it requires an additional powered 
stage. While its lift-off mass is ten times greater 
than Ariane's, its performance in geostationary 
orbit is only twice as good. Ariane is also 
particularly suitable for the sun-synchronous 
orbits required for earth observation satellites. 
The fact that the two programmes differ in 
complexity means that they have progressed 
differently. It may be noted in particular that: 
- all of the complete flight configuration 
tests of the three Ariane stages took place 
in December 1977 and J anuary 1978 at 
nominal thrust ; the first test of the 
shuttle main engine at nominal thrust is 
not scheduled before February or March 
1979; 
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- of the four Ariane qualification tests one 
or even two failures would have only 
little impact on its operational avail-
ability. On the other hand a single orbiter 
will have to be used for complete quali-
fication of the shuttle system (six flights) 
and also for the first eight operational 
flights up to 1981. An accident in flight, 
even without being catastrophic, would 
have an immediate and considerable 
impact on the shuttle's operational 
availability. 
On the financial plane a very aggressive 
pricing policy, strongly criticised moreover in the 
United States, has led NASA to grant particu-
larly low priees during the 1981-83 period, a 
revision at the end of 1983 being subsequently 
designed to strike a financial balance over these 
three years plus a further nine. 
In spite of that the priee quoted by the 
shuttle for a satellite of the Intelsat V class 
($22.5 million at mid-1977 priees) is very close 
to the marginal cost of Ariane ($22 million 
dollars at mid-1977 priees) including an insur-
ance policy (10 %) providing a free reflight in 
the event of failure. 
In view of these remarks and the fact that 
the history of transportation has shown that 
whenever a technological change occurs the 
bringing into service of a new concept always 
takes a great deal of time and effort and never 
replaces the conventional one outright, it is fair 
to assume that the coexistence of Ariane and 
the shuttle on the applications satellites market 
of the next decade should not prove detrimental 
to either system. 
V. Uprating of Ariane 
CNES has proposed to ESA a programme 
for uprating the launcher in order to improve 
Ariane's competitiveness. 
Its main features are: 
- a scheme to reduce production costs ; 
- a performance improvement programme 
(to rai<te the capability in transfer orbit 
from 1,700 to 2,300 kg) without signific-
antly increasing the unit cost of the 
launcher. · 
This performance increase relates mainly 
to the simultaneous launch of two satel-
lites of the Thor-Delta P AM or STS-
p AM class, and the launch of future 
direct television satellites, and is obtain-
able easily by modest changes to the 
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launcher (the addition of two small solid 
boosters, an increase in 10 % of the 
Viking engine thrust level, lengthening 
of the third-stage tank) ; 
- a study programme on the parachute-
aided reuse of the L 140 first stage of 
the launcher whose production cost is 
almost half that of the total vehicle cost. 
This overall programme under study by the 
~ Ariane Launcher Programme Board should be 
decided in the second half of the year so that 
launches to the new standard can be carried out 
in the second half of 1982. 
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VI. Cost of the development programme 
The estimated development cost was fixed 
at 2,060 million French francs (370.89 MAU 1), 
plus a margin of 20 % of this programme cost 
for technical contingencies, making a total of 
2,470 million francs or 445 MAU (at January 
1973 priees) or 4,388 million francs (658.3 MAU) 
updated to July 1977 economie conditions. 
It can be estimated that the cost-to-
completion of the Ariane programme will remain 
within this envelope since, less than a year before 
the first launch, less than a half of the contin-
geney margin is expected to be used by then. 
1. MAU millions of aceounting units (1 AU == 
5.55 French francs or $US 1.08). 
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(b) Map of Guiana Space Centre 
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Amendments 1 and 2 
Brazilian-European collaborative ventures 
and the consequences for Europe 
AMENDMENTS 1 and 2 1 
tabled by Mr. Cornelissen 
5th December 1979 
1. In pa.ragra.ph 1 of the draft recommandation proper, a.fter "emphasis" a.dd "on safeguards a.gainst 
the danger of the proliferation of nuclea.r weapons and". 
2. In pa.ragraph 4 of the draft recommandation proper, leave out "and milita.ry". 
Signeà : Oornelissen 
1. See 14th Sitting, 6th December 1979 (Amendment 1 agreed to; Amendment 2 withdrawn). 
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Relations with Parliaments 
INFORMATION REPORT 1 
submitted on behalf of the 
Committee for Relations with Parliaments 2 
by Mr. De Poi, Rapporteur 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
29th October 1979 
!NFORJIIATION REPORT 
submitted by Mr. De Poi, Rapporteur 
I. Relations with European assemblies 
II. Activities of the Committee 
APPENDICES 
I. Table of action in the parliaments of member countries 
II. Table of interventions (debates, questions, replies, etc.) on texts adopted 
since June 1977 
III. Visits by the Committee for Relations with Parliaments 
IV. Speech by Mr. Lahaye in the Belgian Senate on Western European Union 
V. Question put by Mr. Odru in the French National Assembly on the defence 
responsibilities of the assembly of the European Communities and reply 
by Mr. Barre, Prime Minister 
1. Adopted unanimously by the Committee. 
2. Members of the Committee: Mr. Jeambrun 
(Alternate for Mr. Visse) (Chairman) ; MM. Bchlinge-
mann, De Poi (Vice-Chairmen) ; MM. Arfé (Alternate : 
Borg hi), Bohm, Bonnel, Delehedde, Enders, Glesener, 
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Kershaw, Meintz, Eoper, Stoffelen (Alternate : Lam· 
berts), Tanghe (Alternate: Dejardin). 
N.B. The names of those taking part in the vote are 
p1·inted in italics. 
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Information Report 
(submitted by Mr. De Poi, Rapporteur) 
1. Relations with European assemblies 
1. Hitherto, the Committee for Relatiom; with 
Parliaments has been in touch with ali parlia-
mentarians from member countries and hence the 
representatives to the two other European 
assemblies who are members of parliament of 
signatory states of the modified Brussels 'rreaty. 
2. Since the election of the assembly of the 
Communities by direct universal ~ufirage, this 
situation has changed radically ; sorne three 
hundred representatives to that assembly are 
not members of national parliaments and there-
fore cannot always be kept informed of the 
work of WEU. The Committee has consequently 
asked your Rapporteur to examine the problem. 
3. Obviously the matter cannot be discussed 
in depth in time for this session, but the report 
to be submitted in spring 1980 will set out aU 
the solutions found by the Committee. The ques-
tion will of course be studied within the limits 
of the terms of reference of the Committee and 
hence from a purely technical standpoint, with-
out reference to political or other a!lpects which 
would be the responsibility of one of the other 
Committees. 
4. The Committee will therefore merely study 
how to keep representatives to the European 
assemblies informed of the work of the WEU 
Assembly : direct contacts, contacts through the 
intermediary of officiais, or by sending docu-
ments, etc. 
5. At the time the ECSC assembly was being 
transformed into the assembly of the Commu-
nities, the bureaux of the three assemblies met 
in January, February, May and October 1957. 
Meetings between the Clerks of the three assem-
blies were held in 1956 and 1957 and, more 
recently, the three Presidents met in 1971 and 
1978. The purpose of all these meetings was to 
solve the problem of co-ordination between the 
assemblies, their respective responsibilities or 
preparation for the unification of the European 
assemblies, while the meetings of Clerks were 
intended to avoid the same subjects being dealt 
with in more than one assembly at a time. 
6. In 1977, the Conference of Presidents of 
European Parliamentary Assemblies set up a 
European centre for parliamentary research and 
documentation (for the moment a mere network 
to facilitate the exchange of information between 
the staffs of national European parliaments and 
of European parliamentary assemblies) staffed 
by senior officiais from the parliaments of Euro-
pean countries and the three European assem-
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blies. Through this centre, permanent contacts 
are maintained between officiais. 
7. Finally, documents are exchanged between 
the three assemblies to allow each one to be 
informed of the work the others have carried 
out, but in view of the volume of such documen-
tation, which is sent to the Offices of the Clerks, 
in practice only the documentation services read 
these texts. 
8. Since the assembly of the Communities had 
held only one working session before this report 
was prepared, it will not be possible to propose 
solutions to the problems of concern to the Com-
mittee until the summer 1980 session of the 
WEU Assembly. But your Committee is already 
of the opinion that meetings between the three 
Clerks and meetings of the three bureaux (in 
practice the President and one or two other 
members of each bureau) would be useful for 
maintaining contact and avoiding duplication in 
the work of the three organisations whose aim 
is the unification of Europe. 
U. Activities of the Committee 
9. At the last session of the WEU Assembly, 
from 18th to 21st June 1979, preparations were 
already being made for the symposium on a 
European armaments policy, held from 15th to 
17th October this year, and the texts transmitted 
to the parliaments of the WEU member countries 
were therefore the recommendations in the three 
reports which provided a basis for the sympo-
sium: 
- 329 on industrial bases of European 
security; 
- 333 on parliaments and defence procure-
ment; 
- 335 on political conditions for European 
armaments co-operation. 
10. The Chairman of the Committee for Rela-
tions with Parliaments, Mr. Jeambrun, sent 
Committee members a letter suggesting questions 
to be put on these three texts. To date, questions 
have been put in the Belgian, French and United 
Kingdom parliaments. 
11. Nevertheless, the total number of interven-
tions recorded by the Committee secretariat for 
the period 21st June 1979 to 1st October 1979 is 
rather impressive in spite of the parliamentary 
recess and the renewal of two governments : by 
1st October, fifty interventions had been recorded 
and Collected Texts 30 includes texts which are 
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often of great importance. In particular, your 
Rapporteur wishes to draw attention to a long 
statement by a Belgian Senator, Mr. Lahaye, 
who, although not a member of the WEU Assem-
bly, nevertheless described the history of WEU 
and its various organs. This statement deserves 
to be widely circulated 1• 
12. The problem of responsibilities of the various 
European assemblies continued to concern mem-
bers of parliaments, particularly since the direct 
elections to the assembly of the Communities. An 
interesting answer by the French Prime Minister, 
Mr. Barre 2, on 29th September 1979, spells out 
government opinion in member states on the 
responsibilities of the various assemblies. 
1. See Appendix IV. 
2. See Appendix V. 
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13. Several questions on the WEU Standing 
Armaments Committee drew the attention of 
members of parliament to the study which the 
Committee has been carrying out since 1977 on 
the armaments industries of member countries 
(see Document 731, II B 3). This study analyses 
the conditions for reorganising the European 
armaments industries with a view to greater 
co-operation. 
14. The Committee paid an information visit 
to Franche-Comté on 29th and 30th October. A 
meeting was organised between members of 
parliament and university and press represen-
tatives in order to make WEU and its Assembly 
better known. 
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APPENDIX I 
Table of action in the parUaments of member countries 
(Totals by country for each session) 
Member countries 
~ 
Recommandations '§1» ~ 1 adopted in ~ «> l~ J ]' 0 ]> 1 i «> l~ 1-1 «> ~ Il=! s z ....::1 
fil:! 
1956 0 0 3 0 0 0 
1957 4 0 1 0 0 5 
1958 2 0 3 0 0 4 
1959 0 0 9 0 0 0 
1960 3 12 2 8 0 3 
1961 0 2 0 3 0 6 
1962 2 4 4 6 2 3 
1963 0 0 13 22 1 2 
1964 4 14 9 Il 1 5 
1965 0 Il 12 24 0 5 
1966 2 12 12 49 1 4 
1967 14 9 22 29 2 6 
1968 6 14 20 22 1 16 
1969 11 15 17 8 0 4 
1970 3 15 15 7 2 3 
1971 0 4 19 9 0 6 
1972 0 6 2 1 0 1 
1973 0 4 2 6 1 0 
1974 0 1 3 13 2 0 
1975 10 28 8 19 3 11 
1976 16 40 13 14 2 3 
1977 4 18 4 15 1 1 
1978 17 49 12 21 4 10 
1979 9 34 7 3 0 1 
Total 107 292 212 290 23 99 
Annua.l average 4.46 12.10 8.83 12.09 0.96 4.12 
Ill 
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! ~ Total 
"d 
~ p 
0 3 
2 12 
3 12 
0 9 
1 29 
0 Il 
10 31 
3 41 
2 46 
28 80 
18 98 
16 98 
47 126 
36 91 
10 55 
10 48 
0 10 
0 13 
0 19 
3 82 
8 96 
14 57 
14 127 
10 64 
235 1,258 
9.80 7.49 
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APPENDIX II 
Table of interventions (debates, questions, replies, etc.) on texts adopted since June 1977 
.§ 
.s.fl ~ ! 1~ 
1 11 
~ ~ 1:1 'Ct:~ 
.[ al ! al .... 0 u " ~ 0 ~ "; ,.. Ill ïi ~ ~ +> .s~ 'OÏ~ +> 0 al 'i ~ 1-1 ~ "C E-1 ~i 00 ~ ,.. i " ~p.. ~'S ~ al al ~ f'l:t p 
---
297 
-
298 x 1 1 
299 x 2 2 4 
300 1 2 3 
June 301 1 2 3 
1977 302 2 1 2 5 23 
303 
-
304 2 2 4 
305 1 2 3 
306 
-
--- --- --- --- ---
307 x 1 1 
308 x 1 1 2 
Nov. 309 x 1 1 2 
1977 310 x 2 2 34 
311 x 1 1 2 
Other action 4 15 4 2 25 
---
312 
-
313 x 2 2 2 6 
314 x 2 2 1 2 3 2 12 
315 2 2 4 
June 316 
- 33 
1978 317 2 1 3 
318 x 3 1 1 2 7 
319 
-320 
-
321 1 1 
322 1 1 
323 x 6 1 7 
324 1 1 
Nov. 325 7 2 1 2 12 94 
1978 326 x 2 4 3 2 11 
327 
-
328 x 2 2 4 2 2 4 16 
Other action 7 26 4 4 3 2 46 
329 x 2 1 2 2 7 
330 
-331 2 2 
June 332 
- 64 1979 333 x 2 1 2 5 
334 
-
335 x 2 4 6 12 
Resolution 63 3 3 
Other action 3 26 5 1 35 
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Visits by the Committee for Relations with Parliaments 
22nd February 1963 
lOth October 1963 
llth-12th November 1964 
28th-29th April 1965 
15th-16th December 1965 
Paris 
Rome 
Bonn 
The Hague 
Brussels 
30th October-lst November 1966 London 
23rd-24th November 1967 
2nd-3rd April 1968 
26th-27th Ma.rch 1969 
27th-28th October 1969 
14th-15th April 1970 
lst-2nd April 1971 
4th-5th November 1971 
24th-25th February 1972 
18th-19th September 1972 
lst-2nd May 1973 
15th-18th October 1973 
8th-lOth July 1974 
27th-28tb October 1975 
llth-12th ]day 1976 
25th-26th November 1976 
9th-lOth May 1977 
3rd-4th November 1977 
31st Ma.y-lst June 1978 
3rd November 1978 
3rd-4th May 1979 
29th-30th October 1979 
Berlin (Regional pa.rliament of Land Berlin) 
Luxembourg 
Rome 
Paris 
Bonn 
Rome 
Bonn 
The Hague 
Florence (Regional pa.rliament of Tuscany) 
St. Bélier (Regional parliament of the States 
of Jersey) 
]dunich (Regional parliament of the Free State 
of Bavaria) 
Palermo (Regional parliament of Sicily) 
The Hague 
Luxembourg 
Brussels 
Rome 
Bonn - Wiesbaden (Regional parliament of 
Hesse) 
Paris - Cergy /Pontoise 
Rome 
The Hague 
Besançon (Franche-Comté region) 
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APPENDIX IV 
Speech by Mr. Lahaye in the Belgian Senate on Western 
European Union 
6th June 1919 
Mr. LAHAYE. - It is now clear that the 
election of the European Parliament by universal 
suffrage will not solve aU the problems of 
Europe's future. It was still possible a few 
months ago to believe that the newly-elected 
parliament might be able to take wide-ranging 
steps to become something of a European con-
stituant assembly, taking its election as a basis 
for dealing with European affairs as a whole. It 
is now evident that this will not be so, for during 
the electoral campaign certain governments had 
to promise not to increase any of the assembly's 
responsibilities, particularly in defence matters. 
The European Parliament will remain, and for 
a long time to come, whether we like it or not, 
the parliament of the European Community. The 
day European union is achieved, will it become 
the parliament of that union ? It is to be hoped 
so, but a policy cannot be based on what, at the 
present juncture, is only a hope. 
On the contrary, we must face the facts. 
The first is of course the existence and text of 
the Rome Treaty. lt and it alone is the present 
basis of the responsibilities of the European 
P'arliament. But that does not mean that Europe 
does not exist in other fields, particularly that of 
defence. But there it is based on other texts and 
other principles. So far, the only bas$ is the 
modified BI'USsels Treaty which set up Western 
European Union (WEU) and its Assembly. Per-
haps one day we shall witness a merger of the 
treaties and organisations, giving the European 
union of tomorrow, or, more probably, the day 
after tomorrow, a unified structure. But we are 
not entitled to act as if this were already so. 
Western European Union was instituted by 
the Paris Agreements of 23rd October 1954 modi-
fying the Brussels Treaty of 17th March 1948. 
The Brussels Treaty Iinked the United Kingdom, 
France and the Benelux countries to face any 
threat from Germany. The Paris Agreements, on 
the contrary, associated Germany and Italy with 
a defence alliance which henceforth united seven 
European countries. After the rejection of the 
proposed European Defence Community by the 
French parliament, the question was to provide 
a framework for and limitations on the rearma-
ment of Germany and Italy and to allow these 
countries to take part in defending Europe 
against a threat that was considered to come 
mainly from the Soviet Union. For this purpose, 
Germany was called upon to join the Atlantic 
Alliance, it being understood that it first belonged 
to a truly European organisation and that it 
ll4 
would give its European partners a certain 
number of guarantees, without mentioning the 
principle of supranationality. 
The main part of the modified Brussels 
Treaty is Article V which defines the obligations 
of its signatories as follows : 
"If any of the high contracting parties 
should be the object of an armed attack in 
Europe, the other high contracting parties 
will, in accordance with the provisions of 
Article 51 of the Charter of the United 
Nations, afford the party so attacked ali 
the military and other aid and assistance 
in their power." 
It is thus far more binding than the North 
Atlantic Treaty, which contains no provision for 
automatic assistance in the event of attack. 
Article VIII of the Treaty created a Oouncil 
"so organised as to be able to exercise its func-
tions continuously ... to consider matters con-
cerning the execution of this treaty and of its 
protocols and their annexes". The Council was 
to take decisions by unanimous vote except for 
application of the protocols concerning the level 
of armaments and their control. Article IX 
makes it incumbent on the Council to report 
to a parliamentary assembly composed of repre-
sentatives of the seven member countries in the 
Assembly of the Council of Europe. 
The responsibilities of Western European 
Union are general but their exercise may be 
entrusted to other organisations : for instance 
NATO for questions relating to integrated 
defence, the Council of Europe for social and 
cultural matters and the EEC for economie 
matters. It has retained the exercise of its respon-
sibilities in questions relating to the limitation 
and control of armaments and for the joint 
production of armaments and it is empowered to 
resume the exercise of its responsibilities in the 
event of an organisation with a larger membership 
appearing to be unable to exercise them. This 
might inter alia be the case of NATO since the 
North Atlantic Treaty covers only a limited 
geographical area, whereas consultations between 
the members of the WEU Council may cover any 
area of the world whatsoever. 
The limitation and control of armaments 
Each year, member countries have to provide 
the Council with statements of their forces and 
armaments on the mainland of Europe. An 
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Agency for the Control of Armaments is 
responsible for verifying these statements in 
respect of armaments. However, a number of 
special commitments apply to the Federal Repub-
lic of Germany which, under the treaty, under-
took not to produce certain conventional weapons 
and above ali any atomic, biological or chemical 
weapons. Application of these bans is ensured 
by the Agency for the Control of Armaments 
which has the wherewithal to carry out docu-
mentary and on-the-spot checks. WEU is in fact 
the only effective guarantee of the non-produc-
tion of atomic weapons by the Federal Republic 
of Germany. 
In May 1955, a Standing Armaments Oom-
mittee was set up, associating the defence staffs 
of member countries with a view to the joint 
production of military equipment. The aim was 
to allow European armaments industries to 
reorganise themselves in terinB of a market suffi-
ciently vast to allow the armies of member conn-
tries to procure equipment which would no longer, 
in the main, be purchased from the United 
States. In fact, the Standing Armaments Com-
mittee has so far played only a very limited rôle 
because an attempt was made to organise the 
co-production of armaments in the framework of 
NATO and not in a European framework. So, 
in spite of the creation of the independent Euro-
pean programme group (IEPG), co-operation in 
this field has remained meagre, contrary to the 
wishes frequently expressed by certain govern-
ments and by the WEU Assembly. 
What has WEU done ? It played an impor-
tant rôle in the development of Franco-German 
relations and in the solution of the Saar problem, 
up to the signing of the treaty of friendship and 
co-operation between General de Gaulle and 
Chancellor Adenauer. 
Inter alia, the WEU Council helped to bring 
the British economy closer to that of six-power 
Europe until the United Kingdom joined the 
European Community. 
Where defence policy is concerned, WEU has 
maintained a close link between France and its 
partners in the Atlantic Alliance since France's 
withdrawal from the NATO integrated military 
structure. 
From a technical standpoint, the control of 
armaments has worked perfectly satisfactorily. 
However, from the moment France started to 
build up a nuclear force, it refused to allow 
controls to be applied to this force. There are 
now signs that the Government of the Federal 
Republic is feeling sorne aversion for what is 
considered to be the discriminatory treatment to 
which it is subjected. Its reservations concern 
the restrictions on its right to manufacture con-
ventional weapons. 
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Ail the member countries seem to consider 
that the treaty, particularly Article V, is an 
important part of their security. This is specially 
the case of the Federal Republic since it is the 
only text by which the other member countries 
are firmly committed to defend!ing the Federal 
Republic in the event of attack. Such a binding 
article as Article V implies continuing co-opera-
tion between ali its signatories and mutual 
confidence which can be based only on respect 
for the treaty as a whole. 
Twenty-five years' application of the modi-
fied Brussels Treaty have led to the relinquish-
ment of sorne of WEU's work in favour of other 
European or Atlantic organisations. On severa! 
occasions, France has made proposais for 
stimulating the activities of the WEU Council 
both as a forum in which Europeans should 
effectively examine among themselves problems 
relating to their common security and as a centre 
for inJtra-European co-operation in the production 
of armaments. The most notable attempt to con-
cert defence policies was made by Mr. Jobert 
in an address to the WEU Assembly on 21st 
November 1973. 
It was followed by parallel proposais by the 
Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Van 
Elslande, concerning the joint production of arm-
aments. But although they have never rejected 
these proposais, the other member states have 
never followed them up either but, on the one 
hand, have sought to develop political co-operation 
in a framework closer to the European Commun-
ities - "nine-power political consultations" -
and on the other to develop armaments co-operation 
in a framework closer to NATO - first "Euro-
group", in which France refused to take part, 
and then the independent European programme 
group in which France does take part. 
To date, the European member countries of 
the AtlanJtic Alliance have attained worthwhile 
results in the co-production of armaments only 
through agreements with which firms were 
directly associated. No European organisation 
can really claim to direct this joint production. 
In spite of the absence of political will 
shown by the majority of the members of its 
Council of Ministers, WEU is at present the 
only truly European organisation with respons-
ibilities in defence matters. It is distinct from 
the Atlantic Alliance and is based on the prin-
ciple of unanimity which preserves the freedom 
of decision and action of its members. 
Further, WEU opens the way to close 
co-operation on a truly European basis in the 
field of armaments production and is a factor 
of détente and peace of considerable importance 
because it forbids the Federal Republic to pro-
duce nuclear weapons. Indeed, it provides the 
Soviet Union with the guarantee that Germany 
will respect the non-proliferation treaty and also 
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assures Germany's partners that no switch in 
the foreign policy of the Federal Republic can 
give it the power to jeopardise the balance and 
peace in Europe. 
There seems to be no doubt that WEU will 
be maintained until the treaJty expires in 2004. 
But it is certain that the most is not being made 
of aU its inherent possibilities. A revival of its 
activities might shape a different course for 
Western Europe. 
The WEU Assembly for its part has always 
asked the Council to apply the modified Brus-
sels Treaty in full, together with its protocols. 
This will be seen again at the next session, to be 
held in Paris from 18th to 21st June, since the 
agenda includes three reports designed to prepare 
for a vast symposium to be held in Brussels in 
October, bringing together parliamentarian.s, civil 
servants and representatives of industry to study 
the prospects of joint production in Europe. 
One report concerns parliaments and defence pro-
curement, the second the political conditions for 
European armaments co-operation and the third 
the industrial bases of European security. 
Is it once again to discuss matters so closely 
related to Europe's security wirthout the Council, 
duly represented by sorne of the Ministers for 
Foreign Mfairs or Defence of the seven member 
countries, playing a real part in a debate on 
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essential questions raised by parliamentarians 
and on the texts of recommendations Y Or will 
the ministers again prefer to rely on the Per-
manent Council, which meets at ambassadorial 
level, to spend months working out written replies 
concealing, under the stratagems of diplomatie 
language, the fact that it is constantly evading 
its responsibilities ? Y et the Council is informed 
in advance of the texts submitted by the Com-
mittees in plenary assembly and there is no 
reason why it should not prepare its participation 
in the debates without infringing the unanimity 
rule imposed on it by the treaty. 
If the Council agreed to make this effort, 
parliamentarians would feel less as if they were 
addreasing shadows and, back in their own conn-
tries, they might be able to transmit to their 
colleagues who appointed them as their national 
parliaments' representatives to the WEU Assem-
bly worthwhile information about Europe's pros-
pects in the fields of defence, armaments and 
security policy. Could we not, for our part aJt 
least, ask our government to do its utmost to 
ensure the full application of both the spirit and 
the letter of a treaJty which institutes as a basis 
of Europe's defence policy a dialogue between 
representatives of governments and of parlia-
ments? 
APPENDIX V DOOUMENT 818 
APPENDIX V 
Question put by Mr. Odra in the French National Assembly on 
the defence responsibilities of the assembly of the European Communities and 
reply by Mr. Barre, Prime Minister 
Question put by Mr. Odru (15th September 1979) 
Mr. Odru complains very strongly to the 
Prime Minister abourt the decision to include 
in the agenda of the assembly of the European 
Communities a debate on Community pro-
grammes for arms supplies. This decision was 
taken in Paris by the Bureau of the European 
assembly under the chairmanship of Mrs. Veil. 
But according to the Rome Treaty defence ques-
tions are not within the purview of that assembly. 
They are the responsibility of each national 
government. Hardly three months after the 
elections to that body, therefore, the French 
Government is revealing its intention, concealed 
from the French people at the time of the 
electoral campaign, to drag our country further 
towards supranationality. It is scorning the state-
ments, now proved untrue, by the President of 
the Republic that the French Government would 
oppose any extension of the powers of the Euro-
pean assembly at the expense of the French 
parliament. Common programmes for arms sup-
plies, like programmes for the standardisation 
or interoperability of armaments, are but the 
first step towards undermining any authentic 
national defence and establishing a so-called 
European defence for which a whole campaign 
is still being orchestrated. In fact, true national 
defence cannat be envisaged without a national 
policy for the production of armaments. Con-
sequently, Mr. Odru asks the Prime Minister 
to indicate as a matter of urgency whether or 
not he intends to ensure that the Rome Treaty 
is respected by having the question of common 
programmes for arms supplies removed from the 
agenda of the European assembly. 
Reply by Mr. Barre, Prime Minister (29th Sep-
tember 1979) 
The question put by the honourable member 
seems to confuse government policy with the 
internai procedure of the assembly of the Euro-
pean Communities. Here it is recalled that the 
Communities and their institutions are not part 
of the institutional order of the French Republic, 
as the Constitutional Council confirmed in its 
decision of 30th December 1976. The inscription 
by the enlarged Bureau of the assembly of the 
European Communities of an oral question for 
debaJte on common programmes for arms supplies 
in the framework of industrial policy can there-
fore in no way be assimilated to the French 
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Government's action in this field. In its relations 
with the assembly of the European Communities, 
the government intends to abide by the provisions 
of the treaties and the constant practice whi<>h 
has been established since their signature. 
In the case raised by the honourable member, 
he notes that the decision of the enlarged Bureau 
of the assembly of the European Communities 
was taken in accordance with Rules 12 and 47 
of the Rules of Procedure of that assembly which 
in turn were adopted in accordance with Article 
142 of the Rome Treaty. The consequence is 
that it is in correct application of the treaties 
that the assembly of the European Communities 
is master of its agenda without other institutions 
of the Communities and the governments of 
member states having any say whatsoever. As the 
honourable member knows, the treaties make no 
provision for the subjects of debates in the 
assembly to be verified for conformity with the 
responsibilities of the Communities as defined 
in the treaties. Nor is there need for such 
verification since, under the provisions of Article 
4 of the Rome Treaty, acts of one of the institu-
tions of the European Communities outside the 
limits of its attributions have no effect on the 
others and a fortiori on states. Conversely, it has 
become established custom since the Communities 
were created, and with the active participation 
of ail political groups represented in the assembly 
without exception, for the latter to debate ques-
tions outside the scope of the treaties but which 
may be of interest either because they are tackled 
in the framework of political co-operation 
between the governments of member states or 
because they are of special concern to public 
opinion in each of the states. Any resolutions the 
assembly may adopt after such debates are 
without legal effect. The French Government, 
in the Council of Ministers of the European 
Communities, has always ensured that this is so. 
In the future as in the past, it will continue 
to refuse to consider in the Council matters which 
do not conform to the letter and spirit of the 
treaties, which is the case in point raised by 
the honourable member. The French Government 
considers in fact that the item included in the 
agenda of the assembly of the European Com-
munities relating to the armaments industry, 
under cover of industrial policy considerations, 
in fact touches on national defence policies which 
are outside the purview of the European institu-
tions. It is also the opinion of the governments 
of the other member states since, in reply to an 
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earlier written question on an identical matter 
put to the Council of the European Communities 
by Mr. Normanton, representative to the assem-
bly of the European Communities, on 14th July 
1977, the Council stated that it was not 
empowered to examine such a matter. 
Moreover, the governmenrt reminds the 
honourable member that, at internai French level, 
it is bound, under Article 2 of Law 77-630 of 
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30th June 1977 on the election by direct universal 
suffrage of representatives to the Assembly of 
the European Communities, to consider any act 
by that assembly outside the limits of its respons-
ibilities as recognised by the treaties to be null 
and void where France is concerned. The govern-
ment will not change its policy in this respect. 
This reminder and the accompanying details are 
considered sufficient to calm the concern expres-
sed by the honourable member. 
Document 819 5th November 1979 
~olitical conditions for European armaments co-operation 
REPORT 1 
submitted on behalf of the General Alfairs Committee 9 
by Mr. van Waterschoot, Rapporteur 
.. 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
DRAFT RECOMMENDATION 
on political conditions for European armaments co-operation 
EXPLANATORY MEMORANDUM 
submitted by Mr. van Waterschoot, Rapporteur 
APPENDIX 
..-
General report submitted by Mr. Schmidt, General Rapporteur of Working 
Group II 
1. Adopted in Committee by 15 votes to 0 with 2 
abstentions. 
McNair (Alternate : Page), MM. Mangelsohots, Mende, 
Minnoooi, Mo=ersteeg, Müller, Péridier, Perin (Alter-
nate: van Watersohoot), Lord Reay (Alternate : 2. Members of the Committee: Mrs. von Bothmer 
(Chairman) ; MM. Sarti (Alternate : Treu), Portheine 
(Vice-Chairmen) ; Mr. Ariosto, Sir Frederic Bennett, 
MM. Berrier, Brugnon, Deschamps, Druon, Faulds 
(Alternate: MoGuire), Gessner, Gonella, Hanin, Lord 
'· 1 1 
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Atkinson), MM. Reddemann, Segre, Thoss, Urwin, Voogd 
(Alternate: Sohlingemann). 
N.B. The names of those taking part in the vote are 
printed in italics. 
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Draft Recommendation 
on political conditions for European armaments co-operation 
The Assembly, 
N oting with interest the work of the symposium on a European armaments policy held in 
Brussels from 15th to 17th October 1979 ; 
Noting that in the opinion of most of the experts consulted only a pragmatic approach is 
likely to advance European armaments co-operation in the future ; 
Convinced, however, that Europe will have to assume increasing responsibility for its own secu-
rity, particularly insofar as this involves conventional weapons; 
Considering that the production of armaments brings into play a broad spectrum of unequal 
interests in the varions member countries ; 
Tha.nking the Council for having authorised the Head of the International Secretariat of the 
Standing Arma.ments Committee to present to the Assembly his conclusions on the juridical obstacles 
to co-operation reached as a result of the enquiry conducted by the Standing Arma.ments Committee 
in accordance with a wish often expreSbed by the Assembly; 
Recalling its Recommandation 335 ; 
Rejecting the assertions in paragraph 4 of the reply of the Council to Recommandation 331 
and in the corresponding paragraphe of the replies to Recommandations 325 and 330 ; 
Recalling that the WEU Assembly is, as explicitly admitted by the Council, the only Euro-
pean assembly with defence · responsibilities, 
REOOMMENDS THAT THE COUNOIL 
1. Use every means at its disposai to promote co-operation between its members in the produc-
tion of armaments ; 
2. Examine, inter alia on the basis of the work of the Standing Armaments Committee, by what 
means it would be possible to establish in Western Europe, account being taken of the specifie 
responsibilities of each institution : 
(a) an organisation responsible for gathering and circulating aU necessary information on Euro-
pean supply and demand in the field of armaments ; 
(b) a body responsible for analysing choices of armaments programmes and their overaU finan-
cial, technical, economie and social repercussions ; 
(c) appropriate customs legislation for transfera of armaments between Western European 
states; 
(d) appropriate legislation for transnational bodies producing armaments; 
(e) legislation designed to promote exchanges of technology between European industries; 
(/) legislation and effective action against the illicit production of and traffic in armaments ; 
3. Encourage aU member states to co-operate by communicating aU the information needed to 
facilitate this work; 
4. Re-examine and explain the positions expressed in paragraph 4 of its replies to Recommenda-
tions 325 and 331 and inform the Assembly of developments in the work of the IEPG as it under-
took to do in its reply to Recommendation 298. 
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Explanatory Memorandum 
(submitted by Mr. van Waterschoot, Rapporteur) 
1. At its session in June 1979, the Assembly 
adopted Recommendation 335 proposing to the 
Council a framework for promoting closer 
co-operation in armaments produ0tion. The sym-
posium held in Brussels from 15th to 17th 
October 1979, and in particular the work of 
its Working Group II for which the General 
Affairs Committee had special responsibility, 
did not incite your Rapporteur to change course 
in the present repom. He is including at appendix 
the general report submitted by Mr. Schmidt 
on behalf of Working Group II so that ali who 
are interested may take cognisance of the results 
of this work. 
2. This in no way means that the symposium 
was not highly instructive, as may be seen from 
the recommendation accompanying this report. 
But the lessons learned bring grist and cla-
rification to the direction already followed by 
the Assembly rather than any fundamental 
change. 
3. As he is appending the general report, your 
Rapporteur does not consider that he, for his 
part, needs to review the symposium. He will 
merely make a few remarks which concern more 
specifically the recommendation. 
4. He first wishes to congratulate and thank 
the WEU Council for having acceded to a wish 
frequently expressed by the Assembly, particu-
larly when adopting the report which he already 
submi!tted to it on behalf of the General Affairs 
Committee last June, by authorising Mr. Plantey, 
Head of the International Secretariat of the 
Standing Armaments Committee, to describe to 
the symposium the lessons and experience he had 
gained in dirooting the inquiry into the European 
armaments industries which the SAC 1 had been 
asked to make, with particular regard to the 
section on the juridical aspects which has now 
been completed and transmitted to the govern-
ments. Your Rapporteur trusts that it will not 
now be allowed to gather dust in governmental 
archives. Our task will be to urge governments 
to draw the full benefits from it in the years to 
come. 
5. The document which he submitted to us for 
discussion shows clearly ihat the European arma-
ments market is far from being just a national 
market extended to European dimensions and 
that any differences there may be between the 
legal position of firms in each country and the 
obstacles still standing in the way of European 
co-operation in this field conceal something far 
deeper : political differences stemming from 
1. Standing Armaments Committee (WEU). 
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national traditions and each country's history 
and freedom in foreign policy and the organ-
isation of its defence. The matters he covers 
are not legal alone, it is for politicians to 
seek solutions which can but be political. In 
this connection, Mr. Plantey gives many useful 
indications and suggestions, pointing to a series 
of directions in which immediate progress seems 
possible and desirable. For instance, there is no 
reason why the instruments of co-production 
responsible for manufacturing a given type of 
weapon should remain subject only to the 
national laws of the country in which they have 
their head office. Nor is there any reason why 
the problem of customs duties on imports of 
military equipment by our countries should not 
be settled reasonably and permanently. 
6. When considering the present report on 
5th November 1979, certain members of the 
Committee stressed that they did not consider 
customs obstacles to be a major hindrance to the 
development of transfers of armaments within 
Western Europe and thaJt certain countries' 
administrative and trade practices were also an 
impediment. The Committee therefore wished the 
Council to react against a protemionist spirit and 
protectionist practices in this field of armaments 
not covered by the Rome Treaty. 
7. Similarly, questions raised by technology 
transfer might, at least within lthe European 
Communities, be solved quickly and satisfactorily. 
Very cautiously, Mr. Plantey concludes that 
Europe is moving towards a reduetion in the 
unilateral nature of decisions in armaments mat-
ters. It is this trend that we must identify 
and direct. 
8. Further, your Rapporteur wishes to under-
line the importance of the suggestions made by 
Professor Greenwood on the economie aspects 
of the problem. He has not hesitated to include 
them in his recommendation because he felt them 
to be particularly pertinent and well-suited to 
what the Assembly might in fact ask of the 
Council. He wishes to thank their author. 
9. In drafting the recommendation which it 
adopted, the Committee retained the terms which 
Professor Greenwood had deliberately left rather 
vague in the paper which he submitted to the 
symposium: an "organisation" responsible for 
circulating information, a "body" responsible for 
analysis. In view of prevailing uncertainty about 
the attributions of existing intra-European bodies 
(IEPG, SAC or even the EEC), the results 
actually achieved by each one and what they 
are to become, the Committee wished to spell out, 
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like Professor Greenwood, the functions which 
it thought ought to be fulfilled without embark-
ing on an institutional debate. Professor Green-
wood's paper is, moreover, detailed enough in 
defining these functions for your Rapporteur 
merely to refer, in this connection, to the official 
record of the Brussels symposium and to recall 
the usefulness for European co-operation of ade-
quate information about armaments requirements 
as defined by national defence staffs, planned 
procurement schedules and the capabilities and 
forecasts of firms producing armaments. This 
exchange of information is distinct from the 
function of analysing armaments programmes 
with a view to informing parties to contracts or 
markets in this field. 
10. This does not mean that the other papers 
submi<tted to W orking Group II were not most 
valuable and important, although the subjects 
and the direction followed by their authors may 
have been less suitable for recommendations to 
the WEU Council. They will be published in the 
official record of the symposium which should 
be read in conjunction with this report. On 
behalf of the Committee, your Rapporteur wishes 
to take this opportunity of conveying his most 
sincere thanks to ali those who contributed. 
11. Several of the Council's replies to recom-
mendations adopted by the Assembly at the 
June 1979 session also relaJte to European arma-
ments co-operation. They therefore cali for a 
few comments by your Rapporteur. 
12. Two points in particular attracted his 
attention. First, in its reply to Recommendation 
330, the Council sets out clearly the way in which 
it intends to inform the Assembly of the work 
undertaken by the Standing Armaments Com-
mittee as follows : 
"At their meeting at ministerial level on 
16th May 1979, the Council decided not to 
circulate the study chapter by chapter. As 
soon as the complete text is in their posses-
sion, the Council will consider the content 
and appropriate form of the information to 
be given to the Assembly." 
13. This reply might have seemed rather 
unsatisfactory if, on the other hand, the Council 
had not authorised Mr. Plantey to address Work-
ing Group II of the Brussels symposium on the 
juridical obstacles to European armaments 
co-operation. This gesture of goodwill allows 
the Assembly to defer to a decision, the reasons 
for which it has difficulty in grasping in view 
of the Council's laconie replies. 
14. Conversely, your Rapporteur must express 
surprise at paragraph 4 of the reply to Recom-
mendation 331 (referred to in the reply to 
Recommendation 330) in which it is stated: 
122 
"As stated in their reply to RecommendaJtion 
325, it would be difficult for the Council 
as such to inform the Assembly about the 
activities of the IEPG, since its member-
ship is different from that of WEU, with 
which it has no organisational links. How-
ever, it is open to members of the Assembly 
to question their governments on this sub-
ject, through their national parliaments." 
15. Admittedly, paragraph 4 of the reply to 
Recommendation 325 expressed a similar position, 
although less curtly, but since it did not reach 
the Assembly until just before the June session, 
your Rapporteur was not able to mention it 
in his previous report. 
16. Without denying possible problems for the 
Council in reporting to the Assembly on the 
work of the IEPG, it seems difficult to accept the 
Council's reply as worded. What is meant by the 
statement that WEU has no "organisational 
links" with the IEPG 1 The WEU Council agrees 
to inform the Assembly, insofar as possible, of 
the way in which questions within its purview are 
handled in the framework of other organisations 
with which WEU has no "organisaJtional" links. 
It has done so on several occasions, as indicated 
in its reply to Recommendation 298 which 
specifies that : 
"In their annual reports, the Council provide 
the Assembly with the appropriate inform-
ation on their work, together with any 
information which can be included on mat-
ters relating to the application of the 
modified Brussels Treaty by its signatories 
in bodies other than WEU." 
17. What is the reason for its refusai in this 
specifie case ? Is it not thus calling in question 
its oft-repeated assertion that the Assembly is 
"the only European assembly with defence 
responsibilities" 1 Or is co-ordination of the work 
of the various European bodies dealing with 
armaments so inexistent that it has no inform-
ation about the work of the IEPG ? This is 
difficult to believe when it is recalled that it 
was agreed that the SAC should base its work 
on the standards laid down by the IEPG. 
18. The Council's attitude is all the more 
inexplicable since it recommends members of the 
Assembly to question their governments through 
their national parliaments. If the governments 
are informed of the work of the IEPG, how is it 
that the Council is not? Neither the effective 
lack of information nor the absence of organisa-
tional links is a credible reason for the Council's 
refusal. 
19. Is there not another reason, less easy to 
admit : that one or other of its members is 
challenging the right of any European organisa-
tion to deal with armaments questions ? This 
refusai may be justifiable in the case of the 
Communities and of the European Parliament in 
view of the provisions of the Rome Treaty and 
the supranational nature of these institutions. 
It is not so in the case of WEU in view of the 
provisions of the modified Brussels Treaty and 
the intergovernmental nature of the organisation. 
20. If it were to be thought that this situation 
might lead to the European Parliament taking 
over supervision of the work of the IEPG, there 
is every reason to believe that they would be 
making a serious mistake. There is nothing to 
show - and certainly not the replies of the 
Council- that what is refused an assembly with 
responsibililty for such matters would be granted 
to another parliamentary assembly without res-
ponsibility in this field. Nor is it evident that 
those wishing to avoid the provisions of a treaty 
that they have signed would accept controls to 
which nothing commits them. In view of the 
difficult situation through which Europe is now 
passing, there is every reason to fear that what 
WEU might lose today would be lost by Europe 
for a long time to come if the transfer of the 
exercise of the responsibilities of one institution 
to another was not done in a formai manner. 
21. Should the Council maintain its position in 
this matter, it would be a considerable setback 
in progress towards European armaments 
co-operation and would also place in doubt the 
agreement painfully reached between the Council 
and the Assembly on their mutual relations. 
22. Finally, the Council's reply to Recommend-
ation 335 on the report of the General Affairs 
Committee on political conditions for European 
armaments co-operation, although not giving a 
sufficiently detailed answer to the various points 
in the recommendation, nevertheless demonstrates 
that, on the whole, the Council seems to concur 
with the views expressed by the Assembly. 
23. However, in several respects, it did not 
really reply to the recommendation. For instance, 
the Council states that: 
" ... the SAC was not in a position to submit 
its final report when the Ministerial Council 
met in Rome on 16th May 1979 ... " 
but does not say why the SAC was not in a 
position to submit its report. It is not enough 
for the Council to consider that : 
"... the first part of the economie study 
should be completed both swiftly and to 
the best effect, with the co-operation of 
the administrations concerned" ; 
the Council, or at least its members, should 
ensure that this co-operation is effectively forth-
coming without reservation or limitations. 
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24. Second, it must be noted tha1t the Council 
gives no undertaking about what is to be done 
with the SAC's work, and this makes it incum-
bent on the Assembly to follow attentively the 
way the Council follows up this study in practice. 
25. Finally, the way in which the Council replies 
to the sixth paragraph of the recommendation 
concerning trade in arros constitutes an interest-
ing position : 
"The Council have noted the Assembly's 
concern regarding the dangers of the trade 
in arros in areas where peace is threatened. 
This is an important problem which involves 
different political factors in each country ; 
it would be unrealistic to deal with it in 
the European framework only, since in fact 
this excludes the principal armaments 
exporting and importing countries. 
On the other hand, bearing in mind its 
responsibilities in this respect, every Euro-
pean country could draw relevant con-
clusions from the results of joint action 
that might be taken between countries of 
the same geographical area with a view 
to voluntary limitation of their own imports ; 
such consultations, which would also bring 
in the main supplier countries, would indeed 
make it possible to envisage concerted 
limitation on the sales of conventional 
weapons." 
But the Council must not be content lto express 
a wish ; it must take the necessary steps to ensure 
that the wish becomes reality. Of course, such 
a problem cannot be dealt with "in the European 
framework only". Nevertheless, this is the frame-
work in which steps might be taken to implement 
the policy advocated by the Council. 
26. During the discussions in Committee on 
5th November 1979, the wish was also expressed 
that the Council deal with the question of traffic 
in arros - as distinct from trade in armaments 
- concerning which the Committee believes that 
the measures taken in each member country to 
ban or abolish such traffic should be co-ordinated 
so that Europe plays absolutely no part in oper-
ations dangerous for civil and international peace 
in certain parts of the world, particularly Africa, 
and for the security of people throughout the 
world, including Western Europe. Y our Rap-
porteur can but endorse this wish, recalling that 
when the problems of international terrorism and 
the protection of diplomats were examined, the 
Council demonstrated that it considered matters 
relating to public order to be within its purview. 
DOCUMENT 819 APPENDIX 
APPENDIX 
General report submitted by Mr. Schmidt, 
General Rapporteur of Working Group Il 
Introduction 
European policy towards the armaments industry -
an ambiguous and often ill-defi.ned notion 
The thoughts of Working Group II were 
dominated by two considerations which were 
perhaps not sufficiently elaborated but which 
seem to have played a major rôle in the reasoning 
of those who spoke. 
The first, a real paradox, is that France, now 
Europe's leading armaments producer, sends 80 % 
of its exports of military equipment to non-
European countries, whereas the EEC absorbs 
more than half the total of all its sales abroad. 
This explains France's major reservations 
towards anything that might limit its freedom 
of action, at least as long as Europe does not 
guarantee it the large-scale outlet iJt needs. Recent 
experience has shown that there is little immedi-
ate hope of this. Conversely, a European arma-
ments policy in which it played less than a full 
part would have little significance. 
The second is thrut the notion of an arma-
ments market can hardly be applied to Europe. 
In fact, there is no armaments market in the 
economie sense of the word, for conventional 
criteria of supply and demand ultimately play 
only a secondary rôle and the field in which 
traditional economie competition cornes inlto effect 
is in reality very limited. There are certainly 
large-scale transactions but they are not to be 
seen in simple operational terms. Even within 
each country, they introduce many factors whose 
interaction largely escapes analysis. A fortiori, 
there is no European armaments market since 
possible buyers negotiate with various entities 
with which they have different kinds of relation-
ship ( diplomrutic, strategie, etc.). 
This is one of the main difficulties of the 
subject which the W orking Group had to tackle 
and the very remarkable report submitted by 
Mr. Plantey on the juridical obstacles to arma-
ments co-operation shed particularly strong light 
on this aspect of the problem by suggesting, as 
Professor Greenwood also did, a number of spe-
cifie measures destined not to unsettle this state of 
affairs but to make it slightly less complex. 
Finally, before going to the heart of the 
debate, it should be indicated that the opposition, 
stressed only too often, between exports of arma-
ments and co-operation introduces a debate whose 
terms are clear only if the subject of arms sales 
is tackled in an ideological context. In fact, there 
are many intermediary formulae between co-oper-
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ation proper and pure and simple procurement, 
particularly in the case of the European market. 
Moreover, in the case of regions outside Europe, 
exports are one of the aims of co-operation. Thus 
to establish a balance sheet of the relative 
advantages of each possible form of co-operation, 
the benefits which one or other co-operating 
party may derive from exports should be 
included. A number of examples, such as all 
recent helicopters (Puma, Gazelle) or Alpha-Jet 
seem to show that co-operation has actually been 
a factor which encouraged exports and not the 
reverse. This aspect should be analysed in greater 
detail to discover why and to what extent. 
Finally, what is meant by co-operation? 
To avoid confusion, I propose a broad, all-
embracing definition of co-operation to include 
any form of collaboration between firms of dif-
ferent nationalities in the field of military 
equipment. This approach will make it easier 
subsequently to distinguish between several types 
of collaboration, and in particular : 
( i) collaboration only at the level of 
exploitation ; 
(ii) collaboration covering more or less 
advanced production (co-production) ; 
(iii) collaboration going back to the pre-
design stage. 
Within each of these main categories, specifie 
formulae are possible, i.e. different legal solutions 
according to the legal needs in each case with an 
equitable sharing of participation. 
The report will therefore first : identify the 
true obstacles to the development of a European 
armaments policy ; and, second : suggest and 
promote realistic solutions which should be the 
most effective way of overcoming the obstacles. 
ÜHAPTER I 
Difficulties and obstacles : true and false 
problems 
If it is accepted that the elaboration of 
European co-operation between armaments indus-
tries is a goal which, in one form or another, 
might be common to all our countries, the true 
difficulties in the way of any progress in the 
organisation of this industry at European level 
should be identified. Remarks made by those who 
know the most about the problem indicate that 
the true difficulties do not necessarily corres-
pond to the objections usually put forward in 
this field. 
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The most evident obstacles are legal. They 
have been studied in depth by the WEU Stand-
ing Armaments Committee and the indications 
which, in one form or another, it has given 
about the results of this study show thaJt these 
obstacles are far from insuperable. The political 
will of states might overcome them if, in many 
cases, they were not dealing with superstructures 
concealing other, more deep-rooted obstacles, sorne 
of which cannot be put aside so easily : in this 
field too, law is the visible expression of facts 
which are sometimes difficult to grasp but whose 
weight is evident. 
Intrinsically more important are the dif-
ficulties stemming from the objectively different 
interests of each of the possible partners in the 
economie field in the widest sense of the term. 
In fact, each country has its interests and most 
authors of papers submitted to Working Group II 
stressed their legitimacy and the importance for 
the future of Europe of respecting regional con-
cerns and the economie, social and technological 
reservations of each state called upon to join a 
European association which committed its 
national armaments industry. 
In view of this European vocation, three 
types of contrasting interests may be discerned. 
First, countries with only a small armaments 
industry, whose situation and concerns were 
described accurately in Mr. de Geus' paper. They 
draw their main supplies from abroad and the 
aim of the national armaments industry is mainly 
direct economie profitability. Thus, specialisation 
by their national industries may offer them 
interesting prospects, which is obviously not the 
major concern of the larger industrial powers. 
Second, there is the case of the Federal 
Republic of Germany, Europe's leading industrial 
power~ but whose armaments industry is not yet 
at the level of industries handling civil pro-
duction. This leaves Germany greater economie 
freedom in armaments procurement problems 
since the armaments industry is not central to 
the economy. Furthermore, the Federal Republic 
does not yet have the necessary latitude to 
become an exporting nation. More generally, the 
limits imposed on Germany's freedom in its 
defence policy, particularly because of its place 
in the western system, induce it to seek greater 
integration in the military field and, to a certain 
extent, to subordinate its armaments production 
to this necessity. 
The third type is represented by France, 
whose aim is to have an independent defence 
system and whose armaments industry has a 
very considerable degree of independence. France 
therefore makes its armaments industry play a 
very large economie rôle since 42 % of its arma-
ments production is exported and this industry 
provides an economie lead and technological drive 
for all French industries (at times, this sector 
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accounted for about 30 % of all sums earmarked 
for research and development throughout French 
industry), which is not exactly the case on the 
other side of the Rhine. It cannot therefore 
accept co-operation which would limit its com-
mercial or technological freedom, not to speak 
of the particularly heavy burden of economie 
and social constraints which it has to take into 
account. 
This diversity of types of industrial situation 
obviously makes it difficult to find a common 
denominator meeting the individual interests of 
the principal partners, particularly since it is 
not always easy to draw a clear distinction 
between armaments industries and certain indus-
tries of a civil nature. In certain cases, such as 
the aeronautical or electronic industries, which 
play a major rôle in France, for instance, but 
also among the industries of the smaller powers, 
this intermingling is particularly evident. 
Finally, the political aspects, or strategie 
implications, of co-operation are extremely dif-
ficult to tackle from a unifying standpoint if 
this interpenetration is accepted. Can one reason-
ably link the problem of the armaments indus-
tries with a European industrial policy by 
normalising the armaments industry ? 
This is one of the obvious things at stake 
in the debate, which is not llit all academie, 
whatever may be said, about the responsibilities 
of the European Communities and the parlia-
mentary assembly which is to supervise them. 
Not only are there a number of juridical obstacles 
in the way of this normalisation, but far more 
deep-rooted political differences in the highest 
sense of the word preclude thoug4ts of being able 
to go very far in this field as regards the part 
of the future which can be included in any 
calculation of estimates. 
The last and not the least of the obstacles, 
quite rightly mentioned in Professor Greenwood's 
report, arises from the absence of an appropriate 
framework of assessment allowing an overall 
opinion to be obtained not only of future oper-
ations but even of current or completed oper-
ations. The Director of the Aberdeen Cenrtre for 
Defence Studies makes a number of suggestions 
which should be examined closely with a view 
to providing Europe with the instruments of 
information and analysis which seem essential 
if there is to be any progress in armaments 
co-operation. Inter alia, it is felt that traditional 
economie analyses of the "cost-effectiveness" type 
prove to be quite inadequate insofar as up to 
now they are incapable on the one hand of taking 
account of indirect macro-economie factors 
(employment, industrial structure) and on the 
other hand of including in the calculation non-
economie variables which are more difficult to 
quantify (independence, power). Finally, short-
term advantages perhaps obtained by co-oper-
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ation do not necessarily imply an advantageous 
long-term position. However, it is evident that 
the objective and full assessment of co-operation 
already carried out would be, at the very least, 
an essential prior condition to any serious 
thinking about future co-operation and its 
practice since it must take account of the overall 
interests, not all strictly economie, of each of 
the partners in order to work out the most 
suitable formulae for obtaining worthwhile eco-
nomie results. That is why the methodological 
research necessary for establishing a framework 
for assessing objectively the advantages of various 
co-operative operations, far from being gratuitous 
speculation, on the contrary constitutes valuable 
assistance in decision-taking in these matters, and 
much effort should still be made in this area. 
These difficulties seem infinitely more 
serious than those sometimes put forward when 
a political rather than an economie solution is 
being sought to the problem. Thus, the impos-
sibility of finding the framework for common 
developments does not lie in legal impediments 
or in so-called ideological incompatibility. Mr. 
Gazzo's report does justice to these false dif-
ficulties by underlining the essential rôle which 
might be played by European parliamentary 
supervision if it concentrated on these specifie 
points and thus perhaps helped, at its level, to 
remove sorne of the abovementioned obstacles. 
CHAPTER II 
Ways to progress : concrete measures and 
flexible solutions 
There is no doubt that Working Group II 
conducted a realistic analysis of the situation and 
the possibilities available. lt is therefore not 
surprising that most speakers considered that at 
the present juncture co-operation could only be 
à la carte. At the same time, they sought wide 
flexibility allowing changes of partner or other 
adjustments in the event of an operation proving 
less interesting than expected for one or other 
partner. Everyone knows that this has frequently 
happened in the past. 
From a legal standpoint, it was possible 
to make a few specifie proposais concerning 
inter alia the institutional framework in which 
co-production operations might be carried out. 
Furthermore, Mr. Plantey suggested a range 
of interesting, more general juridical possibilities 
(bilateral harmonisation, diplomatie conventions, 
etc.). But it is from an economie standpoint that 
this approach seems the most promising and that 
an analysis of the present situation provides the 
greatest number of factors favourable to 
increased co-operation between European conn-
tries. This realistic and flexible approach in no 
way conflicts - quite the contrary - with more 
all-embracing views of Europe's development, nor 
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does it prejudge the future of Europe in the 
armaments field. 
But if we wish to be more precise, we must 
know what is on the à la carte menu, to continue 
Professor Greenwood's well-chosen metaphor. 
Three questions then arise : Co-operate with 
whom ? How far ? In which sector ? But before 
~orking out an answer to each of these questions, 
It should be recalled that any co-operative oper-
ation brings into play three separate entities: 
state governments, defence staffs and firms pro-
ducing military equipment. In each case there-
fore, there is a complex system of arbitration 
which it would be insufficient - and con-
sequently incorrect - to reduce to the level of 
states alone. 
This having been said, let us take the first 
question, i.e. who is to co-operate. The first 
case is co-operation with the United States. 
Mr. Mayer's paper underlined the general dif-
ficulties encountered in ali co-operation between 
Europe and the United States and other speakers 
such as Mr. Doorenbos and Mr. Damm stressed 
a few specifie aspects relating to trade practices 
in particular and the establishment of precise 
co-operative operations. 
Generally speaking, the difficulty stems 
from the asymmetry, to use Mr. Mayer's well-
found word, between Europe and the United 
States and between firms on the two continents 
at the industrial, technological and commercial 
levels. In general, this asymmetry often means 
comparatively higher costs for production in 
Europe. Account should be taken of the remarks 
by Mr. Deschamps to the effect that co-operation, 
as seen by certain circles which wished to make 
a unified Europe the single partner of the 
United States, in reality fostered American 
domination over Western Europe. In fact it is 
the United States that makes the most continuons 
effort to have a single European partner, but 
weak because of that, whereas the division of 
Europe allows it, paradoxically and in many 
ways, to negotiate better and above ali to ensure 
the survival of its technological capability which 
would disappear in generalised co-production. 
Thus, the choice of SNECMA for co-production 
of aircraft engines is justified by the existence 
of an independent European industry with Rolls-
Royce. Fully open competition in Europe, or 
generalised co-production with the United States, 
would probably reduce European firms to a 
secondary rôle. Any sustained co-operation might 
then permanently compromise the future of the 
European armaments industry. 
It was underlined that the United States 
sought merely to purchase patents and that it 
imposed its language, and those who, like 
Mr. Wall, advocate the development of the 
two-way street wish to see it organised on the 
basis of a prior compromise which, in exchange 
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for what the United States imposes on Europe 
would, for instance, have the United States adopt 
the metric system. But the main thing is to agree 
on what is counted as procurement on the United 
States side. It is perhaps too much to wish to 
include only purchases of weapons systems. But 
it is certainly wrong to counrt all the expenditure 
involved in the American military presence in 
Europe. 
However this may be, Western Europe's 
research capability must be preserved and close 
consideration given to the practice of compen-
sation which sorne wish to be global over a time-
span fixed in advance, five years, for instance, 
and which others wish in every case rto be set at 
a technologicallevel equal to that of the products 
purchased in the United States. 
Intra-European co-operation for its part will 
probably assume different forms depending on 
whether it is between large industrial powers or 
with smaller countries. 
When it is a matter of large industrial 
powers, i.e. mainly the United Kingdom, the 
Federal Republic and France, the difficulty is 
to achieve an equitable solution in view of the 
fact ihat the industrial development of these 
three countries has been different or even sorne-
times divergent, which has led to negative effects, 
particularly where Franco-British co-operation 
is concerned. The best approach would appa-
rently be to start co-operation rut the preliminary 
research stage on the basis of a definition of 
requirements agreed by the buyers and sub-
sequently in a second stage define a method of 
co-operation ensuring a satisfactory sharing of 
responsibilities which is, above all, worked out in 
advance. Here, the formation of a specifie firm 
for the production of each family of armaments 
is a solution which has proved its worth, not 
only in the case of Airbus but also for various 
families of weapons. 
In the event of co-operation between the 
largest and the smallest countries, iJt is quite 
evident that it must take a different form, 
account being taken of the needs and capabilities 
of each country. The notion of fair return is 
obviously nort of the same importance in this 
case. But for the smaller countries, what counts 
first of ali is that co-operation should be more 
attractive financially than the procurement of 
American equipment, which raises the problem 
of priees, and the delicate question of com-
pensation. Second, there must be very close 
regard for the independence of firms and the 
technological independence of these countries. 
127 
DOCUMENT 819 
Turning now to the actual content of co-oper-
ation, most speakers underlined that, to have 
any chance of success, co-operation had to begin 
before a country could establish any sort of 
priority in order, as far as possible, to associate 
the planned operation with national honour (the 
words are Mr. Wall's). In other words, in most 
cases, co-operation should start at the design or 
even pre-design stage (prepara tory study stage). 
It must then cover ail production operations and, 
finally, as Mr. de Geus underlined, if it is to be 
really effective, it must also extend to the main-
tenance and upkeep of the equipment produced. 
It emerges from these remarks that it is the 
sectors in which the armaments industry is the 
most closely linked with civil production, such 
as the aircraft and computer sectors, where the 
industry itself is already very largely inter-
nationalised, that co-operation is the easiest. In 
the case of traditional equipment for the army, 
where firms, often nationalised, are the privileged 
suppliers of certain national armies, co-operation 
often proves more difficult and has to be viewed 
more in terms of technical normalisation than in 
truly economie terms. 
In this general context, naval shipbuilding 
is an intermediary stage. Obviously the first 
steps should be taken in areas where co-operation 
is easiest, particularly as these sectors are pro-
bably the ones whose economie and technical 
future is the most promising. W e should there-
fore not be too disturbed if, for instance, the 
French army continues for a long time to come 
to prefer French vehicles and the British army 
British vehicles. 
Conclusions 
The search for an operational time scale 
The overall thinking of this Working Group 
was not concerned with the immediate future, 
which is already fully determined, nor was it 
concerned with the very long term where any-
thing is possible and where everything may be 
changed by scientific and technical upheavals 
which are yet impossible to foresee. It is very 
difficult today to see what :murope or European 
co-operation, in any field whatsoever, will be at 
the end of this century, which is not very far 
away. But a medium-term horizon, i.e. ten to 
fifteen years hence, should allow steps to be taken 
now to set Europe's course for a far longer 
period. It is in this context that what sorne may 
consider to be the rather disillusioned realism 
of the preoccupations and solutions advocated 
by this group should be placed. 
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The Assembly, 
Draft Recommendation 
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Near and Middle East on Western European security 
DOOUMENT 820 
Considering that the maintenance of peace in the Near and Middle East is essential for Wes-
tern Europe's security and economie prosperity; 
Regretting that Soviet intervention in Mghanistan, far from establishing internai peace, poli-
tical stability and a resumption of economie activity in that country, has led to intercommunal and 
religions strife and created yet another difficult refugee problem; 
Considering that the upheaval in Iran in 1978, inspired by revolutionary principles, has further 
delayed the introduction of democracy and the restoration of national unity ; 
Noting that the Camp David agreements, while establishing peace between Israel and Egypt, 
have so far provided no solutions to the main problems in the Middle East, especially the Palestine 
question; 
Considering that solutions which exclude participation by the Palestinian people do not offer 
them the possibility of exercising their right to self-determination and neglect the underlying causes 
of the conflict ; 
Considering that the positions adopted by Jordan and expressed by His Majesty King Hussein 
in the United Nations on 25th September 1979 constitute a positive step towards peace; 
Deploring that the continuing establishment of Israeli settlements on the West Bank only 
makes more diffi.cult a just and lasting solution to the Palestinian problem ; 
Welcoming the fact that the Nine have been able to speak with a single voice on Middle 
Eastern matters on severa! occasions, particularly on 25th September 1979 in the United Nations 
General Assembly, 
REOOMMENDS THAT THE CouNon. 
1. Ensure that consultation between its members is extended to caver matters relating to Mghan-
istan and Iran ; 
2. Ensure that its members refrain from selling arms to Iran as long as internai strife and armed 
repression continue in that country and seek a general agreement between armaments exporting 
countries and the countries of the area on curtailing sales of arms to Iran other than those specifi-
cally required for defence against external aggression ; 
3. Continue to co-ordinate the positions of its members in the United Nations and cali for a 
clarification from the Security Council of the actual implications of Resolution 242 ; 
4. Ask Egypt, Israel and the United States urgently to consult with a view to reaching agree-
ment on a mutually accepted interpretation of the implications of the Camp David agreements; 
5. Ask its members to urge Israel immediately to accept the existence of the Palestinian people 
and to renounce its policy of settlements on the West Bank and commence direct negotiations with 
valid Palestinian representatives as to a time-table for self-determination of the inhabitants of the 
West Bank and the Gaza Strip ; 
6. Ask its members to urge the PLO contemporaneously and reciprocally to declare its acceptance 
of an independant Israeli state within internationally agreed and defined borders and to urge the 
immediate cessation of terrorist acts of violence which caU into question the validity of any such 
declaration ; 
7. Use its best endeavours, if these preconditions are met, to promote a broader-based conference 
than Camp David including representation from aU the countries directly involved in the Palestinian 
dispute. 
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Explanatory Memorandum 
(submitted by Sir Frederic Bennett, Rapporteur) 
1. Introduction 
1. Vlhen Yugoslav General Michailovich was 
about to be executed at the end of World War II 
he is reputed to have said, as his own epitaph, 
that he claimed only to be just one more victim 
of what he described as the "storm of the world", 
adding that even though the global conflict had 
come to an end, many more men, women and 
children would die violent deaths before the 
storm abated. 
2. Y et not even the most prescient individual 
would have guessed how long - after "peace" 
had been attained, at such cost - bitter strife 
would continue, deriving not only from ideological 
clashes but including interracial and inter-
communal religions and other tensions, affecting 
every continent and involving the deaths of 
hundreds of thousands more people, all surely 
utterly war-weary in the aftermath of the carnage 
of 1939-46. Yet since then, as soon as one part 
of the world seems to have regained sorne degree 
of stabilisation and freedom from bloodshed, 
fresh trouble spots have arisen, new "bush fires" 
have been lit to plague the governments of those 
nations dedicated to seeking to re-establish sorne 
overall global level of security, co-operation and 
order. 
3. Sorne of the most persistent, intractable 
:>ources of new tensions threatening to embroil 
not just those directly concerned, but the great 
powers too, have derived from the Near and 
Middle East ; and at this time the dangers of 
a conflagration on an ever-widening scale seem 
to be increasing, rather than waning. 
4. Looking eastwards from the Aegean, the 
Cyprus problem, although forming no part of 
this report, has to be included in one's considera-
tion of what could turn out to lead to a highly 
dangerous chain reaction. More in the news, of 
course, and even more inflammatory, as long as 
left unsolved, is the Israeli-Arab quarrel, which 
all the efforts of mediators within and without 
the framework of the United Nations have failed 
to resolve. This particular dispute has, ever since 
the state of Israel came into being, varied 
between periods of heightening and temporarily 
reduced tension, smouldering antagonism and 
actual outbreaks of open conflict. The repercus-
sions have not only affected Israel itself and its 
immediate neighbours (perhaps most tragically 
of aU that former example of intercommunal 
peace through compromise - Lebanon). They 
have also made immeasurably more difficult 
highly desirable collaboration and genuine 
friendship between the western world and Muslim 
countries and Islamic communities, stretching 
from Morocco in the West to Pakistan and 
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beyond. Needless to add, too, in this context of 
unsatisfactory relations between the West and 
much of Islam, the Soviet Union has been able 
to extend its influence in the whole affected area, 
because of its championship, however cynical the 
motivation, of the "Arab cause" as against the 
alleged injustices perpetrated upon it by a nation 
- Israel - overtly supported and sustained by 
capitalist America. 
5. Western Europe cannot remain indifferent 
to developments in the Middle East. Any growth 
in the Soviet military presence in that area would 
be liable to endanger the southern flank of the 
Atlantic Alliance system and help to isolate 
Turkey. The security and economy of Western 
Europe, the world's leading oil importer, depend 
on supplies of oil which can come only from the 
Middle East, which produces 35 % of the world's 
oil and is by far the leading exporting region. 
'l'he 1973 crisis showed the close relationship 
which exists between peace and stability in that 
area and world priees for oil, on which the West's 
economy and security largely depend. Finally, 
the situation in the Middle East and its rôle in 
the world economy make it a particularly 
sensitive area in which there is a risk of any 
tension having unforeseeable repercussions on 
peace and balance throughout the world. 
6. There are of course those - your Rappor-
teur is not so convinced - who are convinced that 
the signing of the Israeli-Egyptian peace treaty 
has marked a significant step forward towards 
permanent stabilisation in the area. In the short 
term of course this is true, in that a state of war 
between Egypt and Israel, although it has not 
involved military warfare since 1973, has now 
formally ended ; and Egyptian aspirations to 
recover sorne, if not ali, their land lost to Israel 
in past conflicts has now been achieved too, or, 
hopefully, is in the process of so being. Also of 
course the treaty has certainly alleviated Israeli 
fears of having to fight simultaneously again in 
the foreseeable future on severa! fronts. It has 
also afforded an utterly impoverished Egypt the 
chance to concentrate on efforts to accomplish 
economie progress with American assistance. Yet 
these benefits have only been achieved at the 
cost of increased hostility among Palestinian 
Arabs who feel that their cause has been betrayed, 
have seriously worsened relations between most 
of the other Arab states and Egypt itself, and 
have provided new opportunities for the Soviet 
Union and its backers in the region to exploit 
anti-western and particularly anti-American 
sentiments. 
7. On any objective analysis it would appear 
that at best the treaty has acted as a palliative 
to prevent or inhibit the likelihood of yet another 
direct, early Israeli-Arab confrontation. At worst 
it has provided new elements and causes of 
instability where too many already previously 
existed. In the long term the only real and 
durable solution must lie in an appreciation by 
ail interested parties that the basic causes of the 
Arab-Israeli qUJarrels did not suddenly arise with 
the actual establishment of the state of Israel 
in 1948, but flowed inevitably from much earlier 
conflicting policy decisions providing the root 
cause of the controversy, namely the McMahon 
letters, the Sykes-Picot agreement and the 
Balfour declaration. Although many books have 
since been written to try to explain that these 
three basic elements in the present unhappy poli-
tical set-up in the area were not necessarily in-
compatible, it is a fact that generations of Arabs 
who have never even read the original documents 
believe that they have been robbed of rights they 
thought were guaranteed to them, as the priee 
of their co-operation with the western ll!llies in 
the first world war in order to defeat the Otto-
man empire. Millions of Jews not only living in 
Israel, Zionists and non-Zionists alike, are also 
convinced that they were promised not just a 
Jewish homeland within "Arabia", but a separate 
national state. Renee, it is now academie to 
continue seeking to reconcile the irreconcilable, to 
attribute blame for the misunderstandings, or to 
put the clock back. 
8. On the one hand a sovereign state of Israel 
is here to stay and most Arabs now accept this 
fact, however reluctantly. On the other hand, 
lasting peace can never be achieved as long as 
Arabs continue to believe that Israel is not 
content with its boundaries as defined and 
delineated at the time of the state's creation in 
1948, or even on a 1967 basis, but is still bent 
on further territorial aggrandisement, not just 
seeking territorial concessions in order to safe-
guard its security. The creation of mutual con-
fidence, through provision of reciprocated posi-
tive evidence, between the two sides on both 
these vital points is a prerequisite of any true 
settlement. To emphasise this fundamental fact 
is neither an indication of hostility to Israel, still 
less of anti-semitism, nor a disregard of the right 
of an Israeli state to exist in peace and pros-
perity. Nor on the other hand is it evidence of 
lack of respect for the best interests of lllll the 
Arab peoples. 
9. Another new disruptive factor in the 
Middle East, separate but not altogether un-
related to the Arab-Israeli imbroglio, in effect 
if not in origin, has been the downfall of the 
Shah's government in Iran, and its replacement 
by an extremist, repressive, theocratie régime, 
leading according to present indications to an 
ultimate break-up, not only on religions but on 
ethnie grounds too, of the "Persian empire" as 
it existed until the recent revolution. In retro-
spect, surely even the most ardent critic of the 
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Shah's admittedly authoritarian and corrupt 
government cannot be other than dismayed at 
what has taken place, and what further miseries 
lie ahead for His former Majesty's "liberated" 
subjects. 
10. Even the extreme left-wing groups which 
played a major rôle in the events leading up to 
the fall of the Shah have had to break with the 
new régime and in many cases have been among 
the victims of Ayatollah Khomeini's repressive 
policics. 
11. Looking at the present unhappy Iranian 
scene one is irresistably reminded of the des-
pairing cry of Madame Roland in the wake of 
the French Revolution in the eighteenth century : 
"0 Liberty ! Liberty ! How many crimes have 
been committed in th y name ! " 
12. One suspects that there are a significant 
nrnnber of disillusioned Iranian nationals who 
would elaborate on this theme in sorne updated 
phrases drawn from a new British best-seller, 
"The Plague Dogs", by Richard Adams: 
"Freedom, that land where rogues, at every 
corner, cozen with lies and promises the 
plucky sheep who judged it time to sack 
the shepherd ! Unfurl your banner, Free-
dom ... 
W e are free - free to suffer every anguish 
of deliberation, of decisions which must be 
made upon suspect information and half-
knowledge, every anguish of hindsight and 
regret, of failure, shame and responsibility 
for aU that we have brought upon ourselves 
and others : free to struggle, to starve, to 
demand from ali one Iast, supreme effort 
to reach where we long to be and, once 
there, to conclude that it is not, after ail, 
the right place ... 
The tyrant wasn't such a bad old sod, and 
even in his arbitrary rages never killed as 
many as died in yesterday's glorious hattie 
for liberty." 
13. Be that as it may, however desirable, it 
will indeed be difficult now to restore any 
government capable of regaining the country's 
previous cohesion. 
14. Only a miracle could now permanently 
subdue the revived aspirations, at least for 
autonomy, never other than dormant, of the 
Kurdish people. Similar considerations apply to 
the Arab population and the Baluchi tribesmen 
living along the border with Pakistan - itself 
also suffering serious risk of fragmentation, 
threatening to destroy utterly the future coher-
ence of a country that only achieved unity and 
sovereignty in 1947. 
15. There are those who blame the Russians 
for ali that has happened to the detriment of the 
happiness of the people living in the area. Y our 
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Rapporteur is not noted for holding views 
sympathetie to the policies of the Kremlin, but 
to place the responsibility for all that has hap-
pened in Iran on Soviet malevolence would be to 
over-simplify the issue and lead one wrongly 
to believe that if only the Kremlin could be 
induced to change course aU would be weil. 
16. After all, the Soviet Union has as much 
to gain as any other power from the maintenance 
of stability in Iran and as much to lose from 
the prevailing chaos, even if it would have prefer-
red to witness the establishment of a strong 
communist régime rather than a right-wing 
monarchy. The first signs of Soviet interest in 
the maintenance of a state emerged in 1945 when, 
no doubt regretfully, the Soviet Union preferred 
to withdraw its troops from the northern part 
of the country which they were occupying in 
order to avoid confrontation with the United 
States. It should be added that, having become 
short of oil, the Soviet Union imports a certain 
amount from Iran and would have no advantage 
in seeing this source dry up any more than in 
the abandon of the vast Iranian natural gas 
distribution project of whieh it was to be the 
main beneficiary. 
17. Of course, however, Moscow has lost no 
opportunity to fan the flames of any hostility 
against the West, and to seek to exploit resent-
ment whenever or wherever opportunities have 
occurred. Certainly, too, there can be no doubt 
that expansionist Russia has taken full advantage 
of the seeming near paralysis of the West, most 
notably that of the United States, in order to 
obtain a stranglehold on Afghanistan, as one 
more step forward in the furtherance of its 
historie dream of obtaining direct access to a 
warm water port in the Indian Ocean, and to 
provide an easier opportunity than it now 
possesses to dominate the still fiercely anti-
communist Gulf Arab states. 
18. These latter and, no less important, Saudi 
Arabia have so far suecessfully resisted the con-
tagion of unrest and revolution that has over-
taken luckless Iran. Yet it is an open question 
how long that fragile stability will last, unless 
the West, especially the United States, adopts 
a far more constructive rôle throughout the 
region. Pledges of political and if need be 
military support for the remaining established 
rulers are not enough, especially in the wake of 
the Iranian débacle. The most emotive issue in 
Arabia, especially in an era of Islamic revival, 
is not the fear of going communist : it is the 
finding of an acceptable solution to the Pales-
tinian p11oblem, not just acceptable to Mr. Sadat 
and Mr. Begin, not even if also grudgingly or 
reluctantly acquiesced in by the "moderate" Arab 
states. Their rulers are anyhow fully aware that 
if they countenance any settlement that fails to 
meet Palestinian aspirations for a homeland of 
their own (just as understandable, incidentally, 
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and as creditable as that of the Jews inside and 
outside Israel to have and keep as such their own 
homeland), their own positions will be seriously 
imperilled. For, apart from the inherent feelings 
of their own indigenous subjects, the whole of 
Arabia is now infiltrated by dispossessed Pales-
tinians, many of them, because of their superior 
skills and education as compared with their 
desert kinsmen, holding positions of influence 
and importance. Even perhaps the most moderate 
and pro-West government of all, that of Jordan, 
has had to come to terms with Palestinian 
nationalism, or put at risk the survival of the 
most mature and respected monarchy in the 
whole Middle East. 
19. No, it will have to be the Palestinians 
themselves who will have to believe they are 
getting a fair deal. Without this, a continuing 
and increasing sense of injustice will persist, 
providing just the climate of opinion in which 
it is only men of violence who can prosper or 
offer a solution. 
20. There is an old English ditty : 
"Y esterday upon the stair, 
I met a man who wasn't there. 
He wasn't there again today, 
I wish that man would go away." 
21. Wishes alone, by President Carter, 
Mr. Begin and Mr. Sadat, that, without firm, 
fair remediai action, the "Palestine problem" 
will, if one is patient enough, "go away", are no 
less doomed to failure. 
D. Palestine 
(i) The origins of the problem 
22. Among the innumerable problems stemming 
from the fall of the Ottoman Empire in 1918, 
two have still not been solved: that of Cyprus 
and that of Palestine. Everywhere else, states 
were eventually established with an increasingly 
marked national character, and the frontiers 
separating them are no longer very seriously 
contested by the states concerned, although 
certain minorities, particularly the Kurds in 
Iran, Iraq and Turkey (who have been aptly 
called the Po les of the Middle East), plus of 
course the number of Kurds living in the Soviet 
Uni on, outside the boundaries of the former 
Ottoman Empire, are continuai sourees of unrest 
and sometimes even civil war. 
23. The reason why it has been possible for 
the Palestinian problem to remain unsolved for 
more than sixty years is that the disintegration 
of the Ottoman Empire was accompanied by an 
additional factor : Zionism. In fact, the Zionist 
movement founded by Theodor Herzl in the last 
decade of the nineteenth century adopted as its 
aim the provision of a new homeland guarantee-
ing freedom and the possibility to form a nation 
for the J ewish peoples who had been and were 
often victims of persecution in the many conn-
tries where the diaspora had led them to live. 
At its first congress, in 1897, the Zionist move-
ment, for obvious historical reasons, chose 
Palestine as the location of this new settlement. 
24. Severa! reasons militated in favour of this 
choice : the fact that J erusalem was the tradi-
tional centre of the J ewish religion, and the 
weakness of the Ottoman Empire whose forth-
coming dissolution was to be expected. Moreover, 
Palestine was sparsely populated, its land was 
not properly exploited and there was still a small 
minority of J ews living there : about 10 % of 
a population of 600,000 inhabitants who were 
mainly Arabs, mostly of the Moslem faith but 
with a Christian minority. 
25. The actual frontiers of Palestine as origin-
ally envisaged by the Zionist movement were 
rather vague and covered sizeable portions of 
present-day Lebanon, Syria and Jordan, includ-
ing the east bank of the Jordan, Golan, the north 
bank of the Litani, the western part of the Sinaï 
as far as El Arish and Aqaba. · 
26. The first world war immediately raised the 
question of the fate of the Ottoman Empire and 
the allies had to consider what wouJd happen to 
the Arab territories forming part of this empire 
weil before the peace negotiations. 
27. (i) On the one hand, the fact that a sizeable 
proportion of the Arab population had fought on 
the side of the allies to free themselves from 
Turkish domination had led the British Govern-
ment to enter into a number of commitments 
towards them. These commitments were set out 
in the correspondence exchanged between Sherif 
Husain, Emir of Mecca, leader of the Arab 
revoit, and the British High Commissioner in 
Egypt, Sir Henry Mc:Mahon. In this corres-
pondence, McMahon undertook, on behalf of the 
British Government, to ensure the independence 
of the Arab provinces of the Ottoman Empire 
at the end of the war. 
28. (ii) But, at the same time, the British, 
French, Italian and Russian Governments were 
negotiating with a view to dividing these same 
territories into spheres of influence. On 16th May 
1916, these negotiations led to a Franco-British 
agreement known as the Sykes-Picot agreement, 
from the names of the two principal negotiators, 
whose contents were published by the Soviet 
Union immediately after the 1917 revolution. It 
guaranteed France the northern sector of the 
Arab countries, Britain retaining the south. 
29. (iii) Finally, anxious inter alia to ensure 
that it had the support of the Jewish elements 
of the American people to facilitate the entry 
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of the United States into the war, the British 
Government embarked on negotiations with a 
representative of the Zionist movement, Chaim 
Weizmann, with whom it undertook to encourage 
the formation of a Jewish entity in Palestine. 
This undertaking was formally set out in a letter 
written to Lord Rothschild by the Foreign 
Secretary, Sir Arthur Balfour, on 2nd November 
1921. This letter contained the text of a declara-
tion adopted by the British Government and by 
which it undertook to use its best endeavours to 
facilitate the achievement of a "national home" 
for the J ewish people in Palestine. 
30. The contradictory nature of the various 
commitments entered into by the British Govern-
ment with regard to the Arab provinces of the 
Ottoman Empire has often been underlined. It 
may however be pointed out that, while there 
were contradictions between the interpretations 
given by the French, the Arabs and the J ews of 
the commitments which concerned them, such 
contradictions were not of a formai nature. The 
League of Nations mandate system in fact allowed 
the formation of Arab states under League of 
Nations tutelage, exercised provisionally either 
by Britain or by France. The fact that these were 
class A mandates allowed them full independence 
within quite a short lapse of time. Moreover, the 
Balfour declaration did not imply the creation 
of a Jewish state in Palestine, the notion of a 
"national home" being left, perhaps deliberately, 
vague and undefined. 
(ii) Palestine under British mandate 
31. Y our Rapporteur does not intend to recount 
the history of Palestine over the past sixty years. 
He will merely point out that the population of 
the country increased considerably during that 
period, rising from 750,000 inhabitants in 1922 
to 1,850,000 at the end of 1946. But the Jewish 
population increased in even greater proportions 
than the Arab population since it numbered 
84,000 persons in 1922 and 608,000 in 1945. This 
increase was essentially due to very large-scale 
immigration, there being 316,000 legal immi-
grants, i.e. with the authorisation of the manda-
tory power, and sorne 65,000 illegal immigrants. 
The J ewish population lived mainly in the towns, 
which made great strides. But thanks to financial 
assistance from the international Jewish com-
munity this Jewish minority had by perfectly 
legal means acquired a considerable portion of 
arable land in Palestine (12% in 1946). 
32. British policy had been to allow a Jewish 
community to settle in Palestine while limiting 
immigration so asto avoid a social and national 
upheaval which would have made the Palestinians 
a minority in their own country. However, this 
po licy was accepted neither hy the J ewish 
Agency, the political organisation of the Zionist 
movement, which intended to constitute a true 
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Jewish state in Palestine at the earliest possible 
date, nor by the Arab Palestinian people, who 
found themselves gradually evicted from their 
lands and economically dominated by a Jewish 
population which was better adapted to the 
requirements of a modern economy. In 1938, 
violence broke out between J ews and Arabs and 
there were attacks on British forces in Palestine. 
The J ewish Agency acquired an armed force and 
other J ewish armed organisations such as the 
Irgun and the Stern Group had no hesitation in 
using terrorist methods. 
33. Following the second world war, the 
Palestinian problem assumed new dimensions. On 
the one hand, the League of Nations had made 
way for the United Nations and the mandate 
system was coming to an end. Secondly, the 
persecution and massacres suffered by the Euro-
pean Jewish community led many displaced 
persons to try to settle in Palestine at any cost. 
Several hundreds of thousands were admitted 
officially but many others moved in without the 
consent of either the mandatory power or the 
United Nations. This rapid growth in the Jewish 
community aggravated the conflicts for which 
Palestine was the stage and the problem of 
creating a J ewish state in Palestine presented 
itself in new terms. 
34. Finally, on 29th November 1947 the 
General Assembly of the United Nations, after 
a difficult debate, adopted by 30 votes to 13 with 
10 abstentions a plan to partition Palestine which 
was to allow the British mandate to come to an 
end and two states to be formed in Palestine, one 
J ewish, the other Arab. This plan provided for 
a fairly limited J ewish state and for an Arab 
state ; with J erusalem, an enclave surrounded 
by Arab territory, having special status. The 
whole Palestinian territory was to remain in a 
system of economie union. 
35. As soon as Britain announced that its 
mandate would come to an end on 15th May 
1948, by which date its troops would have 
completely evacuated the territory, the Jewish 
military organisations did their utmost to place 
themselves on the best possible military and 
territorial footing on the date of partition. To 
this end, they did what they could to convince 
the Palestinians to leave the areas which they 
wished to have incorporated in the state of Israel. 
They often used force to achieve this, which led 
to the first Israeli-Arab war. 
(iii) The birth of the state of Israel 
36. As from its foundation on 14th May 1948 
the state of Israel already controlled territories 
which extended far beyond those attributed to 
it by the United Nations when the partition plan 
was adopted on 29th November 1947. The 
Security Council, ordering a cease-fire on 29th 
May 1948, and the General Assembly, in Resolu-
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tion 194, had to recognise a cease-fire line which 
allowed Israel to control the major part of former 
Palestine. As regards Palestinian territOI'Y 
remaining under Arab control, the Gaza Strip 
was transferred to Egypt and the west bank of 
the Jordan to Transjordan which thereby became 
Jordan. The armistices signed at the beginning 
of 1949 between Israel and its Arab neighbours 
did not modify the division of Palestinian terri-
tory, although they did not give Israel a right 
to the sectors which had not been attributed to 
it in the partition of 29th November 1947. But 
they enabled Israel to join the United Nations. 
37. The creation of the state of Israel and the 
armistices far from solved the problem raised by 
the settlement of an increasing1y numerous 
Jewish population in Palestine. Thanks to a very 
high birth-rate, the original Palestinian popula-
tion increased very rapidly, since it amounted 
to 2,700,000 persons in 1967, i.e. more or less the 
equivalent of the J ewish population, despite 
larger-scale immigration due to the exit, often 
under extreme pressure, of J ewish populations 
from several recently decolonised countries. Sorne 
400,000 remained in Israel, the rest taking refuge 
in neighbouring Arab countries. 
38. United Nations Resolution 194 provided for 
the right of Palestinians wishing to return to 
their homes to be able to do so. But in the long 
run at least such a return would have made the 
J ewish element a minority within the very state 
of Israel, i.e. reducing to nil the effort made by 
the Zionist movement to give the Jews of Pales-
tine their own state. The cease-fire therefore did 
not lead to the conclusion of a peace treaty. It 
was to be fully accepted and respected by neither 
of the two partners. 
39. Furthermore, the Palestinian refugees were 
beginning to have an increasingly strong influ-
ence on the Arab countries where they had 
settled with a view to rallying them to their 
cause. Their number and superior cultural level 
allowed them in many cases to play a leading 
rôle in these countries, particularly in Jordan : 
nowadays, throughout Arabia, including the Gulf 
Emir a tes. 
40. Being anxious to put an end to this perma-
nent conflict whose international nature was 
becoming more and more of a threat to it, Israel 
resolved to take oovantage of the opportunity 
offered by the nationalisation of the Suez Canal 
in 1956 to do away by force with the threats 
facing it. A concerted offensive with the United 
Kingdom and France allowed it to inflict a 
severe blow on the Egyptian army, the most 
powerful of the Arab armies at that time. 
(iu) The 1961 war and the re(ugee problem 
41. The temporary weakening of Egyptian 
military strength in 1956 did not however pro-
vide a solution to the problem of Palestine and 
incidents were not long in resuming and increas-
ing. The decision taken by the Egyptian Govern-
ment in 1967 to stop authorising Israeli ships to 
use the port of Elat, the only Israeli outlet on 
the Gulf of Aqaba and consequently on the Red 
Sea, was followed by another Israeli offensive. In 
six days, the Israeli army defeated one by one the 
Egyptian, Jordanian and Syrian forces, which 
allowed Israel to occupy the Sinaï peninsula, 
including the Gaza Strip, the part of Jordan 
territory on the West Bank of the Jordan and 
the Golan territory taken from Syria. 
42. Henceforth, therefore, Israel occupied an 
enormous territory, twice the size of that it had 
acquired in 1949, but in which the Arab minority 
was far more numerous despite the fact that part 
of the population of the West Bank had gone 
into exile and that only sorne 600,000 Palestinians 
were still living there. 400,000 Palestinians were 
living in the Gaza Strip. The number of refugee 
Palestinians at that time reached a level of 
1,600,000, divided mainly between Jorda;n 
(800,000), Syria and Lebanon (600,000), Ku~rut 
(150 000) and the Arab-Persian Gulf states. Smce 
thel;, the number of refugees has increased 
through natural growth and the difficulties they 
have encountered in .Jordan and Syria have 
considerably increased the numbers settling in 
Lebanon (probably 400,000), Kuwait (perhaps 
300,000) and the Gulf countries where the 
development of the oil economy brought about 
a rapid increase in the need for labour, whether 
specialised or not. 
43. The results of the 1967 war have never been 
ratified in a peace treaty but the matter has come 
before the United Nations General Assembly on 
several occasions. On 22nd November 1967, the 
Security Council for its part adopted the famous 
Resolution 242 in which it emphasised the in-
admissibility of the acquisition of territory by 
war, called for the withdrawal of Israeli armed 
forces from territories occupied in 1967 and 
proclaimed the right of every state in the area 
"to live in peace within secure and recognised 
boundaries". It also affirmed the necessity to 
guarantee freedom of navigation through inter-
national waterways, to achieve a just settlement 
of the refugee problem and to guarantee the ter-
ritorial inviolability and political independence 
of every state in the area. 
44. This text was the subject of various inter-
pretations, particularly about the meaning of the 
expression "secure and recognised boundaries". 
Did this mean the 1949 frontiers, which the 
Arab states would have had to recognise as 
permanent, or new frontiers to be decided upon 
and subsequently recognised but which would be 
better able to guarantee the security of Israel ? 
W as recognition of the state of Israel by the 
Arab countries to precede the determination of 
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its frontiers and the signature of a peace treaty? 
These have been the linchpins of the constant 
subsequent confrontations between Israel and the 
neighbouring Arab countries and explain the 
desire, particularly of Jordan, for a United 
Nations Security Council·clarification of Resolu-
tion 242. 
45. Another consequence of the 1967 war was a 
large-scale increase in the Arab population within 
the territory controlled by Israel, which allowed 
a resumption of terrorist operations on the actual 
territory of Israel and the occupied territories. 
In order better to control these territories, Israel 
set up colonisation centres there, sorne in the 
Negev and Sinaï regions taken from Egypt, sorne 
in the Golan, taken from Syria, but far more on 
the West Bank. 
46. Finally, while letting it be known that it 
was prepared to negotiate the establishment of 
a new frontier, Israel has never concealed the 
fact that it did not consider the old city of Jeru-
salem belonging to the state of Israel to be 
negotiable and it set up its government there. in 
order to assert its desire to incorporate the city 
in its territory. The growing number of "col-
onies" on the West Bank also made it far more 
difficult to embark on negotiations jeopardising 
the permanent nature of its settlement on the 
West Bank. In September 1979, when the state 
of Israel authorised its citizens to purchase land 
on the West Bank freely, 27.4% of this territory 
- and generally the best land - already 
belonged to Israelis. The 1967 war therefore con-
siderably worsened the situation prevailing in 
the Middle East since the birth of the state of 
Israel and the 1948 and 1956 wars. 
(v) The Palestine Liberation Organisation 
47. This deterioration was particularly marked 
since throughout the years the Palestinian 
refugees had become organised, in the countries 
in which they were dispersed, and set up combat 
organisations intended to fight against . Israel, 
several of which however soon clashed wlth the 
authorities of the host countries which were not 
anxious to become involved in an open struggle 
against Israel. 
48. These were often rival organisations not 
on good terms with each other, thus making 
negotiations with them no easy task. Sorne 
adhered to revolutionary doctrines while others 
proved more conservative. They were therefore 
assisted and supported by one or another Arab 
state. However, relative unity gradually seems 
to have been achieved around the Palestine Liber-
ation Organisation, set up in 1964, and the use 
of terrorist methods has diminished considerably, 
at least outside Israeli territory. 
49. IIowever, in several Arab countries, par-
ticularly Jordan and J...~ebanon, the Palestinian 
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refugees constitute a considerable force capable 
of bringing particularly strong pressure to bear 
on the host state as they are highly armed. In 
Lebanon, the sorne 18,000 men in the Lebanese 
army are proving incapable of maintaining 
internai order and respect for national frontiers 
by far more numerous Palestinian forces. 
50. Two series of incidents have stemmed from 
this Palestinian action : the first was in Jordan, 
which, from September 1970 to July 1971, con-
cluded with the putting down of armed Pales-
tinian organisations deriving from other Arab 
countries by the J ordanian army and, in Le banon, 
with a true civil war which led to the occupation 
of North Lebanon by the Syrian army and the 
stationing of United Nations forces on the banks 
of the Litani near the frontier between Lebanon 
and Israel, thus confirming the de facto control 
of South Lebanon by the Israelis. So Lebanon is 
still divided, the Christian elements of the 
population having often sided with the Israelis, 
while the Moslem elements were on the side of the 
Palestinian refugees and in 1978 appealed to the 
Syrian army which was already occupying the 
north of the country. The very future of the 
Lebanese state and its unity are therefore now at 
stake. 
51. Moreover, in the absence of other means, 
the Palestinian refugees embarked on a whole 
series of terrorist operations not only against 
Israel but also against those Arab countries 
which had not given in to their requirements and 
even against a large number of western countries 
accused rightly or wrongly of supporting the 
Israeli cause. However blameworthy these oper-
ations may be, they have had the effect of giving 
considerable international impact to the Pales-
tinian affair. In particular, the extent to which 
hijacking has been used as an instrument in the 
fight of the Palestinian nationalist organisations 
is well-known. 
52. Democratie western governments, as part 
of their political credo, at least overtly condemn 
resorting to violence and bloodshed as means to a 
political end, in contrast to negotiated peaceful 
settlements. Y et it is fair to point out that how-
ever much we must ali deplore the use of ter-
rorism by the PLO and: aBSOciated movements to 
achieve their aspirations, this tactic in the un-
happy Middle East scenario is nothing new. Sorne 
architects of the present state of Israel, collective 
and individual members of, for instance, Irgun 
and the Stern group, have unashamedly attri-
buted their past successes to violence. 
53. The trouble is that, just as "one man's meat 
is another man's poison", one man's terrorist is 
another man's freedom fighter: and few of us 
are free from double standards in this respect. 
Y et it is true that generally public condemnation, 
in the West at least, of resorting to violence to 
achieve political ends, just or unjust, is much 
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more deeply and widely felt than it was thirty 
years ago ; and the PLO should appreciate this 
fact, in their own interests as weil as on moral 
grounds. 
54. There are indications that the PLO is 
beginning to realise the harm to its international 
image and aspirations that is caused by indul-
gence in acts of terrorism, particularly those 
involving innocent people overseas in no way 
connected with the Arab-Israeli conflict. The 
PLO now condemns hijacking, for instance, 
hostage-taking at embassies, raids on airports, 
etc. 
55. But there is one important qualification. 
Any nationalist movement, especially one of 
necessity widely dispersed and hence without a 
tight central control, is bound to have undisci-
plined, extremist elements in its ranks or on its 
fringes. 
56. Moreover, it is not only the PLO but Arabs 
generally who draw a distinction between 
politically-motivated acts of terrorism as such 
and the efforts in Arab lands under alien military 
occupation, contrary to United Nations Security 
Council directions, to harass and indulge in 
hostile acts against those who are in such occupa-
tion. 
57. Syria and Jordan are still at war with 
IsraeL: only a cease-fire across the borders is in 
force. Thus Arabs in e.g. the Gaza Strip, on the 
Golan Heights and within the West Bank, who 
blow up bridges, mine roads, etc., regard them-
selves just as much resistance fighters and are 
so regarded by their neighbours, as were the 
resistance movements of occupied Europe in the 
last war whom we did not condemn but rather 
praised and encouraged. 
(vi) The present situation 
58. The 1973 war was provoked by Egypt, 
which took the offensive along the Suez Canal 
and temporarily occupied a portion of the Sinaï 
peninsula. The final defeat of Egypt allowed the 
government of Anwar el Sadat to open negotia-
tions with Israel which first led to the with-
drawal of Israeli forces to a position several kilo-
metres short of the canal banks and then, after 
difficult negotiations imposed on both Israel and 
Egypt by President Carter, to the signing in 
September 1978 of the Camp David agreements 
by which Egypt recognised the state of Israel 
whereas Israel undertook to evacuate progres-
sively occupied Egyptian territories and to nego-
tiate a settlement concerning the West Bank with 
the representatives of the Palestinian people. 
59. Sorne have interpreted the Camp David 
agreements as a step towards peace which will 
come about through successive agreements 
between Israel and its other neighbours. How-
ever, there is sorne doubt as to the value of this 
interpretation. In fact, although the 1967 war 
created a frontier problem between Egypt and 
Israel, Egypt took in few Palestinian refugees 
and its government has therefore had a freedom 
of manoeuvre which the governments of Israel's 
other neighbouring countries did not have. 
60. So now that the Camp David agreements 
have been signed the situation in the Middle East 
is far from clear. On the one hand, Egypt, at last 
at peace with Israel, finds itself isolated among 
the Arab countries, severa! of which have broken 
off ail relations with it and sorne of which are 
threatening it with hostile operations. On the 
other hand, the more moderate Arab states are 
living under the pressure of forces which they 
cannot indefinitely control and which force them 
to adopt an attitude of relentless hostility 
towards Israel, although they know perfectly well 
that their armies cannot presently or in the 
foreseeable future tackle Israeli forces. 
61. Lebanon, which took part in none of the 
wars against Israel, now finds itself at the hub 
of a conflict, sometimes open, sometimes masked, 
in which Israelis and Palestinians continue to 
clash despite the presence of United Nations 
forces. The possibility of a de facto sharing of 
Lebanon between Syria and Israel is far from 
out of the question. Everything indicates that as 
long as no solution has been found to the Pales-
tinian problem the unity of Lebanon cannot be 
restored, and as long as the Palestinians have not 
found a homeland they will continue to be a 
permanent threat to the international community 
and the whole Middle East. But there is nothing 
to indicate that the desire shown by Egypt to 
assoc1ate the Palestinians with the settlement of 
its relations with Israel is leading towards the 
opening of true negotiations since Israel refuses 
to recognise the PLO as the representative of the 
Palestinian people, just as the PLO refuses to 
recognise that the state of Israel has any cla1m 
to Palestine, or any part of it. 
62. The only country in a position to help to 
find a solution to both the problem of the Pales-
tinians and that of Israel's security is Jordan. 
More than half the 2,900,000 inhabitants of the 
territory which it claims are of Palestinian 
origin, whether or not they have refugee status, 
and it still has legal claim to the West Bank ter-
ri tory occupied by Israel since 1967. Ever since 
its constitutional arrangements in 1950, it has 
recognised the right of Palestinians to constitute 
a national state, even though the 1948 partition 
made sorne of them Jordanian citizens. In 1972, 
King Hussein made clear the choice he would 
offer them in the event of the West Bank being 
recovered : return to their country under J or-
danian sovereignty, constitute an independent 
entity federated with Transjordania under a 
single head of state, or form a separate state. 
s• 
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63. In September 1970, Jordan was compelled, 
for domestic reasons and because of the increasing 
number of reprisais carried out by Israeli forces 
on its territory - following terrorist operations 
in occupied territory by Palestinians beyond its 
control - to use furce to establish its authority. 
However, at the Arab summit meeting in Rabat 
in 1974, the Jordanian state admitted that the 
PLO was the only representative of the Pales-
tinians. The 1972 proposai and recognition that 
the PLO was representative were confirmed by 
King Hussein in the United Nations General 
Assembly on 25th September 1979, when he said: 
" ... Jordan, which I am honoured to repre-
sent here today, has a thorough understand-
ing of what is and what is not possible in 
the oontext of war and peace in our region. 
Jordan has al ways advocated reason, moder-
ation and a search for the possible, both 
by virtue of its proximity to danger and 
its close involvement with the train of 
events from the very beginning. The Jor-
danian people have always shared the suf-
ferings and aspirations of the Palestinian 
people. Jordan carried the major burden 
of the human tragedy that befell the 
Palestinians, and absorbed the human, 
economie, social and political results of this 
tragedy. 
Israeli officiais have constantly reiterated 
that Jordan must solve the Palestinian 
problem by absorbing the Palestinians it-
self. But the answer to this argument is a 
very simple one. When we speak of Pales-
tinian rights we speak of a clearly defined 
territory and an equally clearly defined 
people who have inhabited that territory 
on a continuous basis for several centuries. 
That territory, which lies west of the 
Jordan River, is Palestine. It is as simple 
as that. The subject is thus not a matter of 
terminology or semantics. In 1948, Israel 
managed to uproot the people from its 
homeland west of the river. It then took 
another major step and placed 1.5 million 
Palestinians under its control. The case of 
this nation - half in exile and half under 
occupation- is the case of the Palestinian 
people. 
Playing with words will not solve the prob-
lem. Israel must withdraw from the ter-
ritories it occupied in June 1967, must 
respect the right of the displaced Pales-
tinians to return to their homeland and 
must retract its deniai of the Palestinians' 
right to self-determination including their 
right to establish an independent state if 
they so wish. We in Jordan, together with 
the other Arab countries, stand behind the 
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Palestinians in demanding this right. We 
support them in the exercise of their free 
choice and will respect the choice they will 
make. 
The Palestine Liberation Organisation 
through its international activities and 
announced positions in recent months, has 
proved that it wants to participate, in the 
name of the Palestinian people which it 
represents, in steps leading to a just peace 
which ensures the liberation of the Pales-
tinian people from occupation and the 
pursuit of a free independent existence 
within their national homeland. 
W e in Jordan are co-opera ting in good 
faith with the leadership of the PLO and 
with the rest of the Arab countries for the 
good of the Palestine people and the Arab 
world at large ... " 
64. These declarations, which in every respect 
conform to the many United Nations resolutions 
on Palestine, raise the question of what are 
Israel's true goals. If its intention is to ensure its 
security, it may be considered that with the 
Camp David agreements it has every means of 
doing so, peace being based on sound foundations. 
Indeed, now the possible danger represented bv 
Egyptian strength is out of the way, the mai~ 
point of confrontation with the Arab countries is 
along the 600 km. boundary separating it from 
Jordan. Peace with that country, giving a ter-
ri tory to the Palestinians (the West Bank), would 
deprive other Arab countries of any effective pos-
sibility of attacking Israeli territory. Whether 
independent, federated with Jordan or united 
with it, a Palestinian West Bank would not have 
the means of becoming a danger for Israel. More-
over, Israel would demonstrate its will not to 
pursue a policy of territorial extension, whereas 
its present attitude al1ows the Arab countries to 
fear further expansion. The remarkable economie 
development launched by Jordan leaves no doubt 
as to its interests and intentions since its con-
tinued development depends on the maintenance 
of peace. 
65. If the Camp David agreements prove to be 
nothing more than a manoeuvre to allow Israel to 
expand its territory, Israel would bear serious 
responsibility for prolonging a conflict in the 
Middle East which has grave consequences for 
the whole world, opening the region to Soviet 
influence and, in the 1ong run, endangering its 
own security to a far greater extent. Several 
aspects of Israeli policy cannot but make one 
wonder whether territorial expansion is not one 
of its aims, and not just the maintenance of mili-
tary security. These doubts include : 
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66. (i) A comparison of maps of territories 
under Israeli control since partition of Palestine 
by the United Nations in 1947 suggests that this 
is so. 
67. (ii) Statements by some Israeli leaders and 
the World Zionist Movement. 
68. (iii) Israel's armed control of South Leba-
non can also be interpreted in this way. 
69. (iv) But it is mainly Israel's West Bank 
policy which has raised doubts. Military occupa-
tion of this territory was followed by the 
systematic installation of state settlements which 
have steadily developed in recent years, even since 
Camp David. At present, there are 676,000 
Arabs on the West Bank, not including Jeru-
salem, while 12,000 Israelis (2% of the total) 
have settled there in 127 colonies grouped in 
three continuous lines parallel to the River 
Jordan. 27.5% of the territory of the West Bank 
has thus so far been requisitioned for these 
settlements, part of which is being exploited im-
mediately, the remainder being held in reserve, 
seemingly with a view to future extension. In 
addition, in 1979 the Israeli Government author-
ised the purchase of further areas by Israelis. 
Irrigation projects using water from the Jordan 
and the planting of trees which will bear fruit 
only in several years' time indicate that Israel 
does not intend to abandon this territory for 
sorne time, if ever. Pressure allegedly brought to 
bear on the Arab population to leave the area and 
appeals for the immigration of more Jews to 
Israel have encouraged Arab fears that Israel's 
aim is progressively to annex this territory with 
permanent settlements, the result of which would 
be to increase the number of refugees in neigh-
bouring Arab countries, thus aggravating 
economie, social and political problems and 
permanently jeopardising all hope of peace. 
70. (v) The wish to annex terri tory is particular-
ly evident in Jerusalem, although the Arab popu-
lation there is more numerous (about 60%) than 
the Jewish population (about 40%). Part of this 
population has been settled in districts located 
on former West Bank territory, annexed to the 
Israeli administration of the city. The Israeli 
Government has repeatedly proclaimed that it 
considers its annexation of Jerusalem as not 
negotiable with any Arab government and at the 
same time it has extended the administrative 
boundaries of "Greater Jerusalem". 
71. (vi) Israel's refusa! to negotiate with the 
organisation which all the Arab countries 
including Jordan, acknowledge to be representa~ 
tive of the Palestinians is taken by the Arab 
world as a straightforward refusai to negotiate 
and as a deliberate choice of a policy of force. 
72. (vii) Reference by the Israeli authorities to 
personal "autonomy" as opposed to an oppor-
tunity, even years ahead, to exercise self-deter-
mination for Palestinians can but confirm the 
impression that Israel does not wish to allow 
autonomy for territories mainly populated by 
Arabs. In any event, autonomy without terri-
torial sovereignty would offer no guarantees and 
would be illusory, whatever terms were used to 
define it. 
73. Thus, in Arab eyes the Camp David agree-
ments emerge more as a diplomatie success for 
Israel, with American backing having helped to 
break up the Arab front in exchange for conces-
sions to Egypt alone in a desert area, than a step 
towards true peace which would necessarily mean 
granting the Palestinians a status acceptable to 
them. J ordan's position, its modera te demands 
and the support it now draws from the PLO 
make it an essential partner in any peace nego-
tiations. If there is an expansionist Israeli policy 
it can but be at the expense of Jordan and may 
lead to the disintegration of that country, which 
alone is capable of guaranteeing, in the main, the 
security of Israel, which has nothing to gain in 
finding itself in direct contact with wealthier 
Arab countries whose peaceful intentions are less 
evident. 
74. Moreover, the fact that Jordan enjoys the 
confidence of the Palestinian refugees on its own 
territory is a factor which should not be over-
looked. It is the only country to have granted 
them its own nationality, although without 
depriving them of their right to be and want to 
be Palestinians. This is obviously the reason why, 
at the time of the uprising of certain Palestinian 
organisations in 1970, the great majority of the 
refugees living in Jordan refrained from taking 
part, unlike those deriving from other Arab 
countries who did not enjoy the same advantages. 
75. Of course, whether fundamentally or as an 
initial bargaining factor, the PLO's basic 
approach to possible negotiations with Israel is 
not the same as Jordan's since the latter seems 
prepared to accept the de facto pre-1967 war 
frontiers. On the other hand the more extreme 
PLO leaders talk of the absorption of the whole 
of 1947 Palestine, including Israel itself, into a 
new Palestinian state. More moderate Palestinian 
representatives, in asserting their approval of 
United Nations resolutions as a basis for a per-
manent settlement, imply that they intend to 
start from the frontiers laid down in the 194 7 
partitiün plan, which are definitely less advan-
tageous to Israel. Moreover, the PLO has not 
adopted a final position on King Hussein's 1972 
proposais, but it is weil aware that, if one day it 
is to control the West Bank, it will not be able to 
do without close co-operation with Jordan in 
every field. This consideration can but encourage 
a further rapprochement between the positions of 
the PLO and of Jordan, an obvious sign being 
the PLO's approval of King Hussein's speech in 
the United Nations. 
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W. Iran 
(i) The geographical and social context 
76. Present-day Iran covers a surface of 
1,600,000 sq.km., i.e. five times that of the United 
Kingdom, and forms the heart of the Middle 
East, since it lies at the centre of the area of 
contact between India and the Mediterranean, 
between Russia and the southern seas. However, 
for geographical reasons it is a difficult region 
to cross. Although the centre of the country con-
sists of plateaux between 300 and 1,000 m. high, 
from most of which there is no access to the out-
side world, its borders consist of mountains which 
are often more than 4,000 m. high and isolate the 
Iranian plateau: to the west, the Zagros 
Mountains separate Iran from Iraq, to the North 
the Elburz Mountains rise to a height of 5,600 m. 
between the Caspian and Tehran, the Khorasan 
in the north-east and the Fars in the south-west. 
77. An arid climate makes the coasts of the 
Gulf of Oman and the Persian Gulf particularly 
inhospitable and the central plateau includes 
immense uninhabitable desert areas. Only the low-
lands bordering the surrounding mountains are 
densely populated. 
78. This situation is the reason for Iran's very 
eventful history. Its terri tory has frequently been 
invaded by peoples from the north (Mongols, 
Turks or Russians), from the West (Greeks or 
Romans), from the south {Arabs) and from the 
east (Indians), while at other times it has consti-
tuted a pole for the expansion of vast empires 
such as that of the Achaemenids from the sixth 
to the fourth centuries B.C. or that of the 
Sasanians from the third to the seventh centuries 
A.D. These empires themselves did not remain 
truly Persian and helped to mingle autochtons, 
invaders and the subjected populations. Nowhere 
are Iran's frontiers ethnie, linguistic or religious 
frontiers : Kurds, Armenians, Arabs, Baluchis, 
Turks and even Farsis are to be found in Iran 
and the neighbouring countries. 
79. The present population of Iran is appar-
ently about 35 million, i.e. an average of about 
twenty-one inhabitants per sq.km. The population 
is very unevenly spread out. Certain regions, 
such as the southern shores of the Caspian, have 
a particularly favourable climate but, in spite of 
a high standard of agriculture, are over-popu-
lated. Regions situated between the Zagros 
Mountains and the Iranian plateau or to the 
north of the plateau towards the Elburz 
mountains are densely populated. Conversely, the 
central plateau has a very low population den-
sity. The shores of the Gulf of Oman and the 
Persian Gulf are almost uninhabited apart from 
the recent spread of oil centres. 
80. This breakdown of the population, numerous 
around the edges and sparse in the centre, does 
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not favour a centralist political régime, nor does 
the fact that Iran has emerged from its long 
history with a population that has very diverse 
origins, languages and religions. The Iranians 
proper, who originated in the Fars region, are 
also to be found in the Soviet Union and Afgha-
nistan. But in Iran there are sorne six million 
Kurds in the Zagros Mountains, Turks in Azer-
baijan, Armenians on the shores of the Caspian 
and Mongols and Turks in the north and east of 
the country, not to speak of a large Arab minor-
ity in the Gulf regions. In fact there is no ele-
ment of the population, not even the Farsis (true 
Iranians), that has even a 51% majority. 
81. Although Farsi is the official language 
which has been more or less imposed on the whole 
population, it is not the mother tongue of very 
many Iranians. Similarly, although apart from 
the J ews and Armenians or even a few Parsees 
Islam is by far the dominating religion in Iran, 
Sunna is widespread only among the Kurds 
while Shi'a has almost thirty million followers. 
This is one of the two major Islamic sects which, 
while sharing the Muslim faith and its sole 
authoritative exposition, the Koran, differentiate 
themselves from the Sunnis in their interpreta-
tion of the true succession of the Prophet. 
82. Also, in the Shi'a sect individual religious 
leaders, since a final universally acknowledged 
Imam is still to appear, themselves wield, in the 
interim, much greater temporal as weil as spiri-
tual power over their followers than is the case 
of the Sunnis. This provides one of the answers 
to the present absolutist theocratie trends evident 
in Iran. 
83. However, vis-à-vis Kurdish/Farsi tensions, 
Islamic intersect differences are not the basis of 
present or past intercommunal hostility. These 
derive rather from a deep-rooted, historie, and 
apparently irrepressible sense of a separate 
Kurdish nationhood. 
84. Not so very long ago, the Iranian popula-
tion was mainly agricultural, but the very rapid 
growth of large towns meant that in 1979 the 
proportion of the urban population in relation 
to the population as a whole was about 50 %. 
Agriculture, which accounted for 55% of employ-
ment in 1956, still accounted for 35% in 1976, 
while the share of industry rose from 19.5% to 
32.3%, and that of services from 23.8% to 33.7%. 
But agriculture, which in 1959, accounted for 
33.3% of the Iranian GNP, accounted for only 
9.4% in 1976. In the same period, the share of 
industry rose from 14.5% to 20.5% and that of 
oil from 10.7% to 38%, while services feil from 
33.3% to 32.1%. 
85. These figures show the extremely rapid 
development of a traditional social system, which 
was agricultural or even pastoral and nomad, 
into a modern industrial economy. But this 
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development was far from complete at the time 
of the 1979 revolution, and very modern indus-
trial sectors still coexist with the most archaic 
systems of transhumant stock-rearing. Generally 
speaking, rural society seems to have proved 
more loyal to the Shah's régime than the urban 
working class or tradesmen. 
86. Note should also be taken of the extreme 
youth of the population, which is growing very 
fast. In 1976, 45% of the population was under 
fifteen years of age, 51% was between 15 and 
64 and 3% was 65 or more. This overwhelming 
numerical preponderance of young people in the 
Iranian population certainly played a major rôle 
in recent events in that country. 
(ii) History 
87. The heterogeneous nature of the population 
compelled Iranian leaders, particularly the 
Pahlavi monarchy, to seek the roots of national 
unity and pride in the country's wealthy past. 
It will be recalled how much importance the 
last Shah gave to the festivities celebrating the 
2,500th anniversary of the unification of the 
country by Cyrus the Great. This was not merely 
an act of propaganda directed at the outside 
world but perhaps even more an attempt to con-
vince the people of the greatness and permanency 
of the empire. In fact the extreme ostentation of 
the occasion proved counter-productive, in pro-
viding ammunition for the Tudeh Party in 
exploiting the grievances of the underprivileged 
and poor. 
88. Incidentally, of the four great empires 
which dominated Iran in ancient times, only 
those of the Achaemenids and of the Sasanians 
were truly Persian. But the Seleucids governed 
a large part of Iran from Syria while the 
Parthian Kingdom controlled only the north. 
Moreover, in the history of Iran there has not 
been a continuous empire. Per contra there have 
even been periods of complete territorial dis-
integration, particularly during the Middle Ages 
when conquest by Arabs, Mongols and Turks in 
fact destroyed not only the state but the very 
identity of Iran. Only from the sixteenth century 
onwards was a Persian empire reconstituted, and 
it was in the nineteenth century that reasons 
which were very largely external - the terri-
torial expansion of Russia towards the east on the 
one hand and the concern of the British Empire 
to protect the route to the Indies on the other -
ensured the permanence of an independent state 
whose frontiers they determined. In 1921, a coup 
d'état instigated by Britain and soon accepted 
by the Soviet Union brought to power, with Reza 
Shah, a new dynasty which was to remain on the 
throne until 1979. 
89. The Pahlavi dynasty embarked on the quite 
remarkable task of restoring the Iranian state 
and adapting it to the requirements of a modern 
society and economy. It was helped by the dis-
covery of oil and the considerable development 
of the oil economy. Reza Shah's sympathy for 
the European dictatorships which led to his 
abdication and replacement by his son in 1941 
merely speeded up this trend, just as the inde-
pendence of Iran was strengthened when the 
United States replaced the United Kingdom as 
the effective protector of the Iranian monarchy 
~ollowing the second world war and insisted on 
the withdrawal of Soviet forces which were 
occupying the north of the country. Since that 
date, Iran has constantly benefited from large-
scale American assistance, in the military field 
in particular, since from 197 4 to 1978 it pur-
chased $20,400 million worth of American 
weapons, i.e. 40% of total American armaments 
exports. 
90. With the new reign, a series of important 
reforms were undertaken to accelerate modernisa-
tion of the empire, its economie development and 
the transformation of its society. Oil was a con-
siderable help to the state in attaining these aims. 
From 1949 to 1953, the Prime Minister, Dr. Mos-
sadegh, brought to power by a coalition of left-
wing parties, had attempted to use the wealth 
of the country's immense oil reserves to the 
benefit of the Iranian state. He expropriated the 
principal Iranian oil concessionary, British 
Petroleum, and set up the National Iranian Oil 
Company (NIOC) to run ail the country's oil 
industries. Henceforth, the extension of exploited 
deposits, the increase in oil priees since 1973 and 
the development of refinery capacity and of the 
local chemical industries made NIOC a very 
powerful company. But under United States 
pressure the Shah dismissed Dr. Mossadegh in 
1953, but left the privileges of NIOC untouched. 
91. This policy had allowed large-scale invest-
ment, not only in the oil industry but also in a 
large number of other sectors, mainly industrial, 
designed to prepare the Iranian economy for the 
requirements of the day when the country's oil 
reserves were exhausted. This process was 
speeded up as from 1973: the iron and steel 
industry was developed, there were an increasing 
number of processing industries and nuclear 
power stations were ordered. 
92. In 1963, the Shah proposed by referendum 
a series of reforms known as the bloodless revolu-
tion. They included agrarian reform, the aboli-
tion of serfdom, participation by workers in the 
profits of firms, nationalisation of forests but 
also the sale of shares in factories belonging to 
the state to help to finance the agrarian reform. 
Measures were also taken in favour of th<> 
peasants. In 1968, water was nationalised and 
educational reforms undertaken. Women were 
granted civic rights in 1967. In short, a con-
siderable effort to transform the economy was 
accompanied by a whole series of measures 
intended to transform society. 
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93. Increased oil output was of course the 
essential instrument in the country's transforma-
tion. In 1977, Iran produced 276 million tons 
of crude oil, i.e. 9.1% of total world output. It 
was then the world's fourth producer and second 
exporter after Saudi Arabia. Its exports went 
mainly to Western Europe and Japan but it was 
also Israel's principal supplier. The country's 
gross national product therefore rose rapidly, 
increasing from about $50,000 million in 1975 to 
almost $90,000 million in 1978, giving a per 
capita GNP of about $2,500 - a figure which 
placed Iran among the developed countries. 
94. However, incarne was particularly unevenly 
distributed. The peasants, who formed half the 
population, remained poverty-stricken whereas 
those in the upper economie levels such as the 
administration became fabulously rich. It should 
be added that expansion did not come about 
without a high rate of inflation (27.3% in 1977), 
hence major upheavals in the distribution of 
wealth. 
95. As in many cases, the Iranian revolution 
of 1978-79 broke out not in a country which was 
in the midst of economie and social stagnation 
but in a country which, like France in 1789 or 
Russia in 1917, had passed the economie take-off 
point and begun a radical social transformation. 
It was probably the speed of this trend which 
in the last ten years led to increasingly numerous 
reactions from the most varied circles. For 
instance, the number of ertreme left-wing revo-
lutionary groups grew, particularly among 
students and above aU among Iranians living 
abroad. In Iran itself, while the Shi'ite clergy 
showed its deep-rooted hostility to the liberal 
reforms carried out by the Shah, particularly the 
emancipation of women, the influence of the 
Communist Tudeh Party was also continually 
increasing in urban milieux. In general, the 
peasantry and the army remained loyal to the 
imperial régime. But there was growing unrest 
among the ethnie minorities, particularly the 
Kurds, in spite of the assistance which they 
received from the Iranian Government intended 
to weaken Iraq. 
96. In its turn, the spread of unrest led the 
government to take more repressive measures. 
The secret police (SA V AK) used increasingly 
reprehensible means of putting down the opposi-
tion, the relatively liberal constitution was no 
longer applied, while corruption among the 
country's leaders gave a further handhold to 
revolutionary propaganda. 
97. During 1978, the situation worsened con-
tinuously until the riots of 8th September during 
which the army, firing on the crowd in Teheran, 
killed many people. These riots marked the final 
breakdown between the imperial régime and the 
population of the towns, whether tradesmen, pro-
letarians or intellectuals. Henceforth, the Shah's 
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regime was living on borrowed time. It could 
no longer count on the army and on 16th January 
1979 the Shah had to leave Iran, the power 
remaining in the hands of the government of 
Mr. Bakhtiar who was himself soon to be forced 
to leave the scene. 
98. The discontented rallied unanimously to a 
Schi'ite priest who was particularly respected in 
the country, Ayatollah Khomein'i, who had been 
living in exile in Iraq and then in the Paris area, 
and his return to Iran was the principal stage in 
the establishment of a new régime. Based on very 
strict loyalty to Islam, the régime condemned 
modernism in all 'its forms. The great economie 
plans and social reforms of the Shah's govern-
ment were annulled and an attempt has been 
made to return to the traditional customs of a 
rural Isla:mic country. In the process, opposition 
was encountered both from partisans of the 
former régime and from the intellectuals, trades-
men and leading economie milieux. The Ayatollah 
soon attacked not only the partisall$ of the former 
régime, army officers and senior officiais but 
also the extreme left wing which had helped to 
bring him to power, and repression became more 
cruel and brutal than in the time of the Shah. 
Summary justice administered by court martials 
was based on no law or constitutional text. 
99. Savage methods of repression have also 
been used against the increa:sing number of 
national revolta. The most serious has been that 
of the Kurds on the Iraqi frontier against whom 
the major part of the Iranian armed forces have 
had to be used. 
100. There is also serious economie disorder in 
the country. Oil production has fallen to such an 
extent that Iran has had to import refined 
products during the summer. The equipment 
programme for natural gas and nuclear energy 
and most private investment have come to a 
sudden stop. Trade is in a bad way, 
unemployment is affecting a coi1$iderable number 
of people and the middle classes seem to have 
broken with a régime which is ruining them. 
More than 100,000 Iranians have left the country. 
101. After eight months' government, the provi-
sional régime set up by Ayatollah Khomeini 
seems in an extremely dangerous position. 
102. It cannot be claimed that it was established 
by the Soviets nor that ,it has fallen into their 
hands. However, insofar a.s Iran was one of the 
bastions of the W est's defence against Soviet 
imperialism, the weakening - not to say collapse 
- of this bastion endangers the whole balance 
in the Near and Middle East and the security of 
the Gulf through which passes the major part of 
the oil exported by Iran, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia 
and the Emirates. 
103. The Shah had in fact afforded considerable 
assistance in the form of armaments and troups 
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to a number of Arab countries threatened by 
internai subversion, particularly the Sultanate 
of Oman and the Emirates. As from 1973, he had 
managed to dominate the Strait of Hormuz, 
movements through which he controlled. This 
power has now virtually disappeared, the Iranian 
army has been badly weakened and it is not 
only the future of Iran which is at stake but that 
of the whole Arab world and hence Europe's oil 
supplies. 
IV. Afghanistan 
104. With an area of only 650,000 sq.km. and a 
mixed population of 16 million of various ethnie 
origins (about 7.5 million Pashtull$, 2.5 million 
Tadzhiks, 4 million Turks or Mongols, 2 million 
nomads of various origins and 100,000 Baluchis), 
Afghanistan is still not a country without 
importance. It occupies a very special position 
at the crossroads of the influences competing in 
Central ASia. 
105. It is a country of mountains and high 
plateaux hemmed in by Pakistan, Iran and the 
Soviet Union, and has two official languages: 
the Iranian Farsi and Pathan. Of its population, 
the very great majority are Moslem, partly Sunni 
and partly Shi'a ; while several of i,ts elements 
are still organised on a tribal basis. Afghanistan, 
which has no outlet on the sea, can oommunicate 
with neighbouring countries only over rather 
high and inaccessible passes and it is Karachi 
which, thanks to the road over the Khyber Pass, 
provides its best maritime outlet. In the interior 
of the country, communications are difficult to 
say the least. The rare roads and railways linking 
the principal towns skirt the high mountain 
chains along the borders of the country and the 
centre is hard to cross. 
106. Afghanistan owes its statehood to rivalry 
between its neighbours, at the beginning of the 
nineteenth century, particularly the conflicts 
between Britain, then ruler of India, and Russia 
associated with Iran. An area of contact between 
Russian and British domination, Afghanistan 
constantly wavered between the two influences. 
This rôle of buffer state allowed Afghanistan to 
retain its unity despite a very unsettled history 
which in 1826 brought to power the Barakzai 
dynasty, where it remained until 1973. 
107. The British withdrawal from India in 1947 
and the constitution of Pakistan upset this 
balance and therefore considerably weakened the 
solidarity of the régime. Henceforth, no force 
stood in the way of Sov,iet penetration, particu-
larly as in 1964 the principal pass linking 
Afghanistan with Soviet Asia was improved 
when the Soviet Union, at an altitude of 3,700 m., 
built a tunnel through the Salang Pass together 
with a road protected from the snow. From then 
on, the Soviet Uni on was Afghanistan 's only 
powerful neighbour and was to carry overwhelm-
ing weight in its internai affairs. During the 
decade 1953-63, Soviet assistance to Afghanistan 
already amounted to $1,500 million, compared 
with $450 million for American assistance and 
$72 million for Chinese assistance. 
108. On 17th July 1973, a coup d'état by Sardar 
Mohammed Daud put an end to the reign of his 
brother-in-law, Mohammed Zahir Shah. This 
bloodless military coup d'état seems to have been 
quite warmly welcomed by a population which 
was at the time in the throes of a serioua famine. 
109. General Daud proclaimed the Republic, 
while announcing that he intended to have the 
country follow the spirit of Islam and to be 
putting an end to a corrupt monarchy. At home, 
he had a new and democratie constitution 
prepared and adopted in February 1977, which 
pledged respect for the two great national 
languages and for the preponderance of Islam. 
He endeavoured to maintain a friendly relation-
ship with the Soviet Union and China as weil as 
with India and Iran so as to ensure the necessary 
support in the constantly prevailing tension 
between Pakistan and Afghanil;;tan. 
110. This tension was due to the fact that the 
Pathans occupy territories on both slopes of the 
Hindu Kush and historically spread across both 
Pakistani and Afghan territory. But General 
Daud, in an attempt to maintain the country's 
integrity wished to grant the Pathans greater 
autonomy to which Mr. Ali Bhutto's government 
in Pakistan was opposed as he felt this could 
lead to an ethnie fragmentation of his own 
country. 
111. General Daud's government was threatened 
by many attempted coups d'état, there being no 
less than five between 1973 and 1977. This unrest 
compelled him to take increasingly strict measures 
against all opposition forces, including those in 
the army, and to ban the activüies of several 
Communist and Moslem opposition parties. 
112. On 27th April 1978, President Daud's 
régime was overthrown by another military coup 
d'état organised by an Armed Forces Revolu-
tionary Council consisting of young officers 
trained in the Soviet Union and close to the 
People's Democratie Party which itself did not 
conceal its sympathy for the Soviet Union and 
communism as an ideology. 
113. This party, set up by Nur Mohammed 
Taraki in 1965, split into two at the time of the 
1973 coup d'état. Part of it, the Purcham, 
complying with a Soviet directive, agreed to co-
operate with General Daud, while the other 
fraction, the Khalq, remained in the opposition. 
However, in 1977 the Purcham stopped support-
ing General Daud and joined the Khalq in the 
oppoaition in order to reorganise the People's 
Democratie Party illegally. 
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114. It was the assassination of a Purcham 
leader which, by triggering off a series oï 
demonstrations and repressive measures by the 
government, was the direct cause of the coup 
d'état of 27th April 1978. Following the 'attack 
on the presidential palace, President Daud, thirty 
members of his family and most ministers and 
army leaders were massacred. The constitution 
was annulled and a strict dictatorship set up, 
while the country became known as the Demo-
cratie Republic of Afghanistan. 
115. Power was in the hands of the Armed 
Forces Revolutionary Council which formed a 
government under the "chairmanship" of Mr. 
Taraki. This government claimed to be on the 
side of Islam, democracy and neutrality but at 
the same time announced its desire to carry out 
very large-scale agrarian reforms, oppose the 
ruling class and carry out nationalisations. A 
special court of justice was set up to ensure 
application of martial law ,and all meetings were 
banned. Visas were denied to foreign journalists, 
which meant and still means that only fragmen-
tary and incomplete information is available 
about events in Afghanistan. 
116. In l\fay 1978, a series of co-operation agree-
ments were signed with the Soviet Union and 
trade between Afghanistan and the Soviet Union 
increased considerably while relations with Iran 
and Pakistan soon deteriorated, particularly as 
these two countries were accused of supporting 
unrest in Afghanistan. 
117. However, it appears that a growing propor-
tion of the Afghan people is, without foreign 
influence, finding it hard to support the new 
régime. Insurrections have broken out in many 
provinces and information obtained indicates 
that at the present time 50 % of the country is 
in a position of insecurity whereas 30 % is 
actually controlled by the rebels. The government 
has been unable to control more than the towns 
and the main road from Kabul to the Soviet 
Union. 
118. The régime would most likely not have 
survived this rebellion in which elements of the 
Afghan army took part on several occasions 
without Soviet military assistance, which is 
constantly increasing. At present, Afghanistan 
is in the midst of a civil war. Large numbers of 
Soviet air force units are stationed there and 
take part in fighting the rebellion, as well as 
several thousand Soviet advisers, with or without 
uniform. From information which has reached 
the West, it emerges that the Soviet unit$ con-
cerned have apparently suffered considerable 
lossès. 
119. Furthermore, the government is pursuing 
an extremely harsh policy of repression aimed 
inter alia at the Moslem clergy, accused of 
connivance with the new Iranian Government, 
and the army. Thus the whole Pathan territory 
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is in the grips of a rebellion except for a few 
towns which can be kept supplied only by air. 
But the centre, east and south of the country are 
ah;o suffering serious unrest and in July fighting 
broke out near Kabul, where there had already 
been armed clashes in April. 
120. In sueh cireumstances, the Afghan economy 
is in particularly dire straits since internai com-
munications, poor and sparse at the best of times, 
are practically eut off. The agrarian reform was 
carried out in very poor conditions, the 
threatened landowners having stopped sowing 
their crops, and the Soviet Union is ah;o having 
to keep the country supplied. It is therefore 
direetly involved in a struggle where there is 
every indication that it is in confrontation with 
the large majority of the Afghan population. 
121. It is very difficult to foresee the outcome 
of a situation in which the government side, 
while it has considerable military superiority, 
haB not been able to avoid losing control of the 
major part of the country. The fate of 
Afghanistan therefore depends essentially on the 
determination of the Soviet Union to maintain 
the pre$nt régime or accept that it haB bitten 
off more than it can successfully chew. 
122. The latest coup d'état- on 14th September 
1979 - may perhaps be explained by the deterio-
ration of the internai situation, the spread of the 
rebellion to sixteen of the country's twenty-one 
provinces and the flight into exile of sorne 
200,000 Afghans, not to speak of the victims of 
repression and the sorne 12,000 persans who -
according to Amnesty International - are 
believed to be imprisoned. Information received 
so far does not allow ·a very clear picture to be 
formed of events leading up to the death of 
President Taraki and his replacement by a Khalq 
leader, Prime Minister Hafizullah Amin. The 
indications are that the Soviet Union played a 
helping hand in these events, perhaps in order 
to try to ensure that control waB assumed by a 
leader in whom Moscow had full confidence but 
who would be prepared to make aU necessary 
concessions to traditionalist circles to divide and 
put down the rebellion, which taBb President 
Taraki clearly found were beyond his ability. 
V. Conclusions 
(i) Palestine 
123. In aU evidence, the Camp David agreements 
have thrown little light on the very complex 
situation stemming from the initiati'Ves taken by 
the Israelis since 1947 and imposed on the Arabs, 
the development of a PLO which controls no 
territory but is a dominant force in the whole of 
Arabia and which aU Arab states acknowledge as 
having the right to represent Palestinians as a 
whole and the many resolutions adopted by the 
United Nations but not applied. If nothing else, 
these agreements should relieve Israel of any 
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immediate fears for its security and this should 
allow it, if it really wishes, to embark upon nego-
tiations with aU the parties concerned to establish, 
at last, a just and lasting peace in the Middle 
Ea.st. 
124. Here, Israel must above aU think of its 
own security and the advantages it would derive 
from peace and a settlement of the problem of 
the Palestinians. This cannot be achieved by 
annexations and by the movement of ever-larger 
numbers of Arabs from the West Bank and the 
settlement of Israeli colonists in their stead. It 
will have to recognise that the Palestinians Jillould 
be its partners, not its opponents, in negotiations 
on the territory of Palestine and admit that 
henceforth the PLO has to play an active rôle in 
attempting to reach a permanent settlement. 
Taking refuge behind accusations of terrorism or 
the PLO's alleged wish to destroy the state of 
Israel will not for long be able to mask a eut and 
dried refusai to negotiate, based on a position of 
force which will perhaps not laBt indefinitely. 
Israel has every interest in taking advantage of 
the time gained by Camp David in further 
strengthening this position in order to negotiate 
at last. 
125. The PLO, for its part, must grasp that 
wider recognition, not only by Israel but also 
by the western powers, depends essentially on a 
total renunciation of violence, at least while 
negotiations are under way, and also on its 
recognition of Israel's right to exist within 
defined, agreed frontiers, although no advantage 
should be drawn from results obtained by the 
use of force since 1967, nor even since 1948, 
except for possible adjustments to meet real 
security requirements. Y our Rapporteur is 
pleaBed to note that the PLO seems now to be 
drawing closer to this position, and also that it 
is already moving away from terrorism outside 
territory controlled by the Israelis, as demon-
strated at the time of the attack on the Egyptian 
Embassy in Ankara in 1979 when it made those 
responsible for the attack give themselves up to 
the Turkish authorities. 
126. Y et it seems regrettably clear that the posi-
tions of the PLO and Israel are still too far 'apart 
for direct negotiations to be possible : the 
participation of Arab states involved in the 
conflict is essential insofar as the PLO needs 
their guarantee, just as Israel needs to speak to 
representatives who exercise effective territorial 
sovereignty. Among them, Egypt (as shown at 
Camp David) and Syria have specifie and limited 
interests and territorial rights to uphold. Con-
versely, Jordan, which has rights of various kinds 
over aU the Palestinian territories occupied by 
Israel since 1947 and whose security and even 
existence are constantly jeopardised by the 
continuation of the conflict, the flow of refugees, 
Israel's claim to the waters of the Jordan, tribu-
taries and the underlying water table of its valley 
and the need to defend a very long frontier with 
a small army, is the true key to the problem. 
Taking the United Nations resolutions as a basis, 
it is presenting no territorial claims, but cannot 
be expected to give up what is essential, i.e. the 
return of the West Bank to the Palestinians and 
the right of return or compensation for those 
who have been expropriated and are still often 
living in camps. Its credit among the Palestinians 
makes its participation in any peace negotiations 
essential. Its moderation and realism are 
necessary if negotiations are to succeed. 
127. In the coming months, Europe's rôle might 
be to show the United States that a bilateral 
agreement between Egypt and Israel, even if the 
rights of the Palestinians are reserved under 
sorne bilateral declaration without their parti-
cipation, cannot establish true and lasting peace 
in the Middle East but, now more than ever, it 
is urgent to work out the terms of an agreement 
guaranteeing the Palestinians the right to self-
determination and Israel, within its frontiers, 
the security it is seeking and which, in any event, 
the range of modern weapons will not guarantee 
for long if it is to be ensured by force alone. A 
favourable situation for such peace negotiations 
exists today and it is essential to seize the 
opportunity before it is too late and a further 
conflict brings about a direct confrontation 
between the two great world powers, the 
magnitude of which no one can predict, nor its 
outcome. Europe for its part has no interest 
other than peace and stability in the 'area. 
Experience drawn from its own history and its 
knowledge of Middle East problems should allow 
it to make moderation, realism and respect for 
the fundamental values which it claims to uphoJd 
win the day. 
128. For the United States on its own does not 
have sufficient credibility anywhere in the area 
to play a decisive rôle necessitating a level of 
confidence in the judgment, objectivity and sense 
of purpose which the present administration in 
Washington clearly does not p~ess in the 
Middle East, not even in Egypt and Tel A viv, 
let alone Arabia. 
129. "Which cornes first, the chicken or the 
egg Y" 
130. The application of this ancient riddle to 
the present complex situation in the Middle East 
controversy between Jews and Arabs is truly 
relevant. The only glimmer of hope seems to lie 
in sim1tltaneous declarations by the PLO and by 
!srael. The first must say it is ready to respect, 
m peace, the existence of a state of Israel, in 
perpetuity, within internationally defined and 
agreed borders, in accord with past United 
Nations resolutions. A future Israeli Government 
(since it seems clear that the present one -
following on quite unequivocal recent statements 
by Mr. Moshe Dayan at Strasbourg on lOth 
October- is unwilling to join in any construc-
tive dialogue on the subject) must for its part 
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state it is ready to discuss the future statua of 
the West Bank, East Jerusalem and the Gaza 
Strip with accredited representatives of the 
Palestinian people, which will include an 
ultimate option for Palestinian Arabs to decide 
their own future - a formai link with Israel, 
complete independance, a federation with Jordan, 
or an acceptance of the suzerainty of Jordan. It 
must also drop its settlement policy in the West 
Bank. 
131. Both sides should agree to abandon ali 
forms of violence, one against the other, during 
any period of such negotiation, any transition 
period that follows, and permanently once full 
agreement has been reached. General Dayan's 
resignation within less than two weeks of his 
hard-line remarks, negative responses to ques-
tions, and his exposition of an interpretation of 
the Camp David agreements wholly at variance 
with that of the Egyptian Minister of State 
Mr. Boutros Ghali, also speaking in Strasbourg, 
goes to show that there are real possibilities of a 
genuine overall peace settlement if, but only if, 
there is a readiness to follow the lines of action 
expounded in the final paragraph of this section 
of the report. 
132. The report of Mr. Dayan's interview with 
the New York Times bureau chief in Jerusalem 
after his resignation, published in the Inter-
national Herald Tribune of 29th October stating : 
" ... where my influence stopped was on the 
final and permanent status of the area, 
and here, I think, the prime minister and 
his party, and the (National) Religious 
Party, their concept is that at the end of 
the road there should be Israeli sovereignty 
over ali the area, with a most liberal auton-
omy for the Arabs living there. But the 
Israeli flag should be aU over the area, 
with no ifs, ands or buts" 
provides a new cause for Arab doubts whether 
there is any serious Israeli readiness to make a 
fair and just settlement on the West Bank 
question. 
(ii) Iran 
133. It is a tragic fact that the revolution, which 
was not only - it was widely believed - to bring 
freedom to the people from authoritarian and 
corrupt rule, but also to secure Iran's 
independance as a sovereign unitary state despite 
its varied ethnie composition, should have 
accomplished precisely contrary results. The 
inhabitants are less free - and emancipated --
than ever before and the cohesion of the state 
more imperilled than at any time since its incep-
tion. 
134. No outside interest in the West - or, for 
the time being anyhow, in the Soviet Union -
has received any advantage from the changes-
indeed the opposite. Incidentally, in this context, 
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a new political myth is now nevertheless being 
propagated, asserting that it is only western 
powers and in particular the United States that 
were responsible for favouring and supporting 
the rule of a "tyrannical Shah". In fact, that 
ruler was also often welcomed and fêted by East 
European countries, e.g. state visits to Moscow 
and Bucharest, and the German Democratie 
Republic even made him a doctor honoris causa 
of the Humboldt University of East Berlin. 
135. In retrospect it is quite clear that the Shah 
believed, as other rulers and governments have 
done, that post-Vietnam America had more 
muscle and determination to use if need be in 
support of its friends than proved to be the case. 
It is sadly true, too, and rather ominous that 
other countries, in the whole Middle East region 
and elsewhere up to now friends of the West, and 
believers in the efficacy of an American shield 
against the buffetings of the "storm of the 
world", have suffered a ~Severe shock and have 
started to think in different terms of how best 
to safeguard their security. However, to dwell on 
what has happened, while it has useful !essons 
for us ·ali, especially our American allies, does 
nothing in the case of Iran itself to provide any 
positive new initiative we could take to re-
establish the cohesion of the fractured Iranian 
Empire, let alone in a form that would ensure 
the democratie rights of the peoples involved. 
136. Historically empires containing non-
homogeneous populations within their borders 
have sooner or Iater had, in order to prevent 
total disintegration, to resort to repressive 
policies : or to prevent such disintegration by 
agreeing to levels of federalism of their 
component parts that satisfied the national 
aspirations of each of their component elements. 
137. Over the years varions methods of provid-
ing a cement that would prevent such federalism 
leading in the long run to separatism have been 
tried. 
138. For instance the Austro-Hungarian Empire 
held out as long as it did by creating an almost 
mystical dynastie symbolis:m. The Soviet Union, 
last surviving empire in the traditional meaning 
of the word, has relied on adherence to a common 
political ideology, Marxist-Leninism ; although 
here rtoo the signs of decay are increasingly being 
shown in dissident movement of different types. 
The Shah put his faith, ill-advisedly, in imagined 
patriotic fervour for a glorious history. 
139. Khomeini, as did the Ottoman rulers at the 
height of their glory, clearly believes that Islam 
provides the only cement he needs to maintain a 
continuing centralised unitary state. Certainly 
he is temporarily benefiting from a revival of 
"Islam" throughout the whole Muslim world ; 
but it has already been shown that this strategy 
in itself without the brutal use of armed force is 
insufficient to realise his ambitions to establish 
a $table despotic theocratie régime. 
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140. Under such circumstances there is little 
that Europe can do, at least for the time being, 
than to match the unfolding tragedy. Any 
attempt at direct intervention would be counter-
productive in that it would only strengthen 
Khomeini's hand by providing him with a 
rallying cry of xenophobia, a card he already 
plays to the utmost. 
141. But to stand on the side-lines physically 
speaking does not mean that we should not, in ali 
ways available to us, express open condemnation 
of his tyrannical and reactionary domestic 
policies : because if we do stay silent the many 
intelligent Iranian men and women who are stiJl 
endeavouring, at the risk of their lives, to bring 
about a moderate democratie successor régime to 
succeed that of the Shah will become disiliusioned 
and seek sanctuary outside Iran as at least 
100,000 have done since Khomeini took over, 
rather than stay behind and endure ali the 
dangers his rule entails for ali who oppose his 
absolutism. 
142. Your Rapporteur also believes that in this 
same context any western power is wrong to 
supply arms to an already over-al"'ll.ed nation 
which can only be used either for internai 
repressive purposes or to threaten the stability 
and integrity of neighbouring states. Accord-
ingly, it seems regrettable that despite this fact 
Washington has decided to renew the supply of 
military hardware. 
143. The less there is evidence of external "inter-
vention" as opposed to "influence" to produce 
the political changes we would favour, the less 
likely is direct counter-intervention by the Soviet 
Union. For however many weapons we supply to 
Khomeini, his country's demoralised armed forces 
would be wholly incapable of resisting Soviet 
military intervention, which could only be met 
by a direct American counter-intervention and 
a resultant East-West armed confrontation -
surely the last thing we wish to see just now in 
the Middle East ! 
144. This raises the question whether the very 
unity of the country will survive the present 
crisis. A strong and authoritarian régime would 
be needed to ensure the future of a centralised 
state. A federal system would seem logical in 
such a vast territory with such varied popula-
tions, but it is hard to see how this could be 
introduced in the material and moral chaos in 
which the country seems to be living. 
145. This chaos and the awakening of the 
varions nationalities in Iran itself is a danger 
for the stability of the whole Near and Middle 
East, not only because of the collapse of Iranian 
power which played a leading rôle in the balance 
of the region and provided a guarantee of Israel's 
security but also because the Iranian revolution 
in 1979 liberated forces which are dangerous for 
many countries in the region. These include a 
revolutionary Ieft-wing hostile to the Arab monar-
chies, an Islamic reaction and attitude hostile 
both to the West and to the industrialisation of 
Moslem countries and the liberalisation of aociety 
and customs and the revival of various forms of 
nationalism, particularly that of the Kurds, who 
also form two-fifths of the population of Iraq 
and live throughout Eastern Turkey and Syria. 
146. This collapse of Iranian power has already 
led the United States to form a mobile force of 
about 100,000 men stationed in the United States, 
but capable of intervening in the Middle East at 
very short notice in the event of disturbances 
endangering the West's oil supplies. It is not 
certain that Europe has any interest in foUowing 
suit, but it probably has no interest either in 
becoming involved again in supporting an ill-
esteemed and unstable régime, inter alia by 
resuming with the AyatoUah's government the 
sales of arms foreseen in the agreements with the 
Shah. It is clearly to its advantage to leave the 
Iranians free to decide for themselves on their 
fate, régime and leaders, insofar as other powers 
do not intervene in the country's internai affairs 
or use its weakness to develop subversive opera-
tions in other countries of the Near or Middle 
East. 
147. Also, we in Europe, with our vital close 
links, economie as well as cultural and histori~, 
with many Muslim countries other than Iran, 
have to be very, very careful in criticising 
Khomeini's excesses not to appear to be critical 
of the world-wide Islamic religions revival which 
we aU ought fully to respect. 
(iii) Afghanistan 
148. Unfortunately in this case too there is little 
that can be done, even though the issues involved 
are much less complex than in regard to Iran. 
149. Afghanistan long preserved a precarious 
independence as a buffer state between Russia 
and Imperial British India. When Britain leÏt 
the scene Pakistan was too weak to take over the 
United Kingdom's rôle. Indeed, beoouse of large 
numberr:;; of Pathans living on both sides of a 
frontier only in name, Pakistan has had aU its 
work eut out to hold on to its own territorial 
integrity along the famous North-West Frontier. 
The United States attempted to take Britain's 
place both by supporting Pakistan and affording 
direct aid, mostly economie, to the Kabul Govern-
ment. However, as to the latter, it was never a 
full commitment and never approached the 
extent of Russian assistance. A$ to the former, 
because of successive Indo-Pakistan conflicts, the 
United States decided that it was not worth 
offending India, even to maintain, let alone 
increase, its protective rôle in regard to Pakistan. 
That position obtains today and Rawalpindi now 
looks to Peking as its chief ally. But China is 
neither strong enough nor near enough to act 
as a counterweight against Soviet intervention in 
Afghanistan. So this small country, despite 
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strong resistance by a majority of its fiercely 
proud and independent Muslim tribesmen, is 
facing (unless the Soviet Union as sorne com-
mentators predict, finds it has bitten off more 
than it can chew, except at disproportionate cost) 
ultimate subjection by, and absorption into, the 
Soviet Empire, as yet another so-called 
"autonomous people's republic". 
150. If this should happen, the next step would 
be dangerous indeed to western rund most 
especially European vital interests. It is known 
that within a decade the Soviet Union will need 
to become a net importer of oil on a considerable 
scale. 
151. Only a weak and divided Pakistan now 
atands between Russia and direct access to the 
Gulf area. With a huge and growing naval fleet 
in being, especially if by then the "festering sore'' 
in Arab-western relations - the fate of the 
Palestinians - has not been satisfactorily dealt 
with, it would not be too long before a predomin-
ant Soviet presence in the area would exercise 
a decisive influence on the supply of oil that 
Europe so desperately needs to maintain let alone 
increase the standard of living of its own peoples. 
152. The United States, a weakened giant, at 
lell$t under its present leadership, can do little 
or nothing to dissuade the Russians from their 
objectives in South Asia : despite the fact that 
clearly the Soviet action ridicules the concept of 
genuine détente and is a breach of the provisions 
of the Helsinki Final Act forbidding interference 
by any signatory state in the internai affairs of 
any other countries. 
153. However, the Americans and the Euro-
peans could do much to delay if not altogether 
to hait them by increasing not only economie aid 
but also defem;ive arms to Pakistan, and - 1.10 
less important- showing greater understanding 
for that unhappy country's many difficulties. 
The excuse used in the past to curtail support for 
Pakistan - namely that this posed a threat to 
India with the risk of the latter turning to the 
Soviet Union for help - is certainly not valid 
today. The thought that a nation of four distinct 
ethnie groups, Punjabis, Sindis, Baluchis and 
Pathans, rift with internai divisions and living 
with the loss of half its original nation-state, now 
Bangladesh, taking on India, a country many 
times its size, about twenty times its population, 
with greatly superior armed forces in numbers 
and equipment and infinitely greater industrial 
resources is laughable. 
154. Reports, if true, that Pakistan is seeking 
to develop a limited nuclear deterrent not because 
of aggressive intentions against India, already in 
possession of such a deviee, but because there is 
a feeling in Islamabad that, deserted as it sees it 
by its western friends and surrounded by foes or 
potential foes in the East, except for China, its 
very survival depends on its learning to stand on 
its own feet deferree-wise. 
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Amendments 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7 
3rd Decemher 1979 
Impact of the evolving situation in the Near 
and Middle East on Western European security 
AMENDMENTS 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7 1 
tabled by Dr. Miller 
1. Leave out the fourth paragraph of the preamble to the draft recommandation and insert: 
"Welcoming the Camp David agreements as a major step towards overall peace ,". 
2. In the :fifth paragraph of the preamble to the draft recommandation, leave out "and milita te against 
the underlying causes of the conflict". 
3. Leave out the sixth paragraph of the preamble to the draft recommandation. 
4. Leave out the eighth paragraph of the preamble to the draft recommandation. 
5. Leave out paragraph 3 of the draft recommandation proper. 
6. In paragraph 6 of the draft recommandation proper, leave out "contemporaneously and reciprocally" 
and insert "immediately". 
7. In paragraph 6 of the draft recommandation proper, leave out "internationally". 
Signed: Miller 
1. See Il th Sitting, 4th December 1979 (Amendments 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5 negatived; Amendments 6 and 7 withdrawn). 
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Amendment 8 
Impact of the evolving situation in the Near 
and Middle East on Western European security 
AMENDMENT 8 1 
tabled by Mr. Roper and others 
8. At the beginning of paragraph 1 of the draft recommendation proper, add: 
3rd Decemher 1979 
"Either directly or where more appropriate indirectly through the participation of its membership 
in European political co-operation among the Nine,". 
Signed: Roper, Krieps, Fliimig, Stoffelen, Lamberts 
1. See llth Sitting, 4th December 1979 (Amendment agreed to). 
149 
Document 820 
Amendments 9 and 10 
Impact of the evolving situation in the Near 
and Middle East on Western European security 
AMENDMENTS 9 and 10 1 
tabled by Mr. Corallo 
3rd December 1979 
9. In paragraph 5 of the draft recommandation proper, leave out "valid Palestinian representatives" 
and insert "the PLO". 
10. In paragraph 6 of the draft recommandation proper, leave out "terrorist acts of violence which 
caU into question the validity of any such declaration" and insert "any acts of war as soon as the 
negotiations referred to in paragraph 5 are seriously envisaged". 
Signed : Gorallo 
1. See Il th Sitting, 4th December 1979 (Amendment 9 negatived; Amendment 10 withdrawn). 
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Amendments 11, 12 and 13 
Impact of the evolving situation in the Near 
and Middle East on Western European security 
AMENDMENTS 11, 12 and 13 1 
tabled by Mr. Urwin and others 
3rd Decemruber 1979 
11. In the eighth paragraph of the preamble to the draft recommendation, leave out "Welcoming" 
and insert "Noting". 
12. In paragraph 2 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out from "and" in line 2 to the end of 
the paragraph and insert "cali upon ali other arms-supplying countries to impose a similar moratorium". 
13. Leave out paragraphs 5 and 6 of the draft recommendation proper and insert: 
"5. Ask its members to urge Israel immediately to accept the existence of the Palestinian people 
and to renounce its policy of settlements on the West Bank and commence negotiations with valid 
Palestinian representatives to achieve self-determination, including the inhabitants of the West 
Bank and the Gaza Strip ; 
6. Ask its members to urge the PLO, also immediately, to declare its acceptance of an independant 
Israeli state within internationally agreed and defined borders ; 
7. Ask its members to urge upon both aides a total abandonment of ali acts of violence, which 
cali into question the validity of any such declarations." 
Signed : U rwin, Voogd, Stoffelen 
1. See llth Sitting, 4th December 1979 (Amendment Il negatived; Amendments 12 and 13 agreed to). 
151 
Document 820 
Amendment 14 
Impact of the evolving situation in the Near 
and Middle East on Western European security 
AMENDMENT 14 1 
tabled by Sir Frederic Bennett 
3rd Decemher 1979 
14. At the end of paragraph 7 of the draft recommendation proper, add "and meanwhile cali upon aU 
countries concerned to renounce aU acts of military violence". 
Signed : Bennett 
1. See llth Sitting, 4th December 1979 (Amendment withdra.wn). 
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Amendments 15 and 16 
Impact of the evolving situation in the Near 
and Middle East on Western European security 
AMENDMENTS 15 and 16 1 
tabled by Mr. Cavaliere and others 
3rd Decemher 1979 
15. In paragraph 6 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out "Ask its members to urge the PLO 
contemporaneously and reciprocally to declare its acceptance of" and insert "Ask its members to insist 
that the PLO accept"; renumber paragraph 6 as paragraph 5; and renumber paragraph 5 as paragraph 6. 
16. After the fifth paragraph of the preamble to the draft recommendation, add a new paragraph as 
follows: 
"Wishing the PLO to recognise Israel's right to the existence and security of a free and independent 
state and to stop its acts of terrorism, failing which it is not possible for it to take part in negotiations;". 
Signed : Cavaliere, Del Duca, Roberti 
1. See llth Sitting, 4th December 1979 (Amendment 15 negatived; Amendment 16 withdrawn). 
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Amendments 17 and 18 
Impact of the evolving situation in the Near 
and Middle East on Western European security 
AMENDMENTS 17 and 18 1 
tabled by Mr. Cavaliere and others 
4th December 1979 
17. After the third para.graph of the preamble to the draft recommendation, adda new paragraph as 
follows: 
"Concerned that by taking and detaining employees of the United States Embassy, in violation 
of all principles of international law, Iran may endanger world peace ;". 
18. After paragraph 2 of the draft recommendation proper, add a new paragraph as follows: 
"Ask Iran to free immediately the hostages held in the United States Embassy;". 
Signed: Cavaliere, Miiller, Mende, Hanin, Roberti, Pecoraro, Treu, Valleix 
1. See llth Sitting, 4th December 1979 (Amendments agreed to). 
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submitted on behalf of the 
Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments 2 
by Mr. Meintz, Rapporteur 
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DOCUMENT 821 
The Assembly, 
Draft Recommendation 
on the definition of armaments requirements 
and procurement in Western Europe 
Stressing the important rôle it can play in ensuring parliamentary supervision at European 
level of collective defence arrangements of the Alliance ; 
Considering the proceedings of the recent symposium on a European armaments policy, and 
in particular its W or king Group 1 ; 
Expressing its thanks to all authors of papers and Rapporteurs who contributed to its succeBB, 
RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNOIL 
Urge member governments 
1. To encourage, through their defence procurement policies, the restructuring of the European 
armaments industry, under the aegis of the industrial policy of the European Community, through 
the creation of permanent international consortia in Europe leading eventually to fully European 
corporations for the production of the more sophisticated defence equipment ; 
2. (a) To foster a policy of European preference for bi- or multilateral European defence equipment 
projects duly endorsed by the IEPG ; 
(b) To foster creation of an Alliance-wide market for defence equipment so that dependance upon exports 
to third countries can be reduced ; 
3. (a) To keep their national parliamentary defence committees fully informed about future national 
and allied defence equipment requirements and projects, in particular through the communication to 
them of the equipment replacement schedules prepared by Panel 1 of the IEPG and completed by 
the Conference of National Armaments Directors; 
(b) To request the Chairman of Panel 1 to communicate these schedules to the Committee on 
Defence Questions and Armaments of the WEU Assembly. 
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The Assembly, 
Draft Order 
on the definition of armaments requirements 
and procurement in Western Europe 
DOOUMENT 821 
Stressing the important rôle it can play in ensuring parliamentary supervision at European 
level of collective defence arrangements of the Alliance ; 
Recalling the provisions of its Resolution 15 ; 
INsTRUOTS its Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments to invite members of the par-
liamentary defence committees of the IEPG countries to an annual joint meeting to discuss future 
national and allied defence equipment requirements and projects. 
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Explanatory Memorandum 
(submitted by Mr. Meintz, Rapporteur) 
1. Introduction 
1. The Rapporteur was requested to prepare a 
report drawing political conclusions from the 
proceedings of W or king Group I of the sympo-
sium on a European armaments policy which the 
Assembly organised in Brussels from 15th to 
17th October 1979. The theme of Working Group I 
was the title of the present report : "The defini-
tion of armaments requirements and procurement 
in Western Europe", and the group had before 
it as working documents the reports from the 
Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments 
on a European armaments policy1 and the cor-
responding Recommendation 3252, and on parlia-
ments and defence procuremenP and its corre-
sponding Recommendation 3332• The following 
papers4 were submitted to Working Group I : 
Three papers on the workings of governmental 
institutions : 
(i) Prospects of the work of Panel I of the 
IEPG - timetable for replacing equip-
ment ; author : Mr. Trevor Knapp, Head 
of International and Industrial Policy 
2, United Kingdom Ministry of Defence 
(Chairman of Panel I of the IEPG) ; 
(ii) Prospects of bi- and multilateral Euro-
pean co-operation ; author : Ingénieur 
Général Marc Cauchie, French Perma-
nent Delegate to the WEU Standing 
Armaments Committee ; 
(iii) Prospects of the work of the Conference 
of National Armaments Directors; 
author: Mr. John B. Walsh, NATO 
Assistant Secretary-General for Defence 
Support; 
and three papers on industrial aspects of co-
operation: 
(iv) An industrial view of the definition of 
armaments requirements; authors: (a) 
Dr. Gustavo Stefanini, President and 
Deputy Administrator of Oto Melara ; 
(b) Mr. Roger Chevalier, Deputy 
Director General of the Société Natio-
nale Industrielle Aérospatiale ; 
(v) The rôle of permanent consortia in 
European co-operation; author: Mr. F. 
Striegel, Vice-President, Euromissile. 
1. Document 786, Rapporteur Mr. Critchley. 
2. At Appendix I. 
3. Document 807, Rapporteur Mr. Maggioni. 
4. For the full text of these papers, see the Official 
Record of the symposium. 
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The presentation of each group of working 
papers was followed by a general discussion in 
which severa! distinguished participants took 
part. 
2. The Committee has selected three main 
themes which arose from the papers and discus-
sion and presents them as its political conclusions, 
but for reference a summary of the proceedings 
of Working Group I is attached at Appendix II 
in the form of the report to the plenary sympo-
sium made by the General Rapporteur of W or k-
ing Group I - General Freytag von Loring-
hoven. 
fi. Bi- and trilateral co-operation and 
permanent consortia 
3. The case of a joint production of armaments 
in Europe has been made long ago as many 
previous reports of the Committee have testified. 
The political debate is about how best to organise 
it. There was a clear consensus in the symposium, 
which the Committee endorses, that the future 
of joint production lies along the road already 
mapped out by severa! successful projects such 
as the Hot, Milan and Roland missiles and the 
Tornado aircraft - in the direction of co-
operative production of a particular weapons 
system by two or three countries at the most, 
through the constitution of an international 
consortium of the participating national firms. 
The days of competitive development of rival 
military projects by two different countries are 
over, certainly as far as the more expensive 
weapons projects are concerned, because they are 
too wasteful of resources in the costly research 
and development phase, and lead to too big an 
initial investment both of resources and prestige 
for either initiating country to abandon its 
project if the other is eventually selected for 
production by other participating countries. 
4. While Dr. Stefanini in his paper favoured 
a plurality of production lines, arguing inter alia 
the immobility of labour as a reason, the Com-
mittee nevertheless considers that within the 
European Community at least the way of main-
taining a viable armaments industry within 
Europe lies through the establishment of inter-
national European corporations, the creation of 
which will require some greater mobility of 
labour, at least of professional and skilled labour. 
The Committee reiterates the clause of the 
Assembly's Recommendation 325, echoed also by 
the President of the Assembly in his keynote 
speech to the symposium, which called for the 
restructuring of the European armaments indus-
try under the aegis of the European Community. 
5. The road to this transformation lies through 
the ad hoc international consortia already estab-
lished by participating firms in two or three 
countries for specifie projects such as those 
mentioned above. The international juridical 
framework for co-operation thus established 
should be made permanent when further co-
operative projects can be awarded to the same 
consortia by the governments. 
6. The 1960s saw the concentration of aircraft 
production in member countries into not more 
than one or at the most two major firms in each 
country. The Committee believes that over the 
next two decades a viable European base for the 
manufacture of the most sophisticated armaments 
in the field of aerospace can be maintained only 
through the establishment of not more than two 
international European corporations. This devel-
opment must be actively encouraged through 
governmental procurement policy and through 
the industrial policy of the European community. 
m. European preference, exports and the 
"two-way street" 
7. A secondary theme of the paper by Ingé-
nieur Général Cauchie was that where a bi- or 
trilateral project had been established and was 
going into production, or was about to, other 
European NATO countries- i.e. other members 
of the IEPG - should be expected to give that 
project preference to meet their future arms 
requirements - preference that is over a pos-
sible alternative United States product. This gave 
rise to a discussion of possible priee differences 
and the amount of offset in national production 
that might be awarded as part of a contract for 
a rival project. It was noted that within the 
IEPG there are proposais for subsidising the 
disadvantaged armaments industry of countries 
such as Turkey, in particular through the provi-
sion of assistance in establishing modern produc-
tion plants for types of defence equipment which 
the country has experience of producing - e.g. 
artillery ammunition. The Committee readily 
concludes that where the IEPG is providing 
assistance for a marginal armaments industry 
there is a strong case for calling for the recipient 
country to give preference to multilateral Euro-
pean projects. 
8. Italy in sorne ways is a special case in pre-
senting a significant armaments production 
capacity. The country does participate in certain 
bilateral and trilateral projects, e.g. the Panavia 
consortium producing the Tornado, but Italian 
industry feels that in many cases it fails to secure 
a reasonable share of production in multilateral 
projects dominated by the European "big three" 
- Ji,rance, Germany and the United Kingdom. 
An intermediate group of countries comprising 
Belgium, the Netherlands and the Scandinavian 
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NATO countries have now largely adopted the 
practice of production under licence of compo-
nents of weapons projects in which they parti-
cipate, the recent F-16 deal being the most 
important example. 
9. The Committee urges in its conclusions that 
when a bi- or trilateral project has duly received 
the imprimatur of the IEPG, every effort should 
be made to ensure that it is given preference by 
other IEPG countries when the time for produc-
tion begins - the counterpart should be shared 
production of components or sub-assemblies in 
countries with an appropriate tradition and 
capacity ; or assistance to other parts of the 
armaments industry as in the case of conventional 
ammunition production in Turkey. 
10. There was sorne discussion of export to third 
countries - i.e. countries outside the Alliance. 
On the one hand the principal manufacturing 
countries of sophisticated weapons systems claim, 
rightly in many cases, that the procurement 
requirements of three participating countries are 
insufficient to maintain an economie production 
basis. To increase production runs sorne export 
will be necessary to third countries. This can raise 
problems for the juridical terms of the co-
operation agreement : one participating country 
may not be prepared to allow components or sub-
assemblies manufactured in its territory to be 
incorporated in a finished weapons system whieh 
another participant wishes to export to sorne 
third country to which the first participant for 
political reasons may weil have banned the export 
of armaments. For sorne countries freedom to 
export without agreement of partners is regarded 
as a condition of participation in a multilateral 
project. For other potential participants common 
agreement between ali participants for exports to 
third countries may be regarded as a necessary 
condition for pa:vticipation. 
11. The Committee believes strongly that the 
answer lies in greater European preference and 
in the development of the "two-way street" with 
the United States so that the market open to 
initial production from joint projects covers the 
requirements of the whole of the Alliance. In 
these circumstances the economie requirement for 
export to third countries is reduced to political 
agreement on the foreign policy aspect, either in 
the North Atlantic Council or in the framework 
of European political consultation. 
IV. Parliamentary supervision 
12. The Committee recalls the proposais put 
forward in its report on parliaments and defence 
procurementl and contained in Recommendation 
1. Document 807, Rapporteur Mr. Maggioni. 
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333 and Resolution 63 adopted by the Assembly 
on 20th June 1979. The Assembly in those texts 
stressed the need for member parliaments to be 
able to influence defence procurement policy in 
order to further joint production, and adequately 
to control expenditure. In the course of discus-
sion in Working Group I the point was agam 
made that international projects, once launched, 
were more difficult to control from the financial 
standpoint than purely national projects, because 
of the international commitment entered into. 
Only at the European level, it was felt by sorne 
speakers, could parliamentary supervision of 
international projects be properly exercised. 
13. The Committee in this report reiterates its 
recommendation that national parliaments, or 
their appropriate committees, must receive full 
and timely information on defence equipment 
requirements and projects in research and devel-
opment in both their own and in allied countries. 
Only in this way can they exert proper influence 
in the direction of joint production and favour 
the consolidation of sophisticated defence indus-
tries through permanent consortia leading to-
wards the consultation of multinational European 
corporations. 
14. The Committee makes two specifie proposais 
designed to improve the flow of information to 
defence committees in the national parliaments. 
It proposes first that the equipment replacement 
schedules drawn up in Panel I of the IEPG, and 
completed by the CNADs (described by Mr. 
Knapp in the paper he presented to W or king 
Group I of the symposium), should be commu-
nicated by member governments to the defence 
committees in their national parliaments, and 
should further be communicated by the Chairman 
of Panel I to the Committee on Defence Questions 
and Armaments. 
15. The Committee proposes further that it 
arrange annual meetings with the chairmen and 
members to be designated of the defence commit-
tees in the national parliaments of the WEU 
160 
countries to review the progress of work in the 
IEPG and in the NATO Conference of National 
Armaments Directors, with particular reference 
to the fostering of further joint production 
schemes based on equipment to be identified in 
the equipment replacement schedules. It intends 
further to invite to these meetings, as observers 
with the right to speak, members of the parlia-
mentary defence committees in the IEPG 
countries which are not members of WEU, and 
recalls in this context that it already possesses 
the necessary authority to do so under the terms 
of Resolution 15, adopted by the Assembly on 
18th June 1959 1 • This resolution was adopted 
specifically at the request of the Committee 
which declared that it "would avail itself of this 
authorisation when defence questions are discus-
sed which affect the interests of the states in 
question, or when the Committee wishes to know 
the opinion of observers from other states on 
the matters under discussion". 2 
V. Conclusions 
16. The Committee's conclusions are set forth 
in the draft recommendation and draft order 
which preface this report. 
VI. Opinion of the minority 
17. The report as a whole was adopted in the 
Committee by 11 votes to 2 with 1 abstention. A 
minority of the Committee would have deleted 
the words "under the aegis of the industrial 
policy of the European Community" in para-
graph 1 of the draft recommendation, and the 
corresponding words at the end of paragraph 6 
of this exploratory memorandum, on the grounds 
that the European Community did not have an 
effective industrial policy, or the expertise neces-
sary to restructure the defence industry, or again 
on the grounds that because of the special condi-
tions of the defence industry it would be inap-
propriate for it to be treated in the same way as 
other industry. 
1. Text at Appendix m. 
2. Document 130, Part II (a), Opinion of the Com· 
mittee on Defence Questions and Armaments. 
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RECOMMENDATION 325 1 
'on a European armaments policy 1 
The Assembly, 
Aware that the growing cost of modem a.rmaments technology and current economie trends can 
lea.d to unilateral disa.rmament through inflation in the countries of the Alliance; 
Stressing the need for the joint production of armaments in order to provide interoperability and 
standardisation of military equipment; to ensure the survival of a viable European a.rma.ments industry; 
and lastly a two-wa.y street in armaments with the United States; 
Considering that limited but as yet too slow progress in these directions is now being made in the 
independant European programme group, in the NATO Conference of National Armaments Directors, and 
Military Agency for Standardisation, in ali of which ali WEU countries participate ; 
Believing that only if the European a.rmaments industry as a. whole is restructured on a. viable and 
competitive commercial and industrial basis will adequate progress be made; 
Welcoming the study of the European armaments industry being undertaken by the Standing Arma.-
ments Committee, 
REOOMMENDS THAT THE CoUNOIL 
1. Urge that efforts to achieve joint production, interoperability and, when necessary for the security 
of Europe, the standardisation of defence equipment in the European countries of the Alliance be con-
centrated in the independant European programme group with such assistance as the Standing Armaments 
Committee can provide ; 
2. Give consideration to the restructuring of the European a.rma.ments industry under the aegis of 
the European Community, relying on its responsibility in the fields of industrial and customs policy and 
research; 
3. Ensure that once the present study of the European armaments industry is completed, full use be 
made of the resources of the Standing Armaments Committee to a.ssist in the foregoing ta.sks ; 
4. Request the govemments concemed to arrange for the IEPG to submit an a.nnua.l report on its 
activities to the Assembly. 
1. Adopted by the Assembly on 22nd November 1978 during the Second Part of the Twenty-Fourth Ordina.ry Session 
(12th Sitting). 
2. Explanatory Memorandum : see the Report tabled by Mr. Critchley on behalf of the Committee on Defenoe Questions 
and Armaments (Document 786). 
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RECOMMENDATION 333 1 
on parUaments and defence procurement 2 
The Assembly, 
Having studied the report of its Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments analysing 
the rôle of national parliaments in the national defence equipment procurement process ; 
Considering that national parliaments and their defence committees, with the exception of 
those of Germany and the Netherlands , are usually inadequately informed on defence matters ; 
Believing that parliaments exercise insufficiently their prerogative to control defence procure-
ment policy ; 
Recalling the terms of its Recommandation 197 on military security and parliamentary inform-
ation; 
With a view to furthering joint production and standardisation of defence equipment in the 
armed forces of the countries of Western Europe or in the Alliance, taking due account of the 
military and economie requirements of the Alliance as a whole, 
REOOMMENDS THAT THE COUNOIL 
Invite member governments : 
A. To ensure that their parliaments, or where appropriate their parliamentary defence, budget, 
or other committees concerned : 
1. Are fully informed in good time, within the limits imposed by considerations only of exter-
nal security, not of political or administrative convenience, on ali aspects of defence policy, 
at both the national and allied levels, especialiy on matters affecting the assessment of the 
military threat and the choice of defence equipment ; 
2. Are enabled to exercise sufficiently close control of the defence budget and appropriations 
and of ali stages of the defence procurement process, so as to improve defence capability 
and increase standardisation and interoperability of equipment ; 
3. Are enabled to compile systematicaliy information on current research and development 
projects in the national and European defence industry ; 
B. To ensure that full information on national defence equipment projects in the planning stages 
is available to allied governments, and to take full account of alternative defence equipment pro-
jects available in allied countries; 
C. To provide as far as possible a common strncture for the national defence budgets, national 
defence equipment procurement processes, and, finally, the procedure for supplying classified inform-
ation with a view to instituting in the foreseeable future a European policy of common procure-
ment of new weapons systems. 
1. Adopted by the Assembly on 20th June 1979 during the First Part of the Twenty-Fifth Ordinary Session 
(6th Sitting). 
2. Expla.natory Memorandum : see the Report tabled by Mr. Maggioni on behalf of the Committee ,on Defenoe 
Questions and Armaments (Dooument 807). 
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APPENDIX II 
Report on the proceedings of Working Group 1 
presented to the symposium on a European armaments policy 
by General Freytag von Loringhoven, General Rapporteur, 
on 16th October 1979 
Introduction 
Working Group I divided its work on the 
definition of armaments requirements and pro-
curement in Western Europe into two parts : the 
first covering governmental institutions and the 
second European industries. 
In the first paper on governmental institu-
tions, the work of Panel I of the independent 
European programme group - and especially 
its rôle in setting up a timetable for replacing 
equipment - was very ably discussed by 
Mr. Trevor Knapp. The independent European 
programme group (IEPG) was established [n 1976 
in order to foster collaboration in armaments 
production in Europe. Panel I plays an important 
part in identifying opportunities for such col-
laboration. 
The IEPG has developed a system to tabulate 
the major equipment replacement intentions of 
all twelve IEPG nations. The member countries 
report annually and try to look fifteen to 
twenty years ahead. 
The IEPG system is closely related to the 
NATO armaments planning review (NAPR). 
IEPG equipment tables ~are completed with 
United States and Canadian information in 
NATO's Committee of National Armaments 
Directors (CNAD), and the IEPG, which confines 
itself to seeking opportunities for purely Euro-
pean co-operation, avoided duplicating work in 
NATO or Eurocom. Thus, a number of significant 
potential European projects have been identified. 
The most important are : 
- a new tactical combat aircraft ; 
- a new family of European military heli-
copters; 
- and a third generation of Eumpean anti-
tank guided weapons. 
The work of Panel I of the IEPG has an 
important part to play in encouraging European 
co-operation. The exchange of basic information 
between the allies must take place at the earliest 
possible date before national plans become irre-
versible and must cover much longer-term 
opportunities. 
General Cauchie then reviewed the prospects 
for bi- and multilateral European co-operation, 
concentrating on those aspects that complemented 
the overall action being taken by the IEPG or 
CNAD. The reasons that had progressively 
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strengthened the will to co-operate, i.e. budgetary 
and technological constraints, operational advan-
tages and politico-economic aspects, were now 
generally accepted and the question was no longer 
whether to co-operate but how best to bring co-
oper81tion about. 
As the global capacity of the European arma-
ments industry exceeded the potential European 
market, countries were obliged to export if they 
wished to retain the independence of their defence 
industries. 
The proliferation of small co-operative 
groups of two or three countries, which General 
Cauchie described as "primary" groupings, had 
led to the need for overall co-operation at the 
European level and to the setting up of the 
IEPG. 
Dealing with the relationship of primary 
groupings to the IEPG, General Cauchie said 
that experience had shown that three or four was 
the maximum number for efficient co-operation. 
The participation of particular IEPG countries 
in primary groupings was directly attributable 
to the sums they allocate to development. In this 
connection, he noted a statement by Dr. Perry 
of the United States that as the United States 
spent three times as much as Europe on research 
and development, it was unreasonable to expect 
balanced trade between the two. However, it was 
for an organised Europe, both in the IEPG and 
in primary groupings, to urge the United States 
whose trade with Europe vàries from 10:1 to 
30:1, depending on the country, to bring its ratio 
into line with Dr. Perry's figures. 
General Cauchie stressed that bi- and multi-
lateral co-operation and the activities of the IEPG 
had to be complementary, with · the one taking 
full account of the needs and interests of the 
other. This was the basis of the "European 
preference" approved by the IEPG whereby 
countries agree to grant a privileged position to 
European pmduction in their arms procurement 
and to keep other IEPG countries informed of 
their plans. 
He concluded that bi- and multilateral co-
operation: 
- would remain the practical basis for 
European co-operation ; 
- must take account of the IEPG ; and 
- must stress the practice of European 
preference. 
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In his lecture on the prospects of the work 
of the Conference of National Armaments 
Directors (CNAD) Mr. Walsh described the two 
main objectives of the CNAD as : 
- improved economie efficiency in the use 
of resources ; 
- increased military effectiveness of cquip-
ment. 
With regard to the former, the CNAD tries 
to devise methods of co-operation which reconrile 
the objectives of economie efficiency with the 
sometimes conflicting objectives of national arma-
ments industries. As to the latter, the great 
problem of diversity of equipment can be partially 
overcome by ensuring interoperability which 
to a large extent covers the operational require-
ments of standardisation. 
Common equipment is certainly better for 
the efficiency of the military forces of the 
Alliance, but failing this at least interoperabili.ty 
must be retained as an objective. 
Within NATO two new sets of procedures 
have been set up: 
- the NATO armaments planning review 
(NAPR); 
- the periodic armaments planning system 
(PAPS). 
The NATO armaments planning review is 
primarily a scheme to expose opportuni.ties for 
co-operation. It uses as its point of departure 
equipment replacement schedules prepared by the 
independent European programme group (IEPG) 
and the North American schedules. These oppor-
tunities are presented to the nations and follow-
up procedures ensure that after consideration by 
the nations and the NATO military aurthoriti.es 
deliberate decisions are made. The NATO arma-
ments planning review has already been con-
ducted on a trial basis and is about to be imple-
mented as a regular procedure. 
The periodic armaments planning system 
(P APS) is much more elaborate. Its purpose -
beyond the NAPR- is twofold: 
- to include new types of equipment which 
would not appear in the replacement 
schedules ; and 
- to start the co-operative process early 
enough so that national programmes have 
not progressed to the point where emo-
tional commitments to particular solu-
tions militate against co-operation. Its 
point of departure is a "mission need" -
a qualitative deficiency in military cap-
ability or, sometimes, an opportunity 
offered by new technology. The NATO 
P APS is now in a trial phase. Inaugur-
ation of P APS might be possible la te 
dn 1980. 
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As to the so-called transatlantic dialogue, 
Mr. Walsh pointed out that under the aegis of 
CNAD the independent European programme 
group (IEPG) represents the European voice in 
the negotiations with the North American nations, 
and that although progress was slow, a number 
of encouraging initiatives had been taken. 
In statements from the floor, Mr. Damm 
(member of the Bundestag Defence Committee, 
Federal Republic of Germany) said that co-
operation between North America and Europe 
would only progress if, within the framework of 
NATO, nations could agree on an inrtermediate-
term production-sharing programme of say five 
years, covering a whole range of projects, at the 
end of which there would be a reason.able overall 
balance between what countries put in and what 
they got out. 
Mr. Mulley (Labour member of parliament, 
United Kingdom) stated that the military and 
economie advantages of co-operation were un-
questionable and he had no doubt about the 
existence of the political will to co-operate. There 
were, however, very real difficulties in the way 
of co-operation which could not be ignored. These 
included: 
- the genuine difficulty of securing agree-
ment between the military authorities of 
countries on requirements for common 
weapons; 
- the difficulty of harmonising replacement 
schedules which were often dictated by 
operational imperatives ; 
- the understandable concerns of industry 
and trade unions to secure as much work 
as possible ; 
- the problem of sales to third countries. 
He agreed with Mr. Damm that these 
problems had to be considered in a NATO context 
and looked forward to the outcome of the 
"package" proposai for armaments production in 
the United States and Europe. But he stressed 
that European industry would not be content to 
take the rôle of subcontractor and would insist 
on retaining its design capacity in major areas. 
Beginning the group of papers giving the 
indusrtrialists' point of view, Mr. Stefanini drew 
attention to the difficulties which stem from the 
limited mobility of the European labour force 
and the problem of low volume production. 
The time-scaling of production was one of 
the other subjects of Mr. Stefanini's contribution. 
In his opinion the replacements of technically 
similar armaments, for example, main battle 
tanks, or tracked and wheeled armoured vehicles, 
produced on similar production lines, should be 
spread over a number of years in order to ensure 
regular production capacity. 
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Sound company planning requires advance 
notice of armaments replacement programmes -
not only national programmes but also the entire 
European programme. Mr. Stefanini suggested 
that this information could be channelled through 
the European Defence Industrial Group. Inter-
company agreements could help a great deal in 
the execution of these programmes and he cited 
the SNIAS-MBB agreement on Roland and Milan 
and the Oto MelarajMatra agreement on the 
Otomat as good examples. 
Mr. Chevalier concentrated on the industrial 
view of the definition of armaments requirements 
and procurement and stated that industry could 
help governments to reach decisions on arma-
ments by explaining : 
- the technical possibilities and limitations ; 
- alternative solutions to the problem ; and 
- cost information. 
Mr. Chevalier then described the four 
methods of armaments procurement : 
- to buy in the United States ; 
- to produce under American licence ; 
- to develop and produce in Europe ; 
- to co-operate with the United States. 
The last two possibilities are mainly of 
interest to us in our efforts to make the "two-
way street" between Europe and America a 
reality. 
Mr. Chevalier emphasised the importance of 
a constant exchange of views between government 
and industry in bringing about armaments pro-
grammes. 
On the organisational side, recent experience 
has shown that the most effective approach is to 
set up one office on the government side and 
another on the industrial side. The prerequisite 
is close co-operation between the two. 
Such an approach was adopted in the success-
ful anti-tank weapons programme, with the 
Bureau de Programmes Franco-Allemand on the 
government side and Euromissile on the indus-
trial side. This experience sets an example for 
future programmes where a lot remains to be 
done to achieve co-operation, particularly in the 
field of tactical aircraft. 
In summary, Mr. Chevalier is recommending 
a more efficient approach to European arma-
ments programmes, and advocating that we con-
tinue to seek collaboration with the United States 
on an equal basis in an attempt to make the 
"two-way street" between Europe and America 
a reality. 
Mr. Striegel then dealt with the rôle of 
permanent consortia in European co-operation in 
a very realistic and pragmatic way. He based his 
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lecture on the positive experiences Europe has 
gained with the programmes or families of pro-
grammes: 
- Milan/Hot/Roland ; 
- Alpha-Jet; 
- Howitzer 70 ; 
-Jaguar; 
- MRCA/Tornado ; 
- ASSM. 
He also alluded to the successful example of 
co-operation on the civil side, the Airbus pro-
gramme. 
Mr. Striegel covered the type of co-operation 
in which two or severa! states - industries and 
government authorities as weil - try to find 
common solutions to military technical problems. 
In order to create the conditions in which 
co-operation with industry can exist, governments 
must take fundamental decisions regarding : 
- the definition of a project ; 
- determination of the quantities for the 
respective forces ; 
- the required financial means ; 
- the industrial rights and the technology 
transfer. 
As Mr. Chevalier also stressed, efficient 
organisations on both governmental and indus-
trial sides are indispensable if co-operation is to 
run smoothly. 
But underlying this co-operation between 
government and industries there must exist the 
political will : 
- to overcome difficulties ; 
- to look for and agree on compromises ; 
- to set aside national preferences, and, 
finally, 
- not to attach too much importance to 
points of prestige. 
Over the last four years there has been a 
tendency to develop co-operation on the basis of 
a more formai structure, such as Euromissile, 
Panavia, Turbo-Union and, in the civil area, 
Airbus. These joint programme companies must 
be able to manage the programme's 
- research and development ; 
- production; 
- sales and after-sales. 
These joint companies might become a plat-
form for transatlantic co-operation projects too. 
Alliances of severa! specialised European com-
panies can challenge their United States counter-
parts and assert Europe's technical capacities. 
Furthermore, the joint companies might become 
one of the ways of realising the political will to 
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integrate Europe by creating an awareness of 
a European identity. 
In the general discussion, Mr. Boucheny 
(Communist Senator, France) drew attention to 
the danger of creating a politico-military organ-
isation that could exercise an influence pre-
judicial to the interests of peace and also expres-
sed concern at the implications of standardisation 
and interoperability for employment in national 
deferree industries. French communists were in 
favour of the deferree of Europe provided that 
it came from purely national resources at which 
level it would secure public support. In reply, 
Mr. Walsh (NATO Assistant Secretary-General 
for Deferree Support) pointed out that as far as 
NATO was concerned, the objective was to obtain 
more equipment from present levels of expendi-
ture and that the consequences would be increased 
military capability rather than fewer jobs. 
Mr. Vohrer (FDP member of parliament, 
Federal Republic of Germany) raised the 
question of exports to third countries and was 
informed by the industrialists on the panel that 
armaments companies, whether national or multi-
national, were subject to national legislation in 
this field. General Cauchie added that arms sales 
also had to comply with the United Nations 
Charter and take account of moves towards dis-
armament. In co-operative projects, the problem 
was to reach agreement between the partnerR to 
an export policy and this was particularly diffi-
cult when sub-systems were made in one country 
and incorporated in a final product being made 
in another. 
The Chairman then raised a question covered 
in Mr. Stefanini's paper, namely the flow of 
information from government to industry. 
Mr. Knapp replied that projects were not gener-
ally ripe for industrial intervention until govern-
ments had consulted one another and formed a 
reasonable idea of the shape, whether collabora-
tive or not, the project would take. 
There then followed a discussion of the dif-
ferent structures of ownership of armaments 
companies in which the industrialists on the panel 
stated that in co-operative projects there was no 
discrimination between publicly- and privately-
owned companies. 
In reply to a question from Mr. Vohrer on 
the implications of co-operative projects for free 
competition, General Cauchie said that as Europe 
had neither the capacity nor the resources to 
conduct competitive developments in all areas 
there must be a compromise between competition 
on the one hand and the direct allocation of work 
to consortia on the other. Such compromises had 
worked effectively in the Alpha-Jet and Hot 
projects. General Klennert (Federal Republic of 
Germany) emphasised that the top priority was 
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not to produce weapons at lowest possible cost 
but to provide the means to defend Europe and 
that the normal rules of competition sometimes 
had to be sacrified to this wider objective. 
Mr. Bernini (Communist member of parlia-
ment, Italy) saw standardisation as valuable in 
helping Europe both to meet its deferree needs 
and to meet the American challenge, provided 
that it also contributed to maintaining the mili-
tary balance at a lower level of armaments. 
A discussion ensued on the difficulty of 
parliamentary control of multinational armaments 
projects which Mr. Striegel in his paper, like 
Mr. Maggioni in the report of the Deferree Com-
mittee (Document 807), had described as difficult 
to cancel once started. Speakers agreed that such 
projects were more difficult to start, requiring 
greater certainty of costing before governments 
would commit themselves, but then acquired 
unstoppable momentum, which could lead both 
to ultimate satisfaction with a successful product, 
and to military rigidity and escalating costs. 
Speakers elaborated on the point in General 
Cauchie's paper that European countries should 
give preference to multilateral European projects 
even when not themselves participating in the 
production. The IEPG was studying the pœs-
ibility of assisting the armaments industry of 
its less developed members, and as a quid pro quo 
it was suggested such countries should be pre-
pared to procure equipment produced jointly by 
other IEPG countries even if the priee was not 
the lowest obtainable. 
Conclusions 
The different lectures have shown that 
European co-operation in the field of armaments 
is not only useful, but necessary to reach the 
goal of multilateral and hence truly European 
relations. Furthermore the discussion has shown : 
- that European industry has to aim at 
more effective co-operation and at an 
efficient partnership with the United 
States; 
- that the normal rules of competition do 
not apply to the armaments industry and 
that parliamentary supervision of multi-
lateral armaments projects should be 
developed, perhaps at the European level 
as Mr. Maggioni had suggested in his 
report, to ensure that value for money 
is obtained ; 
- the desirability of permanent consortia, 
which would not be wound up on the 
expiry of particular projects, and which 
might become joint companies, was clearly 
brought out, but the desirability of 
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restructuring the European armaments 
industry under the aegis of the European 
Community, as proposed in Mr. Critchley's 
report, was not discussed in the W orking 
Group; 
- that sales to third countries create 
political problems and that it would be 
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preferable to increase sales within the 
Alliance; 
- that collaboration between those members 
of the IEPG with advanced armaments 
industries and those that were less 
developed industrially presented both 
advantages and problems. 
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APPENDIX III 
RESOLUTION 15 1 
on the participation of observers in certain meetings 
of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments 8 
The Assembly, 
Al'PENDIX III 
Oonsidering the interests of member states of NATO which are not membera of WEU, 
DEOIDES 
1. Tha.t the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments may invite observera to attend its 
meetings from member states of NATO which are not membera of WEU ; 
2. That such observera shall have the right to speak. 
1. Adopted by the Assembly on 18th June 1959 during the First Part of the Fifth Ordinary Session (6th Sitting). 
2. Explanatory Memorandum : see the Report tabled by Mr. Patijn on behalf of the Presidential Committee (Docu-
ment 130 and Addendum). 
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Amendment 1 
Definition of armaments requirements 
and procurement in Western Europe 
AMENDMENT 1 1 
tabled by Mr. Mulley and others 
3rd December 1979 
l. In paragraph 1 of the draft recommandation proper, leave out "under the aegis of the industrial 
policy of the European Community". 
Signed: Mulley, von Bothmer, Krieps, Stoffelen 
1. See 9th Sitting, 3rd December 1979 (Amendment agreed to). 
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Amendments 2 and 3 
Definition of armaments requirements 
and procurement in Western Europe 
AMENDMENTS 2 and 3 1 
tabled by Mr. Baumel 
3rd December 1979 
2. In pa.ragraph 2 (a) of the draft recommendation proper, leave out "endorsed" and insert "examined". 
3. ln paragraph 2 (b), leave out "an Alliance-wide market for defence equipment" and insert "a market 
for defence equipment in the framework of WEU". 
Signed : Baumel 
1. See 9th Sitting, 3rd December 1979 (Amendment 2 agreed to; Amendment 3 negatived). 
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Arctic technology 
REPORT 1 
submitted on behalf of the 
7th November 1979 
Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions 2 
by Mr. Spies von Büllesheim, Rapporteur 
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The Assembly, 
Draft Recommendation 
on Arctic technology 
Considering that the peoples of the world are justified in exammmg the use of the earth's 
natural resources with due regard for the political, technological, economie and ecological implica-
tions; 
Aware that decisions on exploration and exploitation can be taken only after solutions have 
been found to human and technological problems in the polar regions ; 
Conscious of the sustained efforts of the Soviet Union and the United States in this field com-
pared to the lack of progress by the Western European countries in spite of their early start and 
wide experience of polar technology in the past ; 
Aware that the WEU member countries have already worked with the Soviet Union and the 
United States in the framework of the Antarctic Treaty and on certain specified subjects, and would 
welcome help and assistance from these countries and closer liaison in this field of activity between 
the USSR, the United States and the WEU member countries ; 
Considering that several European countries and industries, working in collaboration, have 
gained vast experience of various aspects of offshore technology ; 
Considering the Antarctic Treaty to be an excellent example of an actively applied treaty for 
ensuring and verifying a weapons-free area and therefore of major significance for WEU member 
countries; 
Considering the present state of the Law of the Sea Conference and its poBBible conclusion 
in the early 1980s, 
REOOMMENDS THAT THE CoUNoiL 
1. Draw the attention of member governments to the need for a wide-ranging programme of 
collaboration in Western Europe for the development of Arctic technology, for example in the build-
ing of ice-breakers ; 
2. Invite member governments : 
(a) to draw up mutually-acceptable administrative and industrial guidelines for auch collabo-
ration in order to ensure that Europe plays its part in developing the polar regions ; 
(b) to make every effort to ensure that the content of the Antarctic Treaty is not changed, 
distorted or prematurely terminated at the Law of the Sea Conference, thus preserving an 
important treaty which ensures and allows verification of a weapons-free area ; 
(c) to adopt a common position at meetings of Antarctic Treaty member states dealing with 
the exploration for and exploitation of mineral and fish resources. 
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Explanatory Memorandum 
(submitted by Mr. Spies von Büllesheim, Rapporteur) 
Introduction 
1. Interest in the Arctic and the Antarctic 
became universal when the international geo-
physical year was being organised in 1957 and 
1958. Polar regions to the far north and far 
south have since assumed growing importance 
in both economie and military terms. 
2. There are obviously major distinctions to 
be drawn between the Arctic and Antarctic 
regions in such terms as foreign and EEC policy, 
economie and mineral resources and deferree. 
However, your Rapporteur feels that a report 
on Arctic technology has to embrace both polar 
regions. The same polar technologies apply, often 
involving the same countries and the same 
people, similar problems arise and solutions 
found for one region might be equally valid 
for the other. 
J. The economies of resources development in 
the northern and southern polar regions has 
become a centre of interest for many countries 
and governments due to oil and natural gas 
discoveries in the Arctic and the probable 
existence of mineral resources in the Antarctic, 
especially as the technological means for develop-
ing them have advanced. The fishing of krill 
(shrimps) in the Antarctic might also be 
economically viable. 
4. The Arctic covers some 11 million sq. km. 
The Antarctic covers some 13 million sq. km. 
and is by far the largest single expanse of 
permanently ice-covered land, three-quarters of 
the world total. 
5. There are many contrasts between the 
Arctic and the Antarctic. The Arctic is a deep 
sea, covered with moving, floating pack-ice, sur-
rounded by the continental land masses of 
America and Eurasia. Its sea ice is reduced by 
one-half during the Arctic summer and on the 
land masses a carpet of green tundra spreads 
over wide areas. The two largest expanses of 
tundra (treeless, seasonally-frozen Arctic regions) 
are found in Canada and the USSR. There are 
approximately two million permanent inhabitants 
within the Arctic Circle. 
6. The Antarctic continent is separated from 
the six other continents and is much colder and 
more inhospitable than the Arctic. Ice-covered 
seas are far more extensive than in the Arctic. 
In summer, sea ice is reduced by only one-
seventh. There are no permanent inhabitants 
and the first explorer reached the area in 1895 · 
a mere 750 scientists and support personnei 
winter in the area. 
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7. The Antarctic continent, which is land 
covered with thick ice, covers one-tenth of the 
world's land surface, i.e. it is equivalent to China, 
Argentina, France, Nigeria and New Zealand 
combined. It is also the world's remotest con-
tinent with 950 km. separating it from the 
nearest land at Cape Horn. 
8. According to the Antarctic Treaty signed 
in Washington on 1st December 1959, Antarctica 
was dedicated solely to peaceful purpos,es and 
its use for military purposes was severely 
restricted 1• The main goal of the treaty was to 
preserve the aœea south of the 60° line. No 
member nation was required to renounce its 
sovereign claims but, on the other hand, no 
claims were recognised internationally. The 
treaty contains no provision concerning explora-
tion for and exploitation of mineral resources, 
nor concerning fish (krill) . 
9. The Arctic is of the highest strategie 
importance because of its location between the 
two major superpowers, the United States and 
the USSR. There are many radar sites on both 
sides and the polar routes by air or by sea are 
the shortest distances between these two nations. 
In the North American and Eurasian Arctic there 
are also many military facilities serving as front 
lines of deferree. The tactical significance of the 
northern Arctic regions depends upon their 
inclusion within the territorial limits of the two 
superpowers and Canada. 2 
1. The Arctic 
(a) General 
1 O. The political situation in the Arctic varies 
considerably. Denmark, which has sovereignty 
over Greenland, and the autonomous Greenland 
authorities are reluctant to allow any scienti:fic 
research or exploration of natural resources. The 
Canadians are extremely active in their OWll 
region, as are, of course, the Soviet authorities. 
The Icelandic Government accepts foreign 
scientific research on matters including physics 
and its natural hot springs. 
11. The political situation in the area has 
become more tense due to the fact that vast 
oil and gas reserves have been discovered which 
could eventually be exploited from "tension leg", 
platforms, especially in the Norwegian Sea and 
the Barents Sea. Other exploitable natural 
resources are gold, silver, copper, iron ore, 
platinum, tin and coal. It might also be possible 
1. See Appendix I. 
2. See Appendix IV. 
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to operate in this area with nuclear-powered 
equipment. The northern polar region is not 
open to exploration or exploitation by countries 
which have no sovereignty or treaty rights. 
12. Offshore deposits of oil and gas and their 
development might still cause many difficulties 
since the economie l'lones of the bordering conn-
tries have not yet been accurately established. 
13. Finally, for the Soviet Union the norihern 
route is the shortest maritime route between its 
European and .Asian harbours. With the develop-
ment of nuclear ice-breakers the polar route can 
be kept open for most if not all the year. This 
means that the Soviet Union is able to move 
its fleet from Murmansk to Vladivostok. 
Murmansk is the most important town in the 
Arctic with 300,000 inhabitants. On the Eurasian 
side there are sorne thirty towns of more ihan 
10,000 inhabiiants. On the Canadian side the 
most important town is Inuvik with sorne 3,000 
inhabitants. 
14. Sorne of the richest fishing grounds in the 
world are in the Arctic. 
(b) Alaska 
15. The indigenous peoples of the North 
American Arctic in general and of the United 
States in particular were largely ignored by 
governments until the second world war when 
national defence interests focused attention on 
the area. The total indigenous population in the 
entire state of Alaska is about 28,000 Eskimos 
and 16,000 Indians. Since 1945 changes have 
been fast and living conditions have improved 
considerably. Alaska's Eskimos and Indians have 
full United States citizenship and have been 
active in obtaining recognition of their rights. 
In 1971, the Alaska Native Claims Settlement 
Act awarded them nearly $1 billion and 161,800 
sq. km. of land - 10 % of the state - in 
exchange for renouncing their original rights. 
As in other polar areas, modern technology has 
raised their living standards but at the same 
time threatened their traditional life-styles. 
16. Since 1957, Alaska has provided significant 
quantities of oïl and gas from fields near 
Anchorage, but Alaskan oil production rose 
sharply in 1977 with the completion of the 
1,300 km. trans-Alaska pipeline from Prudhoe 
Bay to Valdez, which took nine years to build. 
The output of the Prudhoe Bay field is more 
than 1.5 million barrels a day or nearly 20 % 
of the United States' total production. Other 
important fields have been discovered nea:r 
Barrow. Estimates of potential reserves range 
from 40-120 billion barrels of oil and from 6-
14 trillion cu.m. of natural gas. Offshore areas 
appear even more promising than the land areas ; 
the Beaufort Sea continental shelf is likely to 
be among the first exploited in North Alaska. 
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17. In January 1977 the United States and 
Canada signed a transit pipeline treaty confirm-
ing a policy of non-interference and non-
discrimination in respect of pipelines carrying 
petroleum products across each other's ter-
ritories. On 8th September 1977 the Alaska-
Canadian pipeline project, described as the 
largest single private energy project in history, 
was approved by both governments. Until this 
pipeline is ready the oil deposits from Alaska 
are transported from the northern slope io 
V aidez for shipment to other parts of America. 
18. Natural gas production at Prudhoe Bay will 
be delayed for several more years at least, pend-
ing construction of a pipeline through Canada 
io the south. 
19. The construction of pipelines in the tundra 
automatically disrupts the ecological system of 
the area from which recovery is very slow. The 
local inhabiiants wish to slow down the exploita-
tion of mineral resources in order to be able 
to establish, in the future, a viable economy, 
even when the non-renewable resources have been 
depleted. 
(c) Canada 
20. Canada's Arctic stores of oH and natural 
gas are concentrated in two main basins : the 
Mackenzie Delta/Beaufort Sea, near the Alaskan 
border, and the Arctic islands in the far north-
east, near the Canada-Greenland border. More 
than half of the reserves in both areas are 
believed io lie offshore. Reeoverable reserves in 
these areas are estimated at 28 billion barrels of 
oil and 10 trillion cu.m. of natural gas. 
21. The native populations of Canada's Yukon 
and North Western Territo:rlies are estimated at 
sorne 12,000 Eskimos and 10,000 Indians. They 
do not have ordinary Canadian citizenship but 
a special status under the Indian Act. In 
Canada, as in the United States, they have made 
land claims and constitutional issues are assum-
ing an increasing importance in those territories. 
A special commission on constitutional matters 
has been appointed by the federal government 
which is to advise on measures io extend and 
improve ·representative local governments in 
these areas. 
22. There has been exploratory drilling for oil 
and natural gas and an important development 
programme has been started in areas near the 
Canadian Beaufort Sea. Exploration on and 
around the Arctic islands has also revealed more 
than half-a-dozen oil and gas fields. Parts of 
the gas fields are offshore in deep ice-covered 
waters where exploratory drilling has been 
accomplished from the ice surface in winter. The 
building of a pipeline is under consideration and 
the federal government's decision on pipeline 
routes is awaited. Consideration is also being 
given to building combined ice-breakerjtankers 
for transporting oil to the south. 
(d) Greenland 
23. Since 1st May 1979, Greenland - a country 
of sorne 39,000 inhabitants, mostly Eskimos -
has achieved internai autonomy under Danish 
sovereignty. It had been a Danish colony from 
1721 and was integrated in the Danish Kingdom 
in 1953. Under the internai autonomy legislation 
the Danish Government is mainly responsible for 
foreign affairs, defence and monetary policy. 
The Danish Government also subsidises Green-
land's budget with sorne $250 million annually, 
but should Greenland's income from mineral 
resources such as lead, zinc, uranium and oil 
exceed :this amount the subsidy would be reduced 
accordingly. Six consortia of oil companies have 
been prospecting the western coast of Greenland 
and so far the test drillings have been negative, 
but the Danish Government is convinced that oil 
will be discovered off Greenland. 
24. In 1973 an agreement was concluded between 
Canada and Denmark on the continental shelf 
boundary. 
25. Although the Soviet Union proposed the 
creation of a joint Soviet-Greenland fisheries 
company, this was not agreed to. 
(e) Norway 
26. In the vast territory covered by the three 
Arctic provinces Finmark, Troms and Nordland 
there ·are only 450,000 inhabitants. Although five 
nations border the Arctic Ocean, there are only 
two international land boundaries: Alaska-
Canada and, in Europe, the land frontier between 
Norway and the USSR. The indigenous popu-
lation consists of sorne 20,000 Lapps who have 
their own culture and language which are the 
same as those of Lapps in Sweden, Finland and 
the USSR. The Norwegian Government is very 
concerned about the quality of the environment 
and the well-being of the indigenous population. 
27. On the mainland there is no international 
political dispUite over the development of resour-
ces. However, there are differences in the Spits-
bergen area concerning the extent of coastal state 
jurisdiction over the Arctic seas and Norway's 
claim to exclusive control of the resources of the 
Spitsbergen corutinental shelf. It has not been 
possible to establish a Norwegian-Soviet con-
tinental shelf boundary in the Barents Sea. The 
dispute is whether the equidistant line or the 
sector principle should be used to mark the 
boundary between the fishery and continental 
shelf areas of the two states. 132,000 sq. km. of 
continental shelf are at stake. Norway established 
the 200-mile fishing zone in early 1977, as did 
the Soviet Union in March of that year. 
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28. The problem of Spitsbergen is far more 
complicated. Norway's sovereignty in this part 
of the Arctic is determined by the 1920 treaty 
on the Spitsbergen (Svalbard) archipelago. The 
treaty between Norway and thirty-nine other 
states established Norwegian rule over the archi-
pelago but prohibited military activities on the 
islands. AU WEU countries, except Luxembourg, 
are among the thirty-nine states parties to the 
treaty ; the Soviet Union acceded in 1925. Ali 
signatories have specifie rights including guaran-
teed access for maritime, industrial, mining and 
commercial operations on a basis of full equality 
with Norway. Apart from Norway, only the 
USSR has taken advantage of its treaty right to 
maintain permanent settlements on the islands. 
There is a permanent coal mining population on 
the Soviet concession of sorne 1,000 sq. km., called 
Barentsburg. The total surface of the islands is 
62,000 sq. km. and sorne 7,000 sq. km. has been 
given in concessions for mining. Although many 
firms also explored for oil in the years 1966-77, 
no important finds were reported. 
29. As the Spitsbergen treaty was drarted before 
the possibilities of oil and gas exploitation under 
the seabed were known, it does not include any 
specifie provisions relating to the continental 
shelf outside territorial waters. AU parties to the 
treaty accept its application to land areas within 
the specified boundaries and the surrounding 
four-mile territorial sea. It seems likely that 
thick sediments with a high petroleum-bearing 
potential exist on the continental shelf south 
and south-east of Spitsbergen. 
30. Offshore drilling is however not possible 
until Norway and the Spitsbergen treaty partners 
reach agreement on ownership of the continental 
shelf around the islands and the Soviet Union 
and Norway settle their dispute over the Barents 
Sea boundary. The United States, the United 
Kingdom and other European states do not 
accept the N orwegian claim that the shelf is 
part of mainland Norwegian territory. Norway 
itself does not want to allow drilling north of 
62° latitude as offshore production south of that 
is more than adequate for Norway's requirements 
and its industrial potential. 
(f) USSR 
31. When technological achievements, especially 
in aviation, made the northern part of the Soviet 
Uni on more accessible, measures were taken to 
install effective control over the long northern 
coast, waters, islands and air space of the 
adjoining Arctic Ocean. The Soviet Union was 
already a leader in Arctic development, and 
development of the northern sea route became 
an important goal in its Arctic policy. Terms 
such as internai waters, historie waters and 
closed sea were used by the Soviet Union to 
describe the type of sovereignty it exerted. The 
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difficulty is of course that the ice cover is a land-
like entity which encloses part of hays and other 
waters. In general, the Soviet Union maintains its 
authority over the twelve-mile territorial sea and 
straits overlapped by the ·territorial sea. It has 
also established the 200-mile fishing zone. 
32. The indigenous Arctic population in the 
Soviet Union is sorne 700,000 people ; the most 
important groups are the Komi and Y akuty 
which together number more than 550,000 people. 
They were already under Russian control in the 
eighteenth century and are mostly reindeer her-
ders, hunters, fishermen and trappers. 
33. The Soviet Arctic contains severa! large 
areas that are favourable for oil and gas accumu-
lation. The most important discoveries are made 
in the Pechora, Ob' and Vilyuy basins. Few of 
the other prospective Soviet Arctic land areas 
and none of the continental shelves have been 
subject to exploratory drilling. One of the major 
constraints is the high cost of exploitation in the 
Arctic due to the inhospitable environment, trans-
portation problems and labour supply düficulties. 
34. Arctic petroleum production at present 
satisfies only a small part of the energy needs 
of the Soviet Union but will provide an increas-
ing share of future energy supplies. Full 
exploitation of Soviet Arctic deposits will require 
further expansion of transport means, especially 
pipelines. Foreign interests might be involved ; 
the Soviet Union has made severa! approaches 
to Japanese industry for the development of 
three large projects in Siberia. However, no 
results were achieved as Japanese industry was of 
the opinion that prospects were not realistic in 
the areas in view of the lack of wwter, electricity 
and transport. Approaches to American industry 
have also been marking time because of disagree-
ment between the Soviet Union and American 
industries on gas priees and economie policies. 
However, western participation in the exploration 
of the Arctic area will be needed if the resources 
are to be exploited as the Soviet Union does not 
possess the required offshore drilling technology. 
ll. The Antarctic 
35. The Antarctic Treaty of 1959 established a 
régime of freedom of operation and open scien-
tific co-operation throughout the corutinent, 
although no operations were to provide grounds 
for new or extended claims during the period 
of application of the treaty, i.e. thirty years. 
Nuclear explosions and disposai of radioactive 
wastes in Anrtarctica are prohibited, although 
the peaceful and scientific use of atomic deviees 
is permitted. 
36. The Antarctic Treaty was originally signed 
by twelve countries: Argentina, Australia, Bel-
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gium, Chile, France, Japan, New Zealand, Nor-
way, South Africa, the USSR, the United 
Kingdom and the United States. In the mean-
time, nine states have acceded to the treaty: 
Brazil,. Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, the 
Federal Republic of Germany, the German 
Democratie Republic, the Netherlands, Poland 
and Romania. The treaty provided a legal frame-
work for the Antarctic continent for at least 
thirty years. This period might allow the 
signatory states time to establish a mutually 
satisfactory basis for a permanent settlement of 
claims. Seven member states, Argentina, Austra-
lia, Chile, France, New Zealand, Norway and 
the United Kingdom, have long-held claims to 
parts of Antarctica 1. 
37. States which conduct substantial scientific 
research activities in the area with a permanent 
scientific station in Antarctica are termed con-
sultative staJtes. These are Argentina, Australia, 
Chile, France, Japan, New Zealand, Norway, 
Poland, South Africa, the USSR, the United 
Kingdom and the United States. During the first 
ten years after the treaty came into force in 
1961, the discussions in the consultative meetings 
concerned technical, procedural and administra-
tive arrangements for advancing scientific 
research in the area. Since then recurring topics 
are environmental transportation activities, 
exchanges of scientific data, information on 
expeditions planned, and the effects of possible 
tourist expeditions to the area. 
38. So far no serious political problems have 
arisen although there are implications for the 
law of the sea negotiations. Potential resources 
in Antarctica are fish, whales and krill, a small 
shrimplike creature sorne 4.5 cm. in length and 
weighing about 1.2 gr., that abounds in the 
Antarctic waters. The geology of the most 
exposed mountain areas is now being studied 
and mineral resources are being explored. 
39. Research activities in Antarctica are con-
cerned with biology, geology, geomorphology, 
geography, geochemics, astrophysics, meteorology 
and oceanography. Glaciology is also very impor-
tant for determining the history of past climatic 
variations and trends as revealed by snow 
accumulation rates. Traverses by cross-country 
tractor and aircra:lit have been made from many 
stations, the most important being by the United 
States in West Antarctica and the USSR in East 
Antaretica. These expeditions have revealed that 
the land mass beneath Antarctica's ice cover is 
extremely rugged. The thickness of the ice sheet 
averages 2,000 metres and in places may be more 
than 4,500 metres. West Antarctica is largely an 
island grouping and East Antarctica is more 
truly continental. 
1. See Appendix II. 
40. It is generally accepted that before the year 
2000 both the surface and subglacial features 
of the continent will be fully explored and 
accurately mapped. There will then be an ade-
quate understanding of the continent and the 
technology of travelling and living will allow 
access to any part of the continent throughout 
the year. It is even expected tha;t industrial 
centres might be developed for industries 
requiring a lot of space, safety of operation, free-
dom from contamination, large quantities of fresh 
water or natural refrigeration 1 • 
41. The Soviet Union employs several hundred 
scientists, technicians and logistic support 
personnel in its Antarctic stations. 
42. Among the WEU member states, Belgium, 
France and the United Kingdom have con-
sultative status and the Federal Republic of 
Germany, which acceded to the treaty on 5th 
February 1979, hopes to become a consultative 
member in the near future. Germany will then 
renew its Antarctic research which started sorne 
100 years ago. The German expeditions to Kaiser 
Wilhelm II-land starting in 1901, to the Weddell 
Sea from 1911 to 1913 and the 1938 expedition 
were especially concerned with oceanographie, 
glaciological, meteorological and biological 
research. The expeditions in 1975-76 and 1977-78 
were concentrated on research on krill. The estab-
lishment of a permanent research station will be 
prepared and a special ship for polar research 
is being built. Sorne DM. 100 million will be 
invested and the current annual expenditure 
on research in specialised institutes in Germany, 
the maintenance of a permanent Antarctic sta-
tion and the ship will amount to sorne DM. 30 
million. 
43. There is also sorne research and develop-
ment in the framework of the EEC. 
44. International collaboration during the 1957-
58 international geophysical year has been con-
tinued in Antarctica under the treaty. The 
United States and Soviet expeditions exchange 
scientists each year. Other treaty members pro-
vide scientists from time to time and ali stations 
welcome visits by other selientists. There is 
constant and extensive research co-ordination and 
data-sharing on scientific activities in Antarctica. 
The Scientific Committee on Antarctic Research 
is the permanent body which promotes this 
co-operation. As formai inspections are permitted 
under the treaty, the United States has exercised 
its righl$ every two or three years, covering many 
stations and fixed Antarctic installations. Other 
member countries have also made a few inspec-
tions. So far, none of the inspections has pro-
vided any evidence of treaty violations. 
1. Bee Appendix III. 
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45. In recent years the world-wide search for 
new resources and the possible implications of a 
law of the sea treaty have drawn much attention 
to the potential resources of Antarctica. Its liv-
ing resources might be exploited commercially, 
especially fish, whales and krill. 
46. During the 1978 meeting of signatories of 
the Antarctic Treaty to examine conservation of 
marine resources, a convention was drafted to 
protect fish resources, especially krill, which 
might be an important source of world protein. 
It was proposed that annual catch quotas be 
established and supervision carried out by ins-
pectors. However, no final agreement was reached 
because of the reluctance of Soviet, J apanese and 
Polish fishermen to submit their fishing opera-
tions to international supervision and the con-
tinuing claims of seven member countries to 
sovereignty over parts of Antarctic territories. 
47. Extensive commercial fishing of krill would 
certainly have ecological repercussions because 
krill constitute the basis of the Antarctic food 
chain. Concern is mounting that Antarctica's 
resources will lead to a rush to develop them, 
which could irreversibly damage the world's most 
untouched ecosystem. If the signatories of the 
Antarctic Treaty disagreed over fishing and oil 
drilling rights the treaty might collapse leaving 
the continent open to chaotic developments and/ 
or superpower rivalry. 
48. Although existing claims are frozen for the 
duration of the Antarctic Treaty, the seven mem-
ber countries which claim sovereignty over parts 
of Antarctica remain firm about their long-term 
territorial rights, probably because of possible 
economie gains and security considerations. The 
signatory states have different views on ques-
tions of offshore jurisdiction and resource exploit-
ation. If the Law of the Sea Conference succeeds 
in 1980 they might claim the same offshore rights 
as coastal nations elsewhere. 
49. The American Ambassador to the Law of the 
Sea Conference, Mr. Elliott L. Richardson, stated 
at the close of the third conference on 24th 
August 1979 that solid gains had been made 
in negotiations on the seabed, the protection of 
the seabed mining environment, the preservation 
of whales, and controls on the production of 
seabed minerais. He was of the opinion that 
compromise positions would be reached in the 
March 1980 session. The nations represented 
at the conference now had the political will to 
overcome the difficulties which had blocked the 
road to a treaty. 
ID. Technical problems 
(a) Transport 
50. One of the most difficult problems to solve 
in polar regions is of course that of transport. 
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Here the Soviet Union, through its Ministry of 
Merchant Marine, possesses a large number of 
ice-breakers of up to 80,000 hp, the main engines 
being nuclear reactors and steam turbines. The 
first nuclear-powered ice-breaker was the Lenin; 
launched in September 1959, it was the world's 
first nuclear-powered surface ship put to sea. It 
has a crew of about 1,000. Two new ships of 
the "Arktika" class were commissioned in 1977-
78 and one of them became the first ship ever 
to make its way through polar ice to the North 
Pole. In the early 1970s three ice-breakers with 
non-nuclear engines of about 41,000 hp were built 
in Finland for the Soviet Union. The Soviet 
Union has seven other ice-breakers of about 
22,000 hp in addition to a fleet of sorne thirty-
three ice-breakers of from 3-5,000 hp, and the 
Soviet navy has four armed ice-breakers. 
51. The United States has two ice-breakers of 
the "Polar Star" class with conventional diesel 
engines of about 28,000 hp, one of the "Glacier" 
class of 21,000 hp, three of the "Wind" class and 
one of the "Mackinan" class of 10,000 hp and 
severa! smaller ones. The ice-breakers are oper-
ated by the coastguard which is in charge of ice-
breaking activities. 
52. In the United Kingdom, the Royal Navy 
has one ice patrol ship. 
53. The Federal Republic of Germany also has 
an ice-breaker of sorne 7,000 hp which operates 
in the Northern Baltic under the Finnish flag 
and in the Southern Baltic under the German 
flag. It also has two small ice-breakers of 
2,000 hp. 
54. The Danish Ministry of Trade and Shipping 
maintains two ice-breakers of sorne 10,000 hp. 
55. The Canadian Government owns five heavy 
ice-breakers with engines from 12-24,000 hp. Two 
new ice-breakers of 13,000 hp are under con-
struction. The ice-breakers are manned by the 
coastguard or by the Federal Ministry of Trans-
port. 
(b) Exploration of polar resources 
56. Ice-breakers are essential for acceding tOI 
polar regions for purposes of exploration and 
ice-cutting transport ships will be necessary for 
bringing in drilling equipment. A project for 
semi-submersible ice-breaking tankers is being 
studied in the United States and Canada. 
57. In order to operate in the polar environ-
ment it is necessary to have an extensive know-
ledge of the workings of ice-packs, icebergs, their 
movements and the influence of varying ice 
temperatures. Icebergs may average 100,000 tons 
and extend 120-150 m. below the surface of the 
sea. Because of their size, they could gouge 
grooves of 10-12 m. in the bo:ttom sediments and 
destroy both the drill ship and any equipment 
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projecting above the seabed. It is also of major 
importance to identify the depth of the con-
tinental shelf, the base of the continental slope 
and the seaward edge in the polar regions to be 
explored. A great handicap is the remoteness of 
these regions from the principal industrial and 
commercial centres in America and Europe. 
58. In recent years severa! concepts have been 
studied for drilling platforms in the polar seas. 
In shallow waters an artificial island could be 
built ; rigs could be set up on sea ice but could, 
of course, be used only IÏn wintertime. For summer 
drilling a rig could be built on a ship-shape hull 
anchored at the bottom of the sea. Other pos-
sibilities are the use of semi-submersible or fixed 
monopodes with rotating ice-cutters. 
59. In Alaska and Canada severa! of the above-
mentioned types of rigs have been tiied, especially 
in the Beaufort Sea and in the strait between 
Canada and Greenland. Many of the problems 
arising in polar regions have been solved, but 
certainly not all. 
60. Severa! reports by scientific and technical 
experts of the Nansen Foundation in Norway and 
the United States National Petroleum Council 
have concluded that the problems of extracting 
oil and gas from the polar regions are not insur-
mountable. Moreover, the technology for deep 
drilling is advancing world-wide. 
61. Special extensive studies are required on 
navigation and different systems of securing dril-
ling platforms, on diving techniques, supply and 
safety problems, problems of icing and de-icing, 
warning systems for collision with icebergs or ice 
ridges, material tests for corrosion, special pro-
tection measures to keep the engines and 
mechanical parts of the engines in good condition 
and, finally, human behaviour in polar regions. 
62. In the Arctic region, oil and gas are already 
exploited and exploration is being continued. 
Possibly there is as much oil and gas in the 
Antarctic region as in the Arctic, but it will 
certainly not be exploited until the mid-1980s. 
Many questions have first to be answered, such 
as: 
- Should oil and other minerais in Antarc-
tica be exploited or not ? 
- What are the risks to the environment 
and to scientific work now being under-
taken f 
- How should the ecosystem be conserved 
and who should police the conservation 
rules f 
- How important is Antarctic oil and gas 
in terms of the world's long-range energy 
needs? 
- How should exploitation be managed, and 
by whom? 
- Who should be allowed to participate in 
the exploitation and who should benefit 
from it? 
- Should there be any sharing of revenue ? 
63. In the framework of the United Nations it 
was suggested that the application of the corn-
mon heritage concept should be promoted and 
that an international control authority under the 
aegis of the United Nations should be established. 
64. However, the signatories of the treaty ail 
wish to keep the involvement of non-signatories 
to a minimum. Member countries laying claim 
to areas of Antarctica feel that they own the 
resources in "their" sectors and even the relevant 
offshore resources. Argentina and Chile have 
already declared 200-mile zones off their Antarc-
tic claims. "\Vhether the Law of the Sea Conference 
will result in a treaty allowing economie zones 
for lands which are uninhabited is not at ail 
sure. The primary conflict is between a common 
heritage approach with freedom of access and 
sovereignty claims without freedom of access. 
IV. Military aspects 
65. As remarked earlier, the Arctic provides 
the shortest route between the two superpowers 
and lies relatively near to vital centres of power, 
whereas the strategie rôle of Antarctica is doubt-
ful. The cruising range of nuclear-powered sub-
marines reduces the need for refuelling or other 
bases. Anything that can be done in Antarctica 
can be done elsewhere more cheaply since polar 
logistic costs and supply problems are enormous. 
Nevertheless it still has sorne military value 
because of its position between the Pacifie, 
Atlantic and Indian Oceans. 
66. The Antarctic Treaty prohibits any military 
activity and neither the superpowers nor the other 
member countries are inclined to start military 
action in that part of the world. It is not likely 
that the treaty, especially from this point of 
view would be changed, nor have any such prop~sals yet been made. The Antarctic Trea.ty 
régime has often been compared to other partial 
disarmament treaties, i.e. the moon, outer space 
and seabed treaties. If this treaty, which has 
functioned smoothly for more than sixteen years, 
were violated or terminated before the end of its 
thirty years' duration, this would certainly. have 
an unfortunate influence on the other treat1es. 
Conclusions 
67. The world and humanity need all the 
resources the earth can offer. Your Rapporteur 
is therefore convinced that whatever difficulties 
polar exploration and exploitation may encounter, 
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they will one day be overcome. The existence 
of important gas and oil deposits in the Arctic, 
and probably in the Antarctic, will certainly 
induce the oil companies to acquire the experience 
necessary to exploit them. 
68. For instance, a United States geological 
survey has estimated that Antarctica's continental 
shelf could contain as rouch as 45 billion barrels 
of oil, one and a half times the current reserves 
of the United States. 
69. The world will need these gas and oil deposits 
and governments and industry are convinced 
that the exploitation of polar technology will 
have widespread repercussions over the whole 
spectrum of advanced technology. It may ~e 
likened to the spin-off of space and oceanographie 
exploration. For this reason alone all modern 
industrialised countries should be interested in 
these developments. 
70. Several European countries already have 
wide experience of Arctic technology through 
firms such as British Petroleum which has gained 
substantial offshore knowledge in developing 
gas and oil deposits in Alaska. The German 
Government is also convinced that it has to invest 
in this field of technology. Scope for European 
collaboration certainly exists ; there are mutual 
commercial advantages in several companies col-
laborating on technical innovations in order to 
overcome the difficulties of climate and environ-
ment. In this context the common development 
of ice-breakers would be to the advantage of all 
countries in view of the high costs involved and 
it might be a useful European collaborative 
venture further to the German-Finnish co-opera-
tion on ice-breakers. 
71. In the exploration for and exploitation of 
gas and oil deposits in the Nor~h Sea, ~ever~l 
European countries and compames workmg m 
collaboration have gained a tremendous amount 
of experience- although not in polar regions-
in the various aspects of offshore technology. 
Mutually-acceptable terms between governments 
and industry could certainly be agreed upon if 
the urgency of Europe playing its rôle in this 
field was generally acknowledged. 
72. The 1959 Antarctic Treaty has kept the 
Antarctic continent and its waters as a nuclear-
free zone, preserved it from commercial exploita-
tion and made it a haven for scientific research 
on a collaborative basis. According to the treaty 
and practice in the last fifteen years, this con-
tinent offers one of the few instances of the 
superpowers accepting mutual inspections of their 
activities. This is of great importance for similar 
action in disarmament. For the WEU countries, 
which have accepted mutual inspections, the 
continuation of the treaty should be considered 
vital. 
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73. It is recognised in the treaty that it is in the 
interest of ali mankind for Antarctica to continue 
to be used exclusively for peaceful purposes. 
Appointed observers from consultative treaty 
powers therefore have the right of free access to 
any area and may inspect ali stations, installa-
tions and equipment by air and on the ground. 
7 4. The original text of the Antarctic Treaty is 
ambiguous about exploitation of resources. It does 
not refer at all to exploitation of mineral and 
other non-living resources and the only reference 
to living resources is a provision to formulate 
measures for the preservation and conservation 
of these resources in Antarctica. There is sorne 
disagreement about whether exploitation of 
mineral resources on land or on the seabed would 
be compatible with the treaty. Sorne believe that 
an amendment to the treaty would be necessary 
as exploitation of mineral resources would disturb 
scientific research. Moreover, it is not the practice 
of mining companies to allow on-site inspections 
which, of course, are necessary for controlling 
demilitarisation. Nevertheless, other treaty powers 
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believe that economie exploitation is one of the 
peaceful purposes mentioned in Article 1 and 
does not therefore prohibit exploration for and 
exploitation of mineral resources. 
75. A parallel may be drawn between Antarctica 
and the position regarding the international 
seabed. Both are beyond recognised national 
jurisdiction and if the Law of the Sea Conference 
succeeds in setting up international machinery for 
administering the seabed this might have direct 
consequences for Antarctica in that machinery 
of this type might also provide administrative 
services for the Antarctic. The Law of the Sea 
Conference would also have an influence on the 
establishment of economie zones as many mineral 
resources might be offshore. 
76. Finally, your Rapporteur wishes to point 
out that the Assembly's Committee on Defence 
Questions and Armaments is submitting a report 
on Arctic defence and for this reason he has 
avoided the detailed military aspects of these 
questions. 
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APPENDIX I 
Antarctic Treaty 
On 1st December 1959, a thirty-year treaty 
was signed in Washington at the end of a twelve-
nation conference on peaceful international scien-
tific co-operation in Antarctica. The twelve orig-
inal signatories were Argentina, Australia, Bel-
gium, Britain, Chile, France, Japan, New Zea-
land, Norway, South Africa, the Soviet Union 
and the United States, who have subsequently 
been joined by Czechoslovalda, Denmark and 
Poland. The treaty came into force on 23rd June 
1961. 
The main provisions of the treaty are sum-
marised below : 
Article 1. Antarctica shall be used for peace-
ful purposes only. The contracting parties are 
forbidden to establish military bases in the area, 
to carry out military manoeuvres, or to test any 
kind of weapons. 
Article 2. Freedom of scientüic investigation 
and co-operation toward that end should be 
maintained. 
Article 3. Scientific information and person-
nel should be exchanged by the contracting 
parties. 
Article 4. Nothing contained in the treaty 
may be interpreted as a renunciation, deniai, or 
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support of a claim to territorial sovereignty in 
Antarctica. No new claim to territorial sover-
eignty may be asserted while the treaty is in 
force. 
Article 5. Any nuclear explosions in Antarc-
tica and the disposai there of radioactive waste 
shall be prohibited. 
Article 6. The provisions of the treaty apply 
to the land area south of 60 degrees south 
latitude. 
Article 7. Each contracting party has the 
right to send observers to carry out inspections 
in Antarctica. Notification must be given of all 
expeditions and stations in Antarctica. 
Article 8. Observers and scientific personnel 
in Antarctica are subject to the jurisdiction of 
their own country. 
Article 9. The contracting parties shall meet 
at suitable intervals to consult together on 
measures for the furtherance of the principles 
and objectives of the treaty. 
In February 1972 the treaty's twelve original 
signatories concluded an agreement on the pro-
tection of seals in the Antarctic, including those 
in the open sea or on floating ice. 
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APPENDIX II 
Territorial claims in Antarctica 
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Amendments 1, 2, 3 and 4 
Arctic technology 
AMENDMENTS 1, 2, 3 and 4 1 
tabled by Mr. Hardy 
4th Deeember 1979 
1. In paragraph 1 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out "for a wide-ranging programme of 
collaboration in Western Europe". 
2. In paragraph 1 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out "for example in the building of 
ice-breakers". 
3. In paragraph 2 (a) of the draft recommendation proper, leave out "to draw up mutually-acceptable 
administrative and industrial guidelines for such collaboration in order". 
4. Leave out paragraph 2 (b) of the draft recommandation proper and insert: 
"(b) to welcome and support the draft convention on the conservation of Antarctic marine living 
resources;' '. 
Signed: Hardy 
1. See 13th Sitting, 5th December 1979 (Amendment 1 withdrawn; Amendments 2 and 3 agreed to; Amend-
ment 4 withdrawn). 
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N.B. The names of those taking part in the vote are 
printed in italics. 
The Assembly, 
Draft Recommendation 
on the industrial bases of European security -
guidelines drawn from the symposium on 
15th, 16th and 17th October 1979 
DOOUMENT 823 
Considering that only governments can give the necessary impetus to joint European arma-
ments production and procurement ; 
Regretting the failure in the mid-1960s and mid-I970s to agree on a joint concept for a 
European battle tank; 
Aware of the risk that if discussions on the future combat aircraft are too protracted, Euro-
pean nations might be forced, for reasons of a credible defence, to buy a ready-made American 
aircraft such as the Northrop F-18L; 
Considering the serious crisis in the European ship-building industries and the possible tech-
nological decline as a result ; 
Welcoming the achievements of existing co-operation in the manufacture of missiles; 
Aware that in tele-informatics - telecommunications, computera, advanced components and 
data banks - European industry is largely being outsold by the Americans and Japanese; 
Recalling that WEU is the only European organisation with defence and armaments respon-
sibilities, 
REOOMMENDS THAT THE COUNOIL 
Invite member governments : 
1. To promote a continuons dialogue between their commanders-in-chief, lower echelon commandera, 
armaments directors and industrialists in the most suitable framework, and related to the indepen-
dent European programme group insofar as this is compatible with the Atlantic Alliance ; 
2. To start discussions now on the battle tank of the I990s; 
3. To bring to a successful conclusion without delay discussions on the successor, for the 1990s, 
to the Franco-British Jaguar, the F-4F Phantom of the Fedeml German air force and the further 
development of the British Harrier ; 
4. To maintain Europe's warship building capability, to agree on the production of interchange-
able components and to promote containerisation; 
5. To continue European co-operation in the production of missiles and to promote specialisation 
by ordering severa! versions of the same type of missile ; 
6. To promote greater standardisation of telecommunications equipment and to create a joint 
integrated digital system for the new command communications which are to be developed ; 
7. To pursue research and development in such branches of advanced technology as integrated 
circuits, microprocessors, radar systems, lasers and infrared sensors for weapons systems ; 
8. To afford support to co-operation in their countries by maintaining existing structures, parti-
cularly in the form of permanent European consortia and, whenever possible, by setting up new 
ones. 
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Explanatory Memorandum 
(submitted by MM. Onslow and Valleix, Rapporteurs) 
1. Introduction 
1. One of the basic aims of Soviet foreign 
policy has always been to split the transatlantic 
Alliance between North America and Western 
Europe. Before the Alliance was formed, the 
Soviet Union warned the Western European 
countries against any military alliance. Once the 
Atlantic Alliance was firmly established, Moscow 
issued warnings with the introduction of every 
new sophisticated defensive weapons system and, 
since Western Europe as a whole concentrated 
mainly on consumer goods, allowing its civilian 
and military technology to decline, the new 
weapons were developed mainly in the United 
States. 
2. When Washington suggested making neutron 
weapons available to its allies, Soviet leaders 
brought pressure to bear on the European allies 
concerned. 
3. Now Moscow has again uttered threatening 
warnings to certain Western European leaders 
not to deploy the modern Pershing 2 and cruise 
missiles 1 on their territory as protection against 
modern and mobile Soviet SS-20 missiles and 
Backfire bombers. 
4. Moscow is also trying to split NATO by 
putting extra pressure on sorne countries not to 
accept Pershing 2 and cruise missiles, knowing 
full well of course that sorne governments will not 
accept any missiles on their territory unless a 
European nation other than a European nuclear 
power - unlike the United Kingdom or France 
- also agrees to have them. It is weil known that 
the NATO Scandinavian countries have a long-
standing policy of not accepting the stationing of 
foreign troops and nuclear weapons on their ter-
ritory. 
5. France, a European nuclear power, is no 
longer part of NATO's integrated military organ-
isation and is not concerned by United States 
weapons. 
6. Y our Rapporteurs believe that in order to 
deter or counter the aggressor ali available 
defence resources should be mobilised. Armaments 
co-operation is an essential part of the common 
effort and should therefore be developed system-
atically, otherwise the European countries will 
always be forced to purchase much of their 
weaponry from the United States. 
7. The Assembly has often expressed the view 
in its reports that the European defence posture 
needs to be maintained and strengthened and that 
the European technological basis should be broad-
1. See Document 773. 
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ened and reinforced. The Committee's prepara-
tory report for the symposium on a European 
armaments policy, entitled the industrial bases of 
European security 1, submitted by Mr. Vaileix, 
was based on this view. The report raised the 
question of whether Europe was to use the 
armaments industries which were the bases of 
its defence and, in paragraph 27, it summarised 
the fifteen technologies considered critical. 
U. Proposals on future weapons systems 
8. During the symposium held in Brussels from 
15th to 17th October 1979, Working Group III, 
which was led by the Committee, dealt with 
research, development and production of arma-
ments systems. During the discussion, at which 
there were sorne 100 participants, the foilowing 
topics were reviewed : 
(a) the future tank; 
(b) future combat aircraft ; 
(c) building of new naval craft; 
(d) missiles; 
( e) electronic communications ; 
(f) future weapons in general. 
(a) The future tank 
9. On future tanks it was generally acknow-
ledged that there would be no fundamental 
changes for the next generation, which might be 
brought into service at the beginning of the 
nineties. Most experts agreed that, at least for 
the next hattie tank generation, the combat heli-
copter equipped with canons and guided weapons 
or high energy lasers was not yet an alternative. 
The tank provided a unique military capability 
in support of infantry on land and, although the 
helicopter could replace sorne aspects of the tank's 
rôle by virtue of its manoeuvrability and wide 
range of possible armament, it would still only 
work in conjunction with and not replace the 
tank. 
10. This being the case, the selection of the 
future battle tank will be made in accordance 
with criteria such as were used in the past but 
taking account of the interests of the allies as 
weil as of national interests. A great difficulty 
is of course that no mathematical model has yet 
been found for an accurate assessment of combat 
effectiveness. 
11. All technical and taciical experience in 
Europe and in the western alliance as a whole 
1. Document 805 ; for the text of the recommendation 
and the Council's reply see Appendix I. 
should be made available to reduce expenditure as 
much as possible. A. way should therefore be 
found to co-operate in a common defence effort 
over and above purely national economie inter-
ests, thus opening the way to multilateral pro-
grammes. The development of a new type of tank 
would be very expensive and multilateral develop-
ment should be imposed by governments. Indus-
trial partners should have the genuine will to 
co-operate on a long-term basis and any limited 
efforts, whether in time or otherwise, should be 
excluded. 
12. Here it should be noted that in the mid-
1960s and mid-1970s abortive efforts were made 
for the joint development of a battle tank. How-
ever, on the central front there are still four 
different types - American, British, French and 
German. Considerable progress would have been 
made if it were possible to reduce this number 
to one or two European models. This shows the 
dimensions of the effol'lt to be made. 
(b) Future combat aircra(t 
13. During the discussions at the symposium, no 
attempt was made to cover the full range of future 
combat aircraft requirements in Western Europe. 
The issue was limited to combat aircraft require-
ments for operations in the battlefield area. On 
the central front, the only main striking force 
is the air arm and this is likely to remain so in 
the foreseeable future. The local imbalance of 
ground forces can only be balanced by air power 
with its flexibility and quick reaction capability 
in space and time. The air forces should there-
fore have offensive support aircraft in their 
in ven tory. 
14. Battlefield support airerait must be located 
close to the front in order to react quickly. In 
order to survive, they have to be able to fly at 
a fairly low altitude at speeds of sorne 900 kph. 
A third requirement is the need to disperse air-
erait in a completely random manner on or out-
side airfields. This means that any future combat 
aircraft need at least a STOL capability if not 
VSTOL. 
15. The next joint European aircraft must be 
planned according to existing military require-
ments and the different and often paradoxical 
concepts of> for instance, the Royal Air Force and 
the German air force should be reconciled. Our-
rent joint efforts indicate that this would be 
possible. Time schedules also should be harmon-
ised. However, a speedy decision is necessary 
and the future combat aircraft should be designed 
at a priee that :the European nations could accept 
in order to avoid buying a cheaper off-the-shelf 
aircraft from the United States. The European 
nations would as a last resort have to accept a 
United Sta;tes aircraft if they were too slow in 
reaching decisions, otherwise there might be 
doubts about the credibility of European defence. 
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16. If the aircraft were to be developed as an 
international collaborative programme, the cost 
could be reduced both directly through cost-
sharing and indirectly through increased sales. 
17. Your Rapporteurs wish to refer to Recom-
mendation 332, adopted by the Assembly on 19th 
June 1979, in which the Council was asked to 
arrange for the neXIt fighter aircraft to be a 
joint European venture by promoting co-operation 
between the existing management consortia pro-
ducing Jaguar and Tornado. The ministers con-
cerned have already discussed this issue several 
times and your Rapporteurs hope they will 
ultimately concur with the Assembly' request. 
18. In reply to Recommendation 332 on 24th 
October 1979, the Council referred to this question 
as follows: 
"4. The Council reaffirm the great import-
ance which the governments of the member 
states attach to the maintenance of efficient 
capacities in the aviation and space sector 
for the future of Europe. The appropriate 
government departments in France, the 
United Kingdom and the Federal Republic of 
Germany are firmly resolved to develop a 
joint European taCitical fighter aircraft for 
the nineties. 
Such a complex venture, which will involve 
the most modern technologies, poses many 
difficult problems which the countries con-
cerned have already begun to study. For 
instance, they will endeavour to harmonise 
their respeetive operational requirements and 
the time factors in order to find a con-
figuration which will satisfy all concerned. 
In the course of these deliberations, the 
work will be apportioned between the conn-
tries concerned, industrial partnerships 
established, and the most expedient form of 
management agreed." 
19. In this context it may be of interest to quote 
also the Council's reply to another part of the 
Assembly's recommendation to the effeCit that 
governments be urged "to provide the European 
helicopter industry with orders necessary for 
uninterrupted development and production" : 
"5. The governments of France, the United 
Kingdom, the Federal Republic of Germany 
and Italy have set up a joint steering com-
mittee on the helicopter industry. The com-
mittee has concluded its studies on expected 
military requirements into the nineties. At 
the presen1t time it is working on a common 
technology programme which will form the 
basis for joint action with regard to military 
helicopters. Only when that programme is 
ready will it be possible to decide what 
orders can be provided for the European 
helicopter industry." 
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(c) Building new naval cra(t 
20. The problems of naval shipbuilding were 
necessarily considered within the larger and more 
complex framework of the shipbuilding industry 
as a whole. This industry is now passing through 
one of the most serious crises in its existence. 
Production has declined from 35-40 million gross 
registered tons to 20-25 million gross registered 
tons. There is an unused tonnage of 50 million 
gross registered tons. The European shipbuilding 
industry can attain Japan's high level of effi-
ciency only if it manages to make the best use 
of its overall size. Only then can it develop a 
programme of specialisaJtion and rationalisation. 
There is no ra;tionalisation and specialisation in 
naval construction, i.e. the five major ship-
building countries are building the same types of 
frigates, minesweepers and offshore patrol ships. 
Even within individual countries new naval cons-
truction is subdivided between many shipyards. 
If this trend persists, technological developments 
might regress rather than advance. In order to 
arrive at a better product, the standardisation 
of elementary components and modules and con-
tainerisation have to be promoted between the 
Western European shipbuilding countries. 
21. One of the most important problems to be 
faced at the present time is that of prodn<~tion 
capacity. Co-operation in Europe is essential since 
the industry would be better able to produce 
the necessary components at an economie priee at 
European level than at national level. Sacrifices 
will have to be made in order to survive. 
22. A certain level of standardisation, based on 
United States standards, has been attained in 
that ali NATO nations respect certain specifi-
cations and quality norms. 
23. In naval doctrine there is an essential differ-
ence between ships for a deep ocean navy and for 
a coastal naYy. It is essential to mruintain a deep 
ocean capability in Europe, otherwise the defence 
of the North .Atlantic routes would be wholly in 
the hands of the United States. 
24. Y our Rapporteurs wish to draw attention to 
the mine counter measure vesse! project which is 
a good example of successful co-operation in a 
naval programme. This was conducted jointly by 
Belgium, France and the Netherlands. An overall 
maritime and naval policy for Western Europe 
should be adopted and the WEU governments 
should be reminded of the need to consider both 
the civil and military aspects of the maritime 
situation. Failing such a policy, no shipbuilding 
industry will open its books and show its com-
petitors its plans for the future. 
( d) Missiles 
25. In the Working Group's discussions on 
tactical missiles likely to become operational in 
the 1990s, it was pointed out that, except for very 
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short-range firings, such missiles would probably 
replace non-guided weapons. 
26. The scope for using certain types of missiles 
will become greater and the reliability of the 
new missiles will be enhanced by a reduction in 
the number of electro-mechanical componenlts. 
The use of a smaller number of very highly inte-
grated components, microprocessors and specifie 
integrated functions will allow the reliability of 
electronic circuits to be increased to a very large 
degree. The cost of tactical missiles mighJt be 
reduced considerably. 
27. As far as international co-operation, inter-
operability and standardisation are concerned, 
the best solution would probably be for each 
country to agree to specialise in a certain type 
of missile and adopt other types of missiles pro-
duced in other countries. Interoperability in itself 
might not produce effective weapons. 
28. It would be useful to have severa! versions 
of the same missile and this could be a favourable 
factor for facilitating negotiations for achieving 
acceptable forms of collaboration. For instance, 
the replacement for the Jaguar aircraft would 
have to be equipped with sorne form of armament 
for self-defence and/or air-to-air attack. With 
two different types of warhead, the missiles with 
which the J aguar's replacement would be 
equipped could be extremely effective. The total 
weight would have to be minimised in order to 
achieve a multi-target rôle. 
29. New technology could lead to smaller 
missiles capable of performing more than one 
task, which in turn could weil lead to less 
arguments over different types of future 
aircraft. 
30. Your Rapporteurs wish to point out that in 
Document 805 on the industrial bases of 
European security a list was given of European 
missile programmes. 
31. Whether in the future a European cruise 
missile should be built led to a lengthy debate 
and the experts could not agree on whether such 
a missile could be used tactically and deliver 
conventional explosives. So far the cruise missile, 
as developed by the Americans, has a nuclear 
warhead which is the only effective explosive 
because of the low weight requirement to ensure 
the missile's invulnerability. 
(e) Electronic communications 
32. A global defence communication system that 
would satisfy ail the needs of the general staffs 
and be immune to most threats should be 
considered beyond reach economically. Never-
theless, important and feasible improvements 
will be made in the future. New technologies 
and operational needs together will create the 
communications of the future. 
33. Defence communications span the entire 
globe and represent many billions of dollars 
with an inventory of hundreds of thousands of 
various communication deviees and equipment. 
There are three types of communications : 
strategie, long distance and tactical. 
34. Digital communication will involve more 
and more integrated communications equipment 
dealing with message processing. The combination 
of computer and telecommunication techniques 
and technologies will constitute a new system 
of communications which, however, to be 
functional would require a high level of 
interoperability. Whenever possible, a certain 
degree of standardisation should also be sought. 
35. The cost of digital technology and advanced 
signal processing is steadily decreasing. The 
new powerful tactical communication technology 
could bring about a revolution in commanù 
communications. For using relays by satellite, 
aircraft or ground installations, there will have 
to be provision for more data processing. Packet 
radios will play a major rôle in mobile units. 
36. New developments in electronic communi-
cations are now possible since the size and weight 
of tactical equipment have been greatly reduced. 
Interference and jamming would be made more 
difficult by virtue of the system's wide 
geographie spread and the wide spread of data 
dissemination. Until now there has been very 
little integration of communications systems, but 
new technologies would permit an integrated 
approach which should be adopted by Europe 
since otherwise it would be overtaken by events 
in ten years' time. This is especially true for 
the systems of data handling in the United States 
with the tracking and data relay satellite system 
(TDRSS). United States technology is already 
well ahead of European systems. 
37. In the draft recommendation to Docu-
ment 805, the Assembly already recommended 
to the Council that greater European co-ordin-
ation of research and development should be 
ensured in such branches of advanced technology 
as integrated circuits, microprocessors, radar 
systems, lasers and infrared sensors for weapons 
systems. It is not acceptable for Europe to 
remain dependent on imported computer parts 
for its own military equipment just because they 
are not produced in Europe at present. This is 
most important. 
(() Future weapons in general 
38. With regard to future weapons, special 
attention should be drawn to new technology for 
command and control of the battlefield. This 
topic is, of course, closely linked to the preced-
ing one. 
39. The process of command will be greatly 
facilitated thanks to new developments such as : 
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(a) microelectronics which will enhance the 
automatic data-processing capability 
and flexibility ; 
(b) infrared, radar and thermal imagery 
which will greatly facilitate surveillance 
and target acquisition and improve 
designation activities ; remotely-piloted 
helicopters which will also be able to 
fly over enemy territory ; 
( c) headquarters which will establish facili-
ties for analysing, storing, presenting 
and distributing information ; 
(d) precision-guided munitions, multi-rocket 
systems and remotely-delivered mines to 
meet enemy attack. 
40. The most important piece of new technology 
is in remotely-piloted vehicles and precision-
guided missiles, whose potential when used 
together is incalculable. 
41. Among new weapons which would appear 
to be indispensable are those which will enable 
us to discover the enemy's intentions as early 
as possible and those which will enable us to 
interfere with his ability to move freely. There-
fore Europe requires new technology weapons 
of surveillance, target acquisition and engage-
ment, together with secure and hardened means 
of directing them, i.e. remotely-piloted helicop-
ters, automatic data-processing, electronic 
countermeasures, electronic counter counter-
measures and precision-guided missiles, multi-
rocket systems, remotely-delivered mines, rapid 
agents of fire and movement, and all the 
command arrangements appropriate to them. 
42. Your Rapporteurs wish to underline that 
if there were only one field in which govern-
ments could make a start, it should be in this 
field. There should be a continuons dialogue 
between ministers of defence, commanders-in-
chief, lower levels of command and industrialists. 
Expense is such that European collaboration 
here is essential. 
III. Conclusions 
43. The discussions in Working Group III were 
most competently summed up by Admirai Sir 
Raymond Lygo, the group's General Rapporteur 
at the symposium. The text of this summary is 
appended to the report. 
44. Nevertheless, your Rapporteurs wish to 
draw sorne conclusions of their own. They wish 
to point out that the European armaments 
industry is based mainly in France and in the 
United Kingdom. In both countries sorne 60% 
of this industry is established in ordnance 
factories which come directly under the 
ministries of defence. Most of the work there 
is carried out at the r·equest of the military. 
An important part of the remaining 40 % is 
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established in nationalised industries such as 
Aérospatiale and British Aerospace, which come 
under the ministries of industry, and a smaller 
part is represented by private industry. It is 
quite clear that the governments, through their 
ministries of defence, and industry have a pre-
ponderant say in the workings of the industries, 
which justifies WEU's exclusive responsibility 
for both armaments and defence matters in 
accordance with the modified Brussels Treaty. 
45. In other countries the situation is rather 
different. In the Federal Republic of Germany 
only 200,000 persons out of a total work force 
of 25 million are employed in the armaments 
industry. This means that armaments represent 
only 2 % of Federal German industrial pro-
duction. The main hardware produced are 
aircraft and tanks. The industry is private 
but the Federal Government, indirectly, by way 
of financing, and of course as the main customer, 
has a say in the type of products. In Italy the 
armaments industry is of even less importance, 
and in the Benelux countries only a few larger 
industries such as Philips work for the military 
market. 
46. In France and Britain especially, but also 
in the other European countries, governments 
have a great influence on military production. 
47. On the governmental side, first they should 
support and actively deveilop the national 
industrial base in advanced technology. The 
means to do so are considerable and, as an 
example, your Rapporteurs can cite the United 
States where the government, through its 
specialised agencies, gives considerable impetus 
to avionics, aerospace and advanced electronics. 
48. Second, governments should adopt firm 
medium- and long-term planning. 
49. Third, financing and budgeting shouJd be 
prepared and established in time. 
50. Fourth, for important programmes, an 
international basis should be laid down. Several 
joint programmes have already been concluded 
successfully and your Rapporteurs wish to name 
as examples Tornado, Airbus, and missile 
programmes such as Milan, Hot and Roland. On 
the basis of past experience, the efficiency of this 
type of programme could certainly be improved. 
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51. Fifth, the government programme manage-
ment agencies should improve their efficiency. 
Government control should be limited using a 
minimum staff with a maximum of responsibility 
in the programme control function. 
52. Sixth, governments should be aware of the 
limits of a country of European size. 
53. Seventh, transatlantic co-operation on a 
basis of equality is possible only if there is a 
balance in the ability to co-operate. In most 
cases, this means a European, not only a national 
partner capability. 
54. Eighth, the European governments should 
be willing to co-ordinate licensing and purchasing 
programmes for United States equipment. 
Transatlantic co-operation is desirable in care· 
fully selected areas. 
55. On the industrial side it should be realised 
that the funding of applied research and basic 
technology developments is part of good indus-
trial performance. 
56. Industry should anticipate the requirements 
for future programmes of military advanced 
technology products. 
57. In the case of international programmes, 
joint transnational industrial proposais should 
be made. 
58. Present management structures for inter-
national programmes should be further developed 
and improved to ensure continuity. 
59. Temporary interruptions of international 
programmes should be avoided by the industrial 
partners in the sense that labour or other prob-
lems in one country should not jeopardise the 
competitiveness of international programmes. The 
spirit of international co-operation should prevail 
in order to establish a firm basis for customer 
confidence. 
60. Although there is much that can be done 
by industry, your Rapporteurs are convinced that 
the main impetus has to come from the govern-
ments in order to establish a healthy climate for 
European collaboration. Your Rapporteurs have 
summed up these considerations in the recom-
mendation to this report. 
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RECOMMENDA TION 329 1 
on the industrial bases of European security 2 
The Assembly, 
Considering that the time is ripe to review the results achieved so far by the various forms of European 
armaments co-operation ; 
its Considering the military and economie need for Europe to acquire at least cost the means of ensuring 
security, a condition of its independance ; 
Considering the technical possibilities of member countries and the constantly-rising cost of arma-
ments a.t the research, development and production stages ; 
Considering moreover the importance of the armaments industries in the economies of severa! member 
countries and the ability of sorne of them to produce many types of equipment without international 
co-operation ; 
Considering :finally the immediate need to conclude an agreement on programmes for the production 
of military equipment to be interoperable by the end of the century or standardised wherever possible, 
taking account of the fact that research, development and production cover a period of from ten to fifteen 
years; 
Noting Resolution 62, adopted by the Presidential Committee on 18th January 1979, on the organ-
isation of a second symposium on a European armaments policy on 15th, 16th and 17th October for which 
this report is to be a preparatory document, 
REOOMMENDS THA.T THE COUNOIL 
1. Urge member countries to determine the military equipment : 
(a) to be produced on a co-operative basis; 
(b) to be produced with due regard for interface conditions to ensure interoperability; 
(c) to be the object of special efforts because of present shortcomings in Europe and their foreseeable 
importance ; 
2. Assess the resulta and advantages of the varions forms of industrial co-operation in these fields to 
date, together with the difficulties and setbacks encountered ; 
3. Define methods of ensuring greater European co-ordination of research and development in such 
branches of advanced technology as integrated circuits, microprocessors, radar systems, lasers and infrared 
sensors for weapons systems ; 
4. lmprove methods of procuring armaments and, in close liaison with the industries concemed, introduce 
appropriate measures for facilitating the exchange of know-how and the protection of industrial proprietary 
rights; 
5. Seek frameworks for lasting co-operation between member countries by forming permanent industrial 
consortia, concluding European agreements on specifications and replacement schedules for military equip-
ment and working out harmonised methods of financing ; 
6. Work out methods and structures to improve decision-taking and production ca.pacity in 
European co-operation. 
1. Adopted by the Assembly on 19th June 1979 during the First Part of the Twenty-Fifth Ordinary Session 
(3rd Sitting). 
2. Explanatory Memorandum: see the Report tabled by Mr. Valleix on behalf of the Committee on Scientific, 
Technological and Aerospace Questions (Document 805). 
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REPLY OF THE COUNCIL 1 
to Recommendation 329 
l. The Council recognise the usefulness of identifying weapon systems which can be the object of 
collaborative production, of achieving improved interoperability where appropriate and of seeking 
areas where European efforts need to be particularly concentrated. The machinery for this sort of 
consideration already exists however. Within the Alliance as a whole, CNAD devotes considerable 
efforts to achieving interoperability in specifie equipment areas and IS at present testmg a penodic 
armaments planning system designed to improve co-operation between the member countries, parti-
cularly by increasing opportunities for standardisation and interoperability of the equipment used by 
them. As the Assembly is aware, the IEPG bears the main responsibility for identifying opportuni-
ties for collaboration in the design and production of defence equipment between European member 
countries. lts purpose includes the strengthening of the European factor in relationship with America 
and the maintenance of a healthy European defence industrial base. As part of its work the IEPG also looks 
regularly at areas of technology in the defence field to which member states should pay special attention. 
Furthermore, as the Council observed in their reply to Recommandation 335, the study at present 
being made by the Standing Armaments Committee of WEU may provide governments with a detailed and 
comparative analysis of the armaments industries in the member countries and assist them to direct their 
choices and their programmes towards increased co-operation. 
2. Industrial co-operation in collaborative projects has taken severa! differem forma. In every project, the 
form of co-operative structure adopted must be that beat suited to the particular circumstances. The Council 
believe that the governments, ministries and industries of member states are already fully aware of 
the advantages and disadvantages of different co-operative structures. 
3. European governments are very conscious of the importance of certain areas of advanced tech-
nology for both civil and military applications. In this connection they make every effort to extend 
their co-operation to these particular fields, either under CNAD and IEPG auspices or bilaterally 
as appropriate, with those nations who have similar interests and requirements. Such co-operation 
can take the form of information exchange or collaborative research and development for projects. 
Devising further formai methods for co-operation of this sort does not seem for the time being likely 
to promote co-operation. 
4. All nations have over the years devised procurement procedures best suited to their own cir-
cumstances. These are constantly being refined, and both CNAD and the IEPG have done work on 
harmonising procedures wherever this has been found possible or desirable. Certainly one example is 
in the field of industrial or intellectual property rights. This is a vital component of co-operation, 
and a sub-group of CNAD has been examining the problems. The Council do not believe that this 
work should be duplicated. 
5. Permanent industrial consortia may weil be established in the future as an effective means of 
undertaking collaborative armaments projects. However, industrial and management structures must 
be tailored to the particular circumstances of each project, and, before the establishment of a per-
manent consortium, the participants would have to be fully satisfied that there would be sufficient 
long-term work for the consortium, involving, in every case, the same nations and firms. The Council 
are aware that in CNAD, the IEPG, and FINABEL considerable work is being done on agreeing con-
cepts, specifications and on examining replacement timetables. The framework necessary to encourage 
co-operation already exists. As with industrial and managerial arrangements, methods of finance for 
co-operative projects must be flexible and must be those best suited to the circumstances of the 
project and to the budgetary systems of the participating nations. 
6. The Council believe that the necessary framework for decision-making already exista. The 
governments concemed are necessarily concentrating on the specifie problems raised by the considera-
tion of particular projects where their interests and requirements appear to be in sufficient confor-
mity. The Council believe that the improvement and tightening of European co-operation require 
fust and foremost the consideration and setting up of concrete projects rather than the devising of 
new structures and methodology. 
1. Communicated to the Assembly on 26th November 1979. 
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Summary of the discussions in Working Group III 
by Admiral Sir Raymond Lygo, General Rapporteur 
Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, it is a 
great pleasure for me to be invited here for this 
symposium as the Rapporteur of Working Group 
III. It has been a most interesting experience for 
me personally because it has made me try to 
reconcile two of my previous existences : as an 
ex-member of the Admiralty Board of the Royal 
N avy, and as a Managing Director of a part of 
the British armaments industry. From my former 
viewpoint as an ex-member of the Admiralty 
Board the achievement of a rational approach 
to arms procurement was made difficult because 
of the very real differences between the concepts 
of operation between the Royal Navy and other 
European na vies. And obviously the reconcilia-
tion of staff requirements must be the ideal 
starting poin:t for collaboration. In the second 
instance, I have come to learn of the very real 
disappointments that have occurred in British 
industry which have resulted from the failure 
to purchase British equipment. On analysis, too 
often this has been because of the reluctance 
of industry to get together with its foreign 
partners and give up a part of sorne cherished 
programme. But when you analyse this you 
find that failure to collaborate was not so rouch 
because British industry could not do so, but 
because of indecision on the part of govern:ment. 
We have been fortunate to have a balanced 
cross-view of the whole of the problem in Group 
III and we have had the opportunity to listen 
to views from people of quite different back-
grounds. Being a simple sailor, I have had to 
ask myself from time to time the question : What 
is it we are trying to do in this area of science 
and technology 1 so that I may remind myself 
of how I might hope to understand and solve the 
problem. I must confess I have found this dif-
ficult to answer and have rather assumed it will 
be, to be provocaMve. However, I have assumed 
it is to examine the harmonisation of European 
armaments procurement programmes in the light 
of rapid advances in technology. Why? Because 
we recognise that the cost and time of modern 
programmes is so large that, in general, if we 
do not harmonise we will finish up by buying 
American. And why would that be bad Y It would 
put us in the position of technologieal satellites 
and take us out of certain areas of advanced 
technology, and if this was not a bad enough 
affront to our dignity, the American concept 
of what is required in Europe in the eighties 
may not be correct. But perhaps of even greater 
importance is the profound effect on the selection 
of weapons systems any battlefield management 
system will demand. I do not believe that the 
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full implications of this communications explo-
sion have been generally realised. The manage-
ment system will demand to interface only with 
compatible systems. If we are to avoid total 
confusion we must be a part of this scene from 
the outset. 
Is cheapnessjlow cost the correct yardstick 
by which to measure effectiveness ? It has 
certainly been raised in the discussions within 
the group. I have in my time been taxed by 
Ministers of various persuasion with the allega-
tion that "the best is the enemy of the good". 
My standard reply has always been: "I did not 
choose the enemy, Minister, you did." And if 
you choose the best in Europe, or in the world, 
to be my enemy, then I am afraid I can do no 
less than ask for the best in return. Not because 
it must be so, but because if I do not, I am 
evading my responsibility to my men and anyway 
I know I will probably finish up with less than 
I need in any event ! 
This eternal dilemma of the honest military 
commander is very real indeed because he is 
closer to the reality of war and he is likely to get 
killed. 
A responsible military procurement author-
ity also has to face up to the very real industrial 
problem of producing something which is sale-
able. I have not changed my view since joining 
industry. The desirability of producing things 
that are saleable must be good but not, I sug-
gest, at the expense of satisfying the NATO 
requirement. To do so would be irresponsible. The 
answer, it seems to me, is to look for ways of 
providing a capability, which exists in a missile 
or other system without the expensive and sorne-
times cumbersome trappings that are necessary 
to go with it, in the more sophisticated NATO 
environment. I instance here the possibility of 
box launching missiles, first introduced by the 
Russians and which the French have exploited. 
This enables a small ship, for example, to be 
given a really serious punch. Of course, it does 
not have the constant reload or magazine capabi-
lity of a big ship, but it does possess a very 
strong capability in a limited sense. This, it seems 
to me, is one way to try to exploit our systems 
for export. Not by insisting that our own services 
take a degraded system. One way of reducing 
cost might be a frank exchange of ideas between 
industry and the planning staffs at the con-
ception stage, because there is no doubt that 
at this point it might be possible to save a great 
deal of expense merely by explaining the realities 
and costs of sorne of the tasks we are set. W e 
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certainly have a long way to go on this in the 
United Kingdom. There can be, and generally 
speaking there are, quite often fundamentally 
different views of the need for certain weapons 
systems. To take the simple example of the naval 
case, the British primarily are concerned with 
the defence of the Eastern Atlantic, and that 
is deep water. It means that they must have 
ships that will be able to operate within these 
waters in co-operaJtion with the United States 
navy. This is for them of fundamental impor-
tance. So if you attempt to discuss a system 
which is not capable of operating in this area, 
even though it may be capable of operating 
within the continental shelf or the Mediterranean, 
it just may not be good enough. 
But at least the Royal Navy recognises that 
it is the weapons system, not the ship, that 
matters. They came to that fundamental truth 
with the introduction of the turret at the end 
of the last century. But I found myself time and 
again reminding members of my own group that 
it was a weapons system we should be addressing, 
and not the individual bits and pieces. 
In addressing the important topic of 
standardisation of warships there appeared to be 
a fairly common confusion that you can switch 
from building tankers to warships and back 
again in a short space of time. A moment's 
thought will demonstrate lthat this really is not a 
practical proposition, and therefore the warship 
building capacity of Europe, which is probably 
no more than is needed for the event, will need to 
be preserved at about its present size. 
Unfortunately, and quite probably, the com-
mercial facts of life will not make the survival 
of the broader shipbuilding base possible. 
Although this is a matter of considerable concern, 
it is, in a European armaments sense I suspect, 
nowhere near as critical as the need to maintain 
our warship building capacity. We agreed that 
a start could be made in producing a standard 
range of interchangeable components (pumps, 
valves, etc.) designed to agreed characteristics, 
and that containerisation could help. 
The air forces of Europe have a very dif-
ficult problem on the central front, but the really 
important question is not so much how they 
attempt the task but whether they attempt it, 
i.e. should you risk an ;ES million aircraft on a 
bridge 1 We were given a persona! view of how 
the important tri-national deliberation should 
conclude and debated the important question 
of STOL/VSTOL. We are developing and have 
developed the most sophisticated battlefield point-
defence systems, and they will have mobility. 
And it is pointless to pretend that the threat 
to low-flying aircraft is not going to increase 
dramatically in the next few years. This leads, 
not to the demise of the aircraft, far from it, 
but to the development of stand-off systems 
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and also underlines how important it is for 
airerait to survive the first exchange, which 
to me means VSTOL, spell it any way you like, 
and thereafter to be able to perform a multi-
purpose rôle, not because it is so very elever 
aerodynamically, but because it is equipped with 
the necessary systems that will give it this 
capability. 
Air forces must look upon the cruise missile, 
and I use the term in the most general sense, 
as their ally, not a competitor. There will be a 
great need for the airerait that survive to do 
those things which only aircraft can do best. 
Our task as designers of armaments should be 
to ensure they do survive. 
Where do we go in the future with the 
hattie tank 1 What is its rôle ? If the history 
of war teaches us anything, it is that those who 
prepare for the last one are at a disadvantage. 
We received a description of sorne of the options 
open to fitting guns to the next generation of 
tanks and quite clearly there must be a great 
deal of room for argument. We touched on the 
problem of propulsion, but not directly on the 
effect that improved infrared seekers might have 
on the choice. 
As a naval officer I reserve my comments, 
and am probably prudent so to do. But I know 
this: weapons of ail sorts are getting "smarter" 
and the tank is one kind of metal box that I 
am uneasy about. 
W e finished by addressing the future of 
weapons in general and concentrated on the 
importance of the man and of human decision-
making in any future hattie scenario. I agree 
with most of this, so long as, of course, it is 
not an excuse for a lack of technical ability. Too 
often in British history we have found this to 
be the case. 
There is no doubt of the genuine desire that 
has been expressed in my group for a sane 
approach to the procurement of weapons systems 
in Europe and I would sum up our debates as 
follows: 
Insummary: 
(i) Advancing technology will result in smaller, 
more intelligent missiles ; and the use of western 
know-how applied to guided weapons could be 
the best way to correct the imbalance of forces 
between East and West at a priee we can 
afford. 
(ii) At the moment we are not bad at our 
job given a line of sight. The next step is to 
harness surveillance, target acquisition and hom-
ing to extend our capability to longer ranges and 
indirect fire. This will lead to the computerised 
integration of battlefield intelligence and the 
automatic selection of channels of fire. The 
importance of acquiring a common language for 
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the integration of this information is of vital 
importance to the continuance of an independent 
European armaments industry. 1 really doubt 
whether many people have grasped this point. 
(iii) We must start to think total weapons sys-
tems and stop considering guided weapons and 
their vehicles separately. 
(iv) A modest start must be made in specifying 
standard, interchangeable components for war-
ships. Containerisation could be helped by the 
increasing use of data highways. 
It is idle to pretend that either industry 
alone, or the chiefs-of-staff alone, or governments 
alone, can make this happen. There are too many 
horses pulling in too many directions. 1 make 
no apology to my predecessors in the ministries, 
neither do 1 have to apologise to my contem-
poraries in industry, for saying that the prime 
responsibility for this must fall to governments. 
And too often, overburdened Ministers have too 
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little time to really understand the problem. 1 
would suggest that if we are to make a reality 
of standardisation of equipment in Europe then 
this can only be done at the highest government 
level, and 1 sincerely hope that the time will be 
provided to make sure that the debate is informed 
and that the consequences of standardisation are 
understood. If this does not take place, then 
1 suspect that we shall come back to a forum 
of this kind in a few years' time and find that 
very little really and truly has happened except 
that the explosion in technology and battlefield 
management has been so great that we will have 
been left so far behind we will have little choice 
but to sub-contract from the United States. We 
must be realistic about this. 
What do 1 carry away from the discussion 
so far and those which I hope are to follow ? 
A genuine desire to see things better. It must 
now be matched with a determination on the part 
of those people who matter to understand the 
problem better and to come to grips with it. 
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Draft Opinion 
on the budget of the ministerial organs of WEU 
for the financial year 1979 
The Assembly, 
Noting tha.t in communica.ting the budget of Western European Union as a whole the Council ha.s 
complied with the provisions of Article VIII (c) of the Charter; 
Ha.ving ta.ken note of the contents, 
Has no commenta to ma.ke a.t this stage on the figures communicated. 
1. Adopted unanimously by the Committee. 
2. Members of the Committee : Mr. A.Zber (Chairman) ; 
MM. Jager, A.driaensens (Vice-Chairmen) ; MM. Ahrens, 
Antoni, Bonalumi, DeZ Duca, Depietri, Evers (Alternate : 
von Hassel), Lord Hughes, MM. Jeambrun, Krieps, 
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McNamara, Orsini, Page, Peeters, Schleiter, Stainton, 
Tummers (Alternate : Voogd), Vohrer, Mrs. van der 
Werf-Terpstra. 
N.B. The names of those taking part in the vote are 
printed in italics. 
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Draft Recommendation 
on improving the status of WEU staff 
The Assembly, 
We1coming the decision of the councils of the co-ordinated organisations to grant a reversionary 
pension to widowers of female staff in the same conditions as for widows of male staff ; 
Considering that the establishment of a single appeals board would be the logica] foUow-up 
to the establishment of a joint section for the administration of pensions ; 
Again regretting that the Council has still not answered the Assembly's recommandation to 
set up a committee of senior experts to plan and promote a personnel policy, 
REOOMMENDS THAT THE CoUNCIL 
I. Promote in the framework of the co-ordinated organisations 1 : 
1. The creation of a single appeals board as soon as possible; 
2. The creation before 1983 of a joint body for the administration of pensions for staff of the 
co-ordinated organisations ; 
3. The establishment of a committee of senior experts to plan and promote a personnel policy 
and in particular : 
- to review the structure of grades ; 
- to study the possibi1ity of introducing a dua] grading system at every level of the hier-
archy; 
- to study the type and length of contracta ; 
- to co-ordinate staff rules ; 
- to review the indemnity for losa of job ; 
- to study methods of transferring an official from one co-ordinated organisation to another ; 
- to make clear the financial consequences of their proposais ; 
II. Invite the Secretary-General to inform WEU officiais of aU staff vacancies so that they may 
take advantage of aU possibilities for promotion which may arise within the organisation. 
1. OECD, NATO, WEU, Council of Europe, ESA. 
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Explanatory Memorandum 
(submitted by Mr. Kershaw, Rapporteur) 
1. Budget of the ministerial organs of WEU 
( i) Approval 
1. I have studied the budget of the min.isterial 
organs of WEU for the financial year 1979 and 
have no comment to make for the time being. I 
Secretariat-General .................. . 
Standing Armaments Committee ..... . 
Agency for the Control of Armaments . 
therefore submit the attached draft opinion and 
draft recommendation to the Committee for 
approvaà. 
(ii) The budget 
2. The total budget of WEU for 1979 as com-
pared to 1978 is as follows : 
Revised 1978 
budget 
;E 
666,705 
F 
4,815,825 
10,741,985 
1979 budget 
:E F 
786,660 
5,299,865 
11,928,930 
----------------------------------Office of the Clerk .................. . 
TOTAL BUDGET OF WEU ............ . 
(iii) WEU establishment 
3. The total establishment of WEU for 1979 
is as follows : 
Secretariat-General . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48 
Standing Armaments Committee . . . . 28 
Agency for the Control of Armaments ~ 
128 
Office of the Clerk . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28 
TOTAL ESTABLISHMENT OF WEU FOR 
1979 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 156 
U. Pension scheme 
4. In his report to the Assembly in June 1977\ 
Lord Selsdon proposed facilitating the applica-
tion of the pension scheme for WEU staff, on 
the one hand by setting up a pension unit to 
manage the pension scheme common to the 
co-ordinated organisations and, on the other 
hand, in a second stage, by setting up a joint 
management fund legally separate from the 
co-ordinated organisations and having its own 
staff and budget. 
5. The establishment of a joint section for the 
administration of pensions was agreed upon in 
May 1978, but this section will not be able to 
start exercising its duties bef ore 1st J anuary 
1980. This delay is due to problems of recruiting 
an official as head of the section, and con-
sequently the recruitment of other members of 
the staff had to be postponed. 
1. Document 7 42. 
7,778,000 8,517,000 
666,705 23,335,810 786,660 25,745,795 
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6. The Assembly realÏI*ls that this joint admin-
istrative section will inevitably run up against 
difficulties in fulfilling its task in its first years 
of operation. Such difficulties, however, should 
not be an obstacle to setting up an independent 
joint management fund which would be the best 
guarantee of pensions being paid regularly 
whatever the ups and downs of one or other 
co-ordinated organisation. 
7. It is also essential for the Council to decide 
without delay to set up a single appeals board 
for all the co-ordinated organisations in accord-
ance with the provisions of paragraph 15 of the 
abovementioned document. 
8. Replies to the questionnaire given in Docu-
ment 783 are appended. It will be noted that 
WEU will be refunding approximately F 24 
million to member governments in respect of 
validation of pensions. 
m. Careers and conditions of employment for 
staff in the co-ordinated organisations 
9. In Recommandations 302 and 327, the 
Assembly recommended that the Council pro-
mote, in the framework of the co-ordinated 
organisations : 
"The establishment as soon as possible of a 
committee of senior experts to plan and 
promote a personnel policy." 
10. So far, this recommendation has remained 
unanswered although for more than ten years 
the Assembly has continuously reported on 
obstacles encountered by its officiais in the 
course of their careers. Thus, within the Office 
of the Clerk itself, eighteen of the twenty-six 
officiais have already reached the last step in 
their grade (sorne of them severa! years ago) or 
will reach it within two years. As matters now 
stand, these officiais can expect no improvement 
in their career prospects. It is easy to understand 
the disappointment of officiais who have given 
the Assembly devoted service for many years -
sometimes more than twenty - and who should 
normally be able to have hopes of promotion. 
11. The Assembly therefore strongly urges the 
Council to set up a committee of experts to study 
the problem of careers and the structure of 
grades. Consideration might, for instance, be 
given to the possibility of introducing new 
categories of grades (there are now four : A, L, 
B, C), increasing the number of steps in each 
grade and introducing a dual grading system at 
every level of the hierarchy. 
12. The committee of experts should also study 
the îollowing problems : 
- The type of contract offered to officiais 
on recruitment (at present, an initial one-year 
contract followed by a contract of indefinite 
duration). 
Might consideration not be given to contracts 
of fixed duration, five years for instance, for 
Grade A posts requiring specifie technical 
qualifications ? 
13. - Co-ordination of staff rules : 
Since salary scales and allowances and the 
pension scheme rules of the co-ordinated organ-
isations are identical, the rules applying to their 
staff should be similar. 
14. - Indemnity for loss of job: 
In J anuary 1972, the WEU Council decided 
to grant an indemnity for loss of job to any 
member oî the staff holding a firm contract and 
fulfilling certain conditions 1 : 
1. (i) who holds a firm contract 1 ; 
(ii) and whose services are terminated for any one 
of the following reasons : 
- suppression of the budget post occupied by 
the staff member ; 
- changes in the duties of the budget post 
occupied by the staff member of such a 
nature that he no longer possesses the 
required qualifications ; 
- general staff cuts including those due to a 
reduction in or termination of the activities 
of an organisation ; 
- the withdrawal from the organisation of 
the member country of which the staff 
member is a national ; 
- the transfer of the headquarters of the 
organisation or of any of its units to 
another country and the consequent trans-
fer of the whole staff concerned ; 
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The indemnity amounts to one month's 
emoluments for each year of service, with a 
maximum equivalent to twenty-four months' 
emoluments. Nor must the indemnity represent 
a greater number of months than the staff mem-
ber would have had to serve until reaching the 
age limit for retirement as set out in the Staff 
Rules of the organisation. Consequently, a staff 
member having worked for more than twenty-
four years in the organisation and finding 
himself in one of the abovementioned cases 
without being near to retirement would have no 
claim to anything more than this maximum 
amount. It would seem fair to reconsider this 
matter with a view to taking greater account of 
the actual years of service by officiais in the 
organisation. 
15. - Methods of transferring an official from 
one co-ordinated organisation to another : 
At present, an official wishing to leave one 
organisation for another is obliged to resign and 
sign an initial contract with his new organisation. 
When such a case occurred recently in the Office 
of the Clerk of the Assembly, many problems 
arose over separation allowances and pension 
rights, although the official concerned was to 
take up a post in another co-ordinated organ-
isation. 
IV. Staff vacancies within WEU 
16. The Assembly renews its recommendation to 
the Secretary-General on the publication of staff 
vacancies in WEU. 
- the refusai by the staff member, where his 
contract does not cover the point, to be 
permanently transferred to a country 
other than that in which he is serving ; 
- withdrawal of seeurity clearance on 
grounds which do not warrant the dismissal 
of the staff member as a result of 
disciplinary action ; 
(iii) and who 
- is not offered a post in the same grade in 
the same organisation, or 
- is not appointed to a vacant post in one of 
the other co-ordinated organisations at a 
comparable remuneration, or 
- if employed in the public services, has 
failed to obtain immediate reintegration 
in his national, civil or military adminis-
tration. 
1. A firm contract shall be interpreted to mean a 
contract made with a staff member on completion of the 
probationary period. It goes without saying that a staff 
member who has held a firm contract in a co-ordinated 
organisation and who has subsequently been offered, 
either in that organisation or in another co-ordinated 
organisation, a contract involving a probationary period, 
shall be deemed to satisfy this condition if such contract 
is terminated during or on completion of such probation-
ary period. 
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It has noted with interest the Couneil's 
answers to written questions 1 but is convinced 
that certain posts might have been filled by 
WEU staff. Internai recruitment would have 
allowed an official to be promoted followed by 
a series of other possible promotions. 
1. See Appendix IV. 
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17. The geographical breakdown presumably 
has to be as fair as possible. Nevertheless, an 
official who has acquired wide experience in an 
organisation and who has the necessary qualifi-
cations should be preferred to an official 
recruited from outside the organisation, whatever 
his nationality. 
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APPENDIX I 
WEU BUDGET ESTIMATE FOR 1979 
Proposed expenditure and income 
A* B* C* TOTAL B + C 
i Francs Francs Francs 
Salaries and allowances .............. 889,285 6,905,400 14,263,600 21,169,000 
Pensions ............................ 66,420 421,200 2,007,400 2,428,600 
Travel .............................. 34,715 84,500 346,000 430,500 
Other operating costa ................ 125,995 443,765 546,430 990,195 
Purchase of furniture, etc. ........... 4,040 8,500 24,900 33,400 
Buildings ........................... - 132,000 241,700 373,700 
Total expenditure ................... 1,120,455 7,995,365 17,430,030 25,425,395 
WEU tax .......................... 304,290 2,389,500 4,893,500 7,283,000 
Other receipts ....................... 9,650 50,500 95,000 145,500 
Pension receipts ..................... 19,855 255,500 512,600 768,100 
Total income ....................... 333,795 2,695,500 5,501,100 8,196,600 
NET TOTAL ......................... 786,660 5,299,865 11,928,930 17,228,795 
National contributions 
J 
A* B* C* Office of the Clerk 
600ths 
i 
Belgium .................... 59 77,354.90 
France ..................... 120 157,332.00 
Federal Republic of Germany. 120 157,332.00 
Italy ....................... 120 157,332.00 
Luxembourg ................ 2 2,622.20 
Netherlands ................. 59 77,354.90 
United Kingdom ............ 120 157,332.00 
600 786,660.00 
Total WEU budget 
* A • Secretariat-General. 
B - International Secretariat of the Standing Armaments Committee. 
C - Agency for the Control of Armaments. 
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7. 
Francs Francs 
1,694,164.84 837,505 
3,445,759.00 1,703,400 
3,445,759.00 1,703,400 
3,445,759.00 1,703,400 
57,429.32 28,390 
1,694,164.84 837,505 
3,445,759.00 1,703,400 
17,228,795.00 8,517,000 
i 786,660 
Francs 25,745,795 
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Al 
Secretary-General 1 
Deputy Secretary-Genera.l 1 
Director of the Agency 
-
Assistant Secreta.ry-
General 1 
A7 -
A6 1 
A5 2 
A4 -
A3 3 
A2 2 
L5 1 
IA 1 
L3 1 
L2 1 
B6 -
B5 -
B4 8 
B3 7 
B2 5 
BI 2 
C6 -
C5 -
C4 1 
C3 8 
C2 2 
1 
48 
1. A . Secretariat-General. 
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Table of establishment 
WESTERN EUROPEAN UNION 
Bl Cl Total A,B,C 
- - 1 
- -
1 
-
1 1 
1 - 2 
- 1 1 
- 3 4 
1 6 9 
4 8 12 
- 1 4 
- 2 4 
- - 1 
1 - 2 
3 2 6 
- - 1 
- - -
- - -
4 8 20 
7 8 22 
- 2 7 
- -
2 
- - -
- 1 1 
4 
-
5 
3 9 20 
- - 2 
28 52 128 
B • International Secretariat of the Standing Armaments Committee. 
C - Agency for the Control of Armaments. 
2. Including four secretaries Translations /Publications. 
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Office of the Clerk 
Clerk 1 
-
-
Clerk Assistant 1 
-
. 
-
5 
22 
1 
32 
-
1 
-
4 
7 
-
-
1 
-
-
2 
-
28 
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RECOMMENDATION 327 1 
on improving the status of WEU staff 11 
The Assembly, 
Welcoming the decision of the councils of the co-ordinated organisations to set up a joint pensions 
administration section as a fust step towards the creation of a truly independant body to deal with pensions ; 
Reiterating its regret that provision has still not been made for a reversionary pension to be granted 
to the widowers of female staff in the same conditions as for the widows of male staff ; 
Deploring the fact tha.t no reply was given to the Assembly's recommandation to set up a committee 
of senior experts to plan and promote a personnel policy, 
REoOMMENDS THAT THE CouNOIL 
1. Promote in the framework of the co-ordinated organisations: 
1. The creation of an independant body for the administration of pensions for staff of the co-ordinated 
organisations; 
2. The granting of a reversionary pension to widowers of female staff in the same conditions as for 
the widows of male staff ; 
3. The establishment of a committee of senior experts to plan and promote a personnel policy; 
TI. Give consideration to using a percentage of the pension validation monies received to create a fund 
from which interest-bearing housing loans could be made to the staff of WEU; 
TIL Invite the Secretary-General to give priority, when vacancies arise, to staff a.lready serving in the 
organisation in order to ensure maximum career prospects. 
1. Adopted by the Assembly on 23rd November 1978 during the Seoond Part of the Twenty-Fourth Ordina.ry Session 
(13th Sitting). 
2. Explanatory Memorandum: see the Report tabled by Mr. Kershaw on behalf of the Committee on Budgeta.ry Affairs 
and Administration (Document 783). 
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REPLY OF THE COUNCIL 1 
to Recommendation 327 
I.l. In April 1978 the Council approved the 149th report of the Co-ordinating Committee concerning 
the principle that a joint pensions administrative section should be set up as an inter-organisation unit 
of the co-ordinated organisations. 
The stage now reached in recruiting staff and in the organisation of such a unit makes it likely 
that it will start work in the course of 1979. 
I.2. The Council approved on 21st March 1979 the 161st report of the Co-ordinating Committee con-
cerning the granting of reversionary pensions to widowers of female staff in the same conditions as for 
the widows of male staff with effect from 1st January 1979. 
This implies the reopening of the option for those female staff members concerned and includes 
the appropriate amendments to the Pension Scheme Rules. 
!.3. The Council indicated in their reply to Recommandation 302 that the functioning of the machinery 
for co-ordination was under review by various authorities ; this is still the case. 
II. The Secretary-General and the Budget Committee are at present considering various solutions to 
the problem of loans for the construction, purchase or improvement of living accommodation following 
the introduction of the Pension Scheme. 
III. The Council are aware of the limited scope for internai promotion due to the small size of the 
organisation, the need to respect the distribution of posts as between nationals of the member states and 
specifie technical qualifications for certain a.ppointments. 
The Secretary-Genera.l, however, while taking account of these restrictions, seeks every available 
opportunity to promote staff within the organisation. 
1. Communicated to the Assembly on 25th_ April 1979. 
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Written questions and replies of the Council 
(i) Question put by Mr. Stoffelen on the European 
Centre for Medium-Range Weather Forecasting and 
the reply of the Council 
Question : The European Centre for Medium-
Range Weather Forecasting, now being set up 
near Reading in the United Kingdom, will not 
be included in the framework of the so-called 
co-ordinated organisations, the reason given 
being that Yugoslavia is a member of the centre. 
Would the Council indicate whether this is 
correct and, if so, clarify the position~ 
What arrangements will be made for careers 
and conditions of employment of staff in this 
centre 1 
Will this situation delay the working of the 
centre? 
Reply : While awaiting the decision of the Coun-
cils of the five co-ordinated organisations, the 
European Centre for Medium-Range Weather 
Forecasting is represented by an observer in the 
various co-ordinating bodies, including the Co-
ordinating Committee of Government Budget 
Experts. 
Meanwhile, the Council of the centre has 
adopted the salary and allowance scales for staff 
of the co-ordinated organisations serving in the 
United Kingdom and, in general, the principles 
governing conditions of employment in the co-
-ordinated organisations. 
The Council are not aware that the present 
situation has delayed the work of the centre. 
(ii) Question put by Mr. Voogd on the number of 
A and L grade posts which became vacant in 1918 
and the reply of the Council 
Question : Would the Council inform the Assem-
bly of the total number of A and L grade posts 
which became vacant in 1978 ? 
Of these posts how many were, or will be, 
filled by permanent officiais already working in 
the organisation Y 
How many promotions did, or will, this 
represent 1 
Reply : The total number of A and L grade posts 
which became vacant in 1978 was six, of which 
one was on the establishment of the Secretariat-
General and the others were posts for experts in 
the Armaments Control Agency. 
The Secretariat-General post has been filled 
by the promotion of a permanent official already 
on the staff. 
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For the organisation as a whole, staff is 
drawn equitably from nationals of the member 
states. 
Furthermore, in the particular case of the 
Armaments Control Agency, specifie technical 
qualifications are required of candidates for all 
appointments to the higher ranks. 
These considerations, together with the fact 
that the total establishment of WEU is not large, 
tend to limit the scope for internai promotion. 
(iii) Questions put by Mr. van Waterschoot and by 
Mr. Warren on the recruitment and promotion of 
WEU staff and the reply of the Council 
Question 1 : In its reply to W ritten Question 193, 
the Council referred to the recruitment and 
promotion of WEU staff in 1978. Can it indicate 
how many times Article 43, paragraph (a) of the 
Staff Rules was applied in 1977 and 1978 and, 
in each case, what were the results of such 
application 1 
In view of the requirement for technical 
qualifications mentioned in the Council's reply, 
does the Council not consider a number of years' 
service with WEU to be an appreciable element 
of qualifications ? 
In view of the proportions which have to be 
respected among nationals of member states, can 
the Council not consider a table of establishment 
which is sufficiently flexible to allow sorne degree 
of rotation of neighbouring grades, particularly 
in the case of A4 and A5 and B3 and B4 staff ? 
Does the Council consider it acceptable that 
officiais should have to remain at the same grade 
for more than ten years with no hope of pro-
motion and cannot it consider introducing a dual-
grading system for such officiais ? 
Question 2 : The personnel question, with specifie 
regard to the WEU situation, should receive 
the Council's continuons attention. Many posts 
are fixed in the narrow organigramme of the 
organisation, depriving, for instance, the 
assistants of the Assembly's committees of any 
promotion. Would the Council not consider dual 
grading or a revision of the organigramme for 
those who are at the top of their grades ? 
Reply : Whenever a vacancy occurs the 
Secretary-General seeks a solution in the first 
place under Article 43 (a) of the WEU Staff 
Rules. However, because of the size of the organ-
isation and the limited number of staff available, 
there is often no serving staff member suited to 
the vacant post. This meant, for example, that 
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the two vacancies arising in 1977 had to be filled 
by recruitment from outside the organisation and 
in 1978, of the 11 vacancies, only 4 could be 
filled by promotion within WEU while 7 called 
for external recruitment. 
The number of years served with WEU is 
of course an important element of qualification, 
but can only be part of a wider range of con-
siderations. Other important factors are for 
instance, specialised knowledge of certain aspects 
of the organisation's work, geographical distribu-
tion as between the seven member countries and 
in a small organisation, working in two official 
languages only, linguistic balance and capability. 
Again, due to the small number of staff 
involved, the Council have found it impossible 
to establish a flexible type of establishment allow-
ing for more than a very limited degree of 
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rotation as between neighbouring grades. But the 
Council fully realise the problems that staff face 
in such a rigid, indeed virtually unchanging, 
establishment. 
Salary scales for the co-ordinated organ-
isations are so structured as to try and com-
pensate for the limited promotion possibilities. 
The introduction of a dual-grading system would 
involve a redesigning of the scales to be applied 
within the co-ordinated framework. 
The Council are not convinced that such a 
reform would necessarily lead to a solution of the 
problem. However, one of the co-ordinated organ-
isations has recently sought the opinion of the 
Co-ordinating Committee on this matter and the 
Council would of course consider any recom-
mendation the Co-ordinating Committee might 
submit as a result. 
1 
~ 
1 
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APPENDIX V 
Letter from Mr. Kershaw to the Secretary-General on the 
pension unit and reply by the Secretary-General 
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13th !larch 1979 
When submitting my report on the opinion on the budget of ministerial organs of Western 
European Union for the financial year 1978, 1 spoke of the problem of the pension unit for the 
co-ordinated organisations. 
This unit was agreed upon by the Councils of the co-ordinated organisations last May and 
1 was led to believe that this unit would begin to function in the fust month of this year. 
1 am now given to understand that the head of this unit has still not been appointed and 
it therefore follows that the unit as such does not exist. 
1 should be grateful if you could let me know the reasons for this further delay and what 
steps are being taken by the Secretaries General of the co-ordinated organisations to see that this 
unit is set up within the next couple of months. 
(Signed) Anthony KERSHAW 
22nd May 1979 
Dear Mr. Kershaw, 
1 thank you for your letter dated 13th March 1979 concerning the joint administrative pen-
sion unit. There has been, as you said, some delay in appointing the head of this unit, but 1 am 
pleased to inform you that these di:fficulties have now been overcome and that the unit will probably 
start functioning fully at the end of this year. 
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Yours sincerely, 
(Signed) E. LONGERSTAEY 
DOCUMENT 824 
Dear Mr. Kershaw, 
APPENDIX VI 
Letter from the Secretary-General to Mr. Kershaw 
on pension scheme options 
APPENDIX VI 
I refer to your letters concerning the options exercised by the staff members of the co-ordi-
nated organisations in respect of the pension scheme, and my interim reply, No. IX.33, dated 8th 
September 1978. 
The additional information that I have received since the option was reopened in 1979 for 
female staff members as a result of the 16lst report of the Co-ordinating Committee of Government 
Budget Experts (approved by all five councils) is still incomplete and partially not yet released for 
publication. I regret therefore that I cannot send you the completed questionnaires relating to the 
other four co-ordinated organisations ; however, Annex II to this letter contains some information 
which I have been able to assess. 
I enclose detailed information about WEU in Annex I; you will, however, note from the 
footnote that the figures are not yet final. 
I hope that these two annexes will give you a clearer insight into the results of the intro-
duction of the pension scheme. 
Yours "sincerely, 
(Signed) E. LONGEBSTAEY 
ANNEX I 
Western European Union 
SG ACA SAC Assembly Total 
1. Number of staff employed as at 1.7.79 40 51 27 26 144 
2. Number of staff having opted for the pension scheme 
with full validation of past service (Option I) 12 32 15 19 78 
3. Number of staff having opted for the pension scheme 
with partial validation of past service (Option II) 2 1 3 
4. Number of staff having opted for the provident fund 17 5 5 2 29 
5. Number of staff recruited after 1.7.74 and hence 
automatically affiliated to the pension scheme 9 14 7 4 34 
6. Number of pensions already being paid to: 
( i) retired finvalidated staff 6 17 8 1 32 
(ii) survivors forphans 2 8 2 2 14 
7. Total amount of money due to governments for 
pension validation costs : 
Secretariat-General F.frs 4,383,000 
ACA F.frs 9,651,000 
SAC F.frs 4,425,000 
Assembly F.frs 5,619,000 
Total F.frs 24,078,000 
Note: When an agreement with the United Kingdom Government on the social security affiliation is concluded, 
the option for staff serving in the United Kingdom will be reopened ; the figures quoted above are therefore not 
yet final. 
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ANNEX II 
1. The situation as at lat July 1979 with regard to the options for the pension scheme for the four 
co-ordinated organisations: NATO, OECD, ESA and WEU is: 
- total of staff members involved in the option 5, 715 
- opted for the pension scheme 3,285 
- opted to remain in the provident fund 2,430 
For the Council of Europe a pension scheme has already been in force since lat January 1967. 
2. The total number of pensions being paid as at lat July 1979 for the five co-ordinated organisations : 
NATO, OECD, ESA, WEU and the Council of Europe is: 
- retirement and invalidity 641 
- survivors and orphans 283 
211 
APPENDIX. VII 
Budgetary establishments of the organisations as at 30th June 1918 by countries 
Co-ordinatad Organisations Observers 
Council Total Countrias OECD NATO + SHAPE ESA WEU ECMWF 1 EP02 of Europe 
A-L B-C ALBC A-L B-C ALBC A-L B-C ALBC A-L B·C ALBC A·L B-C ALBC A·L B-C ALBC A-L B·C ALBC A-L B·C ALBC 
-- --------------------
--
-------------------- --
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 
------ -- ------------------------ --------------
Germany 181 165 346 164 98 262 97 113 210 442 376 818 
Belgium 1 1 2 606 1174 1780 1 - 1 608 1175 1783 
Canada 1 - 1 1 - 1 
Den mark 5 20 25 5 20 25 
Spain 5 - 5 5 - 5 
United States 2 - 2 17 1 18 4 - 4 23 1 24 
France 645 1043 1688 253 478 731 99 180 279 195 130 325 43 61 104 1235 1892 3127 
ltaly 146 391 537 35 23 58 181 414 595 
Japan 2 - 2 2 - 2 
Luxembourg 143 574 717 143 574 717 
Norway 17 54 71 17 54 71 
Netherlands 168 313 481 500 331 831 443 272 715 1111 916 2027 
Portugal 3 3 6 3 3 6 
United Kingdom 10 8 18 12 33 45 67 46 113 89 87 176 
Turkey and Greece 46 76 122 46 76 122 
--
-------------------------------- --
-------- --
Grand Total 649 1043 1692 254 479 733 1442 2959 4401 904 582 1486 55 94 149 67 46 113 540 385 925 3911 5588 9499 
1. European Centre for Medium-Range Weather Forecasting. 
2. European Patent Office. 
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APPENDIX VIII 
Membership of the co-ordinated organisations 
Organisations Observera 
Member countries 
OECD Council NATO ESA WEU ECMWF1 EPOD 
of Europe 
EUROPE 
Germany ............ x x x x x x x 
Austria ............. x x x x 
Belgium ............. x x x x x x x 
- Cyprus .............. x 
I>enmark ............ x x x x x x 
Spain •.••........ 0. x x x 
Fini and ••••••• 0 •• x x 
France .............. x x x x x x x 
Greece .............. x x x x x 
Ireland •••••••••• 0 •• x x x x 
Iceland ••• 0. 0. 0 ••••• x x x 
Ital y ............... x x x x x x 
IJechtenstein ......... x 
Luxembourg ......... x x x x x 
Malta ............... x 
Monaco .............. x 
Norway ............ x x x x 
Netherlands •••••••• 0 x x x x x x x 
Portugal ............ x x x 
United Kingdom ..... x x x x x x x 
Sweden ............. x x x x x 
Switzerland .......... x x x x x 
Turkey ............. x x x x 
Yugoslavia ........... x 
AMERIOA 
1 
Canada •..•..•.... 0. x x 
United States ....... x x 
~ AsiA 
Japan .............. x 
AUSTRALASIA 
Australia ............ x 
New Zealand ........ x 
TOTAL ••••••• 0 •••••••• 24 18 15 10 7 16 16 
1. European Centre for Medium-Range Weather Forecasting. 
2. European Patent Office. 
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Document 825 27th Novemher 1979 
Replies of the Cowacil to Recommendations 329 to 335 
RECOMMENDATION 329 1 
on the industrial bases of European security 2 
The Assembly, 
Considering that the time is ripe to review the resulta achieved so far by the various forms of European 
armaments co-operation ; 
Considering the military and economie need for Europe to acquire at least cost the means of ensuring 
its security, a condition of its independance ; 
Considering the technical possibilities of member countries and the constantly-rising cost of arma-
ments at the research, development and production stages ; 
Considering moreover the importance of the armaments industries in the economies of several member 
countries and the ability of some of them to produce many types of equipment without international 
co-operation ; 
Considering finally the immediate need to conclude an agreement on programmes for the production 
of military equipment to be interoperable by the end of the century or standardised wherever possible, 
taking account of the fact that research, development and production cover a period of from ten to fifteen 
years; 
Noting Resolution 62, adopted by the Presidential Committee on 18th January 1979, on the organi-
sation of a second symposium on a European armaments policy on 15th, 16th and 17th October for which 
this report is to be a preparatory document, 
REcoMMENns THAT THE CoUNcrr.. 
1. Urge member countries to determine the military equipment : 
(a) to be produced on a co-operative basis; 
(b) to be produced with due regard for interface conditions to ensure interoperability; 
(c) to be the object of special efforts because of present shortcomings in Europe and their foreseeable 
importance ; 
2. Assess the resulta and advantages of the various forms of industrial co-operation in these fields to 
date, together with the diffi.culties and setbacks encountered ; 
3. De:fine methods of ensuring greater European co-ordination of research and development in auch 
branches of advanced technology as integrated circuits, microprocessors, radar systems, lasers and infra-red 
sensors for weapons systems; 
4. Improve methods of procuring armaments and, in close liaison with the industries concemed, introduce 
appropriate measures for facilitating the exchange of know-how and the protection of industrial proprietary 
rights; 
5. Seek frameworks for lasting co-operation between member countries by forming permanent industrial 
consortia, concluding European agreements on specifications and replacement schedules for military equip-
ment and working out harmonised methods of financing ; 
6. Work out methods and structures to improve decision-taking and production capacity in 
European co-operation. 
1. Adopted by the Assembly on 19th June 1979 during the First Part of the Twenty-Fifth Ordina.ry Session 
(3rd Sitting). 
2. Expla.na.tory Memorandum: see the Report tabled by Mr. Valleix on behalf of the Committee on Soientific, 
Technologica.l and Aerospace Questions (Document 805). 
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1. The Council recognise the usefulness of identifying weapon systems which can be the object of 
collaborative production, of achieving improved interoperability where appropriate and of seeking 
areas where European efforts need to be particularly concentrated. The machinery for this sort of 
consideration already exists however. Within the Alliance as a whole, CNAD devotes considerable 
efforts to achieving interoperability in specifie equipment areas and is at present testing a periodic 
armaments planning system designed to improve co-operation between the member countries, parti-
cularly by increasing opportunities for standardisation and interoperability of the equipment used by 
them. As the Assembly is aware, the IEPG bears the main responsibility for identifying opportuni-
ties for collaboration in the design and production of defence equipment between European member 
countries. Its purpose includes the strengthening of the European factor in relationship with America 
and the maintenance of a healthy European defence industrial base. As part of its work the IEPG also looks 
regularly at areas of technology in the defence field to which member states should pa y special attention. 
Furthermore, as the Council observed in their reply to Recommendation 335, the study at present 
being made by the Standing Armaments Committee of WEU may provide governments with a detailed and 
comparative analysis of the armaments industries in the member countries and assist them to direct their 
choices and their programmes towards increased co-operation. 
2. Industrial co-operation in collaborative projects has taken several different forms. In every project, the 
form of co-operative structure adopted must be that best suited to the particular circumstances. The Council 
believe that the governments, ministries and industries of member states are already fully aware of 
the advantages and disadvantages of different co-operative structures. 
3. European governments are very conscious of the importance of certain areas of advanced tech-
nology for both civil and military applications. In this connection they make every effort to extend 
their co-operation to these particular fields, either under CNAD and IEPG auspices or bilaterally 
as appropriate, with those nations who have similar interests and requirements. Such co-operation 
can take the form of information exchange or collaborative research and development for projects. 
Devising further -formai methods for co-operation of this sort does not seem for the time being likely 
to promote co-operation. 
4. Ali nations have over the years devised procurement procedures best suited to their own cir-
cumstances. These are constantly being refined, and both CNAD and the IEPG have done work on 
harmonising procedures wherever this has been found possible or desirable. Certainly one example is 
in the field of industrial or intellectual property rights. This is a vital component of co-operation, 
and a sub-group of CNAD has been examining the problems. The Council do not believe that this 
work should be duplicated. 
5. Permanent industrial consortia may weil be established in the future as an effective means of 
undertaking collaborative armaments projects. However, industrial and management structures must 
be tailored to the particular circumstances of each project, and, before the establishment of a per-
manent consortium, the participants would have to be fully satisfied that there would be sufficient 
long-term work for the consortium, involving, in every case, the same nations and firms. The Council 
are aware that in CNAD, the IEPG, and FINABEL considerable work is being done on agreeing con-
cepts, specifications and on examining replacement timetables. The framework necessary to encourage 
co-operation already exists. As with industrial and managerial arrangements, methods of finance for 
co-operative projects must be flexible and must be those best suited to the circumstances of the 
project and to the budgetary systems of the participating nations. 
6. The Council believe that the necessary framework for decision-making already exists. The 
governments concerned are necessarily concentrating on the specifie problems raised by the considera-
tion of particular projects where their interests and requirements appear to be in sufficient confor-
mity. The Council believe that the improvement and tightening of European co-operation require 
fust and foremost the consideration and setting up of concrete projects rather than the devising of 
new structures and methodology. 
1. Communicated to the Assembly on 26th November 1979 
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RECOMMENDA TION 330 1 
on the political activities of the Council -
reply to the twenty-fourth annual report of the Councif2 
The Assembly, 
Welcoming the fact that in its twenty-fourth annual report the Council confirmed its intention 
to continue "the dialogue with the Assembly on questions relating to the application of the modified 
Brussels Treaty, including those dealt with by member governments in other international fora"; 
Welcoming the content of many :replies to recommandations of the Assembly and to written 
questions put by members, particularly Written Question 191; 
Regretting however that the informai procedure employed at joint meetings between Commit-
tees and the Council allows too much ambiguity to be left in the replies of the Council; 
Welcoming the content of the statements made by representatives of severa.l member govern-
ments to the Assembly during the twenty-fourth session, particularly in voicing the wish to make 
fuller use of WEU for discussing in a European forum all matters relating to Europe's security and 
for strengthening European co-operation in arma.ments questions and in disarmament ; 
Noting that the Council is still "checking regularly that the application of the modified Brus-
sels Treaty is in no way neglected" and tha.t the implementation of the Paris Agreements appeared 
twenty-seven times on its agenda; 
Noting tha.t the Council ha.s demonstra.ted its good will in a.greeing to a substantial increase 
in the budget of the Assembly, leaving it the possibility of a.ssessing its own requirements, and in 
the active participation of most member governments in the work of the Assembly; 
Considering that since, in due time, WEU will be ca.lled upon to take its place in any future 
European union, the smooth operation of this institution is essential for building a Europe which is 
master of its destiny ; 
Aware that such an independant and autonomous Europe ca.n but be a. political Europe based 
on a truly co-ordina.ted foreign and defence policy lea.ding to integration, 
REOOMMENDS THAT THE COUNOIL 
1. Pursue efforts to extend the dialogue with the Assembly by keeping it regularly informed of : 
(a) the results of the work of the IEPG; 
(b) the completed parts of the study undertaken by the SAC which are not covered by mili-
tary secrecy ; 
(c) matters relating to the application of the modified Brussels Treaty included in the agenda 
of its meetings ; 
2. Seek a procedure for joint meetings which a.llows each participant adequate freedom of speech 
but which also allows the collegiate views of the Council to be expressed ; 
3. Demonstra.te more clearly in its work that it considera the modified Brussels Treaty, particu-
la.rly Article XI, to be a. positive contribution to the establishment of a European union. 
1. Adopted by the Assembly on 19th June 1979 during the First Part of the Twenty.Fifth Ordinary Session 
(4th Sitting). 
2. Explanatory Memorandum : see the Report tabled by Mr. Minnocci on behalf of the General Affaira Committee 
(Document 801). 
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1. The Council will do their utmost to maintain and improve their relations with the .Assembly and 
welcome its expression of appreciation of the twenty-fourth annual report and of the content of many of 
their replies to .Assembly recommandations. 
It is in this spirit that the Council keep the .Assembly as fully informed as possible of the implemen-
tation of the mandate given to the Standing Armaments Committee in April 1977. The Committee on 
Defence .Questions and Armaments, at its meeting with the Council in Bonn, on 5th June 1978, was given 
information on that part of the study on the armaments sector of industry in the member countries of 
WEU which had already been completed. 
The twenty-fourth report contained information on the SAC's activities as a whole, including the 
progress of the study on the armaments sector. 
At their meeting at ministeriallevel on !6th May 1979, the Council decided not to circulate the study 
chapter by chapter . .As soon as the complete text is in their possession, the Council will consider the content 
and appropriate form of the information to be given to the Assembly. The Council will also continue, as 
in the past, to keep the .Assembly informed of matters relating to the application of the modified Brussels 
Treaty included in the agenda of their meetings. 
On the matter of communication of information about the work of the IEPG, the .Assembly is 
invited to refer to the Council's reply to point 4 of Recommandation 331. 
2. The Council note the .Assembly's concern regarding the procedure for joint meetings. They point 
out that the .Assembly can and does obtain collegiate views from the Council through its recommandations 
and written questions. Informai meetings complement the written procedure by giving each member of 
the Council the opportunity to express an opinion on the matters under discussion. 
The fact that the subjects raised by the .Assembly are communicated unofficially to the Council 
in advance enables the latter, without prejudicing the informai character of such meetings, to concert their 
opinions as to the replies to be given. The spontaneity of the discussions, therefore, does not preV'ent the 
expression of the collective views of the Council. 
3. .As the Brussels Treaty states in its preamble, it aima to promote the unity and to encourage the 
progressive integration of Europe. To this end, the Council keep in mind the opportunities offered by 
Article XI of the modified Brussels Treaty. 
1. Communioated to the Assembly on 24th Ootober 1979. 
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RECOMMENDATION 331 1 
on the application of the Brussels Treaty -
reply to the twenty-fourth annual report of the Council 2 
The Assembly, 
Noting with satisfaction that the Council, a.wa.re that the Assembly is "the only European assembly 
with responsibilities in the field of defence", is continuing the dialogue with it "on questions relating to the 
application of the modified Brussels Treaty, including those dealt with by member goveruments in other 
international fora" ; 
Welcoming the meaningful dialogue established with the Council in most cases, in particular through 
recommandations and replies, and noting in this connection that the Council will invite the Secretary-Genera.l 
of NATO to provide information "in particular when the questions raised relate to ma.ttera within the com-
petence of the integrated command structures of NATO"; 
Considering that the essential commitments under the modified Brussels Trea.ty - automatic mutual 
milita.ry assistance and the maintenance of appropriate levels of forces - reta.in and must continue to 
retain a.ll their initial value ; 
Noting tha.t the Council considera the Standing Armaments Committee to be "a. useful instrument 
for thought and a.na.lysis" but that the organisation of "European co-operation in the field of armaments 
production ... is the aim of the independant European programme group in its work", 
REOOMMENDS THAT THE ÜOUNOIL 
1. Withdra.w its refusai to publish in its a.nnual report the true level of British land forces stationed 
on the ma.inla.nd of Europe in a.ccordance with the commitment in Article VI of Protocol No. II of the 
modified Brussels Treaty ; 
2. Keep the Assembly informed, by wha.tever means it considera a.ppropriate, of the resulta already 
achieved in the study underta.ken by the SAC, of the progress made and of the goals towards which its 
work is directed; 
3. Take the fullest a.ccount of the Assembly's recommandations and consider the possibility of incor-
porating appropriate studies proposed from time to time by the Assembly among the new tasks which the 
Council is considering entrusting to the Standing Arma.ments Committee ; 
4. Include in future annual reports a section on the work of the independant European programme 
group. 
1. Adopted by the Assembly on 19th June 1979 during the First Part of the Twenty-Fifth Ordinary Session 
(4th Sitting.) 
2. Explanatory Memorandum: see the Report tabled by Mr. Tanghe on behalf of the Committee on Defenoe 
Questions and Armaments (Document 808). 
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1. The Council have been informed by the Government of the United Kingdom that they are now 
able to provide numbers of British land forces stationed on the mainland of Europe in accordance with 
the commitment in Article VI of Protocol No. II of the modified Brussels Treaty. The numbers, which 
will be an average of the force levels over a year, will be published in future annual reports. 
2. On the subject of information regarding the Standing Armaments Committee's study of the situation 
in the armaments industries of the member countries, the Council refer the Assembly to the content of their 
reply to Recommandation 330. The Council will take a decision on the distribution to be given to the study 
when they have the complete text in their possession. In the meantime, they will keep the Assembly 
informed of the progress of the work, as they have done in the past. 
3. The Council will consider the possibility of entrusting the SAC with work on subjects which may 
be suggested by the Assembly. They will make their decisions on a case by case basis, according to the 
nature of the proposais made and in the light of the SAC's other tasks and of the resources at its disposai, 
whilst avoiding any duplication of work done by other organisations. 
4. As stated in their reply to Recommandation 325, it would be difficult for the Council as auch to 
inform the Assembly about the activities of the IEPG, since its membership is different from that of WEU, 
with which it has no organisationallinks. However, it is open to members of the Assembly to question their 
governments on this subject, through their national parliaments. 
1. Communicated to the Assembly on 24th October 1979. 
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on scientific, technological and aerospace questions -
reply to the twenty-fourth annual report of the Council 2 
The Assembly, 
Welcoming the dialogue with the Council on the policy of member countries in the fields of 
energy, the aircraft industry, space and other areas of advanced technology; 
Convinced that safety problems in respect of nuclear facilities and radiation, and environmental 
problems associated with new sources of energy cali for solutions which eut across national frontiers ; 
Regretting that even the increasingly-serious energy crisis since 1973 has failed to stimulate 
further pragmatic arrangements for more joint action, co-operation and the definition of a medium-
and long-term European energy policy; 
Aware of the enormous sums Western Europe will have to pay for oil and convinced that in 
the near future oil will have to be replaced by alternative sources of energy; 
Welcoming the increase in European collaboration for the production of civil aircraft, especially 
Airbus, and hoping that this success will induce governments to promote more intensive European 
collaboration for the production of a family of fighter aircraft and of helicopters ; 
Considering the growing market for European satellites and la.unchers, 
REOOMMENDS THAT THE CoUNoiL 
1. Continue its dialogue with the Assembly but that it enter into more details in its twenty-fifth 
annual report regarding Western European poli ci es on scientific, technological and a.erospace questions, 
their goals and achievements ; 
2. Promote a major concerted research and development effort and launch a co-ordinated pro-
gramme in: 
(a) energy-saving technologies to be applied in households and industries; 
(b) alternative sources of energy based on new technologies such as non-conventional gas, shale 
oi1, liquified coal, and the use of solar, wind and water energy; 
(c) examining the possibilities of European co-operation in energy matters; 
(d) co-operation on the safety and environmenta.l impact of nuclear facilities, pa.rticularly where 
they create transfrontier dangers ; 
3. Start a detailed and continuing dialogue with the oil-producing countries with a view to 
adjusting production capabilities and requirements ; 
4. Arrange for the next fighter aircraft to be a joint European venture by promoting co-opera-
tion between the existing management consortia producing J agnar and Tornado ; 
5. Urge governments to provide the European helicopter industry with orders necessary for uninter-
rupted development and production ; 
6. Promote the series production of Ariane la.unchers in order to conquer part of the world mar-
ket for European and non-European satellites and their launchings. 
1. Adopted by the Assembly on 19th June 1979 during the First Part of the Twenty-Fifth Ord.inary Session 
(4th Sitting). 
2. Explanatory Memorandum: see the Report ta.bled by Mr. Soheftler on behalf of the Committee on Scientific, 
Teohnologica.l and Aerospace Questions (Document 806). 
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1. The Council are prepared to continue their dialogue with the Assembly regarding policies on 
scientific, technological and aerospace questions, their goals and achievements, and to comply as hitherto 
with the Assembly's request for detailed information. 
2. Current and future problems of energy supply representa big challenge which can only be effectively 
met by a collective and intensified effort. In view of this, the Council attach considerable importance to 
continuons co-ordination of the energy policy measures of member states. This also applies to research 
and development. 
Particularly of late, member states have increased their co-operation in the field of energy policy, 
both within the European Communities and the OECD. This relates in particular to energy saving and the 
use of alternative sources of energy. The Council also attach great importance to international co-operation 
on matters concerning security in the nuclear field. In ali of these fields, efforts are being made in the 
established agencies to find common solutions to the problems that have emerged as a result of recent 
events. Consequently, the Council deem it unnecessary for WEU to take initiatives in energy policy matters. 
3. In view of developments on international oil markets in recent months, the Council support closer 
contacts between oil-consuming and oil-producing countries. In this context, they consider discussion of 
energy matters with the oil-producing countries to be desirable and necessary and welcome steps which 
can be taken towards that end. 
4. The Council reaffirm the great importance which the governments of the member states attach to 
the maintenance of efficient capacities in the aviation and space sector for the future of Europe. The appro-
priate government departments in France, the United Kingdom and the Federal Republic of Germany 
are firmly resolved to develop a joint European tactical fighter aircraft for the nineties. 
Such a complex venture, which will involve the most modern technologies, poses many difficult 
problems which the countries concerned have already begun to study. For instance, they will endeavour 
to harmonise their respective operatiorial requirements and the time factors in order to find a configuration 
which will satisfy aU concerned. In the course of these deliberations, the work will be apportioned between 
the countries concerned, industrial partnerships established, and the most expedient form of management 
agreed. 
5. The governments of France, the United Kingdom, the Federal Republic of Germany and Italy have 
set up a joint steering committee on the helicopter industry. The committee has concluded its studies on 
expected military requirements into the nineties. At the present time it is working on a common technology 
programme which will form the basis for joint action with regard to military helicopters. Only when that 
programme is ready will it be possible to decide what orders can be provided for the European helicopter 
industry. 
6. The ESA Council have declared themselves in favour of the industrial production of Ariane launchers. 
1. Communicated to the Assembly on 24th Ootober 1979. 
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The Assembly, 
Ha.ving studied the report of its Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments analysing 
the rôle of national pa.rlia.ments in the national defence equipment procurement process ; 
Considering tha.t national parliaments and their defence committees, with the exception of 
those of Germa.ny and the Netherla.nds, are usua.lly ina.dequa.tely informed on defence ma.tters; 
Believing tha.t parlia.ments exercise insufficiently their prerogative to control defence procure-
ment policy ; 
Recalling the terms of its Recommandation 197 on military security and pa.rlia.mentary infor-
mation; 
With a view to furthering joint production and standardisation of defence equipment in the 
a.rmed forces of the countries of Western Europe or in the Alliance, taking due a.ccount of the 
milita.ry and economie requirements of the Alliance as a whole, 
REOOMMENDS THAT THE CoUNOIL 
Invite member govemments : 
A. To ensure tha.t their pa.rlia.ments, or where a.ppropria.te their pa.rlia.mentary defence, budget, or 
other committees concemed : 
1. Are fully informed in good time, within the limits imposed by considerations only of exter-
na.l security, not of politica.l or administrative convenience, on a.ll aspects of defence policy, 
a.t both the national and a.llied levels, especia.lly on ma.tters a.ffecting the a.ssessment of the 
milita.ry threat and the choice of defence equipment ; 
2. Are enabled to exercise sufficiently close control of the defence budget and appropriations 
and of ali stages of the defence procurement process, so as to improve defence capa.bility 
and increa.se standardisation and interoperability of equipment ; 
3. Are enabled to compile systematically information on current resea.rch and development 
projects in the national and European defence industry ; 
B. To ensure tha.t full information on national defence equipment projects in the pla.nning stages 
is available to allied govemments, and to ta.ke full account of alternative defence equipment projects 
ava.ilable in allied countries; 
C. To provide as far as possible a common structure for the national defence budgets, national 
defence equipment procurement processes, and, fina.lly, the procedure for supplying cla.ssified infor-
mation with a view to instituting in the foreseea.ble future a European policy of common procure-
ment of new wea.pons systems. 
1. Adopted by the Assembly on 20th June 1979 during the First Part of the Twenty.Fifth Ordinary Session 
(6th Sitting). 
2. Explanatory Memorandum : see the Report tabled by Mr. Maggioni on behalf of the Committee on Defence 
Questions and Armaments (Document 807). 
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A. It is a matter for national parliaments to determine the amount of information required on 
defence and other matters from governments. Detailed information on the defence budget is gener-
ally presented to parliament in nations' annual estimates; in addition, parliaments may also debate 
defence policy on publication of an annual defence white paper or policy statement. Parliamentary 
defence and finance committees may commission memoranda from ministries and question ministers 
or their representatives and submit reports on specifie matters to parliament together with the guid-
ance submitted to them. 
B. The principal fora for equipment co-operation are the Conference of National Armaments 
Directors and the IEPG whose procedures are specifically organised to ensure that members are fully 
informed of the requirements and developments of other allies. Wherever potential common interests 
are identified detailed arrangements are made to exploit as far as possible the opportunities arising 
for collaboration in development or production of equipment. 
C. Work is already in progress in the IEPG, CNAD and Eurogroup on exchanging information on 
different national procedures and bringing them into close conformity where possible. For instance 
the IEPG has done important work on procurement procedures, CNAD is at present testing a perio-
dic armaments planning system designed to improve co-operation between the member countries and 
Eurogroup has a committee examining financial planning systems. Although this work is useful, it 
does not solve the real problems of trying to set up collaborative projects. These problems are not 
ones of procedures or lack of information, but relate to issues of requirements, costs, industrial 
arrangements, etc. and they can only be resolved by detailed compromise in relation to the parti-
cular circumstances of each project. 
1. Communicated to the Assembly on 26th November 1979. 
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on various aspects of co-operation between Europe and the United States 11 
The Assembly, 
Noting the many statements in the United States in favour of closer consultations with Western 
Europe in many fields, but deploring that these statements have not always produced resulta; 
Also welcoming the fact that the United States Government continues to consider the development 
of a European union as a favourable factor in such co-operation; 
Considering that, in an unfavourable economie situation, recourse to protectionism would be a serious 
danger for Europe and noting with satisfaction that the United States, like Western Europe, has set itself 
the aim of progressively freeing interna.tions.l trade ; 
Considering that the creation of the European monetary fund is a major step in the search for the 
balance necessary for developing trade ; 
Considering that Europe's security, based on the Atlantic Alliance, requires improved corumltations 
between European members and the United States on externa.l policy matters; 
Considering that such consultations can be improved to the extent that Western Europe manages 
to de :fine a joint foreign policy itself; 
Welcoming the success of the SALT II negotiations, but considering that the development of strategie 
arms limitation talks caUs for the adoption of joint positions by the European members of the Atlantic 
Alliance and particularly with reference to the SALT ITI negotiations ; 
Welcoming the United States' intention to organise a two-way street for trade in armaments but 
concerned lest such a trend should inhibit European co-operation in this field, 
REoOMMENDS THAT THE CoUNon. 
l. Ensure that consultations between the European members of the Atlantic Alliance allow them, in 
the presence of their American partners, to uphold an external policy worked out by ail the member conn-
tries of WEU in accorda.nce with their goals of security and freedom of their peoples ; 
2. Study in particula.r the implications for Europe's defence policy of the Soviet Union's deployment 
of new weapons ; 
3. At regular intervals, make a. critical appraisa.l of the strategie concepts adopted by NATO; 
4. Ensure that the organisation of European co-operation in armaments production is not hampered 
by bilateral agreements concluded between the United States and several European members of the Atlantic 
Alliance; 
5. Consider in view of more recent developments the need for closer consultation on energy problems 
between the United States and the European countries. 
1. Adopted by the Assembly on 2lst June 1979 during the First Part of the Twenty-Fifth Ordin.ary Session 
(7th Sitting). 
2. Explanatory Memorandum : see the Report tabled by Mr. Schlingemann on behalf of the General Affaira Com-
mittee (Document 803). 
224 
DOOUMENT 825 
REPLY OF THE COUNCIL 1 
to Recommendation 334 
1. The Council wish to remind the Assembly that, in accordance with the purpose for which it 
was formed, the North Atlantic Alliance seeks to safeguard the security and freedom desired by the 
peoples of all its member countries. It is the intention of each member state of WEU to contribute, 
in accordance with the undertakings it has given, to so safeguarding security and freedom. 
The Council observe that, in the communiqué issued after its ministerial session of 30th and 
31st May 1979, the North Atlantic Council declared that "Ministers expressed their confidence that 
as the Alliance enters into its fourth decade it will continue to ensure the security of its members 
by pursuing the complementary aims of deterrence and détente thus contributing to peace and sta-
bility". In the same communiqué, Ministers expressed their satisfaction with the past record of close 
and full exchanges on SALT II within the Alliance. Regular exchanges have therefore taken place 
between all member countries of the Alliance and hence between all member countries of WEU, and 
the views .expressed by each member have been taken into full account. Consultations on SALT 
between the United States and its allies which participate in the integrated defence of NATO have 
been considerably stepped up and are likely to be further intensified inter alia through new consul-
tative mechanisms. 
2. The communiqué referred to earlier states that Ministers "expressed particular concern about 
the growing Soviet theatre nuclear capabilities". The countries participa ting in the integrated defence 
of NATO are keeping under close scrutiny the implications of the Soviet Union's deployment of 
new weapons for the security of Western Europe which is inseparable from that of the United States 
and Canada, and are consulting on measures required to maintain deterrence and defence. 
3. A critical appraisal of the kind suggested is carried out at intervals by the competent agen-
oies of the Alliance in which most of the member countries of WEU are represented. 
4. As regards the organisation of European co-operation in armaments production, the Council's 
view is that the bilateral memoranda of understanding (MOU) signed by most members of WEU 
with the United States do not conflict with the organisation of European co-operation in armaments 
production because the aim of such MOUs is to promote co-operation in the research, development, 
production and purchase of conventional defence equipment in order to improve the two-way flow 
of armaments purchases and to ensure easier access for European manufacturers to the American 
market. 
5. The need for consultation on energy problems between the European countries and the United 
States is fully appreciated by the governments of the member countries of WEU and is recognised 
by the agreement reached in Tokyo last June on oil imports over the next five years and by the 
continuons series of contacts on the subject in the International Energy Agency. 
1. Communicated to the Assembly on 27th November 1979. 
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RECOMMENDATION 335 1 
on political conditions for European armaments co-operation 2 
The Assembly, 
Considering that the production of modern armaments is necessary for the economie, military 
and political independance of Europe while hoping sincerely that the international community will 
eventually reach agreement limiting the production of and trade in arms ; 
Noting that national armies no longer provide a. large enough market for any European coun-
try to be able to produce a.rmaments at competitive priees ; 
Considering tha.t a.rma.ments industries occupy an important place in the economies of severa.! 
Western European countries where they ma.ke a. major contribution to the maintenance of employ-
ment; 
Considering that it is evident that their work ma.kes a. worthwhile contribution to the develop-
ment of scientific and technical research in many fields and to the maintenance of a high level of 
technology in Europe, whilst noting that the resources that are absorbed by armaments production 
limit the investment available for civil production; 
Considering tha.t the course of an armaments policy depends on the co-ordination of defence 
policies provided for in Article VIII of the modified Brussels Treaty ; 
Deploring the extension of trade in arma, particularly to countries in areas where there is 
da.ngerous tension ; 
Gra.tified tha.t the independant European programme group (IEPG) has undertaken the impor-
tant task of co-ordinating the armaments efforts of the European member countries of the Atlantic 
Alliance; 
Convinced that only the firm and steadfast determination of states ca.n allow this work to be 
developed; 
Noting that the modified Brussels Treaty is the only juridica.l basis for the organisation of 
defence and armaments in Europe ; 
Considering that WEU will therefore be ca.lled upon to take its place in any future European 
union; 
Welcoming the fact that the task allotted to the Standing Armaments Committee (SAC) on 
31st May 1976 is guiding its work in this direction, 
REOOMMENDS THAT THE COUNOIL 
1. In application of Article IV of the modified Brussels Treaty, ensure that European armaments 
co-operation develops along tines which conform to the latest technological requirements and to the 
defence policy and strategy applied by the members of the Atlantic Alliance; 
2. Keep the Assembly informed, by whatever means it considera appropriate, of the resulta 
already achieved in the study undertaken by the SAC, of the progress made and of the goals 
towards which its work is directed ; 
3. Ensure that the SAC has access to the sources of information it needs so that its study may 
be completed in the rea.sonably nea.r future; 
4. Study attentively the resulta of the study with a view to preparing on this basis guidance to 
be addressed to the appropriate authorities in member countries and to the European organisations 
concerned; 
5. Keep the Assembly regularly informed of the progress of work in the IEPG; 
6. Examine the limitations which Europe should advocate in regard to exportera and importera 
of a.rmaments and itself to prevent the trade in arms stepping up the armaments race, particularly 
in areas where peace is threatened. 
1. Adopted by the Assembly on 2lst June 1979 during the First Part of the Twenty-Fifth Ordinary SeBBion 
(7th Sitting). 
2. Explanatory Memorandum: see the Report tabied by Mr. van Waterschoot on behalf of the General Affaira 
Committee (Document 802). 
226 
DOOUMENT 825 
REPLY OF THE COUNCIL 1 
to Recommendation 335 
In their reply to Recommendation 297 the Council explained why they consider it necessary 
to develop armaments co-operation hetween European countries and in their reply to Recommenda-
tion 325 they described the common European line of approach to offers of co-operation in the 
framework of the transatlantic dialogue; they also defined the aims which, in their view, should 
guide the action of member countries, whilst acknowledging the di:fficulties of such an undertaking, 
since it is carried out by countries whose armaments industries have widely differing structures and 
levels of development. 
The Council wish to rea:ffirm the importance they attach to the continuation of the work at 
present being carried out, with a view to achieving greater harmonisation of national policies which 
should lead to genuine co-operation on specifie programmes ; in this connection, they consider that 
the work undertaken by the independent European programme group and the study at present being 
made by the Standing Armaments Committee meet the Assembly's concern about the technical and 
political direction it would wish such co-operation to take. 
As the Assembly is aware, only the legal part of the SAC's study on the armaments sector 
of industry in the member countries has so far reached the Council; indeed the SAC was not in a 
position to submit its final report when the Ministerial Council met in Rome on 16th May 1979; 
that meeting did, however, confirm the SAC's mandate and agreed that the first 'part of the eco-
nomie study should be completed both swiftly and to the best effect, with the co-operation of the 
administrations concerned. 
When the final report from the SAC is received, the Council will not fail, as was stated by 
the Chairman-in-O:ffice at the second sitting of the twenty-fifth ordinary session, to consider how the 
Assembly might be informed of its content and its principal conclusions. It is still too soon, in the 
present state of this study, to express a view as to the practical follow-up action to be taken. The 
study may enable governments for the fust time to have a detailed and comparative analysis of the 
armaments industries in the member countries and assist them to direct their choices and their pro-
grammes towards increased co-operation. 
Within the IEPG, in the expert groups, European countries also continue to study the pos-
sibility of joint production in certain sectors of armaments; at the same time, they have started a 
dialogue with the United States with the basic hope of conserving their share of European interests 
while co-operating with that country for the production of certain types of armaments. 
In their reply to Recommendation 325, the Council stressed the di:fficulties encountered by some 
countries which are members of the IEPG but not of WEU with regard to passing on the results of 
the work of that group to the Assembly of the organisation. 
The Council have noted the Assemhly's concern regarding the dangers of the trade in arms in 
areas where peace is threatened. This is an important problem which involves different political fac-
tors in each country; it would be unrealistic to deal with it in the European framework only, since 
in fact this excludes the principal armaments exporting and importing countries. 
On the other hand, bearing in mind its responsibilities in this respect, every European country 
could draw relevant conclusions from the results of joint action that might be taken between conn-
tries of the same geographical area with a view to voluntary limitation of their own imports ; such 
consultations, which would also bring in the main supplier countries, would indeed make it possible 
to envisage concerted limitation on the sales of conventional weapons. 
1. Communicated to the Assembly on 5th November 1979. 
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Document 826 
Definition of armaments requirements 
and procurement in Western Europe 
PREVIOUS QUESTION 1 
moved by Mr. Druon 
rmder Rule 32 of the Rules of Procedure 
3rd December 1979 
1. Con.sidering that the definition, production and procurement of armaments are by their very nature 
inseparable from defence options; 
2. Con.sidering that the Rome Treaty does not give the European Economie Community respon.sibility 
for defence matters, 
The Assembly decides : 
That there is no reason to debate the first paragraph of the operative text of the draft recom· 
mendation on the definition of armaments requirements and procurement in Western Europe submitted 
on behalf of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments. 
Signed : Druon 
1. See 9th Sitting, 3rd December 1979 (Previous question negatived). 
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Introductory Note 
In preparing this report, the Committee took evidence from the following experts : 
11th September 1978 
Brigadier Kenneth Hunt, former Deputy Director of the International Institute for Strategie Studies ; 
Mr. Robert Shreffier, former Director for Nuclear Planning, NATO International Staff; 
Dr. Pieter Boskma, Physicist, University of Twente. 
30th October 1978 
Mr. François Tricornot de Rose, former French Permanent Representative to NATO; 
Mr. Uwe Nerlich, Director of the Stijtung Wissenschaft und Politik. 
Mr. van den Bergh, Rapporteur for Part I, had interviews as follows: 
Washington, 12th Marck 1979 
State Department 
Mr. David M. Clinard, Deputy Assistant Director, International Security Programmes Bureau, Arms 
Control and Disarmament Agency ; 
Mr. R. Lucas Fischer, Regional Division Chief, ISP, ACDA; 
Dr. Pierce Corden ; 
Mr. Marvin Humphreys, Director, Office of Nuclear Policy and Operations, Bureau of Politico-
Military Affaira ; 
Mr. Charles Thomas, Deputy Director, Office of NATO, AtJantic Political-Military Affaira; 
Mr. John A. Froebe, Officer-in-Charge, Defence Policy and Military-Security Affaira; 
Mr. William Newlin, Country Officer for Benelux, Office of Northern European Affaira. 
Mr. Robert Berman; 
Mr. William Maker ; 
Brookings 1 nstitution 
Captain Peter Fitzwilliam, United States Navy; 
Colonel Jim Shufelt, United States Army. 
13th Marck 1979 
Department of Defence 
Mr. Lewis Finch, Director, Nuclear Policy, Policy Plans and National Security Council Affaira, 
International Security Affaira ; 
Dr. Milton J. Minneman, Special Assistant to Deputy Under-Secretary of Defence, Research and 
Engineering, Tactical Warfare Programme; 
Mr. James V. Siena, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defence, European and NATO Affaira, 
International Security Affaira. 
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14tk Marck 1979 
Dr. Fritz Ermath; 
Mr. James Thomson. 
Sena tor Sam N unn ; 
Mr. Jeffrey Record, Assistant; 
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N ati<mal SPcurity Oouncil 
Benate 
Mr. James R. Locher, Assistant on NATO Affairs to the Senate Committee on Armed Services. 
New York, 16tk Marck 1979 
United Nation8 
Mr. Rolf Bjornerstedt, Assistant Secretary General, Disarmament Centre. 
The Hague, 6th April 1979 
M iniBtry for Foreign A flairs 
Mr. E. van Vloten, NATO Affairs ; 
Mr. B. J. van Eenennaam, Military Co-operation. 
MiniBtry of Defence 
Colonel Berkhof. 
Netkertands lnstitute for Peace Studies 
Mr. H. Neumann, Director; 
Mr. S. Rosemond, Deputy Director. 
Stockholm, 4th May 1979 
Ministry for Foreign Al/airs 
Mr. Ove E. Bring, Assistant Legal Adviser; 
Mr. Bo Janzon, Head, Warhead Physics Section, National Defence Research Institute; 
Commodore T. Wulff, Military Adviser; 
Mr. Anders Sandstrom, Head of Division; 
Mr. Mats Marling, Head of Division ; 
Mr. Sture Theolin. 
Stockholm International Peace Researck Centre 
Dr. Frank Barnaby, Director. 
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The Committee as a whole met in Paris on 7th March 1979 when it discussed an outline of the 
present report; it met in NATO Headquarters, Brussels, on 9th July 1979 where it was addressed by 
General H.F. Zeiner-Gundersen, Chairman of the NATO Military Committee, and by Dr. H. C. Lankes, 
Assistant Secretary-General for Political Affaira; it met in Bonn on 25th September 1979 where it was 
addressed by Mr. Andreas von Bülow, Parliamentary Secretary of State for Defence; the Committee met 
in Brussels on 17th October 1979 and in Paris on 6th and 21st November 1979 for a preliminary discussion 
of this report, and decided at the last of those meetings to make public the two preliminary draft 
recommendations as amended by the Committee. The report as a whole was adopted by the Committee 
at a further meeting in Paris on 3rd December. 
The Committee and the Rapporteurs express their thanks to the Ministers, officiais and senior 
officers who received the Rapporteur or addressed the Committee and replied to questions. The views 
expressed in the report, unless expressly otherwise attributed, are those of the Committee. 
Nuclear weapons - Note on terminology 
The following terms are used in this report with the meanings here given ; these correspond for the 
most part with the terminology of United States Department of Defence reports. 
Central nuclear systems: United States and Soviet nuclear weapons systems covered by SALT I 
and II, i.e. weapons based on the territory of one party, or in submarines, and capable ofreaching the territory 
of the other. 
Theatre nuclear forces (or weapons): Ail nuclear weapons systems of allied and Warsaw Pact countries 
other than the central systems. These are sub-divided into : 
(a) Long-range theatre nuclear forces (or weapons) or medium-range weapons: These are allied nuclear 
weapons capable of reaching Soviet (as opposed to other Warsaw Pact) territory from their 
normal position of deployment, and comparable Soviet weapons 1 ; 
(b) Battlefield weapons: Theatre weapons with ranges less than long-range theatre weapons 2• 
The terms "strategie" and "tactical" nuclear weapons have been avoided as far as possible in this 
report, because the distinction is based on the target engaged rather than the characteristics of the weapon. 
For the purposes of comparison with other texts "tactical" weapons may be taken to correspond broadly 
with "battlefield" weapons as defined above, "strategie" weapons with ail other categories. 
1. Both "medium-range" and "intermediate-range" weapons in United States usage have been included in this category 
in this report. 
2. "Short-range" ballistic missiles and tactical aircraft have been included in this category in this report. 
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I 
Draft Recommendation 
on new weapons and defence strategy - modernisation of theatre nuclear forces 
The Assembly, 
(i) Regretting the deterioration in the military balance resulting from the steady increase in levels of 
many Soviet weapons systems, and deploring in particular the increased nuclear threat posed by the 
deployment by the Soviet Union of new medium-range nuclear weapons - the SS-20 missile and Backfire 
bomber - and large numbers of battlefield nuclear weapons ; 
(ii) Believing it essential for the Alliance to main tain and update whenever necessary a complete range 
of weapons systems to ensure a credible military capability in ali parts of the triad of conventional, theatre 
nuclear and strategie nuclear weapons on which the strategy of deterrence through a capacity for flexible 
response is based ; 
(iii) Believing further that political responsibility for and the risks of this policy must be shared by ali 
countries of the Alliance, in particular, while recognising various national conditions, through readiness 
to accept the stationing on their territory of such weapons as may be necessary for its implementation; 
(iv) Believing the essential continuity between the three parts of the triad would be dangerously 
weakened if the threat posed by the Soviet SS-20 missiles and Backfire bomber were not to be countered 
by the Alliance's overali strategie capabilities ; 
(v) Recaliing moreover that the policy of the Alliance is to seek security through détente as weil as 
deterrence, and that reliable arms control agreements and confidence-building measures can contribute as 
much to the establishment of military balance as the provision of adequate weapons systems; 
(vi) Noting therefore that Mr. Brezhnev's speech in East Berlin on 6th October 1979 may be a sign 
that the Soviet Union now understands that the NATO countries consider the deployment of the SS-20 
a serious threat, and is prepared for negotiations on the whole question of medium-range nuclear weapons 
in Europe, although many points still have to be clarified, 
REOOMMENDS THAT THE CoUNOIL 
Cali on the North Atlantic Council: 
To seek to redress the military balance, now threatened in particular by the deployment of new 
Soviet nuclear weapons systems : 
(a) by taking the decisions necessary to ensure that the growing imbalance between Warsaw Pact 
and NATO long-range theatre nuclear forces is corrected in due course ; 
(b) by accompanying these decisions by a firm offer to enter into arms control negotiations with 
a view to limiting long-range theatre nuclear force deployments on both aides; 
(c) by continuing to seek agreement on significant reductions in present numbers of Soviet medium-
range nuclear weapons ; 
(à) by relying meanwhile on the whole range of existing weapons systems based in Europe, at sea, 
and in the United States to counter the threat posed by present levels of Soviet weapons ; 
(e) by seeking any opportunity for agreement on mutual and balanced reductions of central and 
theatre nuclear weapons and of conventional forces and weapons. 
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II 
Draft Recommendation 
on new weapons and de(ence strategy - the impact of technology 
The Assembly, 
(i) Noting with approval that NATO strategy has placed progressively greater emphasis on the role 
of conventional weapons in recent years and that new precision-guided conventional weapons have replaced 
nuclear weapons in certain specifie military applications ; 
(ii) Recognising that the application of new technologies to defence purposes may have unexpected 
repercussions on the military balance and on arms control arrangements, and calling therefore for continued 
proper political control to be exercised over such application, 
RECOMMENDS THAT THE CoUNon. 
A. CaU on the North Atlantic Council: 
1. To take into account the implications of the application of new defence technologies on arms control 
negotiations such as SALT III and MBFR ; 
2. To continue actively the present policy of replacing nuclear weapons systems by conventional systems 
where militarily feasible and of equal deterrent value ; 
B. Urge member governments: 
1. To establish machinery to ensure that the application of new technologies to defence purposes 
continues to be subject to deliberate and properly informed governmental decision ; 
2. To submit annually to their parliaments reports on the arms control implications of aU new defence 
equipment programmes. 
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Explanatory Memorandum 
(submitted by Mr. Roper, Chairman and Rapporteur, 
and Mr. van den Bergh, Rapporteur) 
Introduction 
1. This report was originally intended to dis-
cuss the implications for allied defence strategy 
of the modernisation of existing tactical nuclear 
weapons, including the introduction of enhanced 
radiation weapons, and the implications of other 
new weapons systems. Mr. van den Bergh was 
appointed Rapporteur on 21st June 1978. The 
Committee began its study of the subject in 
September 1978 and submitted a preliminary 
report1 to the Second Pal'lt of the Twenty-Fourth 
Ordinary Session, on which the Assembly on 21st 
November 1978 adopted Order 492 instructing 
the Committee to continue its study of these 
questions and to report to the next part-session 
of the Assembly. 
2. At its meeting on 7th March the Committee 
examined a draft outline report from the Rap-
porteur, who was requested to deal fully with 
enhanced radiation weapons and to broaden the 
report to include the effects of the deployment 
of the Soviet SS-20 medium-range missile with 
a mobile launcher, and the problem of finding 
a counter for that weapon. At the Rapporteur's 
request the Committee subsequently asked for 
the report to be postponed to the present part-
session of the Assembly. 
3. Thus a report which was initially to examine 
the new generations of conventional weapons 
which have greatly improved accuracy and first-
round kill probabilities and the consequences of 
these conventional developments on programmes 
for modernisation of tactical nuclear weapons, is 
also concerned with the politically most topical 
question of the modernisation of theatre nuclear 
weapons systems in a more general context. 
4. For clarity, in the second draft of this 
repol'lt, discussed by the Committee on 21st 
November 1979, these two aspects were dealt with 
in two separate draft recommendations: I. 
Modernisation of theatre nuclear forces, and II. 
The impact of technology. Following substantial 
amendment of the first text by the Committee 
at that meeting, Mr. van den Bergh resigned as 
Rapporteur, but was asked to continue to serve 
in respect of the second draft recommendation, 
while the Chairman was asked to act as Rap-
porteur in respect of the first. Accordingly, the 
explanatory memorandum is now presented in 
two pal'lts, relating to the two draft recommenda-
tions. 
1. Document 789, New weapons and defence strategy, 
Rapporteur Mr. van den Bergh, 31st October 1978. 
2. Text at Appendix I. 
s• 
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1. Modernisation of theatre nuclear forces 
(submitted by Mr. Roper, 
Chairman and Rapporteur) 
1. The changing situation 
5. In this section the Committee deals with 
the long-range theatre nuclear forces. These are 
medium-range nuclear weapons- weapons which 
have been excluded from SALT I and SALT II 
(on which the Committee reports elsewhere) 1 -
but which have a range greater than the hattie-
field nuclear weapons discussed in Part II. 2 (b) 
below - greater, that is, than sorne 1,000 km. 
Such weapons, when based in the NATO guide-
lines area, are implicitly within the scope of the 
MBFR negotiations, but those based e.g. in 
France, the United Kingdom or southern Europe 
on the NATO side, or in the Soviet Union on the 
other, would not be. 
6. The rôle envisaged for theatre nuclear 
weapons- battlefield and long-range - isdes-
cribed as follows in United States Departmen..t 
of Deferree annual report for fiscal year 1980: 
- limited nuclear options designed to 
permit the selective destruction of fixed 
enemy military or industrial targets; 
- regional nuclear options intended, as one 
example, to destroy the leading elements 
of an attacking enemy force; and 
- theatre-wide nuclear options directed at 
aircraft and missile bases, lines of com-
munication, and troop concentrations in 
the first and follow-on echelons of an 
enemy attack. 
The rôle of long-range theatre nuclear forces 
in particular is thus described in the fiscal year 
1980 Department of Defence programme for 
research, development and acquisition: 
"Selected employment options or as part of 
a general nuclear response. These systems 
are primarily intended for attack of fixed 
targets, although there are a number of 
important transient targets such as Warsaw 
Pact staying and assembly areas ... " 
7. In the early days of the deployment of 
nuclear missile systems the United States and 
1. Document 816. "Central" weapons are included in 
SALT I and II weapons - based in submarines or on the 
territory of one superpower and capable of reaching that 
of the other. 
DOOUMENT 827 
the United Kingdom had deployed from 1958 
onwards medium-range (2,500 km liquid-fuelled 
missiles - 60 Thor in the United Kingdom 30 
Jupiter in Italy and 15 Jupiter in Turkey. The 
Soviet Union developed a little later the compar-
able SS-4 which began deployment from 1959 
onwards, and the longer range (3,500 km) SS-5 
from 1961 onwards. These liquid-fuelled missiles 
were quickly regarded as obsolete by the NATO 
countries because the long time rtaken to fuel and 
fire them and the impossibility of protecting 
them made them very vulnerable to a pre-emptive 
strike. The Thor and Jupiter were withdrawn 
from service in 1963 when intercontinental bal-
listic missiles had become operational in the 
United States. The Soviet Union however main-
tained in service a total of sorne 700 SS-4 and 
SS-5 targ~ted against Western Europe, while 
NATO rehed on nuclear capable strike aircraf.t 
and on its superior force of ICBMs and SLBM~ 
to maintain the balance. NATO in these years did 
not perceive any need to maintain on the mainland 
of Europe medium-range nuclear missiles compar-
able to the SS-4 and 5. In 1977 however the 
Soviet Union began the deployment of a mobile 
solid-fuel missile, the SS-20, estimated to have 
three MIRV s, a range of sorne 6,000 kilometres 
and much improved accuracy. About 80 are 
reported to be deployed against Europe at the 
present time and about 40 against China, while 
numbers of the obsolescent SS-4 and 5 have fallen 
to 500 and 90 respectively, -of which between 
10% and 25% are variously reported to be 
deployed against China. 
8. In the field of medium-range strategie 
bombers the United States from 1969 deployed 
the FB-111A with a range of 10,000 km. Sixty-six 
are now based in the United Kingdom. In 1974 
the Soviet Union began deployment of a compara-
ble aircraft, the TU-22 M Backfire, with a range 
of sorne 9,000 km but only about half the payload 
of the FB-111A. About 80 Backfires are now 
reported to be in service, of which 30 are reported 
to be assigned to the Soviet naval air force. 
9. The introduction of the very modern weapons 
systems SS-20 and Backfire undoubtedly poses a 
new threat to the European NATO countries. The 
SS-20 is a threat of a different order from the 
long-standing one of the SS-4 and SS-5 missiles 
because its mobility makes it impossible to includ~ 
it in the sort of nuclear strike plan which could 
readily destroy these fixed liquid-fuelled missiles. 
It is important however not to regard balance 
between categories of any particular weapons 
system in isolation. SACEUR as part of his 
nuclear forces has permanently assigned to him 
the 64 Polaris missiles of the British strategie 
submarines and 400 warheads of the MIRVed 
Poseidon missiles in the United 8-tates ballistic 
missile submarines. The whole of the French 
force de frappe must, in Soviet eyes, be included 
in the same equation - it includes at the present 
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time 64 submarine-launched missiles, 18 land-
based IRBMs and sorne 40 Mirage IV airerait 1. 
10. At its meeting in October 1978 the NATO 
Nuclear Planning Group set up a special task 
force to study the development of a new genera-
tion of theatre nuclear weapons, the incentive 
being largely the advent of the SS-20. The United 
States has under development three land-based 
weapons systems which were no doubt considered 
in the context of a modernisation programme. 
The Pershing II, with a 1,600 km range, would 
be a longer-range version of Pershing IA, capable 
of reaching Soviet territory from Western Euro-
pean bases; it is intended to have much greater 
accuracy through the use of precision terminal 
guidance, thus permitting the use of lower-yield 
warheads and reducing collateral damage. An 
earth penetrator warhead will be one option and 
the programme is in full-scale engineering 
development in 1979. A second alternative is a 
ground-launched cruise missile of 2,500 km range 
which will be mobile and this too is now in engi-
neering development. These two weapons are 
due to be in service in the mid 1980s, with first 
deliveries in 1983. A medium-range ballistic mis-
sile is only in concept design stage; it would be 
a lightweight missile that could be ground mobile 
or air mobile and a decision is due in 1980 as to 
whether the system will proceed to advanced 
development. In addition a land attack version 
of a submarine-làunched cruise missile, capable 
of being fired from standard torpedo tubes of 
conventionally- or nuclear-powered submarines is 
in full-scale development. A fourth programme 
for a long-range theatre nuclear missile has been 
1. The Soviet view of the balance in medium-range 
nuclear weapons is stated in part of the article in Pravda 
of 25th October 1979 by the Soviet Defence Minister 
Marshal Ustinov, to other parts of which reference is 
made in a footnote to paragraph 17 below: "··· the 
United States is proposing to build and move near to the 
frontiers of the Soviet Union and other socialist countries 
new medium-range weapons systems designed for stra-
tegie tasks. In Western Europe it is proposed to install 
sorne 600 cruise missiles and Pershing II ballistic missiles. 
Implementation of this plan could be aimed not only at 
increasing the approximately 1,500 United States for-
ward-based weapons and comparable weapons of the 
United Kingdom and France which can reach Soviet 
territory, but in so doing at changing the strategie situa-
tion in Europe in favour of NATO ... 
... Western opinion has also been misled on another 
important question. The number of medium-range Soviet 
weapons installed in the western regions is comparable to 
the number of similar weapons possessed by the United 
Kingdom and France alone. At the same time hundreds 
and hundreds. of United States nuclear delivery vehicles 
permanently mstalled in aircraft carriers cruising not 
far from Soviet territory are deliberately ignored as 
are the air bases of the European NATO countrie;. If 
account is taken of all weapons forming part of the 
f?rward-based system and intended for use against targets 
s1tuated in Soviet territory, an entirely different picture 
is obtained from that painted by western propaganda." 
A table comparing long-range theatre nuclear forces 
on this basis is attached at Appendix II. 
deleted from the unclassified version of the 
United States arms control impact statement. 
11. The debate on the appropriate response to 
the modernisation of medium-range nuclear 
forces by the Soviet Union has taken on political 
and military dimensions within NATO. Parallel 
to the high-level group on theatre nuclear force 
modernisation, NATO set up a special group on 
arms control aspects of the problem and these 
two committees completed their reports on 28th 
September. A final decision is expected from the 
meeting of the North Atlantic Council on 14th 
December concerning the right response in both 
weapons development and arms control proposai 
terms that should be offered to the SS-20. 
12. Press reports since 5th October have made 
it clear that the NATO high-level group had 
agreed to recommend to the ministerial meeting 
of the NATO Defence Planning Committee to be 
held on 11 th and 12th December that a total of 
572 medium-range nuclear missiles of a new 
generation should be deployed in Europe, largely 
to counter the SS-20. The total would be made 
up of 464 ground-launched cruise missiles: 160 
located at United States air bases in Britain; 96 
in West Germany; ·48 in Belgium; 48 in the 
Netherlands and 112 in Italy. The existing 108 
American Pershing lA missiles based in Germany 
would be replaced by a similar number of 
Pershing Il. (The 72 Pershing lA with which 
German forces are at present equipped would 
presumably remain unchanged.) The GLCM and 
Pershing Il would have ranges of 2,500 and 
1,600 lan respectively, and would be capable of 
reaching targets in the western part of the Soviet 
Union. 
13. All 572 missiles would be American weapons 
and apparently, in the case of those to be based 
in Germany and the United Kingdom, would be 
financed by the United States and would be held 
and operated only by United States units, the 
host country contribution being limited to provid-
ing perimeter security on the bases. lt is not clear 
whether "double-key" arrangements would 
operate in other countries. Mr. Harold Brown, 
United States Secretary of Defence, said at his 
press conference after the meeting of the NATO 
Nuclear Planning Group in The Hague on 14th 
November 1979: "1 would expect the United 
States would bear the cost of development and 
the great bulk of the production costs ["billions 
of dollars"] ... 1 would expect the other allies to 
bear a considerable equitable proportion of 
opera ting, construction and other costs." lt is 
understood that base construction costs would be 
shared in a NATO infrastructure programme. 
2. Mr. Brezhnev's speech of 6th October 1919 
14. Mr. Brezhnev then intervened in the debate 
with a speech in East Berlin on 6th October. It 
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has been carefully studied. By way of preamble 
he recalled that the final act of the conference 
on security and co-operation in Europe was a 
sort of "security charter" for the peoples of 
Europe, and that the Soviet Union wanted it 
applied in full. He said that if NATO projects 
for deploying new types of American missiles in 
Western Europe were implemented, it would 
substantially modify the strategie situation on the 
continent, and claimed that the aim of that pro-
gramme was to upset the balance of forces estab-
lished in Europe and to seek military superiority 
for the NATO bloc. The "socialist states" would 
then be obliged to take additional steps to streng-
then their own security. He stressed that the 
choice confronted in particular the German 
Federal Republic. He refuted the claim that the 
Soviet Union was increasing its military power 
on the European continent to a level which 
exceeded its defence needs. 
15. Mr. Brezhnev then made a number of specifie 
claims: over the last ten years, in the European 
part of the Soviet Union, the number of delivery 
vehicles for medium-range nuclear weapons had 
not increased by a single missile or aircraft; the 
numbers of medium-range missile launchers and 
the yield of their warheads had been somewhat 
reduced. The numbers of medium bombers had 
also been reduced. The Soviet Union deployed 
none of these systems in any other countries. 
Moreover, for several years the Soviet Union had 
not increased the numbers of its armed forces 
stationed in Central Europe. 
16. The Committee recognises that these claims, 
in the terms in which they are stated, are prob-
ably accurate ; they correspond with publicly 
available data on levels of forces. These claims 
do not however reveal the real increase in the 
Soviet threat that has occurred because the newly 
deployed SS-20 is fitted with three MIRV s, 
leading to a net increase of between 60 and 120 
warheads1 on medium-range missile systems 
targeted on Europe although the MIR V ed war-
heads have a smaller yield- 150 KT compared 
with 1 MT for the SS-4 or 5 ; moreover the SS-20 
is virtually invulnerable because of its mobility, 
and is more accurate and reliable, so that the 
quality of this medium-range nuclear threat has 
increased much more than the number of war-
heads would suggest. Over the same ten-year 
period the number of battlefield nuclear warheads 
has increased from 3,500 to 7,000. The claim that 
there has been no increase in Soviet military 
manpower in Central Europe may be true but 
ignores the increase in Warsaw Pact main battle 
tanks in Central Europe from 12,000 to 20,500 
in the same period. 
1. Depending on assumptions made about numbers of 
missiles deployed against China. 
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17. Mr. Brezhnev then made a number of con-
crete proposais. The Soviet Union would be ready 
to reduce, compared with present levels, the 
numbers of medium-range nuclear weapons 
deployed in western areas of the Soviet Union 
provided that no additional medium-range 
nuclear weapons were deployed in Western 
Europe. He asserrted that the Soviet Union would 
never use nuclear weapons against countries 
refusing to acquire such weapons and which had 
none on their territory. The Soviet Union had 
decided to reduce unilateraliy Soviet military 
manpower in Central Europe and in the next 
twelve months would withdraw from East 
Germany up to 20,000 Soviet troops, 1,000 tanks 
and "a certain amount of other military hard-
ware"1. 
18. The Committee believes the proposai to 
reduce present levels of medium-range nuclear 
weapons to merit careful exploration. If agree-
ment can be reached to reduce numbers of the 
new SS-20 missiles, the threat to NATO would 
undoubtedly be reduced, but if the offer merely 
means phasing out of the obsolete SS-4 and SS-5 
NATO would not be justified in suspending its 
proposed theatre nuclear force improvements 2 • In 
any case an immediate moratorium on further 
deployments of the SS-20 would be a necessary 
prerequisite of negotiations in good faith. 
19. The unilateral reduction of Soviet manpower 
in East Germany can only be welcomed, but its 
implications for the military balance cannot be 
calculated. Present Soviet superiority would 
certainly be reduced somewhat if two complete 
Soviet armoured divisions - to which the figures 
of 20,000 troops and 1,000 tanks could roughly 
correspond - were completely disbanded. If on 
the other hand the reduction of 1,000 tanks refers 
merely to the obsolete T-54/55 tanks, for many 
of which there are insufficient trained tank 
drivers at the present time, the effect on the 
military balance would be negligible. If the 20,000 
troops are to be found among administrative or 
support forces, or if they are to be moved only to 
Polandl, the effect again would be negligible. 
20. Mr. Brezhnev concluded with proposais for 
a number of new confidence-building measures 
for discussion in the CSCE : earlier advance 
notification of large military exercises; the 
notification of exercises involving more than (say) 
1. Writing in Pravda on 25th Oetober, Marshal Usti· 
nov, the Soviet Defence Minister, said these withdrawals 
would be to the USSR. 
2. In the same article in Pravda, Marshal Ustinov said 
the offer was to reduce numbers and yielà of medium· 
range nuclear weapons - which might suggest that the 
offer is to reduce only the SS·4 and 5 with their one 
megaton warheads. 
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20,900 (instead of 25,000) men ; the mutual prohi-
bition of exercises involving more than 40,000 or 
50,000 men ; advance notification of troop move-
ments exceeding 20,000 men in the area defined 
in the final act. He reaffirmed ea-r:lier proposais 
for the notification of large sea or air exercises 
near the territorial waters of the CSCE partici-
pants. Sorne of these proposais can be welcomed 
by NATO countries and will be examined in the 
CSCE forum, but the Committee does not make 
substantive comment on them in this report. 
21. In conclusion, Mr. Brezhnev expressed the 
hope that the important SALT III talks could 
begin as soon as SALT II entered into force and 
said that the Soviet Union wished to study in 
SALT III the possible limitation not only of 
intercontinental weapons but other weapons, 
provided that the principle of equal security for 
ali parties was strictly adhered to. 
22. The Committee sees in Mr. Brezhnev's speech 
an indication that part of the Soviet leadership 
at least may now realise that the NATO countries 
are seriously concerned at the new threat from 
the SS-20, and that there would be no benefit 
to the Soviet Union if NATO deployed 572 
medium-range weapons as a result. Mr. Brezh-
nev's proposais are not as so far presented a 
sufficient basis for negotiations, but they are 
sufficiently indicative of a desire to negotiate 
seriously for it to be worthwhile for NATO to 
seek that option. 
3. Positions of European NATO countries 
23. The position of most WEU governments on 
the modernisation of theatre nuclear weapons, 
and their reactions to Mr. Brezhnev's speech, are 
becoming known. Germany is in favour of an 
arms control offer to the Soviet Union intended 
to reduce the imbalance in theatre nuclear forces, 
at the same time as NATO approves in prin-
ciple a modernisation programme on the lines 
described above, which could be put into pro-
duction if the arms control proposai is not 
accepted by the Soviet Union. Germany prefers 
a United States weapon system based actually 
on the territory of continental Europe, with a 
range capable of reaching Soviet, as opposed 
to other Warsaw Pact, territory. Such a weapon 
could be based in Germany if other continental 
countries also accepted the stationing of such 
weapons on their territory. Speaking in Bonn 
on 14th October, Chancellor Schmidt was quoted 
as saying that the Soviet Union had reiterated 
"We want to bargain". If negotiations with the 
Soviet Union were successful it might not be 
necessary "to develop ali of [the medium-range 
weapons], perhaps only many fewer, and in 
ideal cases none at ali. ... 1 am confident that 
[Mr. Brezhnev] wants to use the intervening 
time the way the West wants to use intervening 
time between a decision and actual deployment 
- for negotiation." 
24. In Bonn on 23rd November Mr. Gromyko, 
the Soviet Foreign Minister, claimed that a deci-
sion by the Alliance to deploy the new weapons 
would "take away the basis for negotiations" 
on the subject. Chancellor Schmidt at a press 
conference two days later said "I cannot deter-
mine that Mr. Gromyko had delivered threats", 
and expected further negotiations between NATO 
and the Soviet Union even if the Alliance 
decided to deploy the new weapons systems. 
25. Mr. Simonet, the Belgian Foreign Minister, 
was quoted in New York on lOth October as 
saying that NATO faces three options: postpone 
negotiations on theatre nuclear weapons until 
NATO forces were modernised to equal those 
in Eastern Europe ; negotiate immediately and 
then modernise if negotiations failed ; or proceed 
in principle with modernisation and negotiate at 
the same time. Mr. Simonet claimed that Presi-
dent Carter favoured the first, while he himself 
favoured the third provided that the United 
States first ratified SALT II. 
26. Mr. Scholten, Netherlands Minister of 
Defence, is also reported to have informed United 
States officiais in The Hague on 23rd October 
that ratification of SALT II by the United 
States Senate was necessary before Western 
Europe could take any decision on deploying 
new nuclear weapons. A Foreign Ministry spokes-
man was earlier quoted as saying that the Nether-
lands favoured urgent investigation of the Soviet 
offer to negotiate, without that meaning that 
the December decision on new weapons should 
be delayed. The Netherlands Christian Democrats 
called for a postponement of the decision to 
deploy theatre nuclear forces for two years pend-
ing negotiations on the withdrawal of the SS-20. 
27. At a press conference in Copenhagen on 
23rd November, Mr. Kjeld Olesen, the Danish 
Foreign Minister, said that Denmark would ask 
NATO to postpone for six months a decision 
to deploy the new nuclear missiles, proposing 
that the Soviet Union during that period suspend 
production and deployment of the SS-20 and 
Backfire, and open negotiations urgently, and 
independently of SALT negotiations, to freeze its 
current theatre nuclear forces. 
28. In contrast with other European speakers, 
the British Prime Minister, Mrs. Thatcher, said 
in Luxembourg on 18th October that Western 
Europe must not block the proposed deployment 
of 572 missiles : "Unless we deploy more modern 
weapons soon, things will get worse ... What 
[President Brezhnev] said must not divert us 
from our intention." The United States, on 
6th November, was reported to have decided not 
to reply to Mr. Brezhnev's call for negotiations 
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until after NATO had decided on the deploy-
ment of the new theatre nuclear forces and had 
agreed its own arms limitation proposai. 
4. Conclusions on the modernisation of 
theatre nuclear forces 
29. While the Committee believes that a military 
response must be provided if the Soviet Union 
does not halt and reduce the deployment of the 
SS-20s targeted on Western Europe, it is not 
persuaded that the response to a specifie weapon 
must necessarily take an identical form. After 
the deployment of the SS-4 and SS-5 in 1959 and 
1961, referred to above, the NATO countries 
actually withdrew from service the very similar 
weapons systems which had been operational 
both in the United Kingdom and on the mainland 
of Europe, believing that the counter to the 
SS-4 and 5 lay in quite different weapons 
systems. There is no obvions logic in 1979 in 
insisting that the response to the SS-20 must be 
a NATO variant of the SS-20. 
30. The Committee stresses the need to preserve 
the linkage between ali forms of nuclear weapons 
systems if conventional deterrence fails. This 
means the option of credible selective responses 
from battlefield weapons, tactical aircraft, 
medium-range aircraft, the submarine-based 
systems already assigned to SACEUR, as weil as 
the United States strategie systems. If the SS-20 
is held to be invulnerable because it is mobile, 
the response in any case must be the option 
of selective nuclear strikes at other targets, 
whether airfields or command centres. The 
"seamless" nature of the allied nuclear deterrent 
would be better preserved if weapons systems 
not based on the mainland of Europe, such as 
the FB-111 medium bomber based in the United 
Kingdom and Minuteman missile based in the 
United States (both of which have the required 
accuracy and responsiveness for selective strikes), 
were among those which were earmarked - and 
seen by the So•.-iet Union to be earmarked- for 
employment in retaliation shoul?. the SS-20 ever 
be used. Provided the whole spectl'Ul'rl. of weapons 
is included in the equation, NATO is of course in 
a reasonably strong position - both to deter 
and to negotiate - because of the present 
superiority in strategie systems of 9,200 warheads 
compared with the Soviet Union's 5,100 1 • 
31. In any case the time-scale involved in the 
development of Pershing II and the GLCM does 
not require a final decision on total numbers to 
be procured before 1981 or 1982, if then - they 
are due to begin entry into service ("initial 
1. See Appendix II to the Committee's report on SALT 
II, Document 816. 
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operational capability") only in 1983, and cannot 
be deployed in any numbers before the mid-
1980s. 
32. In the light of all the foregoing consider-
ations the Committee outlines in draft recom-
mendation I the decisions concerning the modern-
isation of theatre nuclear forces which it proposes 
should be taken by NATO at its December 
ministerial meetings. In the preamble the Com-
mittee first deplores the increased nuclear threat, 
described in particular in paragraphs 7, 8,, 59 
and 60 of this explanatory memorandum. In 
paragraph (ii) of the preamble the Committee 
recalls the essential elements of the NATO 
strategy of deterrence relying on a triad of 
conventional, theatre nuclear and strategie 
nuclear weapons systems which is described in 
Part II.1 of the explanatory memorandum. 
33. First, there must be readiness to respond 
to the increased nuclear threat from Soviet hattie-
field weapons and the SS-20. The Committee 
asserts (paragraph (iii) of the preamble) that 
the political responsibility for and risks of NATO 
strategie policy must be shared by all countries 
of the Alliance, in particular through readiness 
for its implementation, although various national 
positions, such as the long-standing policy of 
Denmark and Norway not to station nuclear 
weapons on their territory in peacetime, have 
to be recognised. The only candidates for the 
stationing of 572 GLCM and Pershing II are 
to be found among the WEU countries, and a 
majority of the Committee, in approving oper-
ative sub-paragraph (a), believed that the North 
Atlantic Council should decide forthwith to 
procure and station these medium-range nuclear 
weapons in Europe, and which will be necessary 
to maintain the credibility of the deterrent if 
present levels of Soviet weapons are not reduced. 
The Committee recalls that in any case the pro-
gramme of modernisation of battlefield nuclear 
warheads referred to in paragraph 61 will be 
continued. In sub-paragraph (d) of the draft 
recommendation the Committee stresses the 
"seamless" nature of NATO's possible response 
to aggression referred to in paragraph 30 above. 
34. Secondly, there must be a serious and urgent 
attempt to explore the intentions behind 
Mr. Brezhnev's speech in Berlin on 6th October. 
Paragraph (v) of the preamble recalls the 
importance of détente as well as deterrence in 
NATO's policy, mentioned in paragraph 44 of 
the explanatory memorandum, and stresses the 
importance of arms control agreements which 
are dealt with in Part II.3 of the explanatory 
memorandum. In sub-paragraph (b) of the draft 
recommendation the Committee caUs for a firm 
offer to enter into negotiations with the Soviet 
Union to limit medium-range weapons on both 
sides. The production programme referred to in 
paragraph 31 above makes it clear that total 
240 
numbers of Pershing II and GLCM could be 
reduced below the 572 to be decided on now if 
negotiations with the Soviet Union secured cor-
responding Soviet reductions. 
35. At his 14th November 1979 press conference, 
Mr. Harold Brownr United States Secretary of 
Defence, stressed that "... arguments that have 
been made urging that long-range theatre nuclear 
force modernisation be carried through develop-
ment and production but not to deployment -
no decision be taken on deployment- are com-
pletely unrealistic. There is no way that the 
United States Congress or the parliament of any 
other country would say, 'well, we will spend 
hundreds of millions or billions of dollars if it 
were necessary to produce systems and maybe 
someone will later agree that they might be 
deployed' ", and la ter that "the Alliance needs 
to decide on certain numbers and then to build 
toward those numbers. If negotiations then are 
favourable, naturally then adjustments can be 
made." 
5. Opinion of the minority 
36. In draft recommendation I, a minority of 
the Committee would have replaced operative 
sub-paragraphs (a) to (c) with the following text: 
(a) by calling on the Soviet Union to agree 
to an immediate eighteen months' mora-
torium on the deployment of further 
SS-20 missiles ; 
(b) in the event of the Soviet Union agree-
ing to such a moratorium, by postponing 
for its duration the decision on procure-
ment of the 572 medium-range weapons 
which NATO plans to deploy in 
Europe; 
( c) by seeking within that period agreement 
on significant reductions in present 
numbers of Soviet medium-range nuclear 
weapons; 
(d) by deciding forthwith to investigate 
seriously, on the expiry of the eighteen-
month moratorium and in the light of 
the military and political situation 
which will then prevail, the need to 
procure and station a number of 
medium-range nuclear weapons which 
NATO intends to deploy in Europe;". 
The minority believed in particular that it was 
more important to try to put an immediate stop 
to further deployment of the SS-20, by calling 
for a moratorium forthwith, than to decide now 
on actual procurement of Pershing II and GLCM. 
The development schedules described in para-
graph 31 above make it clear that such a decision 
is not required before 1981 or 1982, and the 
overall balance of central and long-range theatre 
weapons taken together is still favourable to the 
West by some 10,600 to 7,300 1 • The minority 
believes that a decision on procurement of Persh-
ing II and GLCM taken now might prove 
irreversible, and would not permit exploration 
in good faith of Mr. Brezhnev's offer. Another 
minority believed that a decision to procure these 
weapons should be taken now, but that a decision 
on the need to deploy them should be postponed 
for two years. Y et another minority would have 
added a new paragraph urging member govern-
ments to agree now on the deployment of long-
range theatre nuclear weapons. 
U. The impact of technology 
(submitted by Mr. van den Bergh, Rapporteur) 
1. Current NATO defence strategy 
37. In the period since the original Brussels 
Treaty and the North Atlantic Treaty were 
signed, NATO strategy has evolved in two direc-
tions. Geographically, the original signatories 
with very limited manpower resources in face of 
the perceived threat could contemplate only a 
defence based on the Rhine. But once the 
Bundeswehr had been formed and taken its 
place alongside the allied forces in Europe, the 
geographical strategy, after a brief pause on the 
river Weser, became a policy of "forward 
defence" designed to provide a military defence 
on the very boundaries of the territory of NATO 
countries, so as not to permit an adversary to 
seize any territory without first having to initiate 
the use of military force and so placing the onus 
of aggression squarely on himself. The Com-
mittee has noted elsewhere that the actual deploy-
ment of forces in peacetime locations, and the 
associated installations, have not yet met the 
optimum requirements of the policy of forward 
defence. 
38. As far as men and weapons are concerned, 
after toying with the idea in the early fifties 
1. 
Numbers of warheads 
Alliance Warsaw Source Pact 
Central systems 9,200 5,100 Appendix II to 
Committee's re-
port on SALT II, 
Document 816 
Long- and 1,411 2,244 Appendix II, 
medium-range part 1, of present 
theatre system report: "War-
heads assumed 
available" 
Totals 10,611 7,344 
241 
DOOUMENT 827 
of attempting to match Soviet armed manpower, 
NATO, at a time of unquestioned nuclear 
superiority in the strategie and tactical fields, 
turned quickly instead to a policy of reliance 
on nuclear weapons. In the event of aggression 
by conventional Warsaw Pact forces in Europe 
an early and heavy nuclear interdiction strike 
by the superior tactical air forces was intended 
to reduce a conventional onslaught to a level at 
which it could be dealt with by the smaller 
conventional forces of NATO. 
39. With the growth in the numbers of Soviet 
strategie nuclear weapons in the early 1960s, 
however, such a policy of massive retaliation soon 
lost credibility and NATO strategy turned to 
the concept of flexible response, placing equal 
emphasis on the triad of conventional forces, 
battlefield nuclear weapons and strategie nuclear 
weapons. This policy has required considerable 
investment in the quality of conventional weapons 
systems and in the numbers of forces that man 
them. Today, despite Warsaw Pact superiority in 
men on the central front, and its overwhelming 
superiority in tanks, NATO has sufficient con-
ventional forces on the central front to repel any 
local surprise attack. 
40. NATO countries do not however subscribe 
to any policy of "no first use of nuclear 
weapons", and the strategy requires that in the 
event of deliberately prepared aggression involv-
ing a superior concentration of conventional 
forces, NATO has sufficient numbers and range 
of battlefield nuclear weapons available to initiate 
their selective employment if that is necessary 
to contain an attack. Weapons systems are 
designed and deployed to provide a continuing 
range of selective options at all levels up to 
strategie exchange so that a policy of deterrence 
is credible and effective, in facing any potential 
aggressor with a risk of having damage inflicted 
upon him which far exceeds any advantage he 
might hope to secure through the use of military 
force. 
41. To remain credible this strategy requires 
the existence of adequate forces in aU parts of 
the triad. 
42. This policy is described officially by the 
United States in the following terms : 
"It has become a truism of modern defence 
policy that we must maintain military 
capabilities at the basic levels : strategie 
nuclear, theatre nuclear and non-nuclear ... 
This administration like its four predecessors 
has decided that while it cannot and will 
not neglect our nuclear forces it will keep 
the barrier to nuclear warfare - primarily 
in the form of our non-nuclear capabilities 
- at a high level. The Soviets and their 
associates, if considering an attack on the 
United States, its forces and interests, or 
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its allies and friends, must recognise the 
possibility that we would make a nuclear 
response. But we reject nuclear escalation 
as the sole policy on which to base the 
planning or use of our forces. W e will 
continue to avoid relying on nuclear weapons 
unless their employment is clearly in our 
interest - and in the interest of our allies 
- or is forced on us by the nuclear actions 
of others. 
Deterrence is usually seen as a product 
of several conditions. W e must obviously 
be able to communicate a message to the 
other side about the priee it will have to pay 
for attempting to achieve an objective 
unacceptable to us. W e must have the mili-
tary capabilities necessary to exact the pay-
ment (at a cost acceptable to ourselves), ... 
at the same time our deterrent message 
must have sorne degree of credibility. That 
is to say both we and our opponent must 
believe there is a real probability that we 
will indeed perform the promised action, if 
required." 1 
43. The corresponding British statement reads 
as follows: 
"The balanced modernisation and improve-
ment which the Alliance is making to its 
forces are designed to maintain the cre-
dibility of the deterrent strategy of flexible 
response. This calls for the ability to meet 
aggression in any form and at any level 
in a way appropriate to the level of force 
used, and to demonstrate to any aggressor 
that the risks from aggression far outweigh 
any prospect of gaining an advantage. 
NATO ... does need a wide range of forces 
embracing conventional units, a theatre 
nuclear capability and strategie nuclear 
forces. These must be both credible in them-
selves and sufficiently closely linked together 
to convince an aggressor that he could over-
come one level of capability only at the 
expense of incurring a response from the 
next in a process which would continue, if 
necessary, up to the strategie level." '2 
44. At the same time, explicitly since 1967, 
NATO has placed equal emphasis on détente and 
on defence capability. The German defence state-
ment can be quoted in this context : 
"The Atlantic Alliance combines defence 
capability with preparedness for détente to 
form a well-rounded concept. That concept, 
upon which the Alliance agreed in 1967 
1. Department of Defence annual report, fiscal year 
1980, pages 60-61. 
2. United Kingdom "Statement on the defence esti-
mates", February 1979, paragraph 119. 
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(Harmel report), governs the security policy 
pursued by the Federal Republic of Ger-
many : preparedness for détente upon the 
foundation of a secure defence posture." 1 
2. Technological developments in battlefield 
weapons 
(a) Conventional weapons 
45. The period since the end of the second world 
war has seen the entry into service of sorne two 
or three successive generations of conventional 
weapons incorporating a whole range of modern 
technology. The most significant improvements 
in performance have been made in surveillance 
and target acquisition systems and, simultane-
ously, guidance systems. These improvements 
have resulted from the introduction particularly 
of miniaturised electronics providing sensors, 
observation deviees and guidance systems which 
can use radar, infrared radiation and acoustical 
signais ; lasers have led to entirely new applica-
tions of optics, both for range finding and 
target designation. In addition, however, there 
have been steady improvements in conventional 
warheads including the development of miniatur-
ised explosives used in cluster bombs and fuel-
air explosives designed to produce high blast 
effect against personnel in cover. In the words 
of Mr. William Perry, United States Under-
Secretary of Defence for Research and Engineer-
ing, it may in the future be possible to see ali 
high-value targets on the battlefield at any time; 
to make a direct hit on any target that can be 
seen, and to destroy any target tha;t can be hit." 2 
46. At first sight the improved lethality of 
modern weapons might lead to the conclusion 
that they favour the defender, because an aggres-
sor, having to move, will be more exposed to 
observation and more vulnerable to attack 
through lack of cover. Certainly the experience 
of the 1973 Middle East war showed that very 
high casualties could be expected in both tanks 
and aircraft that sought to penetrate defensive 
screens of modern weapons, but at the same time 
the expenditure of these weapons was very much 
higher than had been expected and stockpiles 
were quickly depleted. 
47. The views of the many experts consulted not 
unnaturally differed to sorne extent on the overall 
effects on the military balance resulting from 
the introduction of the newest generations of 
conventional weapons. Apart from the 1973 
1. German "White paper 1979 - The security of the 
Federal Republic of Germany and the development of the 
armed forces", 4th September 1979. 
2. Report to Congress, 1st February 1978, hearings 
before Senate Armed Services Committee, Part 8, page 
5599. 
Middle East war there is no direct experience 
of the combat use of these weapons. If the allied 
policy of deterrence continues successfully to 
prevent the outbreak of war in Europe it may 
weil be that severa! generations of weapons 
systems will succeed one another without either 
side having the opportunity to acquire battlefield 
experience of their effects. Consequently, mili-
tary planners can be expected to caU for a 
multiplicity of systems in order to provide 
insurance against sorne unexpected shortcomings 
in any single weapons system that might be 
found in- the inevitable confusion of hostilities. 
48. If general conclusions, applicable to the 
military balance as a whole, are suspect, never-
theless useful conclusions can be drawn from 
an examination of specifie weapons systems in 
specifie applications. In two areas your Rap-
porteur has encountered general consensus that 
the improved lethality and acquisition capabilities 
of modern conventional weapons can make 
them a preferred substitute for tactical nuclear 
weapons. In the field of anti-submarine warfare 
there have been great improvements in target 
acquisition and location through the use of both 
passive and active sonar, on a variety of plat-
forms, coupled with elaborate data-processing 
deviees. When combined with the new generation 
of guided, homing torpedoes, which may them-
selves be launched from varions platforms 
including surface ships, submarines, helicopters 
and moored "mines", the effectiveness of these 
conventional systems is such that the use of a 
nuclear warhead is no longer a militarily attrac-
tive alternative on anti-submarine weapons. 
49. In the field of surface-to-air missiles for 
use against aircraft the improved lethality of 
the present generation of surface-to-air missiles, 
combined in this instance with the assessment 
that large numbers of aircraft in tightly-packed 
formations are no longer likely to be encountered 
as targets, have made it undesirable to develop 
nuclear warheads as weil as conventional ones 
for these missiles. The successor to the NIKE -
the long-range surface-to-air missile which has 
an optional nuclear warhead - will almost 
certainly rely solely on conventional warheads. 
50. In the field of anti-tank warfare the picture 
appears to be more confused, being complicated 
by many factors. In view of the overwhelming 
superiority of the Warsaw Pact forces in tanks 
on the central front it is an area in which NATO 
cannot afford to draw the wrong conclusions. 
The generation of anti-tank guided weapons now 
in service - such as Tow, Hot and Milan -
are extremely effective at ranges from 500 rn 
up to say 4 km. They have a greatly improved 
first-round hit capability, but still rely on line-
of-sight guidance by the user right up to the 
time of impact. They are very effective in con-
ditions of good visibility where the user himself 
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is in a secure position. Scheduled stockpiles of 
these weapons have been significantly increased 
under the European defence improvement pro-
gramme (EDIP), following particularly on the 
experience of the 1973 war. NATO is reported 
not to have a superiority over the W arsaw Pact 
forces of 2:1 in anti-tank missile launchers 1, But 
it would be wrong to conclude that the threat 
from the greater numbers of Warsaw Pact 
armoured vehicles is thereby completely neu-
tralised. 
51. The more cautions experts have pointed out 
that these weapons systems cover only the 
immediate battlefield area up to ranges not 
exceeding 4 km ; they are severely affected or 
rendered useless by smoke or fog ; the user of the 
weapons remains vulnerable especially to artillery 
fire which could significantly reduce the number 
of hits obtained ; the effects of the relatively 
small warhead carried on these missiles is less 
than that of a modern anti-tank gun, and newly 
developed armour, reportedly relying on a steelj 
ceramic sandwich, may make tanks invulnerable 
to them. Nevertheless the weapons will continue 
to be effective against the armour of existing 
tanks, and against the very large number of 
armoured infantry vehicles possessed by the 
W arsaw Pact forces. 
52. A "fire and forget" terminally-guided anti-
tank missile, with sorne capability for penetrating 
smoke or camouflage, will be the next generation 
to be developed but it is still sorne ten years 
before it will be in service. 
53. Preventing a concentration of armour at 
greater ranges than those at which anti-tank 
guided weapons operate is a rôle for ground 
support aircraft and longer-range missile systems. 
Here modern weapons offer cluster bombs and 
cluster mines as weil as the United States Copper-
head due to enter service in late 1981. This is 
a cannon-launched guided missile, designed to 
enable medium artillery to engage tanks at ranges 
of many kilometres when the target tank is 
illuminated by a laser designator. This however 
requires an operator, whether on the ground or 
in an aircraft, in sight of the tank and is extremely 
expensive - a cost comparison is given in section 
(c) belowt:~ showing that it is not an economie 
military alternative to enhanced radiation and 
nuclear weapons for use against a concentration 
of tanks. Modern ground attack aircraft fitted 
with conventional weapons are however con-
sidered to be very effective agamst tanks and 
the new A-10 is specifically designed for con-
1. United States fiscal year 1980 Department of 
Defence programme for research, development and 
acquisition. Statement by William Perry, Under-Secre-
tary of Defence for Research and Engineering, to the 
United States Congress, 1st February 1979. 
2. Paragraph 67. 
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ventional weapons only and does not have the 
necessary features for the employment of nuclear 
weapons. 
54. In the field of air superiority fighters the 
same is true of the F-15 aircraft which again 
has been designed for conventional weapons only. 
55. From this review of improvements of con-
ventional weapons systems the Committee draws 
the conclusion that they can be preferred replace-
ments for battlefield nuclear weapons in certain 
specifie situations, where they present an equal 
deterrent effect. This "raising of the nuclear 
threshold" in popular jargon is to be welcomed 
in that it provides NATO with a more credible 
conventional defence. The Committee stresses 
nevertheless that it does not obviate the need 
for battlefield nuclear weapons without which 
there would be no continuons spectrum of deter-
rence between conventional defence and strategie 
ex change. 
56. Other non-nuclear weapons should be men-
tioned in this section. Although cruise missiles 
in the sense of pilotless aircraft have been in 
service with both NATO and Warsaw Pact forces 
as nuclear weapons systems in the past, a com-
pletely new generation of ground-launched, air-
launched or sea-launched cruise missiles is now 
under development exploiting the high efficiency 
of the fan jet aircraft engine coupled with 
guidance techniques which will permit both a 
very low under-radar flight path and greatly 
increased accuracy on target. While such missiles 
with terrain contour matching systems may be 
of interest to sorne European countries, the very 
highest accuracy guidance systems involving 
target area matching techniques are considered 
by sorne experts to be prohibitively expensive. 
Nevertheless, if high accuracy is achieved, the 
deployment of GLCMs with conventional war-
heads may become a useful military application 
against high value targets such as strategie 
bridges or other vulnerable unprotected targets. 
57. Lastly, in the high technology field reference 
should be made to United States work on 
directed-energy technology. High-energy lasers 
are being developed both by the navy and by 
the Defence Advanced Research Projects Agency 
Programme (DARPAP), and it is officially 
reported that Tow missiles have been shot down 
by a laboratory testbed laser. The DARP AP 
laser programme is concentrating on space 
defence applications. At the same time DARP AP 
is working on charged-particle bearn concepts 
to see whether such beams would propagate 
stahly in the atmosphere, and is currently con-
structing a high-energy advanced test accelerator 
for this purpose 1 • The same report notes that 
1. United States fiscal year 1980 Department of 
Defence programme for research, development and 
acquisition, February 1979. 
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the Soviet Union is also working on high-energy 
lasers and charged-particle beams, but considers 
that the Soviet decision to begin production of a 
high-energy laser weapon system is premature ; 
the United States is concentrating on techno-
logical development in this field for the time 
being, judging the project not yet ready for 
production as a weapons system. 
58. The Rapporteur is left with the impression 
that the application of technology to weapons 
systems is not fully under political control. 
There is always a risk that a breakthrough in 
certain areas of high technology might, if applied 
to defence systems, completely upset the military 
balance, not necessarily to the long-term benefit 
of the side first developing it. Stability of the 
balance might be undermined if one side per-
ceived an overwhelming advantage in a surprise 
attack. Yet vital decisions on specifie directions 
of defence technology research and development 
may today be taken in the inner sanctuaries of 
defence research departments, and not as a 
deliberate political decision by the cabinet, let 
alone parliament. The Committee proposes there-
fore that the NATO countries institute pro-
cedures to ensure that the application of techno-
logy to defence purposes, particularly long-term 
applications, with unforeseeable strategie con-
sequences, be subject to deliberate political 
decision whether in cabinet or in parliament. 
(b) Battlefield nuclear weapons 
59. Within the last five years there has been a 
dramatic change in the balance of battlefield 
nuclear weapons \ which the Soviet Union was 
slow to develop, Mr. Khrushchev having claimed 
at one time that the Soviet Union would not 
waste fissile material on small weapons, con-
centrating on strategie weapons with megaton 
warheads. Five years ago it was estimated that 
NATO had a 2:1 superiority with 7,000 warheads 
for battlefield nuclear weapons stockpiled in 
Europe by NATO, and only half that number 
by the Soviet Union. 
60. Today the United States estimate is as fol-
lows: 
"Of the nuclear weapons allocated to tactical 
use, about 7,000 offensive warheads are in or 
near the European theatre. We estimate that 
a larger number of Soviet warheads are com-
mitted to the Warsaw Pact." 2 
1. "Battlefield nuclear weapons" is used in this report 
to mean allied theatre nuclear weapons based in Europe, 
but with insufficient range to reach the territory of the 
Soviet Union, and comparable Soviet weapons. 
2. United States fiscal year 1980 Department of 
Defence programme for defence, development and acqui-
sition, February 1979. 
Soviet and Warsaw Pact forces are estimated 
to have sorne 1,600 battlefield nuclear missiles 
with ranges from 15 km to 800 km compared 
with 400 in service with NATO forces 1, and 
sources as disparate as IISS, Jane's Weapons 
Systems and SIPRI in the last two years have 
reported new Soviet battlefield nuclear missiles 
SS-21 (60-100 km) and SS-22 (800 km). Press 
reports have reported these weapons now 
deployed in East Germany. The superior numbers 
of Warsaw Pact battlefield nuclear missiles are 
however offset in part by the numbers of nuclear 
rounds available for NATO artillery, and by 
NATO's superior tactical nuclear air strike 
capability. 
61. Partly in the context of the NATO long-term 
defence programme, the United States has under-
taken research and development programmes to 
modernise warheads for battlefield nuclear 
weapons. Ongoing programmes include improved 
nuclear ammunition for 155 mm and 203 mm 
artillery and for the Lance missile. The object of 
these programmes is to improve survivability 
of a weapons system ; to improve the flexibility 
and effectiveness of employment, largely through 
providing selective yield warheads which, with a 
sufficiently accurate delivery system, can achieve 
the military purpose with lower yield and hence 
less collateral damage; and to improve the con-
trol and safety of such nuclear warheads through 
deniai and disablement features designed both 
to ensure that they can be used only when the 
political decision is taken, and to ensure that 
they will be ineffective if they fall in the hands 
of terrorists. One selective-yield warhead can 
replace several fixed-yield warheads in the stock-
piles in Europe, and the NATO Nuclear Plan-
ning Group in its communiqué of 14th November 
1979 noted the possibility of reducing the theatre 
nuclear force stockpile in Europe by "sorne 
substantial number of warheads" (press reports 
said 1,000). 
62. Battlefield nuclear weapons include free-fall 
and stand-off bombs delivered by tactical air-
craft, and the Pershing IA missile. 
(c) The enhanced-radiation reduced-blast warhead 
63. In 1977 and 1978 the desirability of develop-
ing enhanced-radiation reduced-blast nuclear 
warhead battlefield weapons became the subject 
of political debate, sorne of it emotional, within 
the Atlantic Alliance. When nuclear warheads 
are employed in battlefield weapons the principal 
damaging effects are blast and thermal flash, 
against both of which steel affords a high degree 
of protection. Where battlefield nuclear weapons 
are to be employed against tank concentrations, 
therefore, relatively high yields of standard fis-
1. IISS, Military Balance 1979-80. 
245 
DOOUMENT 827 
sion weapons are required to inflict damage, but 
have the disadvantage in the European theatre 
of inevitably inflicting considerable "collateral" 
damage on the civilian population and ordinary 
housing over a very much wider area, since these 
are very much more vulnerable to blast and 
thermal flash than the steel armour of tanks. 
64. Nuclear warheads with deliberately-enhanced 
neutron emission had been developed and 
deployed by the United States in the Sprint 
anti-ballistic missile system to improve its effec-
tiveness in destroying the warheads of incoming 
ballistic missiles. It was appreciated that the yield 
in terms of blast of battlefield nuclear weapons 
employed against targets such as tanks could be 
considerably reduced if the neutron emission of 
the warhead was increased. because steel is a 
relatively poor shield against neutrons. The 
deployment of enhanced-radiation reduced-blast 
wea.pons on the battlefield, it was argued, would 
provide NATO with a weapon which would 
prevent the Warsaw Pact from concentrating 
its armoured forces because of the credible threat 
of nuclear attack on them that such weapons 
would pose once the danger of inflicting even 
more widespread civilian damage had been 
obviated. 
65. An attempt by the United States Adminis-
tration to consult European allies on the issue, 
rather than to be seen to be taking a unilateral 
initiative in deploying a weapon of considerable 
concern to the European allies, failed to secure 
immediate explicit support from the other NATO 
governments concerned, and served instead to 
stir up considerable public opposition to which 
the Soviet Union did not fail to contribute. 
66. Most recently, on 18th October 1978, Presi-
dent Carter announced a decision to begin pro-
duction of nuclear 203 mm artillery shells and 
Lance missile warheads designed for ready con-
version to the enhanced-radiation mode by the 
insertion of special components, the production 
of only sorne of which was ordered by the Presi-
dent at the same time. This was interpreted 
as a minimum production decision to keep the 
enhanced-radiation option open. Even that mini-
mum decision drew criticism from two NATO 
governments. On 19th October 1978 a Nether-
lands Government spokesman was quoted as 
saying : "The Netherlands Government expresses 
sorrow at the course of action taken by the 
American Government. We are asking our 
Ambassador to seek a fuller explanation from 
the United States ... The weapon is a fact of life 
but the debate will centre on the issue that we 
do not want it installed on the Lance rockets in 
the Netherlands." The Netherlands Government 
conveyed to Washington a resolution of protest 
adopted by the Netherlands Parliament. The 
following month the Norwegian Foreign Minister, 
Mr. Frydelund, said in the Norwegian Par-
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liament : "... W e share the wish which has been 
expressed by the Netherlands Government that 
the neutron weapon be drawn into the nego-
tiations on arms control... The Norwegian 
Government is opposed to production of neutron 
weapons ... " It has always however been Norwe-
gian policy not to permit the stationing of nuclear 
weapons on its territory in peacetim.e. 
67. From a strictly military point of view there 
are obvious arguments in favour of deploying 
the enhanced radiation weapon. One study made 
available to your Rapporteur compared the costs 
and effects of using three different weapons 
against a tank battalion deployed in a 1 km 
radius : an enhanced-nuclear weapon ; a standard 
fission nuclear weapon ; and the Copperhead 
cannon-launched guided projectile - a purely 
conventional weapon which could be expected to 
be effective against tanks at similar ranges pro-
vided that target designation observation was 
available. In ali three cases any civilians in the 
area of the tank battalion would become casual-
ties, but the area beyond the tank battalion within 
which civilian casualties would also be expected 
could be reduced from over 42 sq. km. for the 
standard fission weapon to 8 sq. km. for the 
enhanced-radiation weapon - civilian casualties 
would be reduced to less than one-fifth. Theore-
tically the purely conventional Copperhead could 
be expected to reduce civilian casualties much 
further - to an area of 0.21 sq. km. - but the 
cost would be $2 million (more by a factor of at 
least two than either of the nuclear systems) and 
240 rounds would be required - a number 
which it would be impracticable to deploy because 
of the target designation requirement for each 
round. 
68. The military advantages of the enhanced-
radiation weapon may not however be as clear-
cut as sorne experts are arguing. Greatly improv-
ed accuracy in the delivery of standard fission 
weapons can also permit reduction in yields of 
weapons employed, and it is in this direction 
that the modernisation programme is already 
moving. Moreover, a counter to the deployment 
of weapons with enhanced-neutron emission could 
probably be found by incorporating in tank 
armour materials with large neutron cross-
sections at the energies concerned - hydrogen, 
carbon and boron for example. These materials 
might be incorporated in plastic or ceramic 
materials, or in steel, and might be compatible 
with the new sandwich-type Chobham armour. 
Moreover, casualties to tank crews by neutron 
radiation would not ali be prompt casualties ; 
many deaths would occur hours and days afte1.· 
the attack, and the immediate military effect 
might be less than anticipated. 
69. It has been argued that enhanced radiation 
weapons would raise, or not affect, the nuclear 
threshold. Because their possible employment 
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would appear more credible to an adversary, the 
deterrent effect of the weapons would be in-
creased. Your Rapporteur however personally 
believes that the enhanced-radiation weapon 
would lower the nuclear threshold. 
70. The Rapporteur believes that in the present 
state of the debate there is no case at present 
for proceeding beyond President Carter's decision 
of October 1978, pending the outcome of negotia-
tions with the Soviet Union in the arms control 
area to which reference is made below. 
3. Arms control negotiations 
71. Despite the plethora of international forums 
and agreements the content of present arms 
control arrangements is very limited as many 
reports of the Committee devoted specifically to 
the topic have pointed out ; with the possible 
exception of the partial test ban treaty, the arms 
control agreements have for the most part served 
to codify an existing situation. Since the military 
balance is as much dependent on arms control 
however as it is on forces and armaments, thi3 
report would not be complete if it did not con-
sider essential features of those negotiations that 
are relevant to the weapons covered in this 
report, and did not examine certain fundamental 
concepts. 
72. SALT II, on which the Committee has 
reported elsewherel, covers only those central 
nuclear systems of the two superpowers which 
are based on the territory or in the ballistic mis-
sile submarines of one and are in range of the 
territory of the other. However, in SALT III, 
on which the Committee intends to report next 
year, parties will be free to raise other subjects 
and hence other systems. The MBFR negotiations 
cover only the NATO guidelines area and thus 
exclude weapons based in the United Kingdom, 
France ani!. southern Europe on the NATO side 
and in the Soviet Union, Bulgaria and Romania 
on the other2 • In SALT III it will be essential 
to enlarge the scope of the negotiations to include 
any nuclear weapons systems not already impli-
citly covered in MBFR. 
73. As far as the MBFR negotiations are con-
cerned 3 , NATO has already, in the so-called 
option 3, offered a reduction of sorne 1,000 
tactical nuclear warheads in a package deal in 
exchange for the withdrawal of a Soviet tank 
army. The modernisation of warheads for hattie-
field nuclear weapons referred to in paragraph 
61 clearly makes this a possible offer from the 
NATO standpoint. 
1. Document 816. 
2. The status of Hungary has not been agreed. 
3. See the report of the Committee, Document 809, 
Rapporteur Mr. Pawelczyk. 
7 4. Reference should be made in passing to the 
United Nations conference on specially injurions 
weapons which has just adjourned, and in the 
framework of which agreement is now likely on 
the prohibition of weapons producing non-
detectable fragments ; and possibly on limita-
tions on the laying of minefields and booby traps. 
Agreement has not so far been possible on limita-
tions on incendiary weapons because certain 
types of these remain a military requirement for 
many countries. The bilateral United States-
Soviet negotiations on a convention to ban 
chemical weapons have recently been adjourneù 
on an optimistic note. 
75. The Committee stresses the importance of 
taking full account of the arms control implica-
tions of the introduction of any new weapons 
system and draws attention to the very detailed 
arms control impact statements which, following 
legislation in 1975, the United States Administra-
tion is required to submit to Congress each year 1• 
An unclassified version of these statements is 
made public ; the full classified version is made 
available to the Senate Committee on Foreign 
Relations and to the House Committee on 
Foreign Affairs. They analyse under the fol-
lowing seven headings the possible implications 
of a large number of nuclear weapons systems : 
(i) consistency with United States arms 
control policy and related presidcntial 
decisions; 
(ii) relation to arms control agreements; 
(iii) effect on current and prospective negotia-
tions; 
1. See most recently fiscal year 1980 : Arms control 
impact statements, 'SUbmitted to Congress by the Pre-
sident pursuant to Section 36 of the Arms Control and 
Disarmament Act, March 1979. 
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(iv) effect on global and regional stability ; 
(v) technological implications ; 
(vi) potential interaction with other program-
mes; 
(vii) verification. 
76. The Committee calls for the introduction of 
similar reports on the arms control implications 
of ail new defence equipment programmes to be 
submitted by the government to parliament in 
ali NATO countries. 
77. The lack of political control over the applica-
tion of technology to defence purposes has been 
referred to above 1• Despite the intricate problems 
that may arise, the Committee proposes that a 
study should be made of the possibility of includ-
ing the implications of technological develop-
ments in arms control negotiations - SALT III 
and MBFR. It is felt that if such an approach 
is not made, the already insufficient results of 
arms control negotiations will inevitably be over-
taken by the events of future technological in-
novations in defence. 
78. Although the Warsaw Pact countries have 
undoubtedly introduced a shift in their favour 
in the military balance, particularly through the 
introduction of more battlefield nuclear weapons 
and the SS-20, NATO still has a lead in the 
quality of its weapons systems. The following 
quality comparisons of land, tactical air and 
naval forces, and of basic technology areas, is 
taken from the United States Department of 
Defence report 2• 
1. Paragraph 58. 
2. United States fiscal year 1980 Department of 
Defence progra=e for research, development and 
acquisition. 
TABLE Il-5 
NATO-deployed forces- land and tactical air 
Tanks 
Armoured personnel carriers 
Anti-tank missile launchers 
Artillery tubes and rocket launchers 
Combat aircraft (including air defence 
aircraft) a 
Approximate force-size ratio 1 
NATO and Warsaw Pact Quality 
1:2 
1:2 
2:1 
1:2 
1: 1 
NATO leads in lethality and envelope 
Warsaw Pact leads 
NATO leads, but losing edge 
Equal - USSR leads in diversity ; United 
States leads in lethality 
United States leads 
1. Includes France and United States and allied reserve component equipment. 
2. Also includes naval aircraft and combat-capable trainers in combat units. 
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TABLE Il-7 
Qualitative comparison of deployed general-purpose naval systems 
Deployed system 
SSNs 
Anti-submarine warfare 
Land-based naval air 
Sea-based air 
Surface combatants 
Cruise missile 
Mine warfare 
United 
States 
superior 
x 
x 
x 
United 
States/ 
USSR 
equal 
x 
x 
TABLE Il-8 
USSR 
su peri or 
x 
x 
Commenta 
USSR advantage in maximum speed 
Major efforts under way in both 
United States and USSR 
USSR developing in this area 
CAPTOR technology superior to 
USSR deployed technology 
Relative United StatesJUSSR standing in the 
twenty most important basic technology areas 
United United 
Basic technologies * States States/ USSR 
superior USSR su peri or 
equal 
1. Aerodynamics jfluid dynamics x 
2. Communications x 
3. Computera and software x 
4. Counter-measures 1 
5. Electrical power generation technology x 
6. Electronic materials and integrated circuit manufacture x 
7. Electro-optical sensors (including IR) x-
8. Guidance and navigation x-. 
9. High-energy laser technology 
10. Hydro-acoustic technology x 
11. Intelligence sensors x 
12. Manufacturing technology x-
13. Materials (lightweight and high-strength) x 
14. Non-acoustic submarine detection 
15. Nuclear warhead technology x 
16. Particle bearn technology 
17. Precision op tics x 
18. Propulsion (aerospace) technology x-. 
19. Radar sensors x 
20. Signal processing x-. 
1. The list aggregate was selel'ted with the objective of providing a valid basis for comparing overall 
United States and USSR basic technology. The technologies were specifically not chosen to compare 
technology level in currently deployed military systems. The list is in alphabetical order. 
2. The list was limited to twenty items so that it would be a manageable size for assessment purposes. 
3. The technologies selected had the potential for significantly changing the military balance in the 
next ten to twenty years. The technologies are not static; they are improving or have the potential for 
significant improvements. 
4. The arrows denote that the relative technology level is changing significantly in the direction indicated. 
* Criteria for selection of basic technologies most important to future military capabilities. 
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79. NATO therefore has sufficient strength from 
which to make a positive contribution to arms 
control negotiations. By introducing the techno-
logy factor into appropriate East-West negotia-
tions, on a reciprocal basis of course, a more 
stable military balance could be achieved and 
the danger avoided of having new threats arise 
through the introduction of new technology. 
4. Conclusions on the impact of technology 
80. The Committee's principal conclusions on 
this part of the report are set forth in recom-
mendation II. 
81. In paragraph (i) of the preamble the Com-
mittee notes the greater emphasis now placed 
on the need for an adequate conventional defence, 
referred to in paragraphs 39 and 40 of the 
explanatory memorandum, and notes that the 
newer generation of precision-guided munitions 
have replaced nuclear warheads in the two 
specifie military applications of anti-submarine 
warfare and surface-to-air missiles, described in 
paragraphs 48 and 49 of the explanatory memo-
randum. 
82. In paragraph (i) of the preamble and in 
paragraph B.1 of the operative text the Com-
mittee calls for member governments to continue 
proper political control over the application of 
249 
VOOUMENT 827 
new technologies to defence purposes ; this matter 
is discussed in paragraph 58 of the explanatory 
memorandum. 
83. In paragraph A.1 the Committee calls for 
the implication for arms control negotiations of 
the application of new technologies to defence 
purpose.s to be taken into account, a proposa! 
which is spelled out in paragraphs 77 to 78 above. 
84. In paragraphs 48 and 49 of the explanatory 
memorandum two cases are identified where 
modern weapons with conventional warheadll 
have replaced nuclear weapons. In paragraph 
A.2 of the draft recommendation the Committee 
calls for this policy to be continued where mili-
tarily feasible and of equal deterrent value. 
85. Lastly in paragraph B.2 the Committee caUs 
for the institution of reports to parliaments in 
member countries similar to the arms control 
impact statements already provided by the United 
States Administration to Congre.ss ; these state-
ments are de.scribed in paragraph 75 of the 
explanatory memorandum. 
86. As far as the enhanced-radiation reduced-
blast warhead is concerned, the Committee at 
this time makes no specifie recommendation. The 
Rapporteur considers, in paragraph 70 above, 
that there is no case at the present time for 
proceeding beyond President Carter's decision of 
October 1978. 
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APPENDIX 1 
ORDER 49 1 
on new weapons and defence strategy 
The .Assembly, 
Aware that the present introduction of new theatre weapons systems, in particular precision-guided 
munitions, and the proposed introduction of others such as croise missiles and enhanced-radiation nuclear 
weapons, have many implications for defence policy, strategy and arms control, 
1NSTRUOTS ITS CoMMITTEE ON DEFENOE QuESTIONS AND ARMAMENTS to continue its study of these 
questions and to report to the next part-session of the Assembly. 
1. Adopted by the Assembly on 2lst November 1978. 
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APPENDIX II t::j 0 
0 
1. Balance of long- and medium-range nuclear systems for the European theatre 1 ~ 
This table includea tactical aircraft in Europe and two United States aircraft carriers, but excludea short-range battlefield weapons (artillery and ~ 
missiles). -:r 
NATO long- and medium-range nuclear systems for the European theatre 
Factors Warheads Indices System Category Range In ven- Quality 
and type (nm) tory Utilisa- Service- No. of assumed Surviv- Pene- Flexi- index utility Operating countries and notes 
ti on ability warheads available ability tration bility figure 
SLBM 
Polaris A-3 2,880 64• 1.0 0.45• 1 28 0.25 0.3 0.1 0.65 18 Britain. MRV counted as single 
warhead 
M-20 3,000 64• 1.0 0.45• 1 28 0.25 0.3 0.1 0.65 18 France 
IRBM 
SSBS S-2 1,875 18 1.0 0.9 1 14 0.15 0.3 0.2 0.65 9 France 
SRBM 
Pershing 450 180 1.0 0.9 1 162 0.2 0.3 0.15 0.65 105 United States, West Germany United States inventory in Europe 
108; German 72 (under dual 
United States-German control) 
Ballistic missile sub- 326 232 150 
totals 
Land-based aircraft 
Vulcan B2 2,000 48 1.0 0.8 4 152 0.15 0.15 0.3 0.6 91 Britain. Range varies with flight profile 
Buccaneer 500 50 0.5 0.8 2 40 0.15 0.15 0.3 0.6 24 Britain 
Mirage IVA 2,000 33 1.0 0.8 3 78 0.15 0.15 0.3 0.6 46 France 
F-4 1,400 175 0.33 0.8 2 92 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.4 36 West Germany, Greece, Turkey 
F-UIE fF 2,925 156 0.5 0.8 3 186 0.15 0.2 0.3 0.65 120 United States. 156 known to be based in Europe 
FB-111A 3,000 66 1.0 0.8 4 208 0.15 0.2 0.3 0.65 135 United States. Assumes half United States inventory moved to Europe 
F-4 1,400 324 0.33 0.8 2 170 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.4 68 United States. European-based plus dual-based aircraft 
F-104 750 367 0.33 0.8 1 96 0.1 0.1 0.15 0.35 33 Belgium, West Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Turkey 
Jaguar 1,000 177 0.33 0.8 1 48 0.1 0.1 0.15 0.35 16 Britain, France 
Mirage 5F 650 94 0.33 0.8 1 24 0.1 0.1 0.12 0.32 7 Belgium, France 
Mirage IllE 650 105 0.33 0.8 1 27 0.1 0.1 0.12 0.32 8 France 
Carrier-based aircraft 
A-6E 800 20 0.5 0.8 3 24 0.15 0.2 0.3 0.65 1~ 1 United States. Assumes 2 carriers in A-7E 1,200 40 0.5 0.8 1 16 0.15 0.1 0.3 0.55 range and half strike aircraft used in nuclear rôle 
Etendard IVM 350 24 0.5 0.8 2 18 0.15 0.1 0.2 0.45 8 Assumes 1 out of 2 carriers in range 
Aircraft sub-totals 1,679 1,179 615 
Totals, less Poseidon 2,005 1,411 765 
United States 
central system Assumes 400 "central" United States 
Poseidon 2,800 (40) (10) 400 0.3 0.3 0.15 0.75 300 Poseidon warheads allocated to 
SACEUR strike plan 
Totals, with Poseidon 2,045 1,811 1,065 
Warsaw Pact long- and medium-range nuclear systems for the European theatre 
IRBM 
SS-5 Skean 2,300 90 0.75 0.9 1 60 0.15 0.3 0.2 0.65 39 USSR 
SS-20 3-4,000 120 0.75 0.9 3 243 0.3 0.3 0.25 0.85 206 USSR. Mo bile, MIRV 
MRBM 
SS-4 Sandal 1,200 500 0.75 0.9 1 337 0.15 0.3 0.15 0.6 202 
SS-N-4 Sark 300 27 1.0 0.7 1 16 0.25 0.3 0.1 0.65 10 USSR. On G-I-class ssB. Assumed 
deployed in Baltic only 
SLBM 
SS-N-5 Serb 700 54 1.0 0.7 1 33 0.25 0.3 0.1 0.65 21 USSR. On G-II-, H-II-class SSB 
SS-N-8 4,800 6 1.0 0.7 1 5 0.25 0.~ 0.15 0.7 3 
SSBN. Assumed deployed in Bal tic 
only 
USSR. On 1 H-III-class SSBN. 
Assumed in Baltic and operational 
SRBM 
Scud B 1851 400 0.75 0.9 1 270 0.2 0.3 0.1 0.6 162 USSR SS-12 500 
Scud B 185 16 1.0 0.9 1 14 0.2 0.3 0.1 0.6 8 Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, GDR, 
Hungary and Romania have 
Scud, but only GDR believed to 
have Scud B 
Ballistic missile 1,213 978 651 
sub-totals 
Aircraft 
Tu-22M 3,000+ 50 0.37 0.8 5 74 0.15 0.2 0.3 0.65 48 USSR. Long-range air force aircraft 
Backfire only (naval air force aircraft 
excluded) 
Tu-16 Badger 1,650 318 0.37 0.8 4 376 0.15 0.1 0.25 0.50 188 USSR 
Tu-22 Blinder 1,750 135 0.37 0.8 3 117 0.15 0.15 0.25 0.55 64 USSR 
Su-19 Fencer 600 230 0.19 0.8 2 68 0.1 0.2 0.15 0.45 30 USSR 
Su-17 Fitter 325 640 0.19 0.8 2 194 0.1 0.1 0.12 0.32 62 USSR 
CfD 
MiG-23/-27 450 1,400 0.19 0.8 1 212 0.1 0.2 0.15 0.45 95 USSR 
Flogger B /D 
MiG-21 Fishbed 350 1,000 0.19 0.8 1 152 0.1 0.1 0.12 0.32 48 USSR 
J /K/L/N 
Su-7 Fitter A { 275 220 0.19 0.8 1 33 0.1 0.1 0.12 0.32 10 USSR 275 115 0.25 0.8 1 23 0.1 0.1 0.12 0.32 7 Czechoslovakia, Po land 
Su-20 Fitter C 325 35 0.25 0.8 2 14 0.1 0.1 0.12 0.32 4 Po land 
Il-28 Beagle 1,400 5 0.50 0.8 1 2 0.1 0.05 0.15 0.3 1 Po land 
MiG-23 450 3 0.25 0.8 1 1 0.1 0.2 0.15 0.45 1 Czechoslovakia 
Flogger B 
Aircraft sub-totals 4,151 1,266 558 
GRAND TOTALS 5,364 2,244 1,209 
* Inventory figure of 64 representa SLBM complement of 4 SSBN. But no more than 2 SSBN are likely to be on patrol, and it is to their 32 SLBM that a 0.9 serviceability 
factor is applied. 
1. IISS Military Balance 1979-80. 
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U. Western long-range theatre nuclear weapons presumably included in 
Marshal Ustinov's total of 1,500 
(see paragraph 9 of explanatory memorandum) 
SLBM 
United States Poseidon warheads assigned to SACEUR 
United Kingdom Polaris 4 X 16 
French M-20 4 x 16 
French SSBS-2 18 x 1 
United Kingdom Vulcan 48 X 4 
United Kingdom Buccaneer 50 X 2 
United States FB-lll 66 x 4 
French Mirage IV 40 X 4 
IRBM 
Aircraft 
(possibly United States F-UI E/F 156 x 3 
Carrier-borne aircraft 
United States 5 carriers (out of 7 in 2nd and 6th fleets) 
Total warheads 
400 
64 
64 
18 
192 
lOO 
264 
160 
468) 
A-6 aircraft 50 X 3 150 
A-7 aircraft 240 X 1 240 
Total: 1,652 
(Total including United States F-lll EJF: 2,080) 
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Document 827 
Amendment 1 
New weapons and defence strategy 
AMENDMENT 1 1 
tabled by Mr. Cook 
4th December 1979 
l. In draft recommandation I, leave out sub-paragraphs (a), (b) and (c) of paragraph 1 of the 
draft recommandation proper and insert : 
"(a) by calling on the Soviet Union to agree to an immediate eighteen months' moratorium on 
the deployment of further SS-20 missiles ; 
(b) in the event of the _Soviet Union agreeing to such a moratorium, by postponing for its 
duration the decision on procurement of the 572 medium-range weapons which NATO 
plans to deploy in Europe ; 
(c) by seeking within that period agreement on significant reductions in present numbers of 
Soviet medium-range nuclear weapons ; 
(d) by deciding forthwith to investigate seriously, on the expiry of the eighteen-month mora-
torium and in the light of the military and political situation which will then prevail, the 
need to procure and station a number of medium-range nuclear weapons which NATO 
in tends to deploy in Europe ; ". 
Signed : Cook 
1. See 13th Sitting, 5th December 1979 (Amendment negatived). 
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Document 828 4th Decemher 1979 
Events in Iran 
MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION 
tabled by Mr. Adriaensens and others 
The Assembly of Western European Union, 
Deeply moved and concerned by present events in Iran and by the fact that United States 
diplomatie officiais have been taken hostage, which action is clearly contrary to the universally-
accepted standards of diplomatie relations which have always been applied, 
URGES the highest responsible authorities in Iran to free immediately the American citizens 
now detained in the United States Embassy in Tehran. 
Signed: Adriaensens, Bennett, Gessner, Grieve, Hanin, von Hassel, Hawkins, Jung, Lambiotte, 
Michel, Pecoraro Peeters, Reay, Roberti, Sihiiuble, Tanghe, V alleix, Van der Elst, van W aterschoot, 
Wilkinson, V oogd 
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Document 829 
The Assembly, 
The situation in Iran 
MOTION FOR A RECOMMENDATION 
tabled by Mr. Valleix and others 
with a request for urgent procedure 
4th December 1979 
Considering that the continued detention of members of the United States Embassy in Tehran 
constitutes an unacceptable violation of international law and a dangerous precedent for the main-
tenance of peace ; 
Considering that the grave economie and strategie consequences which the events now occurring 
. in Iran could entail for European security ; 
Regretting that the Council has not felt it appropriate to meet urgently in conformity with 
paragraph 3 of Article VIII of the modified Brussels Treaty to discuss the situation thus created ; 
Aware that the members of the Permanent Council find themselves together in Paris during 
the sessioll8 of the Assembly, 
REOOMMENDS, TBAT THE COUNOIL 
l. Hold an urgent meeting : 
(a) to consider the mea<Jures that member countries of WEU should take in common to con-
tribute actively to the search for a solution in conformity with international law; 
(b) to define, if necessary, suitable action to ensure European security and maintain peace in 
case of worsening of the contlict ; 
2. Report to the Assembly the resulta of this meeting before the end of the present session. 
Signed: Valleix, Pecorar'o, Roberti, Treu, Be"ier, Jessel, van Waterschoot, Kershaw, Grant, Smith, 
Stainton, Wilkinson 
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Document 830 
The Assembly 
The situation in Iran 
DRAFT RECOMMENDA TION 1 
submitted on behalf of 
the General Affairs Committee 2 
by Mr. Grieve, Rapporteur 
5th December 1979 
Considering that the detention of members of the United States Embassy in Tehran constitutes 
an unacceptable violation of international law and a dangerous precedent for the maintenance of 
peace; 
Expressing its deep sympathy and solidarity with the government and people of the United 
States in the emergency thus created ; 
Considering the grave economie and strategie consequences which the events now occurring in 
Iran could entail for European security ; 
, . , Noting that the heads <»:"~a.t&. and government of t~...member states, me~ing in Dublin in 
thé framework of the European Council on 29th and 30th November, issued a. statement concerning 
t •. M,~~tion in Iran, c'«<.;,-).<"'"". ~.lW ... ~~' -
·' 
RECOMMENDS TO THE ÜOUNOIL 
1. That it draw urgently to the attention of the governments of the member states the Ass~-
bly's support for the European Council's declaration; ' 
__ _..-
2. That consultations should take place either. within the framework of the WEU Council~, 
where more appropriate, through the participation of its members in European political CQo.operation 
among the Nine to determine action on this problem. 
1. Adopted in Committee by 15 votes to 0 with 1 abs-
'tention. 
2. Members of the Committee : Mrs. von Bothmer 
(Chairman) ; MM. Sarti (Alternate : Treu), Portheine 
(Vice-Chairmen) ; Mr. Ariosto, Sir Frederic Bennett, 
MM. Berrier, Brugnon, Deschamps, Druon (Alternate 
Vallm), Faulds, Ge88ner, Gonella (Alternate : Peooraro), 
PRINTED IN FRANCE 
Hanin, Mangelschots (Alternate: van Watersohoot), Lord 
MoNair, MM. Mende, Mmnocci, Mommersteeg, Müller, 
Péridier, Perin, Lord Beay, MM. Reddemann, Segre 
(Alternate : OoraUo), ThOS!lj Urwin, Voogd. 
N.B. The names of those taking part in the vote are 
printed in italios. 
9 
STRASBOURG 
